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Introduction and Outline 
 
This book employs ethnography for the analysis of emerging soft coastal protection 
practices in Aotearoa New Zealand1. My goal is to understand coastal protection pro-
jects as situated, material practices of making coastal natures that are meaningful in a 
specific cultural, social and political context. In the limited space of the coast, erosion 
emerges as a sociomaterial phenomenon that is neither fully attributable to a natural 
sphere outside human influence, nor to human actions, values and perception alone. In 
this book, I develop a take on coastal natures as naturecultures (Haraway 2008; Choy et 
al. 2009; de la Cadena and Weiss 2010) while I analyse exemplary practices of soft 
coastal protection situated in Aotearoa New Zealand. Drawing upon a formulation I en-
countered in the field (Trade Publications Ltd 2003), I argue that the discourses and 
practices emerging beyond hard coastal protection can be understood as a new “soci-
otechnical imaginary” (Jasanoff and Kim 2009; 2013; 2015). This imaginary provides a 
shared vision about the common future that is framed as ‘working with nature’ (and not 
against it).  
The importance of the topic itself is by no means limited to Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Significant problems with coastal erosion are experienced on coastlines worldwide and 
bound to be aggravated by the effects of climate change as well as coastal change, in-
cluding residential development and increasing concentration of the world’s population 
in coastal areas (McGrahanan et al. 2007; Nicholls et al. 2007; Church et al. 2013; 
Wong et al. 2014). At the same time, a growing community of coastal management ex-
perts argues against the widespread use of coastal protection structures like seawalls, 
groynes or revetments which are common ways of protecting public and private assets 
against erosion and flooding. They suggest that instead and wherever possible, so-called 
soft approaches should be preferred. A conglomerate of ideas and practices is emerging 
                                                
 
1  Here and in the following, I will use a composite for the name of the country in both official lan-
guages: New Zealand in English language, and Aotearoa in native Te Reo Māori. After its use was 
discouraged throughout the 20th century, Te Reo Māori has undergone a massive revitalisation in re-
cent decades, and was declared an official language (besides English and New Zealand sign language) 
with the Māori Language Act in 1987 (Ministry for Culture and Heritage: 2013b). A number of insti-
tutions now refer to Aotearoa New Zealand (with or without separating the two terms by a slash), in-
cluding the Green Party, most churches, and the Association of Social Anthropologists of Aotea-
roa/New Zealand (ASAA/NZ). 
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in relation to soft coastal protection, including the restoration of natural barriers, the ad-
aptation of human uses of the coast (including retreat from the shoreline), and soft engi-
neering options like beach renourishment or artificial reefs. Widespread discussions 
around the notion of the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Johnson et al. 
2014; Sayre 2012) are likely to accelerate this rethinking of coastal protection policies 
currently happening around the globe. Chapter 1 discusses examples for recent devel-
opments in coastal management and engineering along the binary of soft and hard 
measures that is constantly reproduced in this field. The framing of soft protection as 
‘working with nature’ is shown to be entangled with normative questions as well: what 
is the right coastal management for the Anthropocene? How to deal with the threats of 
eroding coastlines in the light of climate change and ongoing coastal development 
booms worldwide emerges as a sociotechnical question, and to tackle it means engaging 
in the politics of nature. 
In Chapter 2 I develop my take on natural-cultural imaginaries and practices of na-
ture-making that I see realized in the projects I encountered during my fieldwork in Ao-
tearoa New Zealand. I argue for a refined attention to the role of more-than-human prac-
tices and material forces and introduce the main aim of the book: to show how coastal 
protection practices are engaging in the production of natural and cultural orders. To 
this end, I followed the practices of a loosely defined community of practice (Wenger 
1998) consisting of restoration volunteers, coastal management practitioners, scientists 
and others, who promote the use of soft coastal protection measures in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. In Chapter 3 I provide a description of my research design and problematize 
the concept of the field site for doing multi-sited research on coastal protection. I elabo-
rate on conceptual collaborations with coastal management experts, and the challenges 
of bringing ethnographic work back to the field by discussing the concepts of para-
ethnography and the para-site (Holmes/Marcus 2008). Chapter 3 also puts the beach and 
coast into the context of Aotearoa New Zealand’s historical and contemporary political 
landscape. I discuss the role of the beach “bach” myth and the family campsite in the 
national imaginary, and the perceived threat to iconic landscapes posed by the ongoing 
coastal boom. In relation to the contested space of the foreshore and seabed, I show how 
coastal conflicts reveal deep-seating anxieties over the future of the bi-cultural nation.  
While Aotearoa New Zealand’s coastlines remain relatively sparsely populated com-
pared to many other coastal nations, coastal hazard risk is growing, as increasing devel-
opment of coastal areas factors in with the anticipated effects of climate change. Coast-
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lines that feature accessible sandy beaches are mostly characterized by “traditional ‘new 
world’ low density individual dwelling subdivisional development” (Healy and 
Soomere 2008: 456). However, many of these settlements (for example in the North Is-
land’s Bay of Plenty, but also on the Coromandel Peninsula and other places) were lo-
cated very close to the shoreline when they were first developed during the second half 
of the 20th century (Blackett et al. 2010). It was common practice to level the foredunes 
with bulldozers to allow houses to be built directly bordering the beach, offering unim-
peded sea views. The limited space between private properties, the public space of the 
beach and the ocean means, according to coastal scientists from the National Institute of 
Water and Atmosphere (NIWA), that “communities and coastal margins in many locali-
ties are on a slow, but sure, collision course” (Bell et al. 2001: 12).  
About a quarter of Aotearoa New Zealand coasts are subject to coastal erosion (De 
Lange 2012), and where seaside developments are impacted, the preferred answer is 
usually the construction of (hard) coastal protection structures (Pilkey and Hume 2001). 
Such approaches however have come under critique for their negative effects on sandy 
beaches, ranging from aesthetic impact to the complete loss of high tide beaches (see 
Chapter 1). Mike Jacobson, a government commissioned coastal hazard management 
expert (Jacobson 2004a/b), argues that seawalls threaten to destroy a coastal nature of 
nation-building character: 
Coastal hazards, property protection works and coastline natural character are inti-
mately connected in a story that goes to the heart of a Kiwi icon – holidays at the 
beach, the beach bach, and generally the important part that the coast plays in 
growing up as a Kiwi. Unfortunately, it is a story that has yet to take root in the na-
tional psyche in the same way as the stories related to New Zealand‘s native forests 
or endangered species. It is a story that needs to be adopted and acted on by com-
munities before development (and the seawalls built to protect that development) 
‘kill the golden goose’. The important place of natural beaches and dunes in the 
lives of most Kiwis is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. (Jacobson 2005: 6) 
 
Recent developments in New Zealand‘s national coastal policy are also evidence to a 
longer-term trend of policy-making that aims to move beyond hard-protection structures 
(Department of Conservation 1994; 2010).2 Orrin Pilkey and Terry Hume, two coastal 
                                                
 
2  The current 2010 New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS), issued by the Department of Con-
servation (DOC) under the Resource Management Act (RMA) is a binding reference for regional-
level coastal policy-making. Policy 25 requires to “discourage hard protection structures and promote 
the use of alternatives to them, including natural defences” (Department of Conservation 2010: 24f.); 
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scientists that have been vocal in criticising hard protection approaches, argue that Ao-
tearoa New Zealand as a relative late-comer in coastal development and hazard protec-
tion law could benefit from the lessons learned elsewhere, in terms of scientific 
knowledge as well as legislation:  
While it is still not easy to solve the erosion problem, we can conclude on a bright 
note. The New Zealand circumstances, our much-improved scientific knowledge of 
coastal processes, and the uptake of this knowledge into coastal hazard and erosion 
management initiatives by regional Councils, mean there should be no excuses for 
not ‘living by the rules of the sea’ and getting it right from now on. (Pilkey and 
Hume 2001: 23) 
 
This statement however reveals a rather linear understanding of how scientific 
knowledge production informs political processes, which does not shed too much light 
on the role of others with vested interests in the politics of coastal nature. Scientists 
from Waikato Regional Council on the North Island of Aotearoa New Zealand have 
tried to investigate “how coastal residents react” towards approaches of what they call 
“living with nature”. Comparing the level of agreement with the statement that “we 
must accept that coastal erosion is a natural process at the coast” with peoples’ prefer-
ences in terms of coastal management options, they found that respondents who favour 
the construction of hard defences are less likely to agree, while those who prefer a “do-
ing nothing” approach towards coastal hazard, perhaps not surprisingly, show higher 
agreement with the statement that coastal erosion should be accepted as a natural pro-
cess. The authors conclude that this phenomenon is partly a result of people’s “day to 
day experience of living at the coast” (Stewart et al. 2011: vi) – something that geo-
graphers Collins and Kearns might call “everyday” or “emotional geographies” (Collins 
and Kearns 2012: 948). On the other hand, they write,  
[t]hese findings perhaps indicate a link between accepting coastal erosion as natu-
ral and being willing to work within a management paradigm of ‘living with natu-
ral processes’ as opposed to ‘taming natural processes’ (Stewart et al. 2011: vi). 
                                                                                   
 
the use of public land for the protection of private property should be prevented in the future. As 
mandatory guidelines, the NZCPS provisions are mirrored on the regional level. New Zealand is di-
vided into 16 regions governed by Regional Councils which are responsible for questions of coastal 
management (besides other aspects of resource management, land use and transport). The Proposed 
Bay of Plenty Regional Policy Statement (Bay of Plenty Regional Council 2013b), for example, in-
cludes policies on “Discouraging hard protection structures” for areas potentially affected by coastal 
hazards over at least the next 100 years (Policy CE 10XB), on “Avoiding inappropriate hard protec-
tion structures in the coastal environment” (Policy CE 11B) and for “Protecting and restoring natural 
coastal margins” (Policy CE 4A). 
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 This mirrors my own initial fieldwork experience, where I encountered a small 
number of coastal experts who put much effort into spreading the message of sustaina-
ble coastal management through public lectures, workshops, and the media. Often, these 
pioneers were “preaching to the converted”, as a listener put it after a public lecture en-
titled “The BOP Coast in 2050: How Today’s Decisions Will Affect Our Grandchil-
dren’s Future” held in Tauranga in March 2010 (Fieldnotes March 2010). The speaker, 
who worked for a consultancy and a volunteer dune restoration programme, presented 
geomorphological insights into the mechanisms of coastal erosion in the Bay of Plenty, 
spoke about the anticipated effects of climate change and sea-level rise, discussed poli-
cy provisions like hazard lines and sets backs, and finally showed a number of impres-
sive pictures from elsewhere: houses on stilts in Massachusetts and others that had fall-
en off eroding dune scarps into the sea. He did not have the solution himself, the speak-
er declared, “but we have to get our head around this”. He defined adapting to coastal 
hazard as “living with nature”, asking: “is it nature’s problem or ours?”  
His dramaturgy seemed to point strongly to the conclusion that managed retreat, the 
relocation of existing buildings and infrastructure, would be the only viable strategy in 
the long run, but he did not explicate this point. His audience understood his argument 
nonetheless and commented correspondingly. During the question and answer session, a 
man who introduced himself as a volunteer with the community dune restoration pro-
gramme Coast Care and member of the Waihi Beach Environment Society requested, 
“Can you give this talk at Waihi Beach?”. Everybody in the room knew where he was 
coming from: a small coastal settlement at the fringes of the Bay of Plenty that has be-
come the scene of a decade-long conflict over the use of hard coastal protection 
measures. My analysis of the Waihi Beach case in Chapter 4 and 5 will serve as the 
opening for the empirical parts of the book. Since I worked simultaneously on/in several 
field sites, starting the narrative with the Waihi Beach case is a dramaturgical decision, 
taken because it allows me to show how the sociotechnical imaginary of ‘working with 
nature’ emerges in the scope of a conflict about hard and soft protection. Controversies 
are useful as entry points because they explicate what usually goes without saying. By 
unwinding a local history of coastal development and coastal protection measures, and 
by analysing the decision-making process for the common future, I show coastal ero-
sion has emerged as a longterm problem. Eventually, a massive seawall protecting mul-
ti-million dollar houses has been built on a public beach, notwithstanding widespread 
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agreement that in the long run, coastal protection should acknowledge and work with 
natural coastal processes 
Chapter 4 provides a short history of the coastal settlement at Waihi Beach and the 
coastal protection works that have been built to protect it. I go back to the beginnings of 
coastal development at Waihi Beach and identify three crucial points in time with wide-
ranging consequences for today’s situation. I unravel an (unsuccessful) Environment 
Court appeal lodged by local residents opposing the unpopular coastal protection 
scheme, which was proposed by the local Council and backed by beachfront residents. 
Following the conflict into the courtroom and drawing from court proceedings, witness 
statements and other material, I observe how the case was decided by the judge as a 
question of science, not politics.  
Chapter 5 broadens the perspective towards the socio-technical and political future of 
the Waihi Beach protection scheme, looking beyond the preliminary closure of the con-
flict after construction of the seawall. Picking up on the idea of the coproduction of so-
cial and natural orders, I focus on the political repercussions of the conflict, including 
changing understandings of what it means to be a community for the locals, including 
tangata whenua (local Māori). The chapter zooms in on the role that the materiality of 
the seawall itself might play in the coastal policy arena in the near future. Can Waihi 
Beach serve as a last example of its kind before the tides will eventually turn against 
hard protection measures? 
The second empirical part (Part III of the book) focuses on practices of caring for the 
coast, or ‘making coastal naturecultures’. Spanning from the use of dune plants as a 
means of do-it-yourself coastal protection to the development of large-scale soft-
engineering technologies, Part III engages with exemplary cases of soft coastal protec-
tion. The chapters show how the socio-technical imaginary to ‘work with nature’, as 
well as specific coastal naturecultures, are coproduced in the process. With the current 
move beyond hard protection advocated by a growing number of coastal experts in the 
country, the dunes are receiving more and more attention as a central feature of natural 
coastal protection, and their widespread modification is now increasingly considered a 
historical mistake. The majority of dune restoration projects in Aotearoa New Zealand 
are carried out by organized volunteers. Chapter 6 introduces the country’s first and to-
day largest volunteer dune restoration programme Coast Care Bay of Plenty (BOP) and 
describes its shared practices of planting, weeding and pest control, which are all part of 
what could be called maintenance work in the dunes. Chapter 7 looks at ‘working with 
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nature’ by zooming in on the meaning of work and community. I analyse a large-scale 
dune restoration project in suburban Papamoa Beach, where Coast Care collaborates 
with the local authorities to tackle private gardens that have been extended into the dune 
reserve. This anti encroachment project uses dune restoration to reclaim the dune as 
public space. The project becomes possible only by harnessing the workforce of interna-
tional volunteers, school classes and people on periodic detention serving community 
labour hours. I discuss the complex economies of Coast Care work, the diversity of vol-
unteers’ motivations, and show how a continuum of paid and unpaid, voluntary and in-
voluntary work is emerging through practices of caring for coastal naturecultures. 
Chapter 8 focuses on examples where dune restoration is explicitly used as a means 
of natural coastal protection, in the scope of Coast Care projects and also beyond. Serv-
ing as low cost ‘do-it-yourself’ protection, dune restoration and dune-scraping tech-
niques build upon people accepting erosion as a natural process. Instead of settling 
things once and for all, these soft measures require ongoing human maintenance work, 
including the replacement of “sacrificial plants” washed away in returning storms. The 
chapter shows how people’s enthusiasm for Coast Care is used by dune management 
experts to promote soft approaches in general, and addresses the connection between 
dune restoration and climate change politics.  
Chapter 9 addresses once again the question “which nature(s)?”, but more specifical-
ly aims to unwind the role of native nature as a concept that drives dune restoration 
practices as they are embedded into the naturecultural assemblages of postcolonial Ao-
tearoa New Zealand. Erosion control remains a central goal of Coast Care, though many 
projects increasingly focus on coastal protection in a different sense: the protection, 
preservation and reconstruction of native coastal nature. The contemporary renaissance 
of native nature and culture in Aotearoa New Zealand, spanning across biodiversity 
conservation and bicultural politics, forms a backdrop against which the ‘working with 
nature’ imaginary currently fuels coastal restoration practices. This reconstruction of an 
imagined New Zealand coastal nature is another example for the coproduction of natu-
ral and cultural order. Restoration practice emerges as a way of translating the ongoing 
self-reflection about the country’s bicultural past, present, and future into practices of 
nature. What is at stake here is the distinctiveness of Aotearoa New Zealand’s na-
tureculture, that is at least partly expressed through the native plants and the coastal 
landscapes they inhabit. 
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Chapter 10 broadens the scope of caring for the coast to multipurpose reefs, a so-
called soft engineering technology used for coastal protection, but also to enhance ma-
rine biodiversity and surfing conditions. The chapter focuses on fieldwork conducted at 
ASR, a former New Zealand-based company which developed artificial reefs for multi-
ple uses. It deals with this high-tech intervention whose merits are argued on basis of its 
innovative and science-based character, and which has been promoted by ASR as an 
approach to coastal protection working “in concert with nature”. The chapter illustrates 
the integral role that coastal science and surfing as well as the dream of artificial surf 
breaks have played for this technology in order to work technically, socially and eco-
nomically and discusses how the approach has been framed as soft and multifunctional. 
In the conclusion, I discuss how these different practices of ‘working with nature’ 
coproduce specific understandings of coastal nature and culture for the Aotearoa New 
Zealand context. I finally argue that practices claiming to ‘work with nature’ can be un-
derstood as strategic attempts to naturalize nature by less powerful actors. Against the 
backdrop of the increasing popularity of concepts that claim to enhance nature or use it 
as (green) infrastructure (Carse 2012), however, I call for a close ethnographic look at 
such practices. What natures are actually made by whom, and to whose benefit remains 
a contested political question that cannot be answered by simply referring to a singular, 
universal concept of nature. Instead, the theoretical challenge of thinking multiple na-
tures makes it possible to analyse coastal protection and other practices as a politics of 
nature. 
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Part I:  
Introducing Ethnography to  
Coastal Naturecultures 
 
 
 
 
1.    Working with Nature, Working with Water:  
    A Globalized Imaginary 
“It is quite easy to make a compelling large-scale strategic case 
against the construction of coastal defences. (Those still arguing 
for defences are clearly swimming against the tide in regard to 
the sustainability ethos and concerns about sea-level rise and 
increased storminess.)” (Cooper and McKenna 2008a: 304) 
 
 
This chapter explores recent trends in coastal management and engineering worldwide, 
characterized by various actors as ‘working with nature’ approaches or described with 
similar expressions. The chapter critically reviews some of these concepts and also col-
lects some first pieces of evidence for the entanglement of epistemology with normative 
questions. There is a larger question addressed throughout the field by a variety of ac-
tors with possibly conflicting agendas – what is good, desirable, sustainable coastal pro-
tection? 
The popularity of approaches that speak to the idea (or imaginary, see Chapter 2) to 
‘work with nature’ in coastal protection and flood risk management is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Related concepts, however, already circulate and travel through many 
contexts, especially in Europe, where they have gained political currency in recent 
years. From current EU flood risk management policy including the EU Floods Di-
rective 2007/60/EC and the Recommendation on Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
(European Parliament and Council 2002; 2007) to the British Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs’ initiative for “Making space for Water” (Defra 2005), or 
the Dutch “Building with Nature” program (De Vriend and Van Koningsveld 2012), 
ideas like the construction of retention areas for rivers, limitations for structural coastal 
protection measures, or the recreation of coastal marshlands through managed realign-
ment (Ledoux et al. 2005; French 2006; Rupp-Armstrong and Nicholls 2007; Early 
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2008) are increasingly in demand. In relation to riverine flood risk, recurring flooding 
events in the UK (Moss 2014) feed into discussions about managed realignment and the 
abandonment of protection structures, while in Germany discussions about natural or 
ecological versus technical flood risk management regularly reappear (Kuhlicke et al. 
2013). The British Sand Dune and Shingle Network, an organization for the protection 
of coastal habitats and member of the European Dune Network that traditionally focuses 
on the biodiversity aspect of coastal landscapes, states in its newsletter that 
“[i]ncreasingly our work is addressing the ‘flood risk management’ function of these 
habitats” (Sand Dunes and Shingle Network 2013: 1). And in regard to managed retreat, 
Catherine Early observes that in the UK context, “[…] recent years have seen govern-
ment policy on coastal erosion and flood risk moving away from the traditional stance 
of maintaining hard defences towards working with nature” (Early 2008: 36). 
Ironically, it is the challenging prospect of anthropogenic climate change and sea 
level rise that seems to have triggered a rethinking of coastal protection policies from 
many sides. In a 2010 Nature Reports article under the title “Working with water”, Ma-
son Inman states that “[n]ations threatened by sea level rise are starting to look at how 
they can work with nature to defend their coastlines” (Inman 2010: 39). The article 
mostly draws on the example of the Netherlands and declares that the country – known 
for centuries of experience with coastal protection – is now, under the impression of ris-
ing sea levels, “pioneering a soft approach to self-defence” (ibid).  
However, the issue can be controversial. Referring to the substantial loss of (unde-
veloped) land on the southern tip of Germany’s most prominent island of Sylt, the 
Schleswig-Holstein Minister for Energy Transition, Agriculture, Environment and Rural 
Areas and member of the Green Party, Robert Habeck, declared that  
 
[t]he function of coastal protection is to protect human life and not to stop all natu-
ral coastal processes. The Hörnum Odde area has always been subject to change. 
The Bundesland, federal and EU budgets can only be used to protect humans 
against storm tides. (Pfeifer 2014, translation FG) 
 
This comment, a reply to local residents who argued for the expansion of protection 
measures, pits coastal processes and coastal protection against one another, which in-
vites us to take a step back and ask a very fundamental question: what actually is coastal 
protection? Cooper and McKenna have argued that the ambiguity of the term is the crux 
for understanding social and political struggles over coastal protection issues: 
  19 
 
The term ‘coastal protection’ means different things to different people. To the 
ecologist it may mean enabling coastal ecosystems to function naturally while to 
the engineer it means constructing something to halt coastal erosion and protect 
property. To the environmentalist it might mean letting nature take its course, ena-
bling ecosystems to function while to the coastal landowner it means protecting 
property. This diversity of views, coupled with the overwhelmingly positive con-
notations of the term ‘protection’, means that it is easy to gain agreement that 
‘coastal protection’ is desirable and necessary. Who could argue against protecting 
the coast when the opposite must imply damage or degradation? (Cooper and 
McKenna 2008b: 315)  
 
These different meanings, Cooper and McKenna argue, entail a great potential for con-
flict: it is difficult to define a common understanding of the term, and different interpre-
tations imply different priorities and decisions that need to be taken. The most common 
understanding of coastal protection, however, remains in the sense of “protection of 
coastal assets against erosion or flooding” (Fröhle and Kohlhase 2004, quoted from 
Cooper and McKenna 2008b: 315).  
Coastal protection is of course only one potential step that can be taken in the light of 
coastal hazards; most commentators from academia and the policy world categorize the 
possible approaches along the lines of protection, retreat, or accommodation. This defi-
nition dates back to a 1990 IPCC report (IPCC Response Strategies Working Group 
1990). Under these three basic rubrics, the UNFCCC groups a larger number of “tech-
nologies for climate change adaptation in coastal zones” (UNFCCC 2006: 13). Retreat 
entails instruments like relocation of existing buildings, coastal setbacks to prevent new 
development, or so-called rolling easements. The latter approach aims to allow the 
gradual landward migration of coastal ecosystems under the conditions of rising sealev-
els (Titus 2011). Accommodation includes insurance schemes and technical solutions 
such as relocatable buildings or houses put on stilts.  
Protection approaches work in a fundamentally different way. Their focus is not on 
managing human uses of the coast, but on the attempt to intervene in coastal processes 
(Turbott 2006: 6). The term protection is again applied to a number of different ap-
proaches that are commonly distinguished as “hard” and “soft”. The UNFCCC, for ex-
ample, defines the protection option as follows: 
For protection, the most visibly reassuring option may be to build hard structures 
such as sea-walls. But apart from being very expensive these can have damaging 
side effects, for example by displacing erosion and sedimentation. It may be better 
therefore to consider soft options that involve restoring dunes or creating or restor-
ing coastal wetlands, or continuing with indigenous approaches such as afforesta-
tion. (UNFCCC 2006: 13)  
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As seen in the quote above, hard protection measures are criticized for a number of rea-
sons. Seawalls – structures that are built parallel to the shore to prevent erosion and 
coastal flooding – are especially effective in protecting the land behind the structure, but 
do not stop ongoing erosion in front of the structure (Dean and Dalrymple 2004: 404f.). 
This can cause an effect called “coastal squeeze”: the loss of accessible high-tide beach-
es. Because seawalls can aggravate coastal erosion at the endpoint of the structure and 
change the sediment dynamics of adjacent areas, the construction of such defences often 
leads to a gradual armouring of long stretches of coast, sometimes referred to as “New 
Jerseyization” (Pilkey 1998: 13f.). As Cooper and McKenna put it, “[t]he ultimate man-
ifestation of this approach is the replacement of all sandy coasts with hard defences” 
(Cooper and McKenna 2008a: 301).  
Furthermore, seawalls are usually not removable; once built their maintenance caus-
es financial obligations for future generations. Other negative effects noted in the litera-
ture include their possible contribution to a false sense of security for property owners. 
This is especially problematic in sparsely populated coastal locations which are subject 
to increasing hazard risk, but where hard protection might cause disproportionate nega-
tive effects (Arnell and Chatterton 2007: 366). 
On the other hand, “soft” protection is regularly mentioned in definitions, reports, 
plans and policy documents, though the term is often introduced without much of a def-
inition. Generally, the distinction that is being made between “hard” and “soft” has be-
come ubiquitous in the context of coastal protection policy and practice. People reason-
ing about and arguing for or against particular ways of defending the coastline (or not) 
continuously (re)produce a dualistic distinction between hard and soft that merits a 
closer analytical look. In relation to the proliferation of term “soft”, it seems as if only 
the relatively recent introduction of the term “soft” into coastal protection debates1 im-
plicated the demarcation of its opposite: hard being defined as what is undesirable be-
cause it is not soft. It often remains implicit which qualities of actual coastal protection 
measures are taken into account in order to measure the softness or hardness of the ap-
proach. Is the material – stones, concrete, metal versus sand, vegetation, brushwood – 
the defining factor? Or is it the procedure, the scale of invasiveness or the outcomes of 
                                                
 
1  In the context of river restoration, the term „soft approaches“ has been used at least since the late 
1970s. Thanks to Jan Scheve for this comment. 
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the intervention? Furthermore, whenever the distinction between hard and soft measures 
is made explicit, a normative dimension resonates as well. Just as much as it seems in-
appropriate to argue against “protection” (see above), softness and the accompanying 
implications of managing, flexibility, and adaptive capacities seem to fit much better 
with contemporary concepts of social organization when compared to the rigidity of 
hard structures, the worldview of an “engineering perspective” (Cooper and McKenna 
2008b: 316), coastal armouring and “holding the line”2. A coastal engineer who works 
for a soft engineering company explains this along with his thoughts on gendered re-
presentations of nature: 
 
[T]here is something very visceral and human about building a big fuck-off seawall 
or a big massive something that’s gonna stop this other big massive something [the 
sea] that’s coming in with seemingly Armageddon like power. So for your own 
property, I can completely understand why something is... I mean, I’m sure there’s 
some psychological male/female thing going on too; it’s sort of like the [artificial] 
reefs are seen as [a soft measure]. I mean they’re called hard and soft structures, I 
mean. [The reefs are soft because] sediment moves and it changes and it’s more, 
it’s pliable, the whole... it forms and changes around. (Interview with Tommy 
Hamilton, ASR) 
 
Cooper and McKenna argue that while “the concept of ‘working with natural processes’ 
has wide currency in coastal zone management”, a considerable range of visions and in-
terpretations are in fact subsumed under this heading (Cooper and McKenna 2008b: 
317). They arrange different understandings along an axis between what they respec-
tively call the engineering and ecosystems perspectives (Cooper and McKenna 2008b, 
18). 
Only those measures on the latter end of the spectrum, they argue, truly allow suffi-
cient space for natural processes to operate. Interestingly, Cooper and McKenna see 
beach nourishment – a typical example often given for soft engineering approaches – as 
just another, though more indirect way, of fighting nature. They criticize the ongoing 
maintenance required for the technique to work: 
[W]hile nourishment strategies do factor in the subsequent operation of morphody-
namic processes on the nourished material, it is disingenuous to claim that these 
processes are allowed to operate in a natural way (after all, natural waves still con-
                                                
 
2  In relation to this point, see for example Emily Martin’s (1994) seminal study on how the social and 
political currency of the concept of flexibility structures contemporary interpretations of the body and 
the immune system.  
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tinue to operate on a seawall). Human interference with the natural system is simp-
ly done in a more subtle way. While on the face of it nourishment may seem less 
damaging than construction of a seawall, it involves a similar open-ended com-
mitment to an engineered process designed to fight nature. (Cooper and McKenna 
2008b: 329) 
 
Cooper and McKenna discuss the conditions under which a considerable shift towards 
“working with natural processes” could be accomplished in coastal protection. They be-
lieve that “a vigorous campaign of education” (Cooper and McKenna 2008b: 337) is 
needed to address problems in what they call “the perceptual domain” (ibid). This de-
mand refers on the one hand to the inconsistence of definitions described above, and on 
the other hand to what the authors perceive as a necessary “fundamental change in atti-
tude from the prevailing view of coastal erosion as a problem” (ibid) towards an under-
standing of coastal erosion as a natural process (see Chapter 8.1). Cooper and McKenna 
perceive a number of obstacles in the political and social domains, especially in relation 
to existing land management systems and administrative boundaries. While legislative 
changes are conceivable in principle, they are complicated by the political influence of 
coastal property owners. Additionally, the authors observe more latent levels of mean-
ing attached to the seemingly technical questions of coastal protection: 
 
There is also an emotive element attached to individuals losing property. In part 
this is responsible for the traditional view of the sea and the erosion it causes as an 
enemy. This prevailing ‘protection’ paradigm is a traditional one which has proved 
resilient in the face of several decades of modern environmentalism. The language 
used is redolent of war against a ruthless enemy remorselessly attacking a treasured 
birthright. The words ‘coastal erosion’ are routinely followed by the word ‘prob-
lem’. It is little surprise that those wedded to such a view have fundamental prob-
lems with the concept of allowing natural processes to function without interfer-
ence. (Cooper and McKenna 2008b: 328)  
 
This view is echoed by Collins and Kearns (2012), who recommend that emotional dis-
courses are taken more seriously in the analysis of conflicts over coastal natures. Their 
discussion grounds on an empirical case of local resistance against coastal development 
on a sand spit in northern Aotearoa New Zealand. While theirs is not a conflict over 
coastal protection decisions (or not yet, one could argue – see Chapter 4 and 5), they 
trace emotional dimensions of “everyday geographies of the coast” (Collins and Kearns 
2012: 948) as an important backdrop against which such conflicts develop. This can be 
easily translated into the realm of coastal hazards and coastal protection as well, as will 
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be shown in the scope of Part II that deals with the decades of political and legal con-
flict provoked by the construction of a hard protection scheme.  
With these considerations in mind, I would like to screen a few more examples of 
‘working with nature’ discourses before I focus on the situation in Aotearoa New Zea-
land more specifically. The reason for me to follow such an order of things already 
points to the methodological questions that will be raised in the following chapter. I no-
ticed the significance of the ‘working with nature’ theme at different points throughout 
the research, and research partners pointed me to some of the examples I discuss. At the 
beginning, I was framing my research interest in my own words as looking for ap-
proaches going ‘beyond hard protection’. In this context, I encountered the discourse 
about ‘soft protection’; the expression ‘working with nature’ came to my attention at a 
later point.  
I soon realized that the discourse was by no means limited to the Aotearoa New Zea-
land context. One of the examples I was made aware of by an interview partner is the 
EU-funded research project EUROSION, which set out to investigate ways of “living 
with coastal erosion” (Eurosion 2004). The EUROSION report centres on the idea that 
coastal erosion is becoming a problem only because it interferes with human uses of the 
coast. Instead of locally addressing the problem with hard protection, risking “a domino 
effect of hard constructions” (Eurosion 2004: 23), the report recommends rethinking 
coastal management along the concept of the “sediment cell”, a spatially defined area 
within which sediment (sand) is redistributed over time3. In order to prevent coastal ero-
sion from becoming a problem, it is necessary to keep the total amount of sediment 
within the coastal system: 
Therefore, fixing of sediments (due to hard constructions) is less favourable than 
using measures that disturb the natural processes to a lesser extent or measures 
which even make use of the natural processes, for example beach and foreshore 
nourishments. The latter choice is called ‘working with nature’. (Eurosion 2004: 
23) 
 
                                                
 
3  Time is also the limiting factor of the sediment cell concept, because over long time frames, the ex-
change between what has been defined as separate sediment cells might become non negligible (Euro-
sion 2004: 23). Another problematic point is the inability of the concept to grasp land-based processes 
that influence erosion and accretion, e.g. changes in the sediment transport of rivers discharging into 
the sea (ibid).  
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The report further recommends to prioritize interventions and to “try to work with natu-
ral processes or leave natural processes as undisturbed as possible. If no other options 
available, use hard constructions to keep sediments in its position.” (Eurosion 2004: 23) 
The best results until now, the authors conclude from their review of existing schemes, 
have been achieved by combining different types of coastal protection, including hard 
and soft solutions (ibid).  
Also focusing on the situation in Europe, the Nature Reports article introduced above 
explains that what is called ecological engineering “encompasses a variety of approach-
es for working with nature rather than confronting nature’s forces head on” (Inman 
2010: 39). Inman quotes a professor from Wageningen University who speaks about the 
new guidelines of the Delta Commission (the body responsible for coastal protection 
decisions in the Netherlands) as having “changed the philosophy completely” (ibid). 
Under the public-private ‘Building with Nature’ initiative (De Vriend and Van Kon-
ingsveld 2012), large-scale beach renourishment projects aim not only to keep the cur-
rent position of the coastline, but also to add an additional buffer of one or two kilome-
tres to the beach. Dune vegetation could then be established as a means of stabilization; 
Richard Klein from the Stockholm Environment Institute is quoted stating this would 
“certainly be the first time that natural coastal processes would be used to protect urban 
areas” (Inman 2010: 40).  
‘Building with Nature’ was started in 2008 by a Dutch public-private research con-
sortium called Ecoshape. Variously referred to as an “innovation program”, a “philoso-
phy”, and a “paradigm shift”, ‘Building with Nature’ also aspires to think big. The web-
site introduces the program as follows:  
The Building with Nature innovation program is committed to the integration of in-
frastructure, nature and society in new or alternative forms of engineering that meet 
the global need for intelligent and sustainable solutions. (Ecoshape 2012) 
 
Van Koningsfeld and Van Raalte elaborate on the approach in a 2012 conference paper 
on how this approach meets the challenges of urbanisation and economic development 
under the conditions of a changing climate, all of which  
 
demand an innovative approach to hydraulic engineering that aligns the interests of 
economic development with care for the environment. Building with Nature re-
sponds to this demand: working with natural systems in such a way that meets the 
need for infrastructure while creating opportunities for nature. (Van Koningsfeld 
and Van Raalte 2011) 
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They establish that ‘Building with Nature’ essentially means that “surface water infra-
structure development works with nature rather than against it” (De Vriend and Van 
Koningsveld 2012: 1). The authors argue that early infrastructure projects have been re-
alized without taking the environment into account – neither negative effects, nor the 
potential usefulness of natural processes from the project point of view. This they call 
“building instead of nature”. Following this, they observe “a paradigm shift” leading 
from subsequent “building in nature”, which has focused on minimising environmental 
impacts, to “building of nature” – mitigation and compensatory measures like the crea-
tion of wetlands, eventually to “building with nature”. The examples given in the 
‘Building with Nature’ image brochure include oyster reefs, “coastal protection for the 
tropes”, the use of mangrove forests, coral reefs and seagrass meadows, and the 
Delfland Sand Engine project. This large-scale sand nourishment project on the South 
Holland coast aims to combine erosion protection with other benefits while limiting the 
ecological impacts (De Vriend and Van Koningsveld 2012: 13f.). Instead of applying 
repeated localized beach nourishments, very large quantities of sand have been deposit-
ed offshore. The sand engine was designed in the expectation that the natural coastal 
processes would distribute the sediment over a time span of 20 years, according to the 
results from geomorphological computer modelling. As such, the project is ‘working 
with nature’ in two senses: creating new spaces for nature (in the sense of providing 
habitats, for example for seals and flatfish) and working with natural coastal processes. 
The ‘Building with Nature’ concept also has a noticeable normative underpinning 
that becomes evident when the authors paraphrase its development as sketched above as 
“[i]n other words: from doing not too bad, via doing no wrong, to doing good” (Van 
Koningsfeld and Van Raalte 2011: 2). In fact, infrastructure project are presented as a 
chance for better natures in an online introduction to the concept: 
Man-made projects are an inherent part of the environment. They provide a unique 
opportunity to induce positive change! (Deltares 2013) 
 
This normative dimension is inextricably linked to questions of knowledge-making, 
technology and governance. The prerequisite for ‘Building with Nature’, Van Konings-
feld and Van Raalte argue, is that “we want more”, “we know more”, and “we can do 
more”: multifunctional designs, increasing scientific knowledge about natural processes 
and how they can be used, as well as technological improvement are employed to pro-
vide “new opportunities for nature development” instead of mere compensation (Van 
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Koningsfeld and Van Raalte 2011: 3). A similar argument of understanding nature 
through science as the backbone of ‘working with nature’ will be discussed in Chapter 
10 in relation to soft engineering.  
PIANC, the World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure, has also 
worked out its own ‘Working with Nature’ strategy, addressing “navigation develop-
ment projects” (PIANC 2011). The position paper with the same title remains remarka-
bly unspecific when it comes to what kinds of actual projects are envisaged by this 
strategy; however, the goal is defined around “understanding the environment” and 
“project proposals/design to benefit navigation and nature” – producing “win-win solu-
tions” (PIANC 2011: 1). The crux is to consider the environment at the beginning of the 
project, and not as something to be resolved after the fact – a kind of mainstreaming 
ecology approach:  
Working with Nature is about more than avoiding or mitigating the environmental 
impacts of a pre-defined design. Rather, it sets out to identify ways of achieving 
the project objectives by working with natural processes to deliver environmental 
protection, restoration or enhancement outcomes. (PIANC 2011: 1) 
 
‘Working with Nature’ is not a small change, the strategy paper asserts, but accounts to 
a “new way of thinking”, which “requires a subtle but important evolution in the way 
we approach project development” (PIANC 2011: 1). This socionatural vision also has a 
coproductive dimension (Jasanoff 2004), because the right governance structures organ-
izing decision-making, and evaluation and monitoring technologies are an essential part 
of the task:  
A transition from a philosophy of ‘control’ to one of ‘management’ is needed and 
the cultural differences between ecologists, civil engineers, planners and politicians 
similarly need to be addressed if ‘Working with Nature’ is to be embraced. 
(PIANC 2011) 
 
One could argue that the changes described in science, technology and politics are mu-
tually dependent or coproduced as a necessary prerequisite for the realization of infra-
structure while ‘working with nature’.  
Looking beyond Europe, the idea to think of nature as infrastructure has also been 
emerging in the US context. The NYS 2100 commission, assembled by the State of 
New York in the aftermath of the 2012 hurricane Sandy, recommended to “[e]ncourage 
the use of green and natural infrastructure” as one of nine crosscutting recommenda-
tions with reference, amongst others, to the Dutch sand engine as a pioneer project 
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(NYS 2100 Commission 2013: 123). The report advocates a mix of hard and soft infra-
structure, includes the recommendation to assess the feasibility of a storm surge barrier 
for the whole New York Harbor area and warns not to overlook the limitations of natu-
ral infrastructure. However, the commission also observes that most of the Manhattan 
areas that were flooded during Sandy “overlap with man-made areas”, or land reclama-
tions, and asks to address the root of the problem: the loss of “many of the Harbor’s 
natural defenses” due to waterfront development, the destruction of wetlands and oyster 
reefs, and the construction of a 100,000-foot-long seawall with deep-water access: 
Over the course of more than 350 years, New Yorkers dramatically reshaped, ex-
panded, hardened, and deepened the waterfront to accommodate an ever expanding 
population and critical maritime commerce. (NYS 2100 Commission 2013: 118) 
 
As an immediate response, the report calls for sand nourishments to repair beaches and 
dune areas, and argues to use material gained from dredging for navigational purposes 
for coastal protection (NYS 2100 Commission 2013: 123f.). As a strategy for the future 
protection of coastal and Great Lakes communities including the New York Harbor ar-
ea, the report speaks of the potential use of “soft infrastructure coastal protection strate-
gies” (NYS 2100 Commission 2013: 118f.). Five main approaches are listed: barrier 
beach and dune systems, tidal wetlands, oyster reefs, natural berms and levees, and so-
called “living shoreline techniques”, defined as the creation of “coastal areas that are 
designed with salt-tolerant plantings, riprap, and other measures to prevent or reduce 
shore erosion and dampen wave energy while emulating the physical and biological 
conditions of naturally occurring, stable shorelines” (NYS 2100 Commission 2013: 
122). The report states that “[n]atural infrastructure has been increasingly recognized 
and promoted among hazard and climate planners and managers” and recommends  
to restore the resilience of the harbor area through a combination of natural shore-
line restoration and hard infrastructure improvements where appropriate. This 
would require the development of a comprehensive strategy comprised of both eco-
logical system restoration and construction of sophisticated engineering projects 
designed to support or mimic natural processes. (NYS 2100 Commission 2013: 
118) 
 
The commission not only expects better mitigation of coastal risks, but also additional 
“co-benefits”: the cleansing and absorption of urban storm water, the overall improve-
ment of water quality, the creation of new habitats and recreational opportunities, cool-
ing effects and in result an improved quality of life for urban residents. The report also 
refers to studies that prove the cost-effectiveness of ‘working with nature’:  
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From an economic standpoint, natural solutions require lower maintenance and 
management costs when compared to traditional built infrastructure. (NYS 2100 
Commission 2013: 120) 
 
The idea of ‘working with nature’ in coastal protection is also promoted by non-
governmental actors like the US-based Nature Conservancy, which suggests looking at 
diverse contexts, from the urban environment of Post-Sandy New York City to envi-
ronmentally degraded coasts beyond the industrialized world. A brochure named “Using 
nature to reduce climate and disaster risk” presents nature as “part of the solution” (The 
Nature Conservancy n.d.: 2). Similar to the NYS 2100 report, the emphasis lies on the 
combination of engineering options and natural defences. One major argument brought 
forward by the NGO is that of cost-effectiveness:  
Compared to the cost and maintenance of engineered or structural flood protection, 
nature’s infrastructure can provide a cost-effective first line of defense against 
storms. (ibid) 
 
Consequently, the organization is trying to assess “how much can nature protect?” 
(ibid), producing quantifiable data on the risk reduction function of coastal ecosystems, 
in order to assess their effectiveness in comparison to seawalls and other structural de-
fences.  
Looking beyond the industrialized world, The Nature Conservancy and the United 
Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) collabo-
rated with the Alliance Development Works to publish a “World Risk Report” in 2012 
(Alliance Development Works 2012). Focusing on environmental degradation and dis-
asters, and containing a World Risk Index developed by UNU-EHS scientists, the report 
illustrates the links between environmental degradation and climate change, poverty and 
disaster risk. Coastal hazards are identified as a major issue: 8 out of 15 countries with 
the highest disaster risk (understood as a function of exposure and social resilience), ac-
cording to the World Risk Index, are island states (Mucke 2012: 9), most of them small, 
developing states in the Pacific with Vanuatu topping the ranking. 
As part of the report, Beck and Shepard discuss coastal habitats in their risk reduc-
tion function (Beck and Shepard 2012). Against the backdrop that coastal and marine 
habitats – especially coral reefs and wetlands – are suffering the greatest damage from 
ongoing coastal development and climate change impacts, they argue that that “conser-
vation and management of coastal habitats can play a key role in reducing coastal haz-
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ards” (Beck and Shepard 2012: 32). Especially mangrove forest and reef restoration are 
mentioned. The authors observe that “[n]atural conservation solutions, so-called ‘green 
solutions’, are gaining ground” and explain this “growing awareness” with increasing 
availability of scientific evidence for the role of ecosystems for coastal protection, their 
cost-effectiveness and the opportunities to create sustainable livelihoods, e.g. in fisher-
ies and tourism in developing countries (ibid). Beck and Shepard use the terms “gray” 
and “green” solutions for coastal defences (Beck and Airoldi 2007) and argue that “the 
incorporation of natural solutions is imperative given the very high costs to society of 
engineered, ‘gray’ solutions” (Beck and Shepard 2012: 35): 
The range of solutions for reducing coastal hazards ranges from ‘green’ to ‘gray’ 
solutions. Green solutions comprise the conservation and restoration of natural 
coastal ecosystems. Here wetlands and reefs are conserved, replanted or restored to 
reduce the impacts from waves and erosion on the coastline. There is a growing in-
terest in green solutions – but this is also urgently needed. Worldwide, gray solu-
tions have been used the most. Here, coastlines are artificially hardened, and gabi-
ons and breakwaters made of rock and cement are dumped on shorelines to stabi-
lize them. […] Gray solutions cause continuous maintenance costs, whereas green 
solutions are more sustainable and can grow naturally. Mangrove forests, wetlands 
and coral reefs also offer additional benefits to people including fisheries and live-
lihoods (e.g., harvest and tourism). (Beck and Shepard 2012: 33) 
 
Inman, referring to the situation in South East Asia after the 2004 tsunami, explicitly 
states that “[…] not just well-off countries […] are looking to restore their coastlines as 
a way of protecting against rising seas” (Inman 2010: 40), but also that there are limits: 
Even the supporters of ecological engineering realize that it can go only so far in 
staving off the damage caused by rising seas. ‘You can work with nature all you 
want,’ says Klein [from the Stockholm Environment Institute], ‘but it’s all academ-
ic if we lose Greenland.’ For now, though, the softer approaches of ecological en-
gineering are catching on, says Nicholls. ‘All of coastal engineering is moving in 
that direction, with people nourishing beaches instead of armouring coasts.’ (Inman 
2010: 41) 
 
This exemplary assemblage of various elaborations of ‘working with nature’ demon-
strates that there is a specific idea, a formation of discourses and practices currently 
emerging in different contexts of coastal hazard protection; possibly on a global scale. 
The following chapter will work towards building a theoretical framework for the anal-
ysis of such “soft” approaches to coastal protection in the Aotearoa New Zealand con-
text. 
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2.   Natureculture Imaginaries 
 
2.1 Making Multiple Natures 
 
In Chapter 1, I have developed my argument about the global emergence of soft coastal 
protection without further discussing the term nature. Now it is time to open this black 
box and let nature emerge: a contested concept that is central in my analysis of these 
practices. As I have shown in the previous chapter, the ‘working with nature’ framing is 
prevalent in the field, although some of the examples I have discussed are expressed in 
slightly different terms: ‘working with natural processes’, or ‘working with water’. 
Pointing towards the multitude of accounts on water – as a substance and a symbol – 
Stefan Helmreich suggests that there might be no ultimate answer to what “water is” 
(Helmreich 2015: xvii). In the discourses on coastal management, water is described as 
a physical substance that circulates through the atmosphere and earth system, that rains 
down, forms rivers and streams, and flows towards the oceans. Erosion and accretion 
are understood as natural processes, forming one part of the interaction of multiple 
forces and materialities that coastal scientists call a coastal system (Wong et al. 2014).  
The question I want to address is, what do people refer to when they argue for 
coastal protection that works with nature? What is nature? A definition of nature that 
remains fundamental for the social sciences has been provided by Marxist cultural critic 
Raymond Williams in his 1976 “Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society”, 
where he discusses the origins, cultural meanings and political implications of common 
words of the English language. He argues that “nature” is  
perhaps the most complex word in the language. It is relatively easy to distinguish 
three areas of meaning: (i) the essential quality and character of something; (ii) the 
inherent force which directs either the world or human beings or both; (iii) the ma-
terial world itself, taken as including or not including human beings. (Williams 
1976: 219) 
 
Williams continues to argue that these different senses have developed successively, 
though the earlier meanings have continued to exist. Yet sense (i), he writes, is by defi-
nition a specific singular, “whereas senses (ii) and (iii), in almost all their uses, are ab-
stract singulars – the nature of all things having become singular nature or Nature” 
(Williams 1976: 220). This “reduction of a multiplicity to a singularity”, he argues, res-
onates with the emergence of a concept of “God”, an abstraction from the earlier under-
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standing of “a god” or “the gods”. As a result, “[a]bstract Nature, the essential inherent 
force, was [...] formed by the assumption of a single prime cause” (ibid).  
However, it is exactly this abstract singular of “capital-N nature” (Hinchliffe 2007: 
3; Tsing 2005: 88f.; Castree 2005: 8) that has come into question in a world where the 
entanglements of social and natural worlds are constantly getting messier. In his “Geog-
raphies of Nature”, Steve Hinchliffe (2007) suggests that contemporary understandings 
of nature – present in scientific discourse, but not limited to it – can be subsumed to 
three perspectives: nature independent, nature dependent, and nature co-produced. In 
the first understanding, nature is defined as what is “out there”: wilderness, an “inde-
pendent state”, ideally located outside the sphere of human interference and “distinct 
from, absolutely separate to, the social world” (Hinchliffe 2007: 7). This, he argues,  
is probably the most common version of nature in Western societies. It informs 
many types of environmentalism, from the triumphalism of human mastery over 
nature to Western versions of stewardship and even some deeper green philoso-
phies where nature needs saving from humankind, and humankind from itself. 
(Hinchliffe 2007: 8) 
 
Such a worldview is, for example, echoed by Marc Tercek, president and CEO of The 
Nature Conservancy, when he claims that while natural disaster will always happen, “it 
turns out that nature can also help protect people” (The Nature Conservancy 2014). Na-
ture is defined as an abstract universal concept that does not include human actions. Or-
rin Pilkey, the geologist and hard protection opponent encountered already in the Chap-
ter 1, employs a related concept when he speaks of the beach as a thinking organism in 
a documentary film on sand mining (Delestrac 2013). During storm events, Pilkey ar-
gues, the beach is eroded, which means that in effect it changes its form in order to bet-
ter absorb the force of the waves. He describes the beach as an organism that has the 
ability to survive through conscious movement. Consequently, Pilkey calls for the re-
vival of a more systemic, relational thinking. This holistic concept of erosion and accre-
tion implicitly implies that humans can only be a source of interruption and damage to 
these purely natural processes. And if nature is understood as independent of human do-
ings it is best left alone and undisturbed by human interventions. 
Another, radically different approach stems from a social constructionist concept 
which sees nature as “social all the way down” (Hinchliffe 2007: 8). On the one hand, 
the argument goes, there is barely a realm of nature left that has been undisturbed by 
human interference, as landscapes and other natural features actually show the signs of 
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millennia of human-nature interaction (Fisher and Feinman 2005). On the other hand, 
this approach understands nature as always perceived and experienced through social 
and cultural categories. In contrast to the abstract singularity of Nature (and God), in 
this version of thinking nature becomes “but one of many categories that emerge from 
and exist within the realm of human actions and orderings. It is therefore dependent on 
and not prior to social relations” (Hinchliffe 2007: 9).  
Hinchliffe puts forward for a third approach of thinking nature and society as neither 
totally independent, nor one of the two realms always shaping and defining the other. 
Nature and society, he argues, are rather mutually dependent and interacting, they 
coproduce or “make one another” (Hinchliffe 2007: 8). Hinchliffe admits that this con-
cept is challenging as it is not easy to understand; it is “the least intuitive version of na-
ture and requires us to do the most work” (Hinchliffe 2007: 9). However, the merit of 
this more complex coproductive understanding of nature lies in its opening up of new 
conceptual spaces (see Bingham 2006). Instead of Nature understood as an abstract sin-
gular, and instead of a clearly defined boundary between the binaries of nature and soci-
ety, nature emerges as a matter of practices, of becoming and being enacted, and of 
multiplicity. 
With his way of thinking about nature(s), Hinchliffe endorses a wider stream of work 
on “social natures” (Castree and Braun 2001) or “naturecultures” (Haraway 2008; Choy 
et al. 2009; de la Cadena and Weiss 2010), loosely following the Latourian argument 
that “We have never been modern” (Latour 1993). Bruno Latour has famously argued 
that Western modernism has put considerable work into “purification”, separating two 
different ontological spheres of the natural and social, while at the same time constantly 
producing hybrid objects that break these ostensible barriers between the natural and the 
social world (classic examples include the ozone hole or global climate change). There 
is now a growing body of work from the environmental humanities that directly chal-
lenges such blackboxing of nature (Castree and Braun 2001; Whatmore 2002; Law 
2006; White and Wilbert 2009; Law 2010; Goldman, Nadasdy et al. 2011; Lorimer 
2012; 2015). 
Instead of insisting on a clear distinction between social and natural worlds (and lo-
cating phenomena neatly into the respective fields of the sciences and humanities), such 
work shows how the proliferation of hybrids or cyborgs (Haraway 1991) is steadily ac-
celerating in times of “technonatures” (White and Wilbert 2009) with objects like DNA 
or cryo-preserved embryos that are intrinsically linked to emerging technoscientific 
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practices (Fischer 2005; Franklin 2006). However, Noel Castree, who discusses the 
work of what he calls “‘after’- or ‘post-natural’ geographers” amongst other approaches 
to “Nature” in his book of the same name (Castree 2005), warns against the “fundamen-
tal error” to assume that the society-nature dualism had been an adequate description of 
the world only until recently, when technoscience disrupted and destroyed the ontologi-
cal divide between society and nature. Castree stresses that, rather, these scholars  
maintain that we have always lived in a mixed-up, hybrid and ‘impure’ world 
where it is difficult to disentangle things from their relationships. Technoscientific 
developments like transgenic pigs, smart robots and microchip implants are, in the-
se geographers’ estimation, just the latest examples of a long history of society-
nature interfusions. (Castree 2005: 225) 
 
This has direct consequences for the politics of nature. Damian White and Chris Wilbert 
for example discuss the normative and political implications of the holistic concept of 
“capital-N Nature” and argue that it symbolizes the desire to return to a pristine, un-
spoiled nature. With the boundaries between society and nature long having been 
blurred, such anachronistic objectives render problematic “an environmental politics 
that has been premised on a naturalistic politics of Nature” (White and Wilbert 2009: 4). 
Importantly again, this diagnosis not only describes contemporary socio-natural worlds. 
White and Wilbert argue that  
[e]pochal rhetoric can obscure how diverse peoples have always been enmeshed 
and entangled in complex social, ecological, and technological networks. Human 
history has always been entangled with the histories of diverse non-human agen-
cies. (White and Wilbert 2009: 9) 
 
Consequently, these new ways of thinking about nature also concern how the human is 
positioned vis-à-vis the non-human world. Rejecting a perspective of human exception-
alism, recent literature from the intersections of cultural anthropology, Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) and those branches of geography that go under the names of 
human, more-than-human, political, or cultural, focuses on humans as being entangled 
into “more-than-human worlds” (Whatmore 2002). This now includes work on fellow 
critters and “companion species” (Haraway 2008; Hayward 2010; Kirksey 2014; 
Kirksey and Helmreich 2010; Choy 2011; Cassidy 2012), plants (Choy 2011; Hustak 
and Myers 2012; Myers 2014), microbes (Paxson and Helmreich 2014), and even stones 
(Raffles 2012). 
Furthermore, and following from this, the critique of capital-N nature not only tar-
gets the coproduction of the natural and the social, but also the singularity of the con-
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cept of Nature. Instead, the multiplicity of natures in the plural is moved into the focus 
of attention. Already in 1999, anthropologist Arturo Escobar pointed out the need of 
what he then called an “antiessentialist theory of nature”, a theory that embraces social 
constructionism as much as it acknowledges the materiality of nature. In his paper “Af-
ter Nature” (Escobar 1999), he asks for an approach that looks exactly for this specifici-
ty of nature(s) (Escobar 1999: 2). Escobar argues for a political ecology that historicizes 
nature and analyzes what he calls the specific articulations in which nature and society, 
or biology and history, interact, in order to find “new ways of weaving together the bio-
physical, the cultural and the technoeconomic for the production of other types of social 
nature” (Escobar 1999: 4).  
The focus on such articulations of social nature has important implications in two re-
gards. Firstly, only through empirical work can these specific instances and practices be 
grasped. Nature is not only put into practice, but it also does not exist outside practice 
(Hinchliffe 2007: 165f., see Mol 2002). For Hinchliffe, natures are end points, more or 
less stable assemblies, which are the products of work, and not starting points 
(Hinchliffe 2007: 190). Secondly, the normative question is always already implied here 
as well. These questions can have potentially far-reaching implications for a politics of 
multiple natures: “Life without Nature is proving confusing and there is a widely shared 
recognition of the need for new ways of thinking,” geographer Jamie Lorimer observes 
in relation to biodiversity conservation in the Anthropocene starting to incorporate the 
idea of (small-n) multiple natures (Lorimer 2012: 593). Lorimer argues that within some 
parts of conservation science, “the recognition of the Anthropocene challenges preva-
lent and powerful understandings of biodiversity as Nature – a pure and timeless collec-
tion of objects, best removed from Society” (Lorimer 2012: 594). Instead, an ethics of 
experimentation is emerging, visible for example in recent enthusiasm for rewilding 
projects (Lorimer 2015).  
This resonates with Hinchliffe stressing the analytical need to figure out “how nature 
is ‘done’, how it is practised, how it materializes as an active partner in and through 
those practices” (Hinchliffe 2007: 1). Hinchliffe treats representation and perception as 
one of many practices of nature-making (he lists growing, infecting, digging, and count-
ing as other examples, Hinchliffe 2007: 1). Importantly, not all of these practices are 
centred around human actors (ibid). Equally important for his goal of achieving “better” 
ecologies is being attentive to closures and exclusions, looking at “what is outside the 
current set-up” (Hinchliffe 2007: 186) – and to extend the detached mode of scientific 
 36 
analysis in order to become part of the experiment of creating spaces for nature. Pro-
grammatically, he writes: 
The assemblage of nature is in process and the processes can be engaged in 
through many different activities, practices and places. How to engage in the mak-
ing of better natures is a fraught empirical and political question. […T]he question 
is both ontological and political, and requires detailed engagement in the multiple 
practices of nature making. If nature is done, in lots of ways, places and with lots 
of others, then rather than offering interpretations of nature, or analytical concepts, 
the injunction must be to join the doings, to experiment, to engage in the doing of 
environments, to environ in different and better ways (Thrift 2005). (Hinchliffe 
2007: 191) 
 
So far, the environmental humanities have not given too much attention to issues relat-
ing to coastal protection or flooding, however there are some notable exceptions. Cul-
tural anthropologist Michael J. Fischer discusses flood management in the scope of his 
essay on “Emergent Forms of Un/Natural Life”, where he weaves together larger, po-
tentially global discourses and localized practices of nature. In the opening, Fischer de-
fines nature as “an ambivalent term meaning both what is other to us and what is essen-
tially ourselves” (Fischer 2009: 114). He observes the emergence of “four kinds of na-
ture as both other and self-defining” (ibid) that have occupied contemporary politics and 
cultural analysis: natural catastrophes, industrial accidents, biotechnologies and multi-
species connections. Fischer sees the sociotechnical arrangements of US flood control 
as exemplary for the first kind. In his analysis, he takes the 1927 Mississippi flood as 
the historical point when the US Army Corps of Engineers changed its approach toward 
the Mississippi river: 
[T]he flood changed the way in which the Army Corps of Engineers attempted to 
control the river. From trying to work against the river’s momentum, containing 
the river within narrow banks to increase the speed of water flow and self-dredging 
for navigation – the so-called levees only strategy – the corps moved to a strategy 
of working with and leveraging the flow of the river, directing it via outlets and 
[James] Eads jetties. (Fischer 2009: 118)  
 
Flood control is not only understood as coproductive of political relations and responsi-
bilities between the federal government and the states; Fischer also describes the cata-
strophic event as an instance of “deep play” in the Geertzian sense (Geertz 1973), as 
“sites where dynamically an increasing number of meaning structures implode or inter-
sect and where society dramatizes to itself the meaning of its own representations about 
the moral order”: 
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[T]he struggle with the Mississippi has also been seen as the grandest of human 
agons: the Army Corps of Engineers against Nature. The struggle with the Missis-
sippi is a deep play in the Geertzian sense, giving meaning to endeavors to define 
human nature against its others. (Fischer 2009: 119) 
 
Fischer also recapitulates changes in the Dutch flood management politics after the 
1953 flood and refers to intense public debates around a new protection scheme that in-
cluded the maintenance of wetlands behind the defence line. The reorganization of gov-
ernance structures in the form of central and local Water Councils, as well as the in-
volvement of private sector actors, shows how flood management coproduced political 
institutions in the Netherlands (Fischer 2009: 120). 
In a special issue of the journal Architectural Design on “Post-Traumatic Urbanism”, 
Christopher Hight and Michael Robinson from the Rice School of Architecture present 
student projects focusing on Galveston, a city located on a barrier island in the Texas 
Gulf (Hight and Robinson 2010). The city was already destroyed once by a hurricane in 
the year 1900; hurricane Ike, in 2008, left the island devastated and further contributed 
to acute coastal erosion issues. Approaching the problem of city planning for a climate-
changed future, the authors state that such attempts have so far been hindered, “because 
to do so requires reconceptualising the material relationship between city and sea, and 
through it the humanist division between culture and nature” (Hight and Robinson 
2010: 81). But this, the authors assume, would be necessary in order to be able to think 
through the possible interventions, especially in relation to an existing seawall that ends 
its life span and needs replacement. The seawall is conceptualized as a visualization of a 
false dichotomy of nature and culture: Hight and Robinson argue that it “conceptually 
and quite literally serves as an infrastructural line that delineates natural forces from 
human orders” (ibid). The answer given by students Nkiru Mokwe and Viktor Ramos, 
as part of their project called “Energe(ne)tic Fields”, is to disturb and question exactly 
this naturalcultural boundary work. They propose 
a buoyant structural component that proliferated into performative assemblages. 
These allow opportunities for habitation or flexible membranes to respond to wave 
energy, beaches and pockets of leisure. […] The simple line of the existing sea 
wall and its modern dichotomies of nature versus culture are delaminated, modu-
lated, and otherwise transformed into a complex territory that suggests entangle-
ments of nature-cultures. (Hight and Robinson 2010: 81) 
 
Hight and Robinson also discuss land reclamation – the construction of islands from 
sand dredgings that created habitats and allegedly fuelled ecotourism in the Gulf area, 
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arguing that “such artificial landscapes can be understood as ‘restoration’ projects in 
that they attempt to return the bay to at least elements of its preindustrial – its natural – 
state” (Hight and Robinson 2010: 81f.). Importantly, Hight and Robinson try to get at 
the latent dimensions of meaning by asking questions, rather than giving answers. 
Pointing to the history of natureculture entanglement in this highly developed coastal 
area, they wonder “what is at stake in the fantasy of restoration and conservation, since 
it is only possible by embracing the total technological refashioning of the area” (High 
and Robinson 2010: 82). 
Cultural geographers Robin Kearns and Damien Collins also try to “reclaim the 
coast” for cultural analysis. With their recent empirical work about public resistance 
against coastal development on Aotearoa New Zealand’s North Island, they hope to  
open […] space to see the coast as generative of deeply human experience and 
more than simply property relations and geomorphic processes. If coastal studies 
has developed largely without explicit regard for this literal/littoral edge of our ex-
perience, then – echoing Smith et al. (2009) – our paper has sought to reclaim the 
coast as a site, as well as a set of sights, that is more geographically complete. 
(Kearns and Collins 2012: 952) 
 
This larger completeness could also be achieved by employing a social nature or na-
turecultures perspective. However, the authors do not discuss the understandings of na-
ture that emerge in the field. This is what Marc Tebboth attempts to achieve with his 
analysis of ongoing conflicts over coastal erosion in Happisburgh in Norfolk (UK) 
(Tebboth 2014; Tebboth 2013). Trying to explain why local pressure groups and the UK 
government continue to fail in reaching an agreement over how to address the erosion 
issue, Tebboth argues that this reflects implicit differences in how these actors “think 
the world works” (Tebboth 2013). Drawing on Cultural Theory developed by Mary 
Douglas (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) and Erving Goffman’s frame analysis 
(Goffman 1974), Tebboth uses five “social solidarities”, different ways of understand-
ing and interpreting sociality (or different ontologies of the social world, one could ar-
gue). These solidarities are individualism, hierarchism, egalitarianism, fatalism and au-
tonomy (Tebboth 2014: 3), which Tebboth argues can be mapped onto a different sys-
tem of meanings attributed to the natural world – the “myths of nature” developed by 
Michiel Schwarz and Michael Thompson (Schwarz and Thompson: 1990). Analogous 
to the different understandings of the social world, these natural ontologies encompass 
“nature capricious, nature perverse/tolerant, nature benign and nature ephemeral. Each 
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symbolises a different way of perceiving ecosystem stability and underpins a different 
management approach.” (ibid) 
As a result of his analysis, Tebboth then attributes the conflict over how to address 
coastal erosion to incongruent worldviews, which entail a different logic for explaining 
the causes of the problem. He argues that on the national level, a hierarchical worldview 
underpins an understanding of coastal erosion as a natural, inevitable problem, whereas 
on the local level, an egalitarian worldview stresses the function of (in the local’s view 
insufficient) coastal protection measures and evolves around issues such as public in-
vestment and compensation. Unfortunately though, Tebboth’s analytical procedure 
leaves the concept of nature itself being absorbed by the social and political registers he 
discusses, thereby effectively blackboxing nature again.  
Bruno Latour suggests a similar, though more promising approach in his 1998 cri-
tique of political ecology (Latour 1998). Latour’s bashing of political ecology, in his 
view not paying attention to the human-nature entanglements discussed above (Latour 
1998: 228), is of less interest here than is his reception of the French philosophers Luc 
Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991). These have proposed a 
concept of six different regimes of justification, each of which provides a complete, 
working understanding of the world and how it should be ordered. Importantly though, 
the different regimes are “utterly contradictory with the others”. This means that “[e]ach 
of them […] has the capacity to denounce the others because they lack morality or vir-
tue” (Latour 1998: 224). 
Latour transfers these regimes to the sphere of ecology and discusses in detail four 
that he argues are particularly relevant: the domestic, industrial, commercial and civic 
regimes. The domestic regime revalues the principles of belonging, roots, attachment 
and stability. In the environmental context, he explains,  
many practical disputes in ecology are always a question of defending a particular 
territory, a particular aspect of national heritage, a particular tradition or territory 
[sic] against the de-sensitized, de-territorialised, stateless, monstrous character of 
an economic or technical enterprise (Latour 1998: 224). 
 
This is the reason, Latour argues, for the “curious alliance between conservatives, con-
servationists of heritage and nature conservationists” – green politics that protect local 
natures and lifeworlds are not necessarily emancipatory. The industrial regime strives 
for efficiency and evolves around management, monitoring and business as usual, by 
for example turning pollution problems into a market of waste management and trada-
 40 
ble emission rights. The related commercial regime develops new forms of green prod-
ucts and thrives on a consumerist variation of capitalism. The civic regime argues from 
a universalist position and judges in relation to what is perceived as the general com-
mon good, seeking solutions that are not biased towards local interests and that take the 
needs of future generations into account. What Latour proposes is an addition to the 
original concept of Boltanski and Thévenot: a “green” or “ecological regime” that val-
ues open-endedness and uncertainty about existing relations. In order to make justifiable 
political decisions under this (seventh) regime, one has to “ecologise”, to take every-
thing into account that turns out to be part of the network:  
‘Ecologising’ means creating the procedures that make it possible to follow a net-
work of quasi-objects whose relations of subordination remain uncertain and which 
thus require a new form of political activity adapted to following them. (Latour 
1998: 235) 
 
This encompasses a departure from anthropocentrism. Not only human actors, nothing 
should be thought of only as a means, as Latour’s goal is “a collective experimentation 
on the possible associations between things and people without any of these entities be-
ing used, from now on, as a simple means by the others” (Latour 1998: 234). Latour 
then uses river restoration as an example. He discusses several statements, some also re-
ferring to “soft approaches”. A Department of Agriculture representative is quoted argu-
ing against flood channels that destabilized a river – “an absurd system” (Latour 1998: 
238; footnote 12). But the administrator’s interest in the river is reducible to human in-
terests in the river, not the “river per se and its interests” (ibid). It is therefore still sub-
scribing to the “industrial regime”. The same goes, Latour argues, for a river engineer 
who denounces his profession for not taking into account how “on the long range the 
respect for Nature will be beneficial” (ibid). Latour analyses a statement about why the 
engineer has been “converted to the softer sustainable development approach” (ibid). 
The reasons given are manifold: 
I have been converted by the aesthetic aspect of things, by the protection of the 
landscape, then by ecology; in terms of long-term management, it is better with a 
river that self-regulates itself than with a river that is degradating itself all the time, 
 
the engineer argues (Latour 1998: 238). From Latour’s point of view, this reveals him 
as a believer of the industrial regime as well: everything is thought and argued from the 
human point of view, and the river’s own interests are going unnoticed.  
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However, other examples that Latour cites do link up the concern for the river to the 
green regime. The point is that the river is included into a politics that does not only 
treat the river as a tool for human projects. It is not even necessary to speak solely for 
the river’s own sake; it is enough to not reduce it only to a means: 
Such an analysis does not confirm either the notion of nature saved for its own sake 
by sacrificing human interests or that of free human beings dominating nature to 
promote their own freedom alone. A canalised river is seen as something bad and 
undesirable within the ‘seventh regime,’ not because this futile development will 
be seen as expensive – taking thirty years to complete and being quickly eroded – 
but because the river has been treated as merely a means, instead of also being tak-
en as an end. By conspiring with a ‘law which could have its origin in the will of 
the subject undergoing their action’, according to the Kantian expression, rivers are 
allowed to meander again, to keep their dishevelled network of rivulets, to have 
their flood zone. In short, we leave the mediators partially to deploy the finality 
which is in them. (Latour 1998: 233) 
 
As Latour shows, river restoration provides a fruitful example to discuss the practices of 
naturecultures. Actor Network Theory (ANT), though only referenced in passing in the 
above essay, can be a useful tool to problematize a politics of nature which perpetuates 
too simple a distinction between the natural and the social.  
Noel Castree and Tom MacMillan also use river restoration to illustrate the ad-
vantages of an approach that is informed by ANT (Castree and Macmillan 2001). They 
discuss a paper called “Translating nature: river restoration as nature-culture” (Eden et 
al. 2000) that builds on an analysis of the restoration of the river Cole. The specificity of 
the approach taken by Eden and colleagues lies in a view that neither thinks of restora-
tion in a natural realist way as “all about getting ‘back to nature’” (Castree and Macmil-
lan 2001: 215), nor in a social constructionist fashion  
that it is about certain social actors changing rivers to conform with their culturally 
produced image of what nature is supposed to look like (here, then, the claim is 
that a ‘fake nature’ is being restored) (ibid). 
 
Instead, the practice of river restoration is approached in a non-dualistic perspective that 
zooms in on the “‘translations’ that crosscut the social/natural binary, while highlighting 
the illicit ‘purification’ that enables many analysts to incorrectly think that river restora-
tion is either a social or natural phenomenon” (ibid). As a result, the analysis shows that 
the categories of social and natural in relation to the river are produced in the process; 
they are not pre-existing the restoration project itself (Castree and Macmillan 2001: 
216). The river is defined only in the ever-changing relations to other actors in the net-
work, the restoration plan playing a key part. Any attempt to disentangle the social and 
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natural here in order to back up an environmental politics of capital-N nature would 
equal an inappropriate “politics of purity” (Castree and Macmillan 2001: 220). The 
“politics of impurity” that the authors suggest instead does not deny the hybridity of ob-
jects and networks and the multiple nature-culture(s) links they express.  
Turning back from the library to my field, coastal erosion only becomes a problem 
and therefore a political issue when it emerges within a socio-natural assemblage char-
acterized by an entanglement of the biophysical and ecological with cultural, political, 
legal, and emotional forces. Seen in this light, understanding erosion problems requires 
a perspective that is open and attentive to these socio-natural (or naturalcultural) nodes. 
An analysis that neatly separates the natural and social causes and effects of erosion 
does not simplify the issue, but to the contrary makes it more difficult to understand. 
My aim is to analyze soft coastal protection practices as a practical politics of nature, a 
politics of ‘working with nature’. This requires not only thoughtful attendance to make 
these practices visible as practices of nature-making, as making coastal naturecultures. I 
will also need a heuristic framework that helps me understanding what sort of future 
worlds are conjured up when ‘working with nature’ is appealed to. 
 
 
2.2  “Working with Nature”: A Sociotechnical Imaginary 
 
My aim is to show how soft coastal protection is realized in specific sociotechnical 
practices and discourses that are framed by a common objective: to ‘work with nature’ 
(and not against it). The function of this objective can be described as what Sheila Jasa-
noff calls a “sociotechnical imaginary”, and defines as  
 
[a] collectively held and performed vision […] of [a] desirable future […] animat-
ed by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable 
through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology (Jasanoff 2015a: 
19).  
 
Recently introduced by Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim (Jasanoff and Kim 2009; 2013; 
2015), this concept considers practices as well as the material realities of infrastructural 
projects and the latent processes of everyday meaning-making. Using the example of 
nuclear policy in the US and South Korea (Jasanoff and Kim 2009), Jasanoff and Kim 
show how two different national imaginaries have developed in the course of the 20th 
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century, with “atoms for peace” as the dominant narrative of the US policy of nuclear 
containment, and an “atoms for development” strategy in South Korea respectively. The 
authors argue that the different trajectories energy policy has taken in both countries are 
underpinned by collective imaginations of how the (future) world ought to be ordered 
with the aid of science and technology: the sociotechnical imaginaries concept  
helps explain how views of what the world is like and what it should be like get 
built into social identities, practices, institutions, and into the material infrastruc-
tures of society (Jasanoff et al. 2012: 4). 
 
As a framework and a tool, sociotechnical imaginaries tackle the coproduction of dis-
courses and sociotechnical practice. The term coproduction here is meant to express not 
only that things coproduce each other (with nature and culture, as described above, both 
emerging as outcomes), but also specifically describes the interrelationship of epistemic 
and normative dimensions of this process: 
Briefly stated, co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in 
which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable 
from the ways in which we choose to live in it. Knowledge and its material embod-
iments are at once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; 
society cannot function without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist 
without appropriate social supports. Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a 
transcendent mirror of what we term the social. The same can be said even more 
forcefully of technology. (Jasanoff 2004: 2-3) 
 
Coproduction alone, however, is not sufficiently operational to explain both durability 
and change, and the different avenues that societies chose in relation to scientific and 
technological developments (Jasanoff 2015a: 4). This is where the sociotechnical imag-
inaries concept comes into play. These shared visions of common futures are much 
larger and much more elusive than a policy directive, but nonetheless highly effective in 
structuring what can be conceived of as making sense, as an appropriate way to further 
national goals, and a vision of the world the collective “we” would want to live in. Im-
aginaries also have a normative dimension; they are “at once descriptive of attainable 
futures and prescriptive of the kinds of futures that ought to be attained” (Jasanoff et al. 
2007: 1).  
Jasanoff and Kim draw on Charles Taylor’s work on “Modern Social Imaginaries” 
(Taylor 2002; Taylor 2004). Interested in how social structures attain durability, Taylor 
turns to the analysis of collective practices, stories and ideas. He believes that a social 
imaginary, which makes sense of such practices, is their necessary prerequisite. The 
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process is not one-directional though; shared practices are essential in producing a 
shared common sense of community, and this shared understanding in turn defines ac-
cepted and meaningful practices. As such, he argues,  
[t]he relation between practices and the background understanding behind them is 
[…] not one-sided. If the understanding makes the practice possible, it is also true 
that the practice largely carries the understanding. (Taylor 2002: 107) 
 
This interaction theory of practice is also important with regard to the introduction of 
new theoretical ideas, which are usually first expressed by experts and other elites. It is 
through the spread of new practices that novel theories and concepts gain hold outside 
these limited circles. Yet again, the process is reciprocal, because the new theories (or 
“outlooks”) are used by people to make sense of the practices; “[…] the theory is 
‘glossed’, as it were, given a particular shape in the context of these practices” (Taylor 
2002: 111). This way, new scientific ideas can become naturalized into the practices of 
the general public, as it has been historically described with new regimes of hygiene 
(Latour 1988).  
The role of scientists and their work in relation to social and cultural imaginaries has 
been investigated specifically by George E. Marcus in his 1995 volume on “Technosci-
entific Imaginaries” (Marcus 1995, see Jasanoff 2015a). Marcus analyzes interviews 
with scientists on their thoughts vis-à-vis the role of science for the political and social 
challenges at the end of the 20th century. Kim and Mike Fortun have further contributed 
to this line of work, writing on the role of scientific imaginaries of US toxicologists 
(Fortun and Fortun 2005). 
However, the importance of the sociotechnical imaginaries concept lies in its focus 
on the broader society and its everyday engagements with science and technology (Jas-
anoff and Kim 2015: 10f.). A major theoretical inspiration for Jasanoff and Kim lies in 
Benedict Anderson’s theory of modern nation-making. In his influential study on “Im-
agined Communities” (Anderson 1983), Anderson shows how modern citizens come to 
understand themselves as members of an imagined political community, furthered by 
modern technologies such as the production of printed newspapers, the census and the 
map. In fact, the work on sociotechnical imaginaries so far has mostly focused on the 
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scale of national political cultures (Jasanoff et al. 2007; Felt 2013; Jasanoff and Kim 
2013)4.  
This links up with other work of Sheila Jasanoff addressing the modes of operation 
and authority of public science on a national scale. Her work on the coproduction of 
science and society through law (Jasanoff 1997; Jasanoff 2004; Jasanoff 2012) and her 
concept of civic epistemologies (Jasanoff 2007) are especially important here. In differ-
ent national contexts, Jasanoff argues, there are different mechanisms at work in order 
to legitimize the use of expert knowledge for policy-making, to build trust and public 
accountability (Jasanoff 2007: 247f.). National political cultures are interrelated with 
the production of sociotechnical imaginaries, making projects in the realm of science 
and technology part of the nation-building process. Therefore, comparison across na-
tional scales and with a historical dimension attentive to change over time can be par-
ticularly fruitful (Jasanoff et al. 2007: 5).  
The work by Jasanoff and colleagues remains especially attuned to the level of state 
power and the interrelation of sociotechnical imaginaries and national policy-making. 
However, while sociotechnical imaginaries are often bound to powerful institutions or 
expert bodies, they can also be “articulated and pressed for from below” (Program on 
Science Technology and Society 2011; see Barker 2015; Moon 2015). Importantly 
though, visions need to be social, in the sense that they are shared with others in order to 
become imaginaries:  
Individuals may conceive and communicate persuasive visions of the future, but 
these are not appropriately called imaginaries unless they take hold in other minds, 
                                                
 
4  Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim have published an edited volume that focuses explicitly on fur-
ther developing the sociotechnical imaginaries concept, and presents a refined typology of the stages 
of transformative ideas after my manuscript had already been completed (Jasanoff and Kim 2015). A 
thorough discussion of this latest publication is therefore not included in this chapter. I restrict myself 
to necessary updates, focusing on aspects that were not covered in earlier publications, and departures 
from previous statements about the sociotechnical imaginaries concept. The most obvious develop-
ment in Jasanoff and Kim (2015) is probably their departure from a narrow focus on nation states as 
sole articulators of sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff 2015a: 4). Yet the focus still remains on larg-
er-scale power effects in terms of modern societies attaining stability and durability and on explaining 
why at certain points in history, change becomes possible. The aim is to “clarify why, at significant 
forks in the road, societies opt for particular directions of choice and change over others and why 
those choices gain stability or, at times, fail to do so” (Jasanoff 2015a: 14). My approach, on the con-
trary, is not intending to make general statements on Aotearoa New Zealand as a country and the so-
cial order it sustains. Instead it focuses on a detailed analysis of those fine-grained practices through 
which the sociotechnical imaginary of ‘working with nature’ becomes tangible and materializes in 
specific coastal naturecultures.  
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and people start working to convert what is imagined into actuality. Individuals 
who lead and shape institutions or social movements may be especially effective 
creators of sociotechnical imaginaries. (Program on Science Technology and Soci-
ety 2011) 
 
From anthropology’s methodological point of view, the national scale is an uncomfort-
able level of analysis. But also for the ethnographic approach I use here, it is helpful to 
look at the national as a level of articulation that is important to understand the function-
ing of sociotechnical imaginaries. To draw on an example from Chapter 1, the 2008 
Delta Commission strategy paper on “Working together with water” (Deltacommissie 
2008) not only calls the new approach for protecting the Dutch coast a “sustainable 
strategy” with the goal to “harmonise [coastal protection] as far as possible with natural 
processes”, to build with nature, and focus on multifunctional solutions which promise 
“added value to society”, cost-effectiveness, flexibility and the possibility for gradual 
implementation. To qualify as part of this strategy, the approaches should also be “root-
ed in Dutch tradition“ and have the potential to “serve as a beacon to the rest of the 
world“ (Deltacommissie 2008: 15): a call for a specific national project of coastal na-
tureculture. However, there might be competing discourses traceable within a singular 
national context. While imaginaries express a common belief in a joined future, “multi-
ple imaginaries can coexist within a society in tension or in a productive dialectical rela-
tionship” (Jasanoff 2015a: 4), and exactly which imaginaries are put into practice de-
pends on power relations and resources, amongst other things. 
At the same time, ‘working with nature’ circulates through many national and re-
gional contexts, and, in this sense, it is also already a globalized imaginary. To give an-
other example, the NYS 2100 (see Chapter 1) report refers to the Dutch sand engine 
(the representative project of ‘Building with Nature’) and pictures an “engineered oyster 
reef” located at “North Coast, New Zealand” to illustrate its point on soft protection ap-
proaches (NYS 2100 Commission 2013: 123). Conversely, the New Zealand Herald 
featured an opinion paper by a scientist from Auckland Institute of Technology (Unitec) 
arguing, “Let’s build green defences against rising sea” (Bradbury 2013). In response to 
the NYS 2100 commission’s recommendations, Bradbury suggests to protect the Auck-
land CBD by installing a radically different waterfront, which “will be more like a park, 
a watery littoral with native wetlands and coastal planting” (ibid).  
While such globalized ideas circulate, ‘working with nature’ can only ever gain 
ground in specific localities because it is at this level that the assemblage of material 
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and discursive practices, of ideas and materialities becomes productive. To analyze how 
the imaginary connects to discourses and practices prevalent in the Aotearoa New Zea-
land context, and how it possibly coproduces New Zealand coastal natures will be at the 
core of my ethnographic analysis in the coming chapters. How do New Zealanders ac-
quire a sense of soft management that makes sense to them? What sort of common fu-
ture is implicated in the idea to ‘work with nature’ and not against it? As Jasanoff and 
Kim argue, “the capacity to imagine futures is a crucial constitutive element in social 
and political life” (Jasanoff and Kim 2009: 122). Sociotechnical imaginaries express vi-
sions of desirable, feasible futures and how those could be achieved. This is why the au-
thors call them “instrumental and futuristic” (Jasanoff and Kim 2009: 123).  
The political and social dimensions of sociotechnical imaginaries suggest that the 
circulation of novel ideas about the common future can also be met with scepticism and 
resistance (Jasanoff 2015b: 329ff.). In complex societies, the collective imagination 
may always co-exist with scepticism as a counterpoint, even in a musical sense as Shei-
la Jasanoff notes. Therefore she suggests to look at an imaginary “where it runs up 
against a wall of scepticism” (Jasanoff, pers. comm.). In this vein, sites of conflict can 
reveal latent contradictions at stake. For this reason, I start my empirical chapters with a 
closer look at such a wall in the literal sense. The conflict about the installation of a new 
coastal protection scheme in Waihi Beach, combining hard and soft measures (see 
Chapter 1), is a useful starting point to analyze the success of the ‘working with nature’ 
imaginary in transitioning Aotearoa New Zealand’s coastal protection politics.  
This opens up the question of how the production of the ‘right’ coastal management 
links up with other powerful motives of collective imagination. Aspects that are note-
worthy in this regard include: anxieties about the loss of coastal wilderness and the af-
fordable low-key beach life of “Good Old New Zealand” (Chapter 3), the identity-
forming role of do-it-yourself practices (Chapter 8 and 9.9), and the restoration of native 
biodiversity in the dunes (Chapter 9). In this sense, the study has a comparative element 
built in. An implicit discourse about what it means to be New Zealand(er), and ongoing 
self-reflection of the country’s bi-cultural past, present, and future emerge through the 
process of engaging with, practicing, and making coastal natures. At the same time, 
people are drawing on international examples for soft management to make their case.  
Jasanoff and colleagues recommend to be attentive to discursive figures that raise 
“recurrent themes or tropes in reference to national and cultural particularities” on their 
online “Research Platform Sociotechnical Imaginaries” (Program on Science Technolo-
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gy and Society n.d.). However, not only the specificities of local settings and practices 
need to be taken into account, but also the situatedness of nature. If the ‘working with 
nature’ imaginary addresses and coproduces the natural and cultural order of coastal 
management, nature cannot be taken for granted as the passive backdrop against which 
imaginaries, discourses and/or practices emerge. On the contrary, to understand how 
‘working with nature’ is put into practice, one has to question the concept of nature as 
well.  
My coproductive approach to natureculture imaginaries differs from earlier work on 
“environmental imaginaries” by Michael Watts and Richard Peet (Watts and Peet 
1996). Developing a “critical liberation ecology” as “a critique of the West, especially 
its environmental relations and practices” (Watts and Peet 1996: 261), these authors 
combine political ecology with poststructuralist philosophy in order to question domi-
nant development rationales. For Watts and Peet, the environmental imaginary is specif-
ic to a society, grounded in the history of social relations of production and so-called 
regional discursive formations, and expresses normative understandings of the right 
way to relate to nature. As in the imaginaries concepts discussed above, discourse and 
practice levels interact. Interestingly, the concept Watts and Peet propose provides a 
link between nature and society that aims to move beyond social constructivism without 
resorting to natural determinism. The authors see a need to “counterbalance” the social 
construction of nature with “a profound sense of the ‘natural construction of the social’” 
(ibid: 263). Drawing on Donna Haraway, they perceive of environmental imaginaries as 
“situated knowledge[s]” based upon people’s relations to the natural environment:  
[T]hrough the concept of environmental imaginary, liberation ecology sees nature, 
environment and place as sources of thinking, reasoning, and imagining: the social 
is, in this quite specific sense, naturally constructed. (Watts and Peet 1996: 263) 
 
While Watts and Peet stress the contested nature of environmental imaginaries and their 
vital role in political struggles over nature-society relations (ibid: 268), the concept re-
mains overly static. Even though the authors point to the active role of subjects in creat-
ing environmental imaginaries, the possibility of imaginaries to travel and the creative 
forces of imagination involved in the process, they also argue that people inhabiting 
specific natural environments only possess a limited supply of images they can draw 
upon (ibid: 267). These images enable, but also restrict, the possibilities of imagination. 
This understanding makes it difficult to see the transformative role of imaginaries in 
constructing the new social forms the authors envision (ibid: 268). Eventually, the envi-
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ronmental imaginaries concept re-naturalizes environment, place and landscape even as 
it draws upon a political ecology of social relations to nature and acknowledges the 
world-making power of discursive figures.  
Central to my own approach to natureculture imaginaries is that I focus on the mate-
rial practices of making natures. In his work on internet “geeks”, Chris Kelty analysis 
the Internet as a recursive public, or particular form of social imaginary through which 
those taking part in its development “imagine[…] in common the means of their own 
association [and] the material form this imagination takes” (Kelty 2005: 186). Put dif-
ferently, these geeks constantly build and rebuild the flexible infrastructures of the In-
ternet itself, and when they discuss the Web publicly they also address the fundamental 
make-up of this public (ibid: 200). The technological practice of running code and other 
geek activities substantially blur the boundary between discourse and practice:  
To include the activities of building, coding, compiling, patching, hacking, redis-
tributing, and sharing software code and networking tools under the banner of dis-
course is the first step toward understanding how the definition of a social imagi-
nary is transformed by the internet. (Kelty 2005: 200) 
 
In this sense, the social includes not only human interactions, but also technical net-
works, software and protocols. I take from this that the making of coastal naturecultures 
has a recursive element as well, as people engage in material practices that transform 
nature, while they argue with nature as foundational argument when they promote 
coastal protection approaches that ‘work with nature – and not against it’. 
By combining a sociotechnical imaginaries approach with a sharpened attention for 
the implications of thinking nature as multiple, practice-based naturecultures, I hope to 
gain a better understanding of the workings of ‘working with nature’ in soft coastal pro-
tection. To this end, I analyze the latent dimensions of imagining possible futures in re-
lationship with the material dimensions of coastal natures, including the effects of past 
and present development decisions. Coastal protection rightly belongs to the political 
sphere, it is a politics of nature. As such, the naturalcultural politics of the coast are not 
separate from other areas of political contestation, and will need to be empirically 
grounded in the context of Aotearoa New Zealand, a postcolonial nation which takes 
much pride of its unique nature (coastal and otherwise) and bi-cultural society. 
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3.   The Context of the Coast 
 
3.1 Coastal Change and the Bi-Cultural Nation  
 
Located in the South-Western Pacific, Aotearoa New Zealand consists of two large and 
a number of smaller islands, and features a coastline of more than 18,200 kilometres – 
the seventh longest in the world (NIWA 2012: 16). The coastline is an iconic part of the 
national imaginary, and throughout the 20th century, a coastal lifestyle has become at-
tractive and affordable for a growing part of the population. In recent years, the costs 
associated with seaside living have increased dramatically. Nevertheless, coastal devel-
opment remains a massive growth market (Peart 2009). Sixty-five per cent of New Zea-
landers lived no more than five kilometres from the coast in 2006; a slight increase 
compared to earlier census data from the 1980s (Statistics New Zealand 2006: 4). In the 
light of a general increase in population size – which has roughly doubled since the 
1950s, now approaching 4.5 Million – there is also anxiety growing about the possible 
loss of spaces that define Aotearoa New Zealand as a place of remoteness, scenic beauty 
and seclusion (Peart 2009).  
The widespread apprehension that the coastal property boom of the recent decades – 
though somewhat suspended since the financial crisis after 2006 and the ensuing reces-
sion – will eventually destroy Aotearoa New Zealand’s coastlines has, one could argue, 
as much to do with a feeling of loss of cultural space(s) as with physical space (Freeman 
and Cheyne 2008; Peart 2009; see Collins and Kearns 2010; 2012 for case studies). 
Concerns about the increasing transformation of agricultural lands by residential devel-
opment first emerged in the 1970s (Morton et al. 1973), but have become much stronger 
since the close of the millennium. Feelings of loss and nostalgia about what is often 
called “Good Old New Zealand” are related to specific landscapes and natural environ-
ments. They revolve mostly around, though are not limited to, the Aotearoa New Zea-
land version of nature wild and untamed: the remote, undeveloped beach. 
Our identity as New Zealanders […] seems to remain closely tied to images of the 
natural landscape. You can see this in the enthusiasm we have for getting away 
from the cities – where the vast majority of us live and work – and getting into the 
countryside, and the wilderness. In ‘getting away from it all’ we also remind our-
selves what the country is really like – and who we really are. (Clark 2004: 8) 
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Open (rural) space in general is highly valued, showing the signs of distinctive post-
colonial forms of agriculture – iconic green hills of pastoral lands used for sheep-
farming and, increasingly, for dairy cattle, sometimes directly adjoining coastal waters. 
However, most of all, it is the beach that has played a central role in the Aotearoa New 
Zealand national imaginary and life throughout history: the landing site of the waka 
(voyaging canoes) with which the first human settlers arrived from Eastern Polynesia, 
transportation routes in colonial and postcolonial times, providing access where no 
roads had yet been built through the rugged inland terrain, and playing ground for fami-
ly vacations in times of increasing wealth since the end of the Second World War 
(Hayward 2008a; Peart 2009; Hickford 2012).  
Although the traditional beach bach, a small and simple beach hut (often built on 
land leased by a local farmer or sometimes on public land, with or without seeking per-
mission) has mostly vanished, replaced by larger houses and second homes, it remains a 
strong symbol for idealistic imaginations of the nation’s remoteness, coastal identity 
and presumably classless society (Grigor 2008; Peart 2009: 75f.; Kearns and Collins 
2006). The same goes for coastal “family campsites” of simple standard that once were, 
according to the dominant narrative, a sort of accessible summer home visited again 
every year by the whole kiwi family, producing childhood memories for generations of 
New Zealanders. Many have been converted into upmarket “holiday parks”, or, in the 
light of rising coastal property prices, turned into private residential developments cater-
ing to the increasing number of city dwellers who are able and willing to afford a se-
cond home on the coast as a holiday destination and/or investment (Freeman and 
Cheyne 2008; Collins and Kearns 2010). Interestingly, coastal hazard risk or even visi-
ble erosion does not seem to have an impact on property values of these beachfront res-
idences (Turbott 2006; Peart 2009: 167f.)7.  
Robin Kearns and Damian Collins argue that “real or perceived loss of access to coastal 
places associated with childhood, wilderness and the ‘great outdoors’ can prompt col-
lective outrage” (Kearns and Collins 2012: 943). They underline the importance of such 
                                                
 
7  In New Zealand, protection schemes are sometimes built and maintained under the leadership of local 
authorities, but the costs for coastal protection measures are usually redistributed through rates to the 
citizens affected by the works. Before the introduction of the Resource Management Act (RMA) in 
1991, beachfront property owners often took matters into their own hand and adopted do-it-yourself 
approaches like dumping rocks, tyres and rip-rap serving as makeshift coastal protection (Pilkey and 
Hume 2001). 
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attachment to the coast for the Aotearoa New Zealand identity and sense of community, 
which add up to “a conceptualisation of national identity as encompassing a ‘birthright’ 
to enjoy undeveloped coastal places” (Kearns and Collins 2012: 943). This “Feeling for 
the Coast”, they argue, is also a mirror of the postcolonial situation, partly attributable 
to the strong role that coastal natures play for Māori:  
In addition to being the heritage of an indigenous minority, these feelings for the 
coast have purchase within New Zealand society more generally. This stems, in 
part, from a degree of empathy with Māori worldviews among the population but 
also from Pākeha (New Zealanders of European descent) having a distinct cultural 
relationship with the coast in their own right. (Kearns and Collins 2012: 942) 
 
The concept of biculturalism has become the dominant narrative for defining the status 
quo of the postcolonial nation. The term reflects that two “cultures” are officially rec-
ognized: indigenous Māori and Pākeha New Zealanders of European decent. The con-
cept clearly has its limitations; besides masking the multicultural reality and the pres-
ence of immigrants from the Pacific, East and South East Asia and elsewhere (Dürr 
2007), the term ostensibly treats Pākeha and Māori as if these were distinctive cultures, 
while at the same time often effectively attributing “culture” to the indigenous alone, 
masking Pākeha as the unmarked norm (Goldsmith 2003a; Goldsmith 2003b). Howev-
er, the term circumscribes a new phase in the postcolonial history, with a strong renais-
sance of indigenous identities, language politics, and a strengthening of tribal institu-
tions following political fights that started in the 1970s8. Protest marches and land oc-
cupations surrounded the setting up of the Waitangi Tribunal (Te Rōpū Whakamana i te 
Tiriti) in 1975. The Tribunal hears claims by Māori groups relating to breaches of the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Tiriti o Waitangi). With this founding document of New Zealand, 
sovereignty over the new colony had been handed over to the British Crown, while 
guaranteeing property rights and citizenship also to the new Māori subjects9. Between 
1985 and 2008, the Waitangi Tribunal’s mandate was extended to address so-called his-
                                                
 
8  A prominent example of such struggles was the occupation of a beach-side golf course in Raglan, led 
by Eva Rickard. The site had been taken from Māori owners during the Second World War for 
military uses, but had never been returned and instead was used as a public golf course (Keane 2014; 
2014a). 
9  The treaty was signed on 6 February 1840 by representatives of the British Crown and about 540 
Māori chiefs. Differing English and Māori versions have since been subject of dispute, especially in 
relation to the interpretation of “sovereignty”, which was translated into “kawanatanga” meaning gov-
ernance in the Māori version of the treaty (Ministry for Culture and Heritage 2014b). 
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torical claims as well, with the consequence that treaty breaches dating back until 1840 
could be brought up (Waitangi Tribunal 2012: 15). Until today, the settlement process 
continues for many Māori iwi and hapu (tribal and subtribal groups)10.  
Not surprisingly, the coast has also been central in the latest chapters of postcolonial 
politics, most prominently in the scope of the foreshore and seabed debate in the early 
2000s. The seabed is the part of the coastal environment that is always submerged by 
the sea, whereas the foreshore is defined as the area regularly covered by the high tide, 
“the wet part of the beach” (Hickford 2012). About 70 per cent of coastal lands in New 
Zealand feature a so-called “Queen’s Chain”, a 20-metre reserve strip that remained in 
public ownership (Hickford 2012; University of Otago 2013). In 1997, eight South is-
land iwi led by Ngāti Apa had taken a case to the Māori Land Court that hears all mat-
ters relating to Māori owned land (Whaanga 2012; New Zealand Ministry of Jus-
tice/Tāhū o te Ture n.d.). The plaintiffs had failed to secure rights to install mussel 
farming aquaculture and wanted the Court to investigate if they had customary rights 
over the foreshore and seabed. The High Court intervened, determining that the seabed 
has always been owned by the Crown and any customary interest in the foreshore had 
ceased once the dry land behind had been purchased by the Crown (Hickford 2012).  
However, the Court of Appeal overturned this ruling and decided that the Māori 
Land Court could hear and decide the case. To prevent further access to the courts, the 
Labour government led by Helen Clark issued the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, 
which declared the Crown to be the owner of all foreshore and seabed except where pri-
vately owned. The Act guaranteed public right of access, including fishing and naviga-
tion, and protected non-territorial customary rights. It also opened the possibility to 
claim territorial customary rights for people who had occupied and used parts of the 
foreshore and seabed continuously since 1840 and had held a title for the adjoining dry 
land throughout this time (Hickford 2012).  
This controversial political decision in effect closed down the way through the 
Courts and generally refused customary land titles as a form of collective ownership of 
the foreshore and seabed. It led to widespread protest by Māori, including a large hikoi 
(protest march) from Northland to the capital of Wellington, and the founding of a new 
                                                
 
10  Settlements with the Crown usually include monetary compensation as well as the return of lands that 
had not been sold voluntarily, but had been subject to unlawful confiscation or raupata, often used his-
torically by the authorities as a punishment for Māori “rebellion” (Boast 2012). 
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Māori Party. The legislation was later redressed by the succeeding government. The 
2011 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act reinstalled access to the Courts and 
defined a test to prove the right to customary land titles to foreshore and seabed for 
Māori groups able to demonstrate exclusive use and occupation since 1840 without sub-
stantial interruption (New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2011).  
The Act was met with criticism by supporters and by opponents of Māori rights to 
foreshore and seabed alike. While some of the former argued the test was setting un-
meetable criteria, the latter mongered fears that this could lead to a loss of beach access, 
regardless of the fact that the 2011 law entailed mandatory public beach access through 
all public and customary-owned land – a requirement that does not exist for privately 
owned land. The newly formed interest group Coastal Coalition, for example, started a 
nation-wide campaign to “Save our Beaches”, claiming to fight for “retaining the Fore-
shore and Seabed in Crown ownership for the benefit of ALL New Zealanders” (Coastal 
Coalition 2014). The Coastal Coalition’s billboard advertisements, for example, showed 
Helen Clark’s successor John Key, from the National Party, wearing a traditional Māori 
feather cloak and holding a tino rangatiratanga (tribal sovereignty) flag (Hartevelt 
2010). Such comments implied that Māori titles would not be a redress of historical in-
justice suffered by the indigenous minority, but instead an instance of positive discrimi-
nation to the detriment of the white majority.  
Michael Goldsmith, cultural anthropologist at the University of Waikato, also argues 
that the foreshore and seabed conflict has unearthed deep-seated anxieties of New Zea-
land Pākeha that have been “fanned by populist politicians” (Goldsmith 2009: 332). 
Commenting during the first stage of the conflict, he describes how Māori claims to the 
foreshore – it being an “iconic identity marker” – have been perceived as a threat to the 
national identity: 
Allowing Māori groups to assert ownership of these pieces of land would prevent 
the rest of society from gaining access to beaches. In this version of the white New 
Zealand imaginary, bits of foreshore may be for private use but beaches are for 
everyone. The beach […] represents a complex myth composed of freedom (from 
work, convention, clothes), access to fishing and other nautical pursuits, and nos-
talgia for the great New Zealand summer holiday. (Goldsmith 2009: 332) 
 
This is, however, not the only latent conflict Goldsmith observes in this context. He 
goes on to argue that 
[t]he foreshore and seabed dispute derives much of its ferocity from an ongoing 
tension in New Zealand political discourse between, on one hand, privatiza-
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tion/private ownership and control and, on the other hand, ideologies of collectiv-
ism and the common good. (Goldsmith 2009: 333) 
 
Historically, the self-image of a classless society has been very influential for Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s national identity (Sinclair 1969). Taken together with the perceived 
birthright of access to the beach, conflicts over this limited, liminal space are also ex-
pressions of clashing values. Against this backdrop, coastal erosion management also 
becomes a question of public versus private interests. 
 
 
3.2 Designing the Field 
 
The central question of this book is how specific coastal naturecultures (Haraway 2008; 
Choy et al. 2009) emerge through practices of soft coastal protection on the Aotearoa 
New Zealand coast. While the sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff and Kim 2009; 2013; 
2015) of ‘working with nature’ circulates on a potentially global scale, only a close eth-
nographic look at specific practices of making coastal natures can show how things ac-
tually work in the Aotearoa New Zealand context. My aim is to analyse the coproduc-
tion of specific naturecultures in the process of putting ‘working with nature’ into prac-
tice. I use the term coproduction (Jasanoff 2004) here to indicate that this is not a one-
way road. This perspective assumes that this is not just a matter of adapting pre-existing 
practices and technologies of caring for the coast to a specific place. Rather, these spe-
cific coastal naturecultures emerge from the entanglement of people and things, ideas 
and practices: natures as outcomes of practice (Hinchliffe 2007: 190). 
Nothing stays the same in this process: the sociotechnical imaginary is neither an ob-
ject that travels freely without changing its form, nor is the “local context” a stable 
background against which new ideas and projects play out. Seen in this light, zooming 
in on practices of ‘working with nature’ in Aotearoa New Zealand might tell us as much 
about soft coastal protection as it might tell us about Aotearoa New Zealand and the 
widespread preoccupations of its people with the country’s past, present and future. 
Concepts of a bicultural nation and the on-going renaissance of indigeneity, concern 
about introduced species and increasing coastal development, the cultural value placed 
on do-it-yourself approaches, and the economic situation that complicates access to paid 
work are important factors that all play a role in the making of coastal natures. 
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Where to look for the imaginary and the practices of nature it entails? Where to start, 
and how to decide which connection to follow? In short: how to construct the field? The 
field-site is not a bounded entity, according to Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson; such a 
concept, they argue, would in fact conceal that locales are more rightly described as lo-
cations, as partial perspectives that have been chosen by the researcher: “‘The field’ is a 
clearing whose deceptive transparency obscures the complex processes that go into con-
structing it” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 5). The field is, first and foremost, a metaphor 
for where the anthropologist goes to do her work, which then might better be described 
as “location-work” (ibid). With such a move of conscious reappropriation, the situated-
ness (Haraway 1988) of anthropological knowledge production, which concerns the re-
search subjects as well as the researcher herself, can be made productive. Seen in this 
light, ethnographic fieldwork takes shape through the relationships of the researcher and 
her decisions about how to juxtapose, compare, or contrast them – and what not to in-
clude out of the multiple possibilities she encounters, as Vered Amit argues: 
[I]n a world of infinite interconnections and overlapping contexts, the ethnographic 
field cannot simply exist, awaiting discovery. It has to be laboriously constructed, 
prised apart from all the other possibilities for contextualization to which its con-
stituent relationships and connections could also be referred. This process of con-
struction is inescapably shaped by the conceptual, professional, financial and rela-
tional opportunities and resources accessible to the ethnographer. […T]he con-
struction of an ethnographic field involves efforts to accommodate and interweave 
sets of relationships and engagements developed in one context with those arising 
in another. (Amit 2000: 6) 
 
Therefore, George E. Marcus suggests talking about designing field sites (Marcus 1995; 
Marcus 2009; Hess and Schwertl 2013). This idea was first developed in Marcus’ semi-
nal 1995 article on “Ethnography in/of the World Systems” (Marcus 1995), where he 
coined the term “multi-sited ethnography” that since has become ubiquitous in anthro-
pological research, but also beyond; it is one of the few methodological terms of the 
discipline that has been recognized broadly also in adjacent fields.  
Sabine Hess and Maria Schwertl, however, criticize that Marcus’ intervention all too 
often has been narrowed down again to mean field “sites” in a geographical sense, con-
centrating on a mobilized researcher subject tracking connections between certain local-
ities (Hess and Schwertl 2013: 27). This reading overlooks the larger implications of 
Marcus’ critique, especially his reflection on how to grasp globalized connections em-
pirically without resorting to grand theories. Hess and Schwertl go on to argue with 
Deepa Reddy (Reddy 2009) that while movement between sites is important, it should 
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not be understood solely in a physical sense. In her article in the 2009 compilation 
“Fieldwork Is Not What It Used to Be”, Reddy explains her interest 
[…] in the ‘field’ as an almost random assemblage of sites that come into coher-
ence through the processes of fieldwork itself: the field as deterritorialized and re-
territorialized, as it were, by the question brought to bear on it in the course of re-
search. This process entails much movement, as much between physical locations 
closer or further apart as between ideological positionings or frames of reference 
(as I call them). Tracking this movement, understanding the relationships between 
sites, one’s own positioning within each, and the demands placed on the ethnog-
rapher coming-into-being – these, I believe are the means by which the field is 
made, quite alongside the objects of study that it yields then to ethnographic atten-
tion. (Reddy 2009: 90) 
 
One could argue that anthropology has begun to work with a more complex understand-
ing of spatiality, thereby potentially approaching considerations in human geography 
that see space not as an absolute category, but as a product of interrelations that is con-
stituted through constant interactions. Space, therefore, is “always in a process of be-
coming; it is always being made. It is never finished; never closed” (Massey 1999: 28, 
quoted from Hinchliffe 2007: 84; see also Massey 2005).  
Problematizing and mobilizing the concept of the field not only concerns its spatiali-
ty, but also its temporality. The classic setting of the extended fieldstay, or what Caro-
line Gatt calls “the Malinowskian archetype fieldwork” (Gatt 2009: 108, see Malinow-
ski 1922), was in effect a result of the pragmatic decision of the discipline’s foundation-
al figure to rather stay in the Western Pacific than to return to possible internment in a 
war-ridden Europe (during WW1). Malinowski’s influential position (Gupta and Fergu-
son: 7) has, however, contributed to the subsequent naturalization of this approach to a 
point where apprentice research today still usually adds up to a “roughly year-long, 
more or less continuous encampment at a primary physical site, [and] a few satellite 
trips here and there” (Faubion 2009: 163).  
James Faubion attributes the continuation of this form that still characterizes most 
dissertation research first and foremost to the “marked inertia of granting agencies” ex-
pecting this conventional set-up (ibid). While the effects of a more conscious design of 
fieldwork, together with the effects of studying professional cultures, means that re-
search time is often split between more locations, the aspect of research temporalities 
has not yet been discussed broadly in the literature. In fact, and as Gatt argues (Gatt 
2009: 108f.), the recent proliferation of publications that still problematize the Mali-
nowskian setting and elaborate on multi-sited approaches (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; 
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Amit 2000; Ong and Collier 2005b; Coleman and Collins 2006; Falzon 2009; Faubion 
and Marcus 2009) is a strong indication that the archetypical form is in fact still hege-
monic.  
My own fieldwork also followed this model. The project was part of an interdiscipli-
nary German-New Zealand research training group for coastal research, providing post-
graduate training to PhD students from various scientific backgrounds, mostly from the 
geosciences and engineering, but also from marine biology, law and human geography. 
Ironically, fieldwork in the sense of most of my colleagues from the natural sciences 
meant the production of a different type of data: taking sediment samples of iron sands 
at the beach, measuring photosynthetic pigment concentrations of seagrass in the mud 
flats, or going out on a boat to collect samples of the water column. Enrolled at the Uni-
versity of Waikato’s Department of Earth & Ocean Sciences, I was at pains to justify 
my going into the field alone. This plan ran contrary to the Health and Safety regula-
tions that demanded never to access the field without a research companion, or at least 
to determine a “research buddy” who would be minutely informed about the details of 
my time schedule and whom I would call immediately after I left the dangers of the 
field. As it turned out, the idea that ethnographic fieldwork would need about a year’s 
time “in the field” was much easier to convey in this context, as this concept overlapped 
with what people where expecting of anthropologists to do anyway. Effectively, this 
natural science dominated context then provided ideal conditions for classical appren-
tice fieldwork: an explorative visit within the first half year of the project (February-
April 2010), followed by a full year of fieldwork starting in November 2010. I returned 
to the field in February 2015 for two months revisiting fieldwork contacts and discuss-
ing an early version of the book.  
In establishing field contacts, I partly drew on existing relations between the Bay of 
Plenty Regional Council and the University of Waikato. I chose the western part of Bay 
of Plenty (BOP) region as the main focus and the port city of Tauranga as an anchor 
point from where to start the research11. The Western Bay of Plenty (governed by the 
local authorities Western Bay of Plenty District Council WBOPDC and Tauranga City 
                                                
 
11  The western part of the Bay of Plenty, on which I concentrated, significantly differs from the Eastern 
Bay of Plenty in regard to natural features, development, socio-economic conditions and population 
density. While the western part is mainly made up of a stretch of about 85 miles of accessible sandy 
beaches, the coast gets rocky east of the town of Opotiki. 
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Council TCC) was one of the fastest growing regions in New Zealand during the mid 
and early 2000s, when the continuously increasing demand for coastal real estate led to 
significant development pressure in some parts of New Zealand. Even with the reces-
sion, the Bay of Plenty remains one of the fastest growing coastal regions in the country 
(Western Bay of Plenty District Council 2015). This is mostly due to the booming port 
city Tauranga. Tauranga has some popular coastal residential areas. Suburban Mount 
Maunganui and Papamoa Beach stretch along the beach on the eastern edge of the city. 
“If any coastal settlement in New Zealand is likely to become the ‘Gold Coast’ of the 
South Pacific, it is Mount Maunganui in the Bay of Plenty”, writes Raywyn Peart in her 
comprehensive book on coastal development in the country, “Castles in the Sand” 
(Peart 2009: 134). 
Under the so-called SmartGrowth-Plan, these eastern suburbs are planned to be sig-
nificantly enlarged in the near future (SmartGrowth 2013). Already, new neighbour-
hoods have been built and major roads to improve the connectivity to the city centre are 
under construction. As is common in New Zealand, the developments exclusively con-
sist of detached houses, which are often only single-storey; consequently, this requires 
large areas and has consequences in terms of land use in the area. Further to the east, 
though, the picture changes dramatically. Only a few settlements border the road that 
follows the coastline down to Opotiki. These areas are not showing the signs of rapid 
change as in Papamoa; the rural remoteness of the Eastern Bay of Plenty begins here, 
also an area with a large Māori population.  
Following soft coastal protection meant that I got in touch with volunteer groups and 
engineers, took part in planting events in the whole region and conferences all over the 
country, read newspapers and scientific papers and spent time at the University of Wai-
kato in Hamilton. Sometimes I simply contacted somebody I had been referred to and 
asked for a meeting and an interview. I visited places where soft protection projects had 
been realized, and for some months, I regularly drove to the west coast for my intern-
ship at a marine consultancy. Only some localizations can be pinned down to a particu-
lar place. The “meshwork” (Ingold 2007: 80) character of the project entails that not 
every place I went to, every person I spoke to or interviewed, every activity I witnessed 
or took part in can be clearly ascribed to a site or sub-field, though heuristically, my en-
counters might be grouped around the two issues that make up the empirical parts of the 
book: the Waihi Beach conflict about a controversial hard protection scheme, which I 
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analyse in Part II, and practices of making coastal naturecultures, which are covered in 
Part III. 
The chapters in these two empirical parts are constructed around different blends of 
empirical material. This mirrors the fact that the various subfields and threads of the sto-
ry have been enfolding their own logic, which sometimes affected methodological 
choices. Chapters 4 and 5, focussing on the Waihi Beach seawall conflict, rely more 
heavily than others on the analysis of documents that help me set the scene for my focus 
on the Environment Court appeal (the Court decision, expert evidence statements, but 
also reports and reviews of existing protection works, options considered etc.). Inter-
views do play an important role in this chapter; however, participant observation was 
limited to meeting different parties of the conflict, the experience of the beach itself dur-
ing several stages of the construction project (often accompanied by fieldwork part-
ners), and the participation in Coast Care events. Chapters 6 to 9 are based on fieldwork 
in the Bay of Plenty and, in small part, the Waikato region (where a so-called Beachcare 
programme operates, largely similar to Coast Care BOP). I did extensive participant ob-
servation at volunteer events and also established many valuable contacts with dune res-
toration professionals and volunteers from all over the country by attending three annual 
conferences of the New Zealand Dune Restoration Trust. Interview material used for 
this section stems from semi-structured and narrative interviews with people who 
worked with or for Coast Care/Beachcare in different positions: local and international 
volunteers, Council staff, contractors and detainees. Chapter 10 relies mostly on field-
work diary entries and interviews with staff conducted during three months of partici-
pant observation at ASR Ltd. in Raglan, on scientific papers about artificial reefs, pro-
motional material used by ASR (including social media and videos), as well as addi-
tional material collected from surfing magazines and websites12.  
 
 
                                                
 
12  Over the course of the 14 months of the main fieldwork period in 2010/11, I conducted 61 qualitative, 
semi-structured interviews. I also kept a fieldwork diary (partly handwritten in a notebook I carried 
around with me, partly typed on the computer). According to the research ethics protocol followed by 
the University of Waikato’s Faculty of Science and Engineering, I had to assure anonymity to all in-
terview partners. Some research collaborators who were especially instrumental for the research, and 
mostly speaking from their professional point of view, I approached after the write-up was completed 
and offered to choose whether they prefer to remain anonymous or be acknowledged with their real 
names. All other interviews partners carry fictive names. 
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3.3 Para-Ethnographic Encounters and Para-Sites  
 
According to my interest in the materiality and practicalities of soft coastal protection, 
the research focussed on gaining access to a specific community of practice. As such, I 
was often engaging with people who, in one way or the other, make a living of coastal 
management, including work as coastal consultants or engineers, in paid Coast Care po-
sitions, in native plants nurseries, as university teachers in coastal science, or a mix of 
the above. Through participation in New Zealand Dune Restoration Trust conferences 
and workshop series and the New Zealand Coastal Society conference, I got in touch 
with a handful of experts who are committed to promoting the sociotechnical imaginary 
of ‘working with nature’ in their respective fields. While non-professionals, especially 
dune restoration volunteers, or people owning houses on the beach were also important 
research partners, the project has important aspects of what Dominic Boyer and others 
have called the “anthropology of experts” (Boyer 2008; Schwegler and Powell 2008; 
Schwegler 2008): ethnographic research that centres on people’s professional lives.  
Such a methodical approach does not usually encompass the private life of the field-
work partners in the sense of classic anthropological studies that were less centred on 
specific sites of expert knowledge and practice. These encounters can open up new 
modes of knowing for anthropological analysis. When coastal experts kindly shared 
their knowledge and experience with me, this sometimes included anecdotal meaning-
making that was surprisingly familiar and reminded of the para-ethnographic collabora-
tions that George Marcus and Douglas Holmes have explored in recent years (Holmes 
and Marcus 2005; Holmes and Marcus 2008). This mode of reasoning depends on en-
counters with a distinctive sort of expert subjects. The authors define them as firmly lo-
cated within epistemic cultures primarily concerned with experimental and technocratic 
forms of knowledge production, but nonetheless employing reflexive practices, or what 
Holmes and Marcus call para-ethnography. The term is meant to encompass all sorts of 
informal or intuitive knowledge that is not part of the expert culture’s acknowledged 
practices of knowledge production, and that is therefore officially marginalized to the 
point of being illicit, but that is often also a useful resource for the experts in exercising 
their designated tasks (Holmes and Marcus 2005: 237). 
The latter also points to the limits of using this concept in my field. Douglas Holmes 
has been working in the banking sector, where numbers and quantification officially 
rule (Holmes 2009), and the real extent to which market predictions rely on informal 
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knowledge practices and gut feelings needs to be contained. In coastal management, the 
“human factor” gets theoretically acknowledged, especially in concepts like integrated 
coastal zone management or ICZM (Glaeser 2005). However, not only political dimen-
sions are often sidelined in favour of seemingly objective management framings. Social 
and cultural dimensions are often grasped through simplifying approaches like socio-
ecological systems analysis or qualitative modelling, and not necessarily incorporating 
the interpretative, anecdotal, deep knowledge of these experts interested in the broader 
social and cultural context of coastal protection. To give an example, one coastal expert 
repeatedly discussed the cultural significance of private property as something perma-
nent, and never just temporary, which he saw as the main obstacle to his work and his 
ideas of a more sustainable coastal protection practice. 
At the very least, the concept of the para-ethnographic turned out to be a useful tool 
to inspire a closer look at the reflexive, interpretative, “cultural” knowledge of experts 
in science and technology, and go beyond an understanding of technical experts as those 
simply presenting the facts for subsequent interpretation by the ethnographer. Holmes 
and Marcus’ main methodological concern is not the following of experts or “studying 
up” in general. Moreover, they understand these expert subjects to have the potential to 
become research partners to a certain extent because they can offer insights closely re-
lated to the anthropological mode of thought. This concept of collaboration entails that 
para-ethnographer and ethnographer engage in shared conceptual work, or act as “epis-
temic partners” (Holmes and Marcus 2008: 83f.), opening up the very design of the eth-
nographic project to negotiation. Holmes and Marcus go so far as to postulate that this 
collaboration in the para-ethnographic sense has the potential to alter the discipline sub-
stantially, or to “refunction […] ethnography”. However, some caution with the notion 
seems appropriate. This idea relies heavily on a distinction between “traditional” and 
“expert” subjects, as in the following mission statement on “Ethnography of/as Collabo-
ration”, which Holmes and Marcus quote from the website of the Center for Ethnogra-
phy that George Marcus founded at the University of California, Irvine in 2005:  
As the subjects of anthropological investigation become ever more attenuated from 
the classical ‘native on the beach’, ethnographers increasingly find themselves con-
fronted with people whose everyday theories and practices appear strikingly famil-
iar to their own. The time has come for ethnographers to come to grips with the 
ways in which some mode of para-ethnography, undertaken by actors who are col-
laborators in (rather than subjects of) our investigations, is always already a part of 
sites where our research alights. (Holmes and Marcus 2008: 96) 
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This categorical divide, where the para-ethnographic subject is informing the conceptual 
agenda of the ethnographer in a way that the so-called “traditional research subject” 
presumably has never been able to, seems unfair towards the “native on the beach”, 
downplaying her capacity to engage in reflexive practices as well. I do not believe this 
move is necessary to make the argument that there are knowledge practices imminent in 
contemporary fields, especially those structured by expert knowledge, which seem fa-
miliar to the intellectual work of the anthropologist and therefore need specific atten-
tion.  
Drawing the line between native and expert seems like a reminiscence of anthropol-
ogy’s colonial past. At the same time, I do not want to completely reject the idea that 
experts in the field of coastal management, broadly speaking, form a distinctive catego-
ry of subjects relevant for my research. My experience in the field showed me that it 
makes sense to maintain this category, because I observed significant overlap between 
my own understanding of what constitutes the field and that of the para-ethnographic 
experts. On a fundamental level, we shared the assumption that there is some sort of 
larger idea emerging within and through projects making reference to ‘working with na-
ture’. While I call this a sociotechnical imaginary (with Jasanoff and Kim 2009; 2013; 
2015), my interlocutors would speak of paradigm shifts and the like; but there is agree-
ment between me and these experts that the phenomenon can be followed through dif-
ferent settings and levels of comparison. My own mobility, the idea of multisitedness, 
of following the objective to ‘work with nature’, mirrored my proximity to the world of 
these experts, in the sense that my thinking through and connecting examples of coastal 
protection practices resembled the experts’ temporal and spatial orders much more than, 
for example, the embeddedness of local dune care volunteers or protestors at remote 
Waihi Beach.  
On an anecdotal level, I happened to encounter my most important interlocutor Jim 
Dahm even on occasions and in locations where I was unaware of his involvement – 
like at a planting day in Maketu at the Bay of Plenty coast east of Tauranga, where I 
shared a quad bike ride with a local volunteer along the uninhabited sand spit to exam-
ine a backdune planting trial. The driver sped past a group of people visiting the site, in-
cluding Jim Dahm who later commented that I was just everywhere – the same I thought 
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about him in this moment13. Also, when examining technical reports or local newspa-
pers from different regions, often, the names of the same highly mobile experts in-
volved in projects as consultants for Councils or private clients, as scientific experts, or 
as witnesses in resource consent applications14 continually came up.  
In terms of methods, I found it remarkable how my fieldwork partners acknowledged 
the approach of being there and listening, of spending time to follow the logic of the 
field, or “deep hanging out” (a description of ethnographic fieldwork by Renato Rosal-
do, quoted in Clifford 1997: 188). The coastal collaborations with dune restoration pro-
fessionals and coastal protection experts showed that those you work with in the field 
are most likely to understand their work, however technical it may be, as somehow em-
bedded into social and cultural worlds. If they perceive this as a nuisance or if they are 
genuinely interested into interpretive approaches remains a matter of personal prefer-
ence, style and experiences made. Discussing the ethnographic method with Jim Dahm 
after the fieldwork had been finished, he strongly argued for “social science” approach-
es because they could provide novel perspectives beyond what he calls “sterile coastal 
management”. He stressed that my being there, my immersion into the field and the 
contextualization work this entailed allowed me to connect small cases in order to draw 
a bigger picture of emerging coastal protection practices in Aotearoa New Zealand.  
Figuring out how to use ethnographic methods for connecting the micro level of ex-
emplary ethnographic cases with economic and political forces operating on larger 
scales is an ongoing concern in anthropology (for a great example see Tsing for the 
Matusutake Worlds Research Group 2009). The methods of participant observation and 
open-ended interviewing, and of drawing connections between projects, places, politics 
and people also across different spatial and temporal scales is what distinguishes eth-
nography. When Jim praises the promises of ”social science research” to connect micro 
and macro levels, he specifically speaks of ethnography as a distinguished form. 
                                                
 
13  Jim was involved in Maketu in his role as a trustee of the Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand (see 
Part III, especially Chapter 8.3), because the Trust carried out a backdune planting project there and at 
various other locations. 
14  A resource consent is a permit required for activities that impact on the environment. There are five 
different forms of resource consents defined by the New Zealand Resource Management Act 1991 
(RMA): land use consents, subdivision consents, water permits, discharge permits and coastal permits 
(Ministry for the Environment: 2015). 
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But there still remains the problem of what Jörg Niewöhner has termed the “ethnog-
rapher’s third fear of the field” 15 (Niewöhner 2014: 211). Following Rolf Lindner’s 
seminal publication reflecting on the anxieties of entering the field (Lindner 1981), and 
more recent considerations about “studying up” or the ethnography of experts, Niewöh-
ner notes the fear of not being able to contribute anything novel that the field did not al-
ready know (Niewöhner 2014: 211). This is an anxiety that specifically grows out of the 
conceptual space of the „co-laborative“ ethnography of urban infrastructures Niewöhner 
develops, which builds on epistemic partnerships between the researcher and a field 
populated with highly specialized experts and home to reflexive practices that are, more 
often than not, already in some form institutionalized (ibid).  
However, I believe this “third fear” is not limited to situations with such radical epis-
temic symmetry, but generally plays a role in the later stages of an ethnographic project. 
Upon re-entering the field the question becomes inevitable: how can the ethnographic 
findings that have been fed into the academic discourse already be made relevant again 
for the collaborators in the field? After reading an earlier version of this book, my main 
fieldwork partner, Jim Dahm, commented on how it helped him to reframe the Waihi 
Beach conflict case discussed in the next part. He wrote me: 
[Y]our analysis and interpretation of what went on broke open the whole situation 
for me. To be honest, it was a case that that I barely dared revisit; partly because I 
was too angry […] – you have cracked it open and helped me put things in per-
spective. […] We need more social scientists on the coast to break the situation 
open and take us beyond the sterility that the present dominant players (scientists, 
engineers, planners) are trapped in. (Jim Dahm, pers. comm., February 2015) 
 
This commentator has spent a considerable time of his life working towards coastal 
management beyond hard protection. But would my interpretation be helpful for others 
in the field as well, who did not operate in a para-ethnographic mode themselves? How 
can things be “cracked” open, and how to offer and convey some unexpected ideas to 
those very familiar with the field of study, but not with anthropological modes of rea-
soning (Ong and Collier 2005a)? Jim’s support opened up the possibility to test this, 
when he invited me to give a keynote speech at the annual conference of the Dune Res-
toration Trust of New Zealand. This event provides a meeting place for experts and vol-
unteers in dune restoration, and much of the conference time is devoted to field trips 
                                                
 
15  Original: “die dritte Angst des Forschers vor dem Feld”, translation by author. 
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around the area, to visiting people and their projects, and to other “practical” things, 
such as monitoring experiments. The conference focuses on spreading knowledge on 
techniques and approaches rather than on internal scientific exchange alone. The key-
note speeches at this conference are meant to provide additional, or contextual input: on 
climate change projections, on environmental law, or, in my case, showcase “an anthro-
pological perspective”.  
This invitation opened the floor for something I later found comparable to what 
George Marcus and Douglas Holmes describe as “para-sites”: the idea of staged events 
that “blur the boundaries between the field site and the academic conference or seminar 
room” by creating an “overlapping academic/fieldwork space” (Holmes and Marcus 
2008: 99, Footnote 1; see also Marcus 2000). These events, organized by the Center for 
Ethnography at UC Irvine, are “attended by a mix of participants from the academic 
community and from the community or network defined by fieldwork projects” (ibid). 
Marcus and Holmes suggest that the creation of para-sites could become an integral part 
of the fieldwork design (ibid).  
I tried to adapt my contribution to the Dune Restoration Trust conference for the oc-
casion. To accompany my talk and to further the discussion, I designed a brochure that 
included pictures and text to describe the main findings of my research, which I distrib-
uted during the first two days of the conference. When I delivered my talk on the morn-
ing of the third (and last) day, many had already seen the brochure and recognized the 
design in my slides.  
Both the brochure and my talk were structured not around specific sites and projects 
of dune restoration (which would have been the typical approach for this audience), but 
around central themes that had emerged from my analysis: dune restoration as a do-it-
yourself approach to coastal protection (see Chapter 8), as restoration and maintanance 
of native nature (see Chapter 9), and as reclamation of public space (see Chapter 7), as 
well as soft engineering as a different approach to ‘working with nature’ (see Chapter 
10). Besides a section on ethnographic methods, I included some theoretical input, ask-
ing what nature is and briefly explaining the notion of multiple natures and the soci-
otechnical imaginaries concept (see Chapter 2).   
Ending the talk with remarks on the contested politics of nature emerging through is-
sues of soft (and hard) coastal protection, I eventually asked: “what nature do you 
want?”. I was trying to invite the audience to look at their projects as practices of na-
ture-making, and therefore political. However, I expected that for this audience, the 
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most useful part would be the drawing of conceptual connections between different 
dune care projects – especially after Jim’s comments about contextualization and mak-
ing connections as the contribution that ethnography has to offer. I was surprised that it 
were the more theoretical and generalizing considerations about nature as practice that 
people from the audience commented on after the talk. 
In the plenary discussion, a Coast Care volunteer remarked that she found the imagi-
naries concept very inspiring to think with. She went on to explain that unicorns or San-
ta Claus were “imaginary” as well, but have a material reality in terms of their out-
comes: children believe in Santa Claus, festivities are organized and presents received. 
While my “anthropological perspective” provided some food for thought for her, I was 
inspired, too, by this straightforward discussion of what Donna Haraway calls material-
semiotic practices elsewhere (Haraway 2008)16. For the lady commenting from the au-
dience, the sociotechnical imaginaries concept seemed to have opened up nature as a 
practical political space framed by organizing visions. In the following empirical parts 
of the book, I will try to illustrate how an analysis of coastal protection practices can 
“crack open” and make visible the politics of nature at the Aotearoa New Zealand coast 
with the tools of ethnography and anthropological modes of reasoning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
16  Isabelle Stengers (2010) has discussed the world making powers of unicorns and other fantastic crea-
tures in particular.  
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Fig. 1: Title and first page of brochure designed for Dune Restoration Trust of New 
Zealand annual conference 2015 in Whitianga. 
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Part II:  
Beyond Hard Protection?  
The Waihi Beach Case 
 
 
 
Starting with a close look at a localized conflict about coastal protection measures, this 
first empirical part aims to set the stage for the discussion of soft protection in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. By unwinding a local history of coastal development and existing coastal 
protection measures, and by analysing the decision-making process for the common fu-
ture, I will show how in Waihi Beach, coastal erosion has become a tangible, visible 
problem. For the time being, hard protection has been defined as part of the solution by 
politics and legal action, but it remains detested and disapproved of by significant parts 
of the local community as well as by the larger community of practice promoting soft 
protection. In spite of increasing controls regulating the use of hard protection works in 
coastal policy and planning, a new coastal protection scheme has recently been built in 
the small coastal town of Waihi Beach. The local Western Bay of Plenty District Coun-
cil (WBOPDC) aimed to protect about 80 beachfront houses by replacing existing, 
mostly defunct protection works. The Waihi Beach protection scheme now consists of a 
mix of measures and also includes soft ones: the construction of an artificial dune and 
the use of geotextiles. The controversial part, however, remains the seawall, consisting 
of rocks placed along approximately 1 km of the beach: large boulders of about 0.8-1.2 
meters in diameter, piled up to a rock revetment of 3.5 meters height and 3.4 meters 
depth (Western Bay of Plenty District Council 2010). 
Years of searching for options to replace the existing older structures that preceded 
the construction revealed the complexity and political dividedness of the question of 
how to address coastal erosion in Waihi Beach. Disagreement grew between beachfront 
property owners who supported the Council scheme and the majority of Waihi Beach 
residents who opposed it. Political struggles over the right science ensued, with experts 
commissioned and the public engaged. For those resisting the Council’s plan to protect 
beachfront houses against erosion – arguing it was not in the public interest to impede 
public enjoyment of and access to the beach – the case was about democratic represen-
tation and procedures as much as it was about the question of how to best deal with nat-
ural coastal systems. Disappointment over the Council’s approach to dealing with its 
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dissenting citizens finally culminated in an appeal to the Environment Court by two 
Waihi Beach residents, trying to stop the revetment plans. The appeal was declined in 
2008 and the scheme built. However, although construction of the seawall and creek 
training parts of the scheme had been completed in 2011 (the artificial dune proved 
more complex a task, which will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 5.1), the case 
has yet to be settled. On the one hand, the political repercussions still remain noticeable 
on the local level. On the other hand, the scheme has only been granted a temporary re-
source consent, and by 2020, the Council will have to present a long-term solution – a 
condition that recognizes the wide-spread understanding that the seawall cannot be the 
long-term option to deal with coastal erosion at Waihi Beach. Two possible long-term 
options – rediverting beach creeks and managed retreat of existing houses – had already 
emerged during the years of consulting and evaluating options preceding the current 
measures; however, both turned out to be technically, but not politically, doable. It is 
relatively unlikely that within a few years’ time, new technical options will be on the 
table, which makes it difficult for people involved in the Waihi Beach case to imagine 
possible futures – especially without the seawall. 
Although the scheme consists of a bundle of measures, it is consistently referred to 
as the “Waihi Beach seawall” – also in official documents (Environment Court of New 
Zealand 2007; Chadwick 2008), a name under which it has gained notoriety in Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s coastal management circles. While the resource consents were issued at 
a time when an earlier version of the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement was still 
operative (Department of Conservation 1994), a newer version of the current statement 
had already been proposed, further tightening the rules for hard protection and support-
ing the viewpoint of many commentators that this scheme represents a largely outdated 
way to deal with coastal hazards (Department of Conservation 2008; Department of 
Conservation 2010). 
While following ‘soft protection’ through many diverse fields and locales, coastal 
experts and other interested people alike were asking me: “Have you seen Waihi 
Beach?” My interlocutors were probing if I was aware of the possible pitfalls of advo-
cating soft protection, and at the same time insisting that the seawall as a monument of 
failed attempts to do so would actually be the best place to start investigating soft pro-
tection put into practice. With the following empirical part (II) I will do just that. By 
starting off with what might be understood as an example of failure to realize a ‘work-
ing with nature’ approach, I want to provide room to show that the emergence of a soci-
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otechnical imaginary does not necessarily come without conflict and contradictions. 
Looking into what the actors involved perceive to be the heart of the problem at Waihi 
Beach, and what people agree and disagree about, I aim to develop an understanding of 
the political, social, and cultural dimensions at stake when coastal protection options are 
discussed, negotiated, decided, and those decisions acted upon. In the process of these 
decisions about coastal protection technology, the community and its representation are 
coproduced, as is the authority of experts that comes into being through the practices of 
consultations, hearings, and reports.  
Chapter 4 introduces the community of Waihi Beach in the Western Bay of Plenty. 
The chapter lays the foundation for the in-depth discussion of the case as a failed at-
tempt to move beyond hard protection measures. I first provide a short history of the 
coastal settlement and the events leading up to the Council’s decision to build the sea-
wall, and discuss the options for future works that have been on the agenda so far. This 
is followed by a close reading of the Environment Court appeal decision that allowed 
the project to move ahead, concentrating on how the options and the decision-making 
process were framed by the two parties and the Court.  
Chapter 5 looks beyond the preliminary closure of the conflict after the resource con-
sent for the protection scheme was granted and the construction had started. This broad-
ens the perspective towards the sociotechnical and political future of the Waihi Beach 
protection scheme. I will pick up on the idea of the coproduction of social and natural 
worlds and focus on the political repercussions of the conflict. I will discuss the transi-
tion to soft methods in the Waihi Beach case (5.1) together with changing understand-
ings of what it means to be a community also in the political sense (5.2). Tangata when-
ua (local Māori people) have not been a very visible political force in this conflict so 
far, but as will be shown, this might change in the near future when the protection 
scheme needs to be reassessed (5.3). This might happen rather sooner than later, since 
the seawall has only a temporary resource consent that expires after 25 years. The last 
part of the chapter (5.4) assesses a situation where “the science is done”, as fieldwork 
contacts put it. It zooms in on the role that the materiality of the seawall itself might po-
tentially play within the coastal policy arena. Can Waihi Beach serve as a last example 
of its kind before the tides will eventually turn towards coastal protection that works 
with nature, and not against it? 
The chapters consult documents produced before and during the Environment Court 
appeal: scientific reports, minutes of Council meetings, brochures and newsletters to in-
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form the residents, submissions to the resource consent, evidence produced by appel-
lants and witnesses, and the Court decision itself. The more ethnographic layers of the 
analysis build on fieldwork experience: participant observation and extensive interviews 
with actors central to the Court case, or otherwise involved at Waihi Beach. This mate-
rial is used to work out underlying themes that address what people envision, embrace 
or reject as possible futures; perspectives that were negotiated inside and outside the 
courtroom. In this case, the sociotechnical imaginary that promotes ‘working with na-
ture’ (and not against it), although welcomed by many involved in the case, has run up 
against resistance from powerful positions: the Council, the property owners, and the 
Environment Court, which in the end made it impossible to turn ideas into realities (for 
now). This will be a useful starting point to illustrate the backdrop against which soft 
coastal protection is emerging in Aotearoa New Zealand, and demonstrate the political 
significance of the topic. Choosing a site of conflict allows zooming in on different ac-
tors’ tacit understandings of coastal natures, rendered intelligible through a close read-
ing of their epistemological and normative positions.  
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4.   Historical Transect of a Coastal Protection Conflict 
 
4.1 “Have You Seen Waihi Beach?” 
 
Waihi Beach is a small town in the very northwestern corner of the Bay of Plenty re-
gion. The permanent population is just below 2,000 (Statistics New Zealand 2013c), but 
during the summer holiday season about ten times as many people stay in Waihi Beach 
(Waihi Beach Community Board 2007). The season roughly spans from November to 
February in this region of Aotearoa New Zealand’s North Island, which is a popular 
family destination thanks to its favourable climate, sunny weather and accessible sandy 
beaches.  
Peak time is around Christmas, when much of the country files to the coast for the 
typical antipodean combination of summer break, Santa Claus and beach barbecue. The 
Western Bay of Plenty is becoming increasingly popular not only as a holiday destina-
tion, but also for a coastal lifestyle endorsing second homes or retirement villages, with 
new suburban areas sprawling around the port city of Tauranga, about 45 minutes to the 
southeast. Waihi Beach, however, still has the kiwi “feel”: there are no larger hotels or 
apartment blocks and most visitors stay at the holiday park camping sites, motel or self-
contained accommodation. Many have come here for years or even decades. The town 
centre consists of not much more than a main road with a supermarket, some restau-
rants, fish and chips and a pie shop – and real estate agents, evidence to a vivid coastal 
property market, indicating that coastal change has not passed by the town. However, 
still “people can do the real kiwi thing at Waihi Beach” (WBOPDC 2007)17: hanging 
out at the beach, boating, fishing, surfing, or going for a hike over the headland to 
Orokawa Reserve where the landscape is dominated by stands of beautiful Pohutukawa, 
which are covered in characteristic crimson blossoms around December.18  
                                                
 
17 The Waihi Beach Ward 20-Year Community Forum Minutes (WBOPDC 2007) also mention “the six-
ties feel”, and describe Waihi Beach as a “beachy”, “family-oriented place”. Residents at the meeting 
are quoted stating “we would like to keep the simplicity of Waihi Beach” and “we don’t want another 
Mount Maunganui”.  
18  This has been the traditional image of the New Zealand Christmas since the Pohutukawa was dubbed 
the “Settlers’ Christmas Tree” in the 19th century (Ministry for Culture and Heritage (2013a). Until 
today it remains “the most recognised plant of the whole wonderful New Zealand Scenery”, a central 
icon of the postcolonial country found on all matters kiwi, from postcards to artworks (The Complete 
New Zealand Holiday Guide 2008-2013).  
 76 
The “kiwi thing” very much evolves around the enjoyment of nature, the sea and the 
beach; there is not much happening in town in the sense of urban pleasures, the next 
cinema is a 45-minutes drive away, and social life evolves around lifeguard events, the 
pub, and the RSA (Royal New Zealand Returned and Services’ Association). Waihi 
Beach is a “laid-back village” (WBOPDC 2007) and the sandy beach is its primary rai-
son d’être, stretching from a headland in the north almost nine kilometres down to the 
Bowentown Heads, marking the entrance into Tauranga Harbour. 
At the northern end, where the beach is bordered by the headland, access ways 
marked by the local volunteer dune restoration Coast Care group lead from the big park-
ing lot onto the beach, passing through 20-30 metres of shallow dunes, cordoned off 
with knee-high timber bollards and thick rope. Much of the dunes have been replanted 
with striving native plants – mostly Spinifex and Pingao, and a sign explains how these 
help to build up the beach, showing pictures of how this end of the beach looked in the 
mid-1990s when Coast Care first started. Datum posts striped blue and white measure 
sand levels. If you ask the Coast Carers, this area gives an impression of how the beach 
would look everywhere at Waihi Beach if the dunes had enough space.  
After passing by the surf club and a small coastal reserve area, the area of the protec-
tion scheme starts. From here on, houses sit right on top of the dune, only about 2-3 me-
tres above the level of the beach. There is no sand or typical dune vegetation visible – 
but gardens, yards and lawns. The houses are built in varying distances from the dune 
edge, some as close as 5 metres to the beach. This is Shaw Road, the ultimate beach-
front. Most of the beachfront properties along this stretch of coast are estimated around 
at least 1 million NZD, though it might come as a surprise how modest most of these 
one or two storey houses and bungalows look. The first part of the protection scheme 
might be called an attempt to ‘work with nature’, only that nature has so far refused en-
rolment into the project: an artificial dune was constructed and planted with native 
vegetation in May 2011, but was almost completely eroded within a matter of days, re-
vealing underlying rocks from earlier protection works. The steep erosion scarp is plas-
tered with warning signs and large geotextiles bags, piled up to ad hoc access stairs. 
About 600 metres down the length of the coastal road, the rock revetment starts. A mas-
sive strip of large boulders is built up in front of the properties, to roughly the same 
height as the dune. Here, permanent wooden stairs serve as bridges to the beach. A walk 
on the beach has to finish here at high tide: there is no space left between the rocks and 
the surf to continue with dry feet. This inability to walk along the beach at all tides has 
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been one major argument brought forward against the seawall, which is not only a sen-
timent of local critics, but also a major provision of the New Zealand Resource Man-
agement Act (RMA). 
The relics of several decades of hard protection measures still regularly resurface at 
Waihi Beach. Timber planks and rusty steel are washed out during storms or unearthed 
by construction works. Geotextile containers in different life stages can be seen, looking 
like enormous sand-coloured cushions (a local woman despising them calls them “tam-
pons”), some almost invisible under layers of windblown sand, others covered by un-
sightly layers of green algae. These layers of different protection measures can appear 
like historical transects of coastal protection archaeology, and walking down the beach 
with an informed local turns into a guided tour through a life-sized open air museum of 
roughly a century of New Zealand coastal protection policy. Here, the whole range of 
options and the scale of the conflict are very visible.  
This is in stark contrast to the stereotypical kiwi beach imaginary that the artwork on 
a community planning document features. “Defining Our Future” it is called (Waihi 
Beach Community Board 2007), and no seawall is visible in the drawing. However, a 
disclaimer stating “artist’s impression only” is hidden on the left side of the picture. 
Whether the Council anticipates the seawall opponents to protest against this unfaithful 
representation, or whether it is cautious vis-à-vis the beachfronters who might suspect 
that they are not part of this common future (because no seawall most likely will mean 
managed retreat of at least some of the houses) remains speculation. The picture, how-
ever, seems exemplary in two ways. Firstly, it illustrates how every representation of 
this beach is caught up in the conflict about how the common future should look. This 
points to the entanglement of epistemological and normative dimensions of representing 
the world. Secondly, the artistic representation shows the central role that visibility and 
aesthetic pleasure play in the conflict around the Waihi Beach protection scheme. What 
can be seen, what people want and do not want to see on their beach is as important here 
as the trope that the Waihi Beach seawall visualizes the technopolitical failure, the ina-
bility to yet move beyond hard protection (Chapter 5.4 will elaborate on this point and 
discuss how the seawall – now that it has been rebuilt – is getting enrolled into coastal 
politics for the future).  
In the seawall area, one house particularly sticks out – this (and possibly others as 
well) might have needed to be relocated if the Environment Court appellants, their ex-
pert witnesses and allies had been able to convince the Court, the Council and the prop-
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erty owners of their alternative proposal to build a backstop wall. Located as far land-
wards as possible and serving as a last defence, the appellants, local activists and their 
supporters argued that such a backstop structure would allow more room for natural 
processes of erosion and accretion and provide sufficient space for the natural protec-
tion of a vegetated dune in front of it.  
“New Zealand is a small country with a big coastal ‘attitude’; nowhere is far from 
the sea” writes political scientist Bronwyn Hayward, quoting New Zealand poet Basil 
Dowling (Hayward 2008a). Hayward refers to the Waihi Beach example when she dis-
cusses how climate change adaptation and especially managed retreat as a political in-
strument challenges existing democratic processes. Conflict between private interests 
and public resources, beach access and amenity, she argues, is complicated by the com-
plexity of temporal and spatial scales: the benefits of current and future generations, the 
effects of earlier decisions to develop the coast and/or build hard defences, and the im-
pact of such defences on neighbouring areas (Hayward 2008a: 55f.). Political scales 
matter as well: the incongruency of election cycles with slow-onset climate change, and 
the effects of devolving such decisions to local level authorities, which do not have the 
national guidance and resources in terms of research and technical expertise they would 
require to confront local private interests:  
Deep battle lines between those campaigning for ‘dobs’ (defend our baches) or 
‘sobs’ (save our beaches) are common and extremely difficult for local Councils to 
manage. (Hayward 2008a: 55) 
 
Referring to political philosopher Iris Marion Young, Hayward argues that public delib-
eration and a strengthened participation of local communities in decision-making about 
coastal protection does not necessarily solve the problem, but risks to be limited to the 
immediate interests as well, also not addressing the larger scale (Hayward 2008a: 56; 
Hayward 2008b). Critical about the outcomes of one-off deliberative forums, Hayward 
observes links between interested citizens and scientists opposing hard structures as the 
most promising counterpoint to the local lobbyism of beachfront property owners. The 
following will provide a closer look at these linkages and examine how this little coastal 
town became so deeply wound up in a conflict about a narrow strip of sand between 
land and sea, a conflict dividing the community, seemingly intractable within the cur-
rent political and legal situation. 
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Fig. 2: Waihi Beach, Shaw Road, before construction of the new scheme (low tide). 
Picture by author, February 2010. 
 
Fig. 3: Waihi Beach, Shaw Road before construction of the new scheme (high tide). 
Picture by author, February 2010. 
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Fig. 4: Waihi Beach Surf Club area, with signs of Coast Care work. 
Picture by author, December 2010. 
 
Fig. 5: Waihi Beach, Three Mile Creek training with geotextile bags.  
Picture by author, December 2010. 
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Fig. 6: Construction of the seawall. Picture by author, September 2011. 
 
 
Fig. 7: The new seawall at low tide. Picture by author, March 2015.  
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4.2 Coastal Protection History on a Changing Coastline 
 
The Waihi Beach area was first settled by Nga Marama settlers, descendants of Toi and 
the first Polynesian inhabitants of the Bay of Plenty (probably around 1150-1250 AD). 
It was later taken over by Ngai Te Rangi Iwi, arriving on one of a series of voyaging 
canoes making landfall in the area19. The first European land titles at Waihi Beach were 
issued in the early 1870s, shortly after gold was discovered (Moore 1999), and the land 
was subsequently settled by European farmers. In the early 20th century, the Waihi 
Borough Council, governing the gold mining town Waihi about 10 km inland, built a 
road to the beach (Ohinemuri Regional History Journal 1976) and acquired land at 
Waihi Beach through the Public Works Act in order to form a “public recreation and 
pleasure ground”, an early public health measure (Bay Of Plenty Times 1919; New Zea-
land Legislation 1947).  
In 1922, land was divided into small sections and leased out to mining workers suf-
fering from lung disease, to allow them to build the typical New Zealand beach huts, or 
baches, of the time20. After additional land acquisitions in 1944, “coastal development 
in Waihi Beach started in earnest in 1948” (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: 
Appendix B: 2), with the extension of the settlement further to the South. Over the next 
decade, the land was subdivided in several stages, roads extended and more baches built 
into the dune fields along the seafront. New roads were put parallel to the shore on the 
landward side of the properties, with the houses overlooking the sandy beach in front of 
them. Foredunes in front of some of the houses were lowered with bulldozers to provide 
for unimpeded sea view, a common practice during the time (Colloins 2002; Jacobson 
2004: 57). By 1959, most of today’s absolute beachfront properties had been created in 
Shaw Road, the Loop and Glen Isla Place (see map below). With that, the “Waihi Beach 
saga” (Healy and Soomere 2008: 459) had begun. 
                                                
 
19  Today, Ngai Te Rangi is the largest of the three Māori iwi of Tauranga Moana, the Tauranga Harbour 
area (Interview Tūhua Brown, see also Waitangi Tribunal 2000). Otawhiwhi marae in neighbouring 
Bowentown, built in 1870, is its northernmost marae or meeting house. 
20  In 1938, the former 10-year leases were extended to 21-year terms with perpetual right of renewal, see 
also New Zealand Legislation 1994. For examples of typical New Zealand beach baches see Grigor 
(2008).  
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Waihi means rising waters in Te Reo Māori21. Ironically, the name would become 
programmatic for the later chapters of Waihi Beach’s coastal history: waters were in-
deed to rise for the beachfronters. The authorities at the time seem to have acted as if 
they could rely on the terrain to be developed as a fixed and permanent matter. Howev-
er, this turned out to be wrong, as the natural beach system was actually fluctuating be-
tween stages of long-term erosion and accretion. Worse still, most of the development 
seems to have taken place at a time when the beach was unusually wide. Historical 
maps and aerial photography analysed by Jim Dahm in a report for the Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council suggest that in 1953, the shoreline had been in accretion for at least 
half a century (Eco Nomos Ltd. 2003). Since the turn of the 20th century, the dunes in 
front of one of the beachfront roads (Shaw Road) had advanced at least 20 metres – 
leaving about 50 metres of coastal reserve between property boundaries and the high 
tide line, or mean high water springs (MHWS). 
Around the same time that beachfront development was accelerating, however, the 
natural dynamics of the beach changed as well. Soon a series of severe storms hit the 
Bay of Plenty and resulted in erosion of beach and foredunes, amounting to the loss of 
about 10 metres of land in each of several storms (Eco Nomos Ltd. 2003: 47) through-
out the mid-1950s to late 1960s, including the notorious Wahine storm in 196822. In ad-
dition to these extreme storm events, first effects of human modifications of the beach 
environment also became noticeable: two creeks had been channelled onto the beach to 
discharge drainage and stormwater into the ocean; now they caused chronic erosion 
around the development, especially where the stream mouths were migrating on the 
beach23. As a result, several houses were relocated further back on their sections from 
                                                
 
21  The name is attributed to an early Māori explorer using a hollowed-out branch or a hollow reed stuck 
into the ground to drink from a creek on the beach that had dried out, but still had water running un-
derneath the sand (Anderson 1968).  
22  Cyclone Giselle hit New Zealand in April 1968 and received its popular name from the Interislander 
ferry Wahine that sank in Wellington harbour, resulting in 53 deaths (Hutching 2009: 193).  
23  Land-use changes increase stormwater runoff and potentially increase erosion caused by the streams. 
There are conflicting versions as to when these creeks were built or their course changed, or if they 
were “man made” or “man changed” (Interview with Tūhua Brown, Otawhiwhi Marae representa-
tive). In regard to Two Mile Creek, Dullnig et al. (2010) state that Two Mile Creek was constructed in 
1951 “to drain backshore”. A local informant reports this had already been done in 1938: “The water 
that goes down Two Mile Creek used to come out round the RSA Hall, behind where the school is, 
and came out, apparently here at Brighton Park, that it’s original course. And that was 1938, when the 
local woman that owned the farm employed, I think it was Hungarians […] to actually manually dig 
Two Mile Creek and put it out there. So it is a man made structure. I think it was to sort of drain the 
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the 1950s onwards (Eco Nomos Ltd. 2003: 47; Environment Court of New Zealand 
2007: Appendix B: 1). To protect the houses at the beachfront, the authorities of the 
time24 started to construct what over the years would become a potpourri of coastal pro-
tection structures.  
Orchestrated protection works first began in 1962, about ten years after Shaw Road 
had first been extended (Bear 2009: 5ff.; Lumsden 2011: 1). A timber seawall was con-
structed parallel to the beach to protect nine properties along Shaw Road, and Two Mile 
Creek25 was confined between timber walls to stop its meandering. In 1969, another 
seawall followed, this time using not only timber, but also steel posts as well as rocks 
which were put directly behind the structure to “backfill” it. Additionally, 12 metre-long 
groynes26 were constructed from gabions. Until the mid-1980s, similar structures were 
built in several sections along most of the beachfront development, and more rocks 
were put seaward of the walls and along the timber part in attempts to further stabilize 
the works.  
In 1989, a local government reform meant that a new local authority took over re-
sponsibility in Waihi Beach. The town became a part of the newly formed Western Bay 
of Plenty District Council27 (WBOPDC) within the Bay of Plenty (BOP) region. The 
new municipality inherited a coastal protection structure that had literally begun to fall 
apart. Two years later (in 1991), the Resource Management Act (RMA) was introduced, 
                                                                                   
 
farmland because where the hall is, and where the school is, that was virtually swamp land, that's 
where we live, or just behind it, and it is fairly low lying. And [when] we get a lot of rain, especially 
on this end here, the water decides that it wants to come back through the old water course if it gets a 
chance.” (Interview with Ron Whitherspoon, Waihi Beach Coast Care) In any case, it seems that at 
least one of the major creeks had been manipulated in the mid-20th century, arguably contributing to 
the erosion of the beach.  
24  The local authority changed after local government reforms in 1989, see following section.  
25  The creeks are called – in pragmatic settler logic – according to their distance from the northeastern 
tip of the beach: Two Mile Creek and Three Mile Creek. The latter is also known as Waiorooro creek 
in Te Reo Māori. 
26  Groynes are hard structures built perpendicular to the coast to act as wave breakers and sand traps. 
The gabions used in this case to construct the groynes are wire baskets filled with heavy stones.  
27  In 1989, the Local Government Amendment Bill was passed by the New Zealand Parliament, imple-
menting far-reaching local government reforms and reorganizing a complicated, historically grown 
structure with hundreds of local boards and county Councils. The country was divided into 16 regions, 
roughly following the large watersheds, each governed by a Regional Council. The regions were fur-
ther divided into 74 smaller units, each represented by a District Council (in rural areas) or a City 
Council as local government bodies. Waihi Beach became part of the Bay of Plenty Regional Council 
(BOP-RC; also known as Environment BOP) and the Western Bay of Plenty Regional Council 
(WBOPDC), whereas Waihi became part of the Hauraki District Council and the Waikato Regional 
Council (also known as Environment Waikato) (The Department of Internal Affairs 2015).  
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profoundly altering Aotearoa New Zealand’s regulative environment and requiring 
Councils to develop new, comprehensive planning documents. The RMA introduced the 
resource consent as an instrument to regulate all uses of the environment, including pri-
vate land. As the Council later argued, since the structure did not have a valid consent, 
WBOPDC as the new owner of the structure was “required to legalize its existence by 
applying for consent to maintain it or to remove it under the Regional Coastal Environ-
ment Plan” (attachments to Keall 2006), another requirement under the RMA28. 
Throughout the 1990s, however, beachfront residents continued to reinforce the protec-
tion structures, without seeking permission by the Council, and often with detrimental 
effects on the structure as a whole, as a local resident remembers:  
The owners got together and came along with trucks, organized to dump rocks in 
behind. Before that it was just little rocks in behind. And the trucks just tipped the 
rocks and smashed the walls – we talk about the wall wasn’t maintained [laughs], 
but it was, a lot of it was self-inflected damage, you know, authorized by the prop-
erty owners. And it [was] just sort of basic lack of care. (Interview with Henry 
Tamm, Waihi Beach)  
 
While this practice was illegal under the RMA, the new Council reportedly did not pre-
vent the actions. Expert reports commissioned by the Council in 1996 concluded that 
“the works were having no positive effects on the beach but were continuing to provide 
some protection to beachfront property” (Environment Court 2007: Appendix B: 3f.).  
Put differently, it could also be argued that the protection works were near the end of 
their useful lives, and were having negative impacts on the beach. The report confirmed 
what local residents had been observing for a long time: the structures on the beach 
were increasing coastal erosion, access to the beach around the structures was difficult 
at high tide, and pieces of rusty iron and concrete could be considered a hazard in them-
selves. There was general agreement in the community that it looked bad and that some-
thing had to be done. The beachfront property owners, though still feeling protected by 
the dilapidated wall, were thinking no different from the rest of the community. Robert 
                                                
 
28  See also Environment Court (2007: 13), quoting evidence in regard to a 1983 consent to place further 
rocks: “Although this consent was due to expire 6 months after the Regional Coastal Environment 
Plan became operative, an extension of the existing consent was sought, providing an additional 2 
years for the existing structure thus maintaining the legal status of the seawall while consents for the 
present application were lodged”. After the introduction of the Resource Management Act (RMA) in 
1991, all Regional Councils were required to prepare a Regional Coastal Environment Plan (see De-
partment of Conservation n.d.). The BOP Regional Council introduced the first Transitional Regional 
Plan and Transitional Regional Coastal Plan in 1991 (Environment Bay of Plenty 1991).  
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Cook, a beach-front resident and member of an interest group promoting the Waihi 
Beach protection scheme describes the situation at the time:  
The rock wall actually worked; there’s no doubt about it. […] It actually worked 
‘cause it held the line. It was just that it was such a dilapidated... it had never been 
repaired for probably 30 years. Oh, it looked horrible […]. The timber stuff with 
the sort of, the horrible looking rocks and a jumbled mess. (Interview with Robert 
Cook, Waihi Beach) 
 
At this point, Waihi Beach had become subject to considerable economic change as 
well: coastal change (Freeman and Cheyne 2008) was well underway. While the District 
Council had implemented building controls into its Regional Plan in the mid-1990s, 
these proved insufficient to prevent further development of the beachfront because ex-
isting buildings could still easily be replaced (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: 
Appendix B: 1ff.)29. Many sections had been turned into freeholds (private property) af-
ter the original legislation was repealed in 1976, allowing the former Waihi Borough 
Council to sell the original lease-hold sections to lessees (New Zealand Legislation 
2007). This meant that people could now buy beach baches, including title for the sec-
tion of land, and later replace the bach with a much larger house suitable for permanent 
living, as long as it was theoretically relocatable (Environment Court of New Zealand 
2007: Appendix B: 2f.).  
This upgrading became common practice in the 1990s in a climate of economic 
boom, as more and more people were investing in coastal property, second homes at the 
coast became very popular, and many people began planning for retirement at the sea. 
Public investment in road infrastructure led to considerable decreases in travel times, 
and coastal areas within a radius of about three hours driving time became accessible 
for second home buyers from the urban centres, especially Auckland – causing the ac-
ronym jafA – “just another fucking Aucklander” – to become a common derogatory 
term used by those resenting the influx of affluent city people into rural areas. Before 
                                                
 
29  These building controls relying on so-called hazard lines developed by University of Waikato Coastal 
Science Professor Terry Healy also led to an Environment Court case. Beachfront property owners 
represented by the Waihi Beach Protection Society and the Regional Council were both challenging 
the District Council over high and low risk zones in its proposed District Plan and different rules ap-
plied to those. The Protection Society wanted the tighter rules for building in the high risk zone loos-
ened, whereas the RC wanted both areas to be governed under the high risk rules (applying discre-
tionary activity status to all building/construction) (Jacobson 2004a).  
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that, most baches had been owned by people from the vicinity, like this couple in their 
70s who owned a farm 30 km inland of Waihi Beach discusses: 
It was handy […], half an hour you’d be out here, so why do you want to go 
somewhere else for, you know. It’s different with kids these days, they’ve got fast-
er cars and everything else. We used to say it took us 35 minutes... I would be out 
here a lot [on] weekends, in the early times when John was still milking, and he 
might be backwards and forwards. But from the time we bought [the bach] John 
had staff, so he was able to come in and enjoy it. Yeah, weekends off and that sort 
of thing you know. (Interview with Mr and Mrs Watkinson, Waihi Beach) 
 
When agricultural businesses and land were becoming increasingly valuable, this couple 
– like many other farmers – eventually sold their dairy farm and replaced their bach 
with a family home, fulfilling their dream to retire at the beachfront. Property prices in 
Aotearoa New Zealand generally were steeply rising during the 1990s30. Just before the 
global financial crisis started to be felt in a domestic property market crash in 2006/07, 
Waihi Beach and some other more rural and quiet communities (as opposed to the Tau-
ranga suburbs and communities closer to Auckland) had started to pick up enormously 
on the boom, with prices for seafront sections doubling or even tripling within only a 
few years. In April 2005, a local real estate agent told the BOP Times that  
some people had called into his office saying the Mount [Mount Maunganui, a 
suburb of Tauranga] was too big and noisy. They liked Waihi Beach because it was 
quieter – just like the Mount was 25 years ago. (Woodrad and Skellern 2005) 
 
This situation would become a significant factor in any decision about how to deal with 
the rotting seawall and the ongoing erosion endangering those houses located too close 
to the sea. As has been shown above, there was considerable agreement about the situa-
tion at that time and even its causes; however, the question of how to address this situa-
tion was about to become a very divisive issue, eventually pitting the Council and the 
beach-front property owners supporting the new seawall against the majority of the 
community objecting to it. “Unfortunately, as the time went on there was them against 
us... And still is”, says Robert Cook from the beachfronter’s lobbying group, and one of 
his fiercest opponent regrets as well that “it certainly divided the community”.  
                                                
 
30  Values continued to rise until they reached an all-time high in 2006/07, when the effects of the global 
financial crisis led to a sudden decrease in prices. In 2010/11, values were back to 2003 numbers for 
most coastal property (Morris 2010).  
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From this short history of Waihi Beach’s coastal development history, three points in 
time can be identified as crucial moments with long-lasting repercussions for the future. 
Firstly, many would point to the initial development of land this close to a changing 
shoreline as a historical mistake. However, this was only turned into a legacy for com-
ing generations when, secondly, the first protection works were put in place, setting a 
precedent for coastal property owners who now expected ongoing protection against the 
sea, creating a false sense of security (Cooper and McKenna 2008a) that contributed to 
further accumulation of value in the coastal zone – or even a legal liability, as the Coun-
cil argues: 
Had the Ohinemuri County Council decided in the 1960s to let nature take its 
course with dune replenishment, rather than putting protection schemes in place, 
there would be no onus on the Western Bay of Plenty District Council today to 
build a rock revetment or take any other erosion protection action. However once 
protection measures are put in place, the local authority is legally liable to continue 
to protect the foreshore properties that have historically been protected. (Western 
Bay of Plenty District Council n.d.)  
 
This concern of the Council over the possibility of litigious action by affected property 
owners has been a controversial issue because the Council denied any actual legal 
threats by beachfront property owners, something many residents and experts involved 
strongly suspected had been a driving factor for the Council’s decision to build a new 
seawall. In any case, the question concerns solely financial liability or compensatory 
claims for properties on which the Council as the responsible agency for building regu-
lations had once allowed development. It does not translate into a general political re-
sponsibility to provide coastal protection, which in itself is not a duty of the state in Ao-
tearoa New Zealand, and neither local, nor regional or national authorities are mandated 
to provide those structures. In a decision relating to Wainui Beach in the Hawkes Bay 
Region, the Environment Court held in 1995:  
There is no duty on the Council to protect land from erosion, and it is no longer 
taken for granted that the natural process of erosion is necessarily an evil or mis-
chief to be stopped wherever possible. (Environment Court of New Zealand 1994 
see Jacobson 2004a: 52) 
 
Lastly, as a third contributing factor, the coastal change phenomenon (Peart 2009) dras-
tically sharpened the problem, whereas at the time of the original development, build-
ings had only been of minor value. The economic effects of coastal change and increas-
ing prices, insufficient political regulation of coastal development, and ensuing coastal 
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gentrification would add up to a mixture that eventually turned this sleepy little town in-
to “The Waihi Beach Case”. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Aerial view of Waihi Beach, Bay of Plenty, showing Shaw Road and Dillon 
Street and erosion around Two Mile Creek (to the left). Picture by Whites Aviation Ltd. 
Photographs, 2 December 1955, Ref: WA-40388-F. Alexander Turnbull Library, Wel-
lington, New Zealand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Who Owns the Beach? Defending the Local Coast 
 
In 1996, WBOPDC started to assess possible options for addressing coastal erosion at 
Waihi Beach. Workshops were held with Council staff, politicians and coastal experts, 
some also including interested members of the community. A wide range of options 
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were selected for assessment by a coastal engineering company, encompassing the 
whole spectrum of measures from hard to soft, including a new seawall, dune restora-
tion, managed retreat, closing or re-diverting the creeks on the beach, as well as combi-
nations of several options (Western Bay of Plenty District Council 1997, see Jacobson 
2004b: 57). In a review of the coastal hazards policies of the (then active) New Zealand 
Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS) 1994 for the Ministry of Conservation, Mike Jacob-
son quotes from this initial report to show that at this stage, a seawall was not deemed a 
satisfactory option by the consultants: 
Seawalls do provide local protection to the backshore property, but at a cost to the 
beach and adjacent shoreline areas. […] All of the hard engineering options are in-
consistent with Resource Management Act Principles and national, regional, and 
local policy, and generally have the highest costs and adverse effects. (Gibb and 
Tonkin & Tailer Ltd. 1997, see Jacobson 2004b: 58)  
 
Repeatedly, so-called upper catchment stream diversion turned out to be the option pre-
ferred by both coastal experts and locals alike, something that beachfront owners and 
other factions in the community could agree on (Keall 2006: Appendix 3). The idea en-
visaged was to re-divert the creeks into Tauranga Harbour, so that drainage and storm-
water from the inland would be directed into an embayed natural harbour, instead of 
discharging it onto the sandy open coast beach where it was causing chronic erosion 
around the beachfront development nearby.  
The Council, however, took the option off the agenda in 2002, after receiving advice 
that costs of around 11.5 million NZD were expected – deemed unaffordable in a situa-
tion where the Council had to rely on charging the ratepayers for the costs of coastal 
protection (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: Appendix B: 10). Mike Jacobson, 
in his assessment, therefore comes to the conclusion that in the Waihi Beach case,  
[a]ffordability is the clear barrier to implementing the alternative option which rep-
resents both the desired long-term option and the option that is the most sustainable 
and most in accord with the NZCPS. This would involve stream diversions and 
limited retreat of development (Jacobson 2004a: 29.) 
 
Because of the focus on immediate costs, stream diversion did not hold up against other 
options which have lower investment costs, but require ongoing maintenance31. Stream 
diversion was considered to work long-term because it was meant to address a major 
                                                
 
31  The scheme eventually implemented cost 5.9 million NZD and has consent for a period of 25 years.  
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cause of coastal erosion at Waihi Beach, instead of addressing the symptoms. Many 
people involved still think of this as a future solution – including the Council and the 
Environment Court, as will be discussed below.  
Managed retreat, on the other hand, would have been long-term in that it would have 
removed existing development out of the immediately impacted areas of coastal ero-
sion. Such an approach would have required the relocation of at least some of the about 
80 threatened beach-front properties – not necessarily removing them completely, but 
possibly relocating them further back on existing sections, at the owners’ direct expens-
es or via Council paying relocation and recuperating costs through rating (Keall 2006: 
Appendix 3; Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: Appendix B). 32 Considerations 
of this kind of long-term solution called the beachfronters into action, who formed the 
Waihi Beach Protection Society to represent their interest in structural measures provid-
ing immediate protection to their properties.  
The Protection Society not only lobbied against managed retreat for existing proper-
ties; at the same time they also challenged the Council’s coastal planning policy for fu-
ture development which was effectively aiming to at least keep coastal development at 
the current scale. As mentioned above, hazard lines had been in place since the mid-
1990s, however with limited success. When the Council aimed to further restrict devel-
opment in the Primary Risk Zone, the Waihi Beach Protection Society lodged an appeal 
at the Environment Court in 2002 (Environment Court of New Zealand 2002, see Ja-
cobson 2004b: 29). In the decision, the judge elaborates on the possibility of (future) 
managed retreat as the background against which these planning decision were to be 
made. By referring to a lack of “effective protection by way of properly designed engi-
neering works”, he also comments on what he sees as adequate “public work[s]” for 
coastal protection at Waihi Beach and shows sympathy for the beachfronters concerns, 
while acknowledging that this was less of a legal and more of a political decision to be 
made by the Council:  
We share the concern expressed [by the judge in the Falkner v Gisborne District 
Council (Environment Court of New Zealand 2002, see Jacobson 2004b: 29)] over 
the policy of ‘managed retreat’. There is a grim connotation for beachfront proper-
ty owners who perceive themselves as not only lacking local government support, 
                                                
 
32  This can also be considered a form of managed retreat. An informant working as a coastal expert for a 
Regional Council argues that hazard lines that require relocation after erosion has reached a prede-
fined trigger point are a form of case-by-case managed retreat.  
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but exposed on that account to the greater likelihood of damage to their properties 
from coastal hazards. We are not, of course, dealing in these proceedings with any 
specific consent application to establish or restore particular works on either beach. 
As matters stand, properties in the immediate vicinity of both beaches are without 
effective protection by way of properly designed engineering works. It has been 
said often enough that this Court is not vested with authority to commit a Council 
to the financial obligation and responsibility of undertaking a public work, nor to 
determine how a Council’s funds should be allocated in the face of other priorities 
beyond the Court’s knowledge or concern. We therefore apprehend that, however 
attracted we are to the [Waihi Beach Protection] Society’s plea for the timber wall 
to be reinstated and maintained, a decision to pursue that course must rest with the 
[Western Bay of Plenty] District Council. It may well be that the Council will con-
clude after further investigation and consideration that at least some form of formal 
beach protection work is the best practicable option at either beach. (Environment 
Court of New Zealand 2007: 11f.) 33  
 
In response to the Waihi Beach Protection Society’s lobbying efforts, managed retreat 
options were not followed up further, and after stream diversion had been taken off the 
agenda, the Council decided to proceed with a rock revetment (seawall) around the 
creek areas and along Shaw Road. This was presented as a short-term solution only, 
however, without addressing how a long-term strategy could be envisaged, apart from 
hinting at a general willingness to potentially reconsider creek diversion at some point 
in the future34. Mike Jacobson notes the decision to build the seawall has been justified 
in ways incompatible with the NZCPS 1994. In its resolution to proceed with the pro-
tection works, the WBOPDC District Directions Committee states that the 
diversion of Two-Mile Creek and Three-Mile Creek to Tauranga Harbour is con-
sidered to be the best long-term sustainable option to address coastal erosion in its 
locality at Waihi Beach [...] [The Council] agrees to the construction of protection 
works in the short term at both Two-Mile Creek and Three-Mile Creek. Reason: 
That [rock revetment] protection works […] are considered at present to be the best 
practicable option to address coastal erosion. (WBOPDC District Directions Com-
mittee 2002, see Jacobson 2004b: 61) 
 
                                                
 
33  Here the judge refers to the NZCPS 1994, Policy 3.4.6: “Where existing subdivision, use or develop-
ment is threatened by a coastal hazard, coastal protection works should be permitted only where they 
are the best practicable option for the future. The abandonment or relocation of existing structures 
should be considered among the options. Where coastal protection works are the best practicable op-
tion, they should be located and designed so as to avoid adverse environmental effects to the extent 
practicable.” (Department of Conservation 1994: 10) 
34  In May 2002, WBOPDC sought submissions on two options: “to divert Three Mile Creek only, con-
struct protection works in the area affected by Two Mile Creek, and undertake enhanced dune care at 
the northern end of Shaw Road; or to undertake enhanced dune care at the northern end of Shaw Road 
and build protection works only in the vicinity of both creeks.” (Environment Court 2007: 15f.)  
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Jacobson comes to the conclusion that “the reference to ‘best practicable option at pre-
sent’ is in contrast to the NZCPS Policy 3.4.6 reference to ‘best practicable option for 
the future’” (Jacobson 2004b: 61, emphasis added FG). In order to back up their solu-
tion to pursue the construction of a new seawall, the WBOPDC District Directions 
Committee decided to adopt a motion defining the objectives of the project as a whole. 
While an earlier version had stated that “the objective of the protection works is to pro-
vide protection whilst enhancing the amenity value of the beach”, the Committee re-
worded the objective when it found a rock revetment contradicted the original state-
ment. The amended motion read:  
The objective of the protection works is to provide protection whilst being de-
signed to enhance the existing appearance and safety of the beach including the 
protection works. (Keall 2006: 3) 
 
By adding public safety to the goals of the project, the bureaucrats found that from their 
point of view, they had prepared the ground for a seawall. However, the decision for a 
seawall, as well as the rewording meant to support it, sparked resistance in the commu-
nity.  
From this point on, the Council had to deal with organized resistance from seawall 
opponents as well. So far it had only been the beachfronters who were vocal as an inter-
est group lobbying for a new protection scheme; however, now the seawall opponents 
formed the Friends of the Beach (FOTB). Notably, the name of the group referred to 
“the Beach” in general, not specifying their allegiance like the Waihi Beach Protection 
Society, suggesting that they were standing up to speak for nature itself. A former 
member reminisces the starting of the group: 
In Council, the word amenity was struck out of the motion. […] I mean this was a 
unilateral decision in Council to take the amenity [formulation out of the resolu-
tion], ‘cause nobody now was speaking for the beach. And just that shortly after 
that Jim Dahm35, from Thames, came over. My neighbour decided to do something 
about it. We organized a public hearing, there were 500 people in the community 
hall, and Jim Dahm gave us a coastal lecture on dune care, and it was brilliant. And 
that was when most of us really decided, we gotta do something. (Interview with 
Henry Tamm, Waihi Beach) 
 
                                                
 
35  Jim Dahm later became an expert witness for Waihi Beach locals lodging an appeal against the pro-
tection scheme at the Environment Court. See Chapter 5.  
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The FOTB’s counterpart, The Waihi Beach Protection Society (sometimes abbreviated 
as the Protection Society), had already chosen a name that allowed the group to present 
itself as representing a greater good. While the term protection can have different mean-
ings, it has overtly positive connotations, as Cooper and McKenna describe: “Who 
could argue against protecting the coast when the opposite must imply damage or deg-
radation?” (Cooper and McKenna 2008b: 315; see my discussion in Chapter 1) 
The engagement of citizens critical of a new protection scheme was to a large part 
fuelled by the feeling that the decision if and how the beach should be protected should 
not be left to the beachfront property owners alone, a thought expressed by local activist 
and Coast Care volunteer Edgar White when he remembers his motivation to fight the 
wall: 
I’ve tried to tell people that the beach belongs to all the people from hundreds of 
miles away, doesn’t it? Not just a few people living on the front foreshore. But we 
fought this Council to stop this rock wall going up and we didn’t win […] Evil 
prevails when good people do nothing. So at least, at least we fought them. It’s bet-
ter, it’s like in life, it’s better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all. 
(Interview with Edward White, Waihi Beach) 
 
A similar point is made by J.A.G. Cooper and J. McKenna in their paper on “Social Jus-
tice in Coastal Erosion Management”, who argue that  
[i]f the arguments relating to social justice in coastal erosion management are con-
sidered at broader spatial and temporal scales it is evident that the arguments must 
also be based on the implications for coastal users who may live some distance 
from the coast, for other property owners on adjacent coasts, and also for future 
generations of users and residents. (Cooper and McKenna 2008b: 300)  
 
The FOTB group had the character of an ad hoc network rather than that of a pre-
defined interest group. Willie Walker, who was a member of the group, remembers that 
it was “very loose” in the sense that there was no clearly defined structure or procedure 
to become a member; “you didn’t have to sign anything or join anything, it was just like 
[we were] friends of Waihi Beach”. What held the group together was joint action. Wil-
lie describes how that looked:  
People like me and others went around and circulated petitions saying that they 
didn’t like the Council’s proposal to do a revetment structure at Waihi Beach. And 
once the Council announced that it was going to seek a resource consent; then peo-
ple had to prepare submissions, so people prepared submissions. And at the same 
time there were more petitions were circulated; there were street – not exactly pro-
tests, but people out in public informing anybody that wasn’t aware of what was 
going on. (Interview with Willie Walker, Waihi Beach) 
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While Willie likes to think of it as a protest movement, the group’s strategies were actu-
ally more leaning towards responsible citizenship than civil disobedience: raising 
awareness, circulating petitions, writing submissions, lobbying Council, “and then of 
course we came to the hearing phase finally; so we went to the hearings”. One could say 
that FOTB was forming a public by informing the public – invoking Waihi Beach as a 
community by sharing information they felt mattered to this community. They were re-
markably effective; the initial petition received more than 2,000 signatures (Stevenson 
2004).  
The effects of this civic engagement were still noticeable when I spoke to some of 
the former protestors. Sitting with Willie in the old and cosy bach he inherited from his 
grandfather and drinking tea, he started rummaging around in his assorted files and got 
out old info sheets distributed by the Council, or sketches for submissions in answer to 
their suggestions. During the interview, Willie often fell into the language of these 
submissions that took up the legal categories of the Resource Management Act. FOTB 
and a later group called the Waihi Beach Environment Society overlapped with the 
Coast Care constituency (see below), and as mentioned by Waihi Beach local Henry 
Tamm above, a dune restoration specialist appeared on the scene and sparked the idea 
of sustainable coastal management, probably also first introducing the opponents to a 
new idea: the backstop wall option.  
Roger Kearns and Damien Collins describe a similar example of citizens’ resistance 
in a case against the development of the Ngunguru sand spit in the Northland region, 
where they also observed the use of technical language in spite of people’s very emo-
tional entanglement with the coastal environment (Kearns and Collins 2012: 950). 
Kearns and Collins observe that this emotional attachment had direct effects on the di-
rection of the political campaign, because people wanted to keep the sand spit complete-
ly free of built structures. They quote one of their local interview partners who distances 
herself strongly from any kind of compromise in terms of development plans: “No, for-
get it. There’s no compromise there for me. It’s just not appropriate” (Kearns and Col-
lins 2012). The protesting Waihi Beach residents were also unwilling to compromise in 
that they did not want the seawall (and many continue to do so). However, there was 
openness towards discussing other options: first and foremost soft approaches.  
Under the impression of widespread resistance against the proposal by Waihi Beach 
residents, the Council again invited interested groups to a meeting in September 2003, 
where alternative options could be discussed (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: 
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16f.). FOTB presented an alternative proposal: a so-called back-stop wall, a wall that 
was to be located further back in people’s properties instead of on public ground. It 
would be much lower than the seawall and partly buried, ideally with more sand build-
ing up on top of it over time, eventually covering the wall. The existing protection 
works were to be removed to allow the natural processes more room for that to happen, 
while the backstop wall was meant to function as a final barrier that would only be ex-
posed in cases of extreme erosion events when it would protect the beachfront houses.  
Additionally, FOTB proposed beach nourishment and creek training with so-called 
geotubes, large sand-filled fabric containers. At the meeting, a number of other alterna-
tive proposals were raised by different “interested and affected parties” (Keall 2006: 
Appendix 3), supported by the Community Board or individual members of the board. 
On the one hand, it was suggested to revisit options abandoned earlier, especially man-
aged retreat. On the other hand, new options were raised that could be put under the 
joint heading of “soft engineering”. ASR Ltd. (see Chapter 10) suggested the installa-
tion of its new generation of geotextile artificial reefs, combined with beach nourish-
ment36. Another approach sponsored by a Community Board member was to use so-
called Undercurrent Stabilizers™ from Holmberg Technologies Inc. of Florida 
(Holmberg Technologies 2010), one of many new techniques promoted by small com-
panies (Western Carolina University 2013). 
Most clearly, the FOTB suggestion was not only addressing appropriate technology, 
but simultaneously also speaking to the question of responsibility, as the group asked 
for the beachfront property owners to foremost shoulder the financial burden of the 
scheme, with Council only taking on creek training (Keall 2006: Appendix 3). FOTB 
was not only trying to speak for nature, the group also claimed to represent the interests 
of the majority of the community not living directly at the beachfront. In their perspec-
tive, many of the beachfronters were not actually part of the community at all: they 
were “out of towners”, a description with clear normative underpinning, as Ron Whith-
erspoon, a long-term resident explains:  
                                                
 
36  A group of hydraulic engineering students from Delft University (NL), visiting the University of 
Waikato’s Coastal Marine Group and working on a project for Waihi Beach came up with the same 
idea, although their calculations estimated costs about twice as high as in the ASR proposal (NZD 4.8 
million compared to NZD 2 million) (Stevenson 2003).  
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The local people, are beautiful people here, they got a great little community. […] 
The out of towners come in and that’s when we get the graffiti, that’s when we get 
the torn-down letter boxes, the broken glass on the foot path, the dog faeces on the 
foot path [laughs], they’re a different type of people unfortunately. And, or they 
appear to be, and I suppose there is a little bit of resentment, there is a bit of that in 
us. You know, I think the locals sort of appreciate what we’ve got here, a lot more 
than a lot of the out of towners. There are some lovely people that come in here on 
holiday, who got holiday places, but there is an element that is fairly self-centered I 
think. (Interview with Ron Whitherspoon, Waihi Beach) 
 
By specifying what does not count as locally appropriate behaviour, the local itself is 
getting defined as well – and more so in moral terms than in terms of clearly defined pe-
riods of absence or presence in town. The ongoing resentment against the out of towners 
– or absentees37, as others call them – is at least partly fuelled by the knowledge that 
property prices have risen to over a million NZD on average for the beach front, un-
thinkable of for most of the other inhabitants, especially those who bought their houses 
a long time ago or inherited them38. The prime value of the ultimate beachfront has so 
far not been impacted by the high erosion risk that these properties have. A coastal sci-
entist involved in defining hazard lines for Council policies and plans claims, not with-
out sarcasm, that the primary hazard line is pretty much interchangeable with a “One 
Million Dollar line”. Not only is this number backed up by the local newspaper’s report-
ing on the real estate market, the same article from 2005 also repeats the unease of the 
locals with what they perceive as a buy-out:  
The Kiwi dream of owning a bach on the beach now costs $1 million – even in 
some of the smaller Bay communities. Coastal prices have almost doubled in just 
two years and a Bay of Plenty Times survey of the seaside strip from Waihi to 
Ohope has found that seven-figure sums are now the norm. The baches and homes 
are being snapped up by people from Auckland, Hamilton, Rotorua and Tauranga, 
                                                
 
37  This is a term also used in New Zealand official statistics; however, there it applies to people who are 
absent (on census night) from the dwelling they usually live in, contrary to the colloquial usage for 
people who are absent for most of the year from their second homes (Statistics New Zealand 2013b).  
38  The beachfront values are exponentially higher than houses located further back, with values for the 
second row considerably lower, often only about half of the seafront prices. Rising nominal values al-
so cause a problem for retirees and other people who bought their houses at lower market levels. Be-
cause rates are calculated according to an estimation of the property value at present, rising values 
mean rising rates, a problem for those with limited income and no intention to sell. Ron Whitherspoon 
explains what happened after the sewage system was installed around 2000 which allowed more sub-
division: “The rates have skyrocketed, and unfortunately, it’s driving a lot of people out because there 
is quite a number of people [who] are elderly, pensioners on very, very limited fixed incomes. A lot of 
our friends are in that category and they struggle to meet the rates demand.” (Interview with Ron 
Whitherspoon, Waihi Beach)  
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many of whom are using them only during the Christmas-New Year holidays and 
long weekends. (Woodrad and Skellern 2005)39 
 
The activists at the time felt that Council was carrying out the will of these rich people, 
asking for protection for their risky investments to the expense of the wider public. Ru-
mours about the local Council being threatened with litigation by beachfronters circu-
lated widely. Ron Whitherspoon says that he had managed to buy a house “just in time” 
before it would have become unaffordable for him: 
We’re talking well what to me is big money. Especially to have it lying sort of idle 
like this if you were paying a million dollar for your house […] One of the com-
ments when I first came here and this argument was starting to simmer, one of the 
comments was that the Council had been told that the beach front property owners 
were going to win because they had more money to go through the Courts than 
what Council did. Whether that was a comment that was made or not, I got a suspi-
cion that it could have had some truth. And because there is some very, very 
wealthy people involved and it’s like a lot of things. (Interview with Ron Whith-
erspoon, Waihi Beach) 
Ron goes on to underline his point by telling me about an interview he had listened to 
on the radio. It featured Sir Michael Fay, an investment banker and one of the richest 
New Zealanders, notorious for speculative transactions in the 1980s and 1990s involv-
ing former state-owned enterprises, including the purchase of New Zealand Tranz Rail, 
which saw Fay and his business partners accumulating large profits40. Fay had been fi-
nancing Aotearoa New Zealand’s first ever entry at the America’s Cup in 1987, and af-
ter the Aotearoa New Zealand team lost the race to a team from San Diego, he used a 
combination of litigious actions, re-reading of the original 1852 rules, and fostering the 
development of a new generation of fibre glass boats in his attempt to eventually secure 
victory for the Kiwis41. Ron draws a connection of this reckless attitude – rewarded by 
                                                
 
39  The article also states that “the 800 sq m properties along the Waihi Beach waterfront in Shaw Rd and 
The Loop are valued at $1.1 million – just for the land.” See also Peart 2009 on the coastal develop-
ment boom.  
40  The majority of small shareholders lost money. That gave the impression that private profits were 
trumping public interest in a rather fishy way; Sir Michael Fay and his business partner David 
Richwhite (Fay Richwhite) had actually been the main financial advisers to New Zealand Rail during 
government restructuring immediately before the selling (Gaynor 2004). Other companies involved in 
the deals were the Bank of New Zealand and Telecom New Zealand. The highly profitable transac-
tions were connected to tax avoidance deals establishing a company named European Pacific Invest-
ments on the Cook Islands, centre of the so-called “Winebox” parliamentary inquiry in 1999 (Gaynor 
1999).  
41  When the NZ team arrived second to the San Diego Yacht Club (SDYC) in 1987, Fay used litigious 
action to challenge SDYC to another Cup race in the following year, arguing that the original Deed of 
Gift did not contain a provision that meant he had to wait for a general international challenge, held 
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the Queen by bestowing knighthood on Fay “for services to merchant banking and 
yachting” (The London Gazette 1990) in 1990 – to what he perceives to have happened 
in Waihi Beach:  
And Fay says, ‘I go by the golden rule: I’ve got the gold, I make the rules’. And 
that’s always stuck with me, and I think, most probably it’s become more and more 
apparent I think, the people that have got the money make the rules. Unless there’s 
people like us that, only little I suppose, sort of ever go occasionally to sort of stop 
it, it’ll go on and on and on. (Interview with Ron Whitherspoon, Waihi Beach) 
 
So there is, at the same time, a sense of the new rich challenging the old ways of doing 
things and the respective unwritten rules, ever more stretching the possibilities of pri-
vate gains on public expense. But at the same time, these maneuvers are nonetheless 
recognized and acclaimed by the traditional powers, knighted in the most literal and tra-
ditionalist sense – a timeless coalition of money and state power that never really 
changes. There is a feeling of powerlessness conveyed through the deep disappointment 
that many of the former activists feel. Senior Waihi Beach resident Edward White still 
vividly remembers his involvement, his fight against the wall, and how it felt to be de-
feated:  
Unfortunately, I’m very disappointed with [it, we were] overridden by Courts, 
couldn’t stop them from putting rock walls up, and yet we went there with the best 
intentions. And yet the powers that be couldn’t – well, didn’t have enough – well 
the question is, where do you start? (Interview with Edward White, Waihi Beach) 
 
Edward has been an active member of Waihi Beach Coast Care for many years, and al-
so draws a connection between their volunteer dune restoration work and his opposition 
to the seawall: 
All the planting I helped do and the seeds I picked and trying to do the things nec-
essary to protect the beach and then, we get turned down by a judge that lets the 
big people build the rocks and protect their houses, but they say if they don’t pro-
tect their houses, they’re going to threaten county [the Council] with litigation. So 
it’s sort of a no win situation sometimes isn’t it? Mind you, that doesn’t stop us 
from still trying […]. You participate, and not get the result you wanted, [but] you 
still get a certain amount of pride out of having a go, don’t you? (Interview with 
Edward White, Waihi Beach) 
                                                                                   
 
typically every 3-4 years (Foster 1989). The story developed into a legal battle over the rules between 
Fay and the SDYC’s skipper Dennis Connor, when Fay had a new type of glass fibre monohull built – 
a controversial move that was answered by Connor by building a multihull (catamaran) that won the 
1988 race. Fay challenged the San Diego Yacht Club’s victory in Court, claiming the club had violat-
ed the Deed of Gifts but was defeated in 1990 (Miller 1990).  
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Edward makes a very calm, kind and amiable impression, but still there is a noticeable 
rebellious overtone that emerges towards the end of his statement. At another occasion, 
a young Council employee tells me an anecdote, trying to explain what he calls the 
“Western Bay of Plenty District Council – bad” attitude he so often encounters in his 
work life. He was having a meeting with some Coast Care representatives on the beach 
when Edward came along and was introduced to him. Edward commented succinctly 
about him: “ah, okay, one from the dark side”.  
From the perspective of the seawall opponents, the Council is much more representa-
tive of “the dark side” than the beachfronters themselves, notwithstanding the often 
quoted split in the community. In December 2003, the Waihi Beach residents made an-
other, as it turned out, last attempt to negotiate directly with one another and subse-
quently presented the Council with shared desired outcomes, agreed upon at a Council-
facilitated workshop held between FOTB, Waihi Beach Protection Society and the local 
Ratepayers’ Association (Keall 2006: Appendix 2). This “joint co-operative approach” 
was later seen as the final point of concurrence, but this path wasn’t followed any fur-
ther. A participant argued that “they [WBOPDC] were already in the process and they 
just elected not to stop the process. They just kept on going down that road” – to the 
seawall. 
In 2004, the District Council applied for resource consent to build a combination of a 
1050 metre rock revetment replacing the existing structures, “enhanced dune refor-
mation from beach scraping” (Healy 2005: 2) along another 600 metres, and training 
groynes for Three Mile creek mouth42. After lodging the application, the Council was 
obliged to invite submissions from the public. Coastal scientist Prof. Terry Healy from 
the University of Waikato, who had been conducting research on Waihi Beach since the 
1970s (Healy and Harray 1976; Harray and Healy 1978), was commissioned to under-
take a mandatory peer review of the application and some selected submissions. One of 
these had been written by the directors of the soft engineering company ASR Ltd. (see 
Chapter 10), also coastal scientists and formerly affiliated with the same university. 
                                                
 
42  The project was split up into several consents. BOP Regional Council was the responsible consent au-
thority for the creek training and earthworks in relation to the dune enhancement. For the seawall it-
self, because it was partly located below the MHWS line, some works required a separate consent 
from the Minister of Conservation. 
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Black et al. (2005) argued strongly against seawalls on open coast beaches, stating that 
they were inconsistent with both the objective to ‘work with nature’, as well as the aim 
to the address the causes of coastal erosion with long-term options: 
Seawalls […] are applied because of coastal engineering history, i.e. they are a 
hang-over from times when these coastal protection structures were the only op-
tions available. […] Successful long-term coastal protection solutions seek to di-
rectly address and work with the natural physical processes responsible for the ero-
sion, not just the effects of erosion. Coastal protection devices that only address the 
effects of erosion are often known as ‘band-aid solutions’ since they do not address 
the cause of erosion and in many cases on the open coast either accelerate the ero-
sion processes or move the problem down the coast. Seawalls are not a form of 
coastal protection, they are designed to protect the land. Because they are a ‘band-
aid’ solution, they are doomed to fail in the open coast, and will also accelerate the 
loss of sand[y] beach in front of and adjacent to the structure. (Black et al. 2005a: 
11) 
 
Healy agreed with these objections and raised a number of concerns with the scheme. 
He eventually withheld his approval. Healy had developed a theory of sediment moving 
south-eastwards from Waihi Beach down along the Bay of Plenty coastline, a so-called 
net littoral drift (or long-shore sediment drift). He believed that over time, sand was be-
ing transported away from Waihi Beach by the predominant ocean currents. On the ba-
sis of this theory, Healy criticized that neither the design of revetment, nor dune en-
hancement and creek training were addressing the underlying causes, “the fundamental 
problem of the long term sediment deficit that has caused the erosion in the first place” 
(Healy 2005: 9). Therefore, the seawall was expected to contribute further to the so-
called coastal squeeze (Jacobson 2005: 8) which limits the high tide beach.  
The dune enhancement area, Healy argued, would need to be assisted by ongoing 
beach scraping, and would not be able to maintain itself “naturally”. In his report, the 
reviewer reformulated the idea of the longue durée that others had considered before 
him, and addressed it in coastal science terms, speaking of the long-term character of 
the natural processes involved. In doing this, he was arguing from a position of authori-
ty that could not be completely ignored. The District Council reacted by withholding 
publication of the peer review regardless of its legal obligation to do so, presumably to 
prevent it fuelling the opposition against the scheme. Effectively, the public had been 
excluded from this episode of truth-finding and evaluation of the merit of the project. 
That Professor Healy later joined the ranks of scientific experts supporting the Envi-
ronment Court appeal against the scheme (see following Chapter 4.4) was then met with 
satisfaction by many involved.  
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Healy was raising another objection – which was going to be addressed in the up-
coming Environment Court appeal – pointing beyond his specialist coastal science ex-
pertise: public access. This is an important issue which is not only covered by the RMA 
provisions quoted by Healy below, but also a vital part of the popular culture and na-
tional identity in a country where “easy and free access to the beach has been seen as a 
national birthright” (Phillips 2012). Healy insists on the necessity to allow public access 
along the beach (in contrast to access to the beach) in his reply to further information 
provided by the engineering consultant. He argues that “the extremely important RMA 
S6(d) issue of ‘public access to and along the coastal marine area’” was not adequately 
addressed by the ten new “informal access points” mentioned in the consent application: 
 
These do not address the issue of public access along the coastal marine area at all 
stages of the tide. This can only be mitigated by a public walkway along the top of 
the sea wall to allow access along the beach at all stages of the tide – which would 
exist in nature if the sea wall was not there. Moreover, what is an informal public 
access point? What are the legal and public liability issues of such access points? 
(Healy 2005: 11)  
 
Framing the issue in terms of the beach as a public versus private space has been a vital 
part of the seawall opponents’ line of argument, especially for those experts involved 
who perceive themselves as speaking for the public. Another coastal scientist involved 
in the case explains in an interview:  
In Waihi Beach the argument was that the seawalls are built on public land but 
were preventing public access to the beach. […] If the seawalls were built in the 
private property, then it would have been a different issue. Because what tends to 
happen with seawalls […] is that the seawall is actually built on the public land. 
But the owners tend to extend their fences and gardens out to the edge of the sea-
wall and create barriers to public access along the top of the seawall. […] So, ef-
fectively the private people get an extension to their property; they have their own 
personal access to the beach and the public lose out. That’s the key issue that we’re 
arguing from. (Interview with Peter Stone, Waikato Regional Council)43 
 
However, the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (BOP-RC) granted resource consent to 
the local WBOPDC Council in 2006 for the parts above mean high waters springs 
(MHWS, the high tide line) that fell within its jurisdiction, and recommended to the 
Minister of Conversation to give approval to the remainder of the project located below 
                                                
 
43  This trope of beachfronters secretly creeping out onto public land will also be discussed in Chapter 
7.3.  
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MHWS (Lumsden 2011: 3). However, in their internal report, the responsible Regional 
Council employees also once again echoed the theme of short versus long-term reme-
dies: 
While staff are recommending granting the application to construct the Shaw Road 
revetment, it should be noted that continued reliance on the level of protection pro-
vided by the revetment beyond the duration of the consent is not considered sus-
tainable. The […] consent term recommended should be viewed as a period of 
grace for the applicant to reconsider development levels and shoreline management 
for Waihi Beach. Staff consider the possible closure and/or effective management 
of the Two Mile Creek outlet and reconsideration of forward development lines 
would provide enough relief from localised erosion and greater beach width to 
eventually make a structural revetment unnecessary. (Andrew Bruere’s staff report 
of 14 November 2005, see Waihi Beach Community Board n.d.) 
 
At this point, two of the opposing residents lodged an appeal against the resource con-
sent at the Environment Court. The following chapter will take a closer look at what fol-
lowed when the case entered the sphere of the court, and questions of science, property 
rights and coastal policy became subject to a legal decision that was experienced as an 
unexpected defeat by the local appellants, as well as by the coastal experts supporting 
the case against the seawall. 
 
 
4.4 Narrowing Down the Case: The Environment Court in 
Search of “The Scientific Viewpoint” on the Conflict 
 
The Environment Court of Aotearoa New Zealand (Te Kooti Taiao o Aotearoa) is man-
dated with addressing all issues in relation to the Resource Management Act (RMA). 
An appeal to this court is the main avenue for citizens objecting to plans or projects that 
have already been granted resource consent44. Initially, the appellants were only de-
manding access to the unpublished peer review discussed in the previous chapter. But 
soon, the appeal expanded in scope: it turned into an attempt to revisit the decision-
making process of the Western Bay of Plenty District Council (WBOPDC), and to 
probe the Friends of the Beach (FOTB) alternative – the backstop wall – in court. This 
happened, however, without the backing of the FOTB group itself, which understood it-
self as a “protest organization” and was not willing to negotiate a compromise in court. 
                                                
 
44  The Environment Court usually consists of a presiding and possibly a second Environmental Judge, as 
well as two commissioners with scientific education fulfilling a consulting function. 
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The two residents appealed as private individuals, although their supporters subsequent-
ly founded another group, the Waihi Beach Environment Society in order to support 
them morally and financially with a number of activities, including used book sales, 
self-designed t-shirts, and a “beach bums” calendar featuring nude pictures of local 
businessmen.  
The appeal case relied on expert witness evidence provided by a number of well-
known experts in the field of coastal management, who contributed their work free of 
charge in order to support the appeal and to prove the point that the Waihi Beach pro-
tection scheme was unsustainable. Notably, Professor Healy, who had been commis-
sioned by WBOPDC to provide the peer review, also provided expert evidence in sup-
port of the appellants. The appellants demanded the resource consent for the sea-
wall/revetment part to be declined and argued for the construction of a backstop wall in-
stead, set back as far as possible (up to 20 metres in comparison to the sea-
wall/revetment design) and located within private property boundaries. Such a construc-
tion, it was argued, would provide room for “a more natural shoreline” (Dahm 2007a: 
21) to develop, while offering protection for the properties in case of more severe 
storms and erosion events. The main expert witness presenting the backstop alternative 
also proposed to initially train the second creek (Two Mile Creek) to prevent further 
erosion, something which had not been part of the WBOPDC consent application. 
In his decision dismissing the appeal, the judge argues that he cannot possibly rule 
the replacement of the seawall with something else, because this would be a political 
decision. Such a proposal would need to include a public submission process that could 
not be bypassed by a court ruling (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: 28) – a 
democratic argument well taken. This is, however, not the main line of his argument. 
The decision to reject the appeal is framed along his interpretation of “scientific evi-
dence”, especially engineering evidence the judge saw missing on the appellants’ side. 
The judge begins to lay out his decision by recounting the history of the Waihi Beach 
“problem” (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: 9f.) from the evidence provided 
by the Council witnesses. These historical narratives are presented as mere facts, strictly 
descriptive and could therefore – from the judge’s point of view – be taken as an objec-
tive representation of what has happened so far: 
Being mainly factual, that evidence was not materially affected in our view through 
cross-examination. It is helpful also to cite the following historical description giv-
en by Mr J L Lumsden, a qualified expert with considerable experience in coastal 
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engineering issues called on behalf of the respondent consent authorities. (Envi-
ronment Court of New Zealand 2007: 18) 
 
The judge goes on to claim that “matters have moved on” from the stage of assessing 
options “and devolved to the wall comparison issue currently at stake”. Therefore, he 
can directly move on to the technical point of view, represented by “a coastal engineer 
of senior standing” giving evidence for the Council about the different options that have 
been considered previously. The closure of this matter is deemed so clear that the evi-
dence about the options assessment does not need to be repeated, let alone be scruti-
nized by the Court. This declaration sets the scene for the judge’s truth-finding, which 
he then claims to limit itself to what he calls “the scientific viewpoint”: 
Consequent upon the narrowing of issues as explained, the preponderance of evi-
dence on all sides predictably emanated from the coastal engineering and hazard 
management experts. Hence, it is the ‘scientific viewpoint’ to which we largely al-
lude in explaining the parties’ respective cases. (Environment Court of New Zea-
land 2007: 18) 
 
Implicitly recognizing that the scientific viewpoint held by the majority of science ex-
perts does not support hard protection works on open coasts, the judge adds that ideal-
ism has to be replaced with realism:  
Ideally the aim would be to avoid a visible man-made structure along the (albeit 
reduced) length of the foreshore as proposed. Realistically though, a protective 
wall is considered necessary in the short to medium term, with the ideal having to 
be tempered by what is practicable. (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: 
18)45 
 
While the judge joins the Council in arguing along the lines of objectivity and realism, 
the appellants insist on different categories: a more complicated version of history, a 
different idea of practicality (more leaning towards acceptability) and of the importance 
to protect the community (its amenity, and social structure, and not the coastal proper-
ty). They repeatedly state their determination to achieve not only an affordable, but also 
an “acceptable” solution in the sense of working not only financially and technically, 
                                                
 
45  This echoes what the engineer witnessing on behalf of the Council states, “unshaken under cross ex-
amination”, which presumedly allows the judge to turn a normative statement into bare facts: “The 
desire of the land owners at Waihi Beach and others to have a useable beach along the coast is perfect-
ly understandable but it must be realised that, sadly, such an ideal is not compatible with maintaining 
properties that have been built too close to the shore on an eroding coast.” (Environment Court 2007: 
20f.) 
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but also in a social sense of working for the community – an answer not only to the 
epistemological, but also to the normative and social conflict (a redefinition of “best 
practicable option” according to the RMA): 
We are firmly of the view that a backstop wall option as proposed by Mr Jim 
Dahm is the best practicable option for Waihi Beach. […] [It] would be consistent 
with the previously agreed desired outcomes and would, we believe, go a long way 
towards resolving the current division that occurs at Waihi Beach. However, this 
needs to go hand-in-hand with a long term strategy to reduce the risk from coastal 
erosion and to provide a more acceptable outcome. We do not want to lose an op-
portunity to make improvements for Waihi Beach and its community. (Keall 2006: 
13) 
 
The appellants and their main expert witness ground their argument on a notion of pro-
cessuality: the appeal is very much concerned with furthering the argument that the 
Council did not follow due process when moving forward in a way not supported by the 
majority of the citizens, including elaboration on the change in wording I have de-
scribed in Chapter 4.3 (changing the objective of the project from the amenity of the 
beach to the appearance and safety of beach and protection works). This insistence on 
going back to where the way was first opened for the seawall construction, and the re-
sistance towards the attempts of promoting closure from the side of the Council, were a 
phenomenon very present throughout my whole fieldwork experience in and about 
Waihi Beach, visible also in many submissions on other policies and plans (see Keall 
and Mason n.d.).  
This is also what supposedly makes the seawall opponents so annoying to talk to for the 
Council employees and beachfronters – they are constantly trying to keep the problem 
space wide open, to go back to fundamental points like ‘what are the options’ or ‘what 
is an option’, while the judge and the engineers want to discuss how deep a trench needs 
to be to build a wall of a specific height and depth. The expert witness for the appellants 
also points towards his approach not being centred on a definite design, but instead ar-
gues the backstop wall is an idea that needs to be concretized in conversation with the 
homeowners affected by it: 
Which is better overall? In my and other experts’ view the correct starting point is 
identifying the preferred backstop wall location and then work on designing a final 
location accepting some degree of compromise. (Dahm 2007b: 16) 
 
In this vein, the conflict as it was brought before the judge is very much about different 
understandings of or approaches to what is a sustainable solution, leading to differing 
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versions of temporality. On the one side, the supporters of the seawall and the Court 
aim to address the issue here and now. Their goal is to optimize what is there, in order 
to achieve closure. On the other side, the opponents and to some degree their scientist 
supporters understand things as always in flux, subject to continuous change. They 
claim that everything should be taken as temporally open. For them the issue is never 
concluded, but should be revisited or re-opened at any point in time if necessary to 
achieve an adequate outcome. In this sense, their clock is ticking on an eternal time 
scale. The Court however starts the clock at the moment when the appeal is filed.  
These two conflicting understandings are in line with the findings of Cooper and 
McKenna, who argue that hard protection measures are the more difficult to justify vis-
à-vis criteria of social justice and sustainability, the larger the temporal and spatial 
scales taken into consideration become: 
As the temporal scale increases, the negative environmental impacts of intervention 
become larger and the costs to future generations are more evident. As the spatial 
scale increases, the negative implications of sea defences for larger sections of so-
ciety (e.g. non-resident coastal users) become more evident, as do the implications 
for more distant sectors of the coastal sedimentary system. […] At larger spatial 
scales and long time scales, the intergenerational equity question and the losses 
suffered by non-coastal residents appear to reduce any social justice argument on 
the part of coastal property owners to the realm of ‘ideological intimidation’ (No-
vak, 2000) at worst and wishful thinking at best. (Cooper and McKenna 2008a: 
302f.) 
 
During the court proceedings, the appellants’ witnesses continued to argue for a widen-
ing of the scope and scale. Spatiality remained central to the argument: “The first deci-
sion to be made now is to establish replacement protection works in the right place” 
(Healy 2007: 8). The crux of the problem is the location, not the design of the wall, 
those in favour of the backstop wall argue. Under the Council scheme, there is neither 
space for a vegetated dune, nor room for public access.  
From a perspective that thinks of the coastal space as socio-natural, one could argue 
that the seawall project provides neither sufficient space for the natural (processes) nor 
the social (uses) in this socio-natural environment46. In relation to the recurring theme 
of temporality, the appeal witnesses introduce further arguments from environmental 
economics, arguing for the multifunctionality, or multiple benefits, of a backstop wall, 
                                                
 
46  Terry Healy goes on to argue for a combination of backstop-wall and beach nourishment, an approach 
that aims at enlarging the always limited coastal space.  
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especially in terms of intergenerational equity. Expert witness Peter Singleton from the 
neighbouring Waikato’s Regional Council refers to what he says is the undesirability of 
a possible future expansion a seawalled coast under climate change conditions:  
To put this into context, approximately 1 km (or 3%), of the Region’s developed 
eastern sandy beaches are currently protected by seawalls. This could increase to 
18 km of seawall by 2100. The implications for beach use and loss of amenity in 
these locations are significant. For this reason I consider the outcome of this Waihi 
Beach hearing where the issue is whether most of an existing but now dilapidated 
seawall should be replaced in essentially the same location could have important 
implications for how beaches in the Waikato and other parts of New Zealand might 
be managed. (Singleton 2007b: 4) 
 
These apprehensions of a future with widespread coastal armouring are probably fuelled 
by knowledge about the present-day situation of many developed coastlines. Cooper 
and McKenna, for example, observe that “[a]t present, large sections of the coastline of 
Europe are armoured or engineered to slow coastal erosion” and that 
[t]he inevitable result of continued and expanded intervention in coastal processes 
is a completely armoured shoreline that depends on human intervention for its 
maintenance. […] It will only be possible to reverse the trend of continued devel-
opment in ill-advised locations if the practice of engineering of the shoreline is 
stopped other than at sites where intervention is imperative for society as a whole 
(e.g. for essential navigation or to protect vital infrastructure). (Cooper and 
McKenna 2008b: 330) 
 
Willem De Lange, Oceanographer and Senior Lecturer in Earth and Ocean Sciences at 
the University of Waikato, raises another argument for the dunes in the context of sand-
binding vegetation as nature’s help against climate change: 
It is likely that if human impacts on beach processes are minimised, that natural 
processes can provide the necessary mitigation against sea level rise for sandy 
beaches around New Zealand. […] A combination of backstop wall and a natural 
beach system will provide a higher level of protection from all coastal hazards than 
a seawall alone can provide. (De Lange 2007: 13f.) 
 
The appellation of the beach as a public asset is, however, explicitly denied by one of 
the Council witnesses, a consultancy engineer. Quoting his statement that,  
protection of the properties at risk may take precedence over the need to maintain a 
beach, most likely because it is not a significant public asset and the costs of main-
taining the beach cannot be justified,  
 
appeal witness Jim Dahm in reply points to the value of the beach: 
The beach is after all the primary reason that the town is there […] Intangible val-
ues are not things dreamed up, they are real values that the market is not yet able to 
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recognise or value appropriately – not because the item (e.g. a beach) lacks value 
(as appears to be assumed by Mr Lumsden) but because of deficiencies in the mar-
ket’s pricing mechanisms. (Dahm 2007b: 11) 
 
The judge however does not subscribe to this argument. He sharply dismisses any at-
tempt to reframe the “scientific question” into a question of public interest. He is not in-
terested in defining public interest. And for him, the question is not if those demanding 
protection for their private property under the given circumstances – coastal squeeze, 
loss of high tide beach, investment of taxes, unresolved public access issues – may be 
counteracting public interest, however defined: 
In fact counsel for the first appellants went so far as to suggest at one point of ar-
gument that it is selfish for the beachfront property owners to expect their proper-
ties to be protected via the wall as proposed at the expense of the natural beach en-
vironment and the well-being of others who use and cherish the beach. We do not 
criticise the first appellants for mounting the challenge they have out of what we 
conceive to be a genuine public-spirited intent, but agree with Mr Cooney in re-
sponse for the Council that, in determining these proceedings from an RMA per-
spective, the case is not about taking advantage of a public asset for private gain or 
about people receiving preferential treatment. Rather, it is about how the natural 
and physical resources of this coastal area should be sustainably managed, given 
the notable hazard risks (both in causative event and consequential effect terms) to 
which the area is unquestionably subject. (Environment Court of New Zealand 
2007: 33) 
 
In doing so, the judge again redefines the question. This is not about politics, but about 
science. This is not about public versus private benefits and responsibilities, but about 
resource management understood as a different sort of cost-benefit calculation, not in-
cluding intangibles. What the Environment Court did not scrutinize was the beachfront-
ers’ interest to have their capital gains reinsured by public works – a kind of insurance 
by engineering technology in a situation where regular insurance is becoming more dif-
ficult to get on the market (see Cooper and McKenna 2008a). In some cases the houses 
had been bought long time ago for only a tiny fraction of the current value, which 
means society would carry part of the investment risk47. Eventually, engineering argu-
ments turn up trumps: the Court settles the matter by accusing the appellant witnesses of 
lacking engineering know-how: 
                                                
 
47  The following quote from Robert Cook of the Waihi Beach Protection society exemplifies the point: 
“I mean we’ve always had, sort of rocks there, and the sea’s amazing. I can remember when we first 
bought that was only a little wee tiny bach in the sand hills – it cost $17,000; that was all.”  
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The first appellants’ case rests upon the evidence of several coastal scientists, in-
cluding lengthy evidence given by Mr J Dahm, a coastal processes and coastal haz-
ards management consultant with 17 years work experience. As with other wit-
nesses called for the first appellants, Mr Dahm readily acknowledged that his ex-
pertise is not that of an engineer. He nevertheless pointed to having worked in col-
laboration with such professionals. While we acknowledge Mr Dahm’s apparent 
sincerity of purpose in emphasising the advantages of the backstop wall concept 
with particular reference to the first appellants’ proposed alternative, his responses 
under questioning assumed at some points a rather effusive character. (Environ-
ment Court of New Zealand 2007: 21) 
 
According to the judge, the appellants’ primary expert witness testimony is rendered 
unconvincing by his performance; he is seemingly too enthusiastic, too much convinced 
of his idea of the paradigm change in coastal management to count as a reliable, trust-
worthy expert. The latter goes great lengths to underline his familiarity with the issue, 
including his practical experience from different positions (as a former Council officer 
at Waikato Regional Council and as a consultant for owners and for Councils, see Dahm 
2007b: 3) and the ubiquity of approaches beyond hard protection if seen from a global 
perspective:  
If the term ‘buried seawall’ or similar is typed into Google, you will find innumer-
able other examples all around the world – this is not an ‘unproven’ method, it is a 
standard and simple technique. However, after 17 years [of] experience (at proba-
bly over 200 sites in various roles) I am well aware of the fierce opposition to any 
form of retreat from the coast and can understand why traditional engineering prac-
tices (and associated adverse effects) have generally been maintained. Promoting 
sustainable management on the coastal interface between high public and private 
values is not easy. (Dahm 2007b: 17)48 
 
All this, including the statement that there are no easy solutions here, points to an un-
derstanding of coastal science and coastal engineering as being irreconcilable approach-
es when it comes to coastal protection issues. This motif is also elaborated upon by oth-
ers involved, as this witness to the case summarizes: 
                                                
 
48  In the following passage, he elaborates: “I have quite literally been involved in 100s of meetings and 
discussions with front beach property owners over the last 18 years, both as a Council officer and as a 
consultant – in roles acting for owners and for Councils. I am very familiar with views of the kind he 
encountered. Such views are in fact well known to practitioners experienced with coastal erosion – not 
just in Aotearoa New Zealand but overseas. I am presently encountering exactly the same views and 
opposition to a backstop wall at another site and have had to work through similar views at several 
sites […] I find it interesting that these wider community views and opposition are not discussed, even 
though I am sure the applicant must be aware of the widespread community opposition.” (Dahm 
2007b: 3) 
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So, it was all the coastal scientists are saying, ‘there are better ways to do this than 
the seawall’. And the engineers were saying, that you couldn’t build a backstop 
wall without going onto properties, which in retrospect, if there’d been an engineer 
to show that that wasn’t the case, which seems to be true, that would have helped 
with the court case. But there were no engineers, on our side if you like. (Interview 
with Peter Stone, Waikato Regional Council) 
 
When I asked the appellants themselves why they did not pursue engineering evidence, 
they stated that there were simply no engineers volunteering to support their case. The 
pioneers and promoters of a ‘working with nature’ approach, like the ones who assisted 
the Waihi Beach appellants, tend to be coastal scientists. They share what Knorr-Cetina 
(1999) has called an epistemic culture (see also Meyer and Molyneux-Hodgson 2010). 
Their understanding of coastal nature as a “dynamic equilibrium” (Schwartz 2005: 
399f.) that is cyclic, always in flux and indefinite, matches that of the seawall oppo-
nents. Chapters 6 to 9 will take a closer look at dune restoration projects through which 
these coastal experts and interested locals engage in sharing a community of practice 
(Wenger 1998) for ‘working with nature’. In the process of the Waihi Beach Environ-
ment Court appeal, the coastal scientists were pointing to what could be done at Waihi 
Beach. The engineering “thought style” (Fleck 1979: 39f.) on the contrary, zooms in on 
the restrictions of the situation as it is found, and can be characterized as following 
through path dependency, and asking what can be done now. 
Ironically, the Court finally came to the conclusion that a backstop wall “may well 
qualify as a longer term future possibility” – just not for now, as “it is not a practicable 
option at present or within a clearly identifiable timeframe”. The Council should there-
fore 
carry out purposeful investigation in the years ahead and consult with the local 
community, including the beachfront property owners in particular, as to the best 
practicable long term option or combination of options beyond the consent period. 
On the last point, timely investigation and planning will be essential to ensure that 
a more permanent solution is practicable for adoption, without repetition of the cir-
cumstances that presently allow for a short to medium term approach only. Doubt-
less the concept of a ‘true’ backstop wall, and a revisiting of the possibility of di-
verting Two and Three-Mile Creeks, will feature among the options that will need 
to undergo serious consideration. (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: 35) 
 
Dismissing the appeal with its decision dated 30 November 2007, the Environment 
Court upheld the existing resource consents for the activities above mean high water 
springs (MHWS): the beach scraping, the construction of training groynes and parts of 
the seawall (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: 5; Chadwick 2008). The Court 
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repeated its recommendation to the Minister for the Environment to grant consent for 
the activities below MHWS. The Court also suggested that for the time being, training 
of Two Mile Creek should be considered as well. The Minister’s approval on 26 April 
2008 came as no surprise, but contained two conditions: the consent was only tempo-
rary, valid for 25 years, advising WBOPDC that since “the rock seawall is not a long 
term solution to coastal hazards at Waihi Beach”, by 2020, it  
must undertake comprehensive investigations into the best ways to manage the 
long-term effects of erosion. In doing this, it will be important that the Council 
works with the community to come up with a long-term solution. (Chadwick 2008) 
 
As a further requirement, WBOPDC was required to signpost public access. In the press 
release informing the public about the consent being granted, the Minister also picks up 
on the ‘working with nature’ theme: “In the long term, we must restore and work with 
the natural processes on the coast” (Chadwick 2008). 
The Minister’s comments point to an interrelationship between ‘working with nature’ 
and ‘working with the community’ that I think is symptomatic of the Waihi Beach Case 
and demands interpretation. If analysing ‘working with nature’ triggers the question of 
‘what nature?’ – including the hypothesis that coastal natures are nothing pre-existing, 
but brought into being through practice – then the same might be said about the com-
munity: which community? How is it brought into being? In any case, the ubiquity of 
the ‘working with nature’ theme in this case where it was not put into practice is re-
markable, and mirrored by the earlier declaration of Council employee Grant Bridgwa-
ter:  
Nobody wants to build a rock revetment – or re-build one to modern standards, as 
in this case. It’s not really the most long-term, environmentally friendly option but 
you can only afford what you can. (Stevenson 2004) 
 
The appellants had been well supported by scientists whose assessment of coastal engi-
neering options was not a minority opinion, even though the court treated it as such. 
Moreover, when I speak with an employee of the engineering consultant that had de-
signed the protection, he is at pains to stress that from the engineering standpoint a sea-
wall at Waihi Beach is the wrong choice. And the revision of the New Zealand Coastal 
Policy Statement, especially of the parts relating to coastal hazard exactly during the 
time of the appeal (Jacobson 2004a; Jacobson 2004b; Department of Conservation 
2008) shows that the political will was already there to move beyond such hard protec-
tion schemes. 
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The wall unites local opponents and coastal experts working across the country. Ex-
cept for some of the beachfront property owners (not even all of them where in favour 
of the project) and the local Council which was arguably balking at the prospect of legal 
challenges and political costs, everyone in this case agreed in their disapproval of the 
seawall. This makes the seawall an even more powerful object, the seemingly unpre-
ventable outcome of an unstoppable process. It symbolizes the paradoxical situation of a 
country which on the one side praises social equality, the nation-building function of 
iconic coastal landscapes and public access to the beach, but on the other side is built 
upon a strong notion of private property rights, has been subject to neoliberal reforms 
and privatization policies early on, and has recently experienced an unprecedented 
coastal development boom. The same paradox had a violent outburst in the 2004 fore-
shore and seabed debate (see Chapter 3.1). 
As noted above, the decision pro seawall has been furthered by framing it only as a 
short-term solution. The costs for the protection scheme of about 6 million NZD will be 
funded through rates over the 25-year consent period and distributed amongst the dis-
trict residents49. The substantive costs, the length of the political and judicial quarrel be-
fore the project went ahead, but also the sheer size of the rock revetment – about 3.5 
meters in height and 3.4 metres in width – make it highly unlikely that the seawall will 
be removed again as long as it still works as a protection structure for the houses. The 
materiality of the seawall, the institutional framework and the processes of decision-
making all lean far to the pragmatist understanding of the matter that emerged during 
the appeal.  
The peer reviewer assigned to the construction process of the scheme in 2011 ad-
dresses the question of temporal scale via climate change adaptation of the seawall. He 
critiques missing allowances in the wall dimensions for climate change, but comes to 
the general conclusion that 
as far as sea level rise is concerned, rock revetments do have a distinct advantage 
over other marine structures such as wharves in that they can usually be upgraded 
                                                
 
49  The costs for the project amounting to 5.9 million NZD were divided into three rate divisions: imme-
diate beneficiaries, residents of Waihi Beach Ward (including Bowentown and Athenree), and resi-
dents of WBOPDC, distributed over the complete time span of the consent, 25 years. The rates will be 
increased according to inflation rates. In the first fiscal year (2008/2009), the immediate beneficiaries 
on the beachfront paid 3,800 NZD, the residents of Waihi Beach ward 21.90 NZD, and the rest of the 
district 1.90 NZD (Owens 2008). 
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to suit changing conditions. This may include adding rocks to the face and increas-
ing the crest height, both of which may become necessary in the event of predicted 
climate change […]. The revetment can be upgraded in the future, if necessary. 
Since this might not be necessary for several decades, on-going maintenance of the 
revetment must be provided in order to ensure its longevity. (Lumsden 2011: 12, 
emphasis added FG) 
 
When talking to people whose properties are protected by the “temporary” scheme, they 
also convey a sense of closure, the material presence of the revetment being an im-
portant point. Just as important for them is that they feel unlikely to be affected by what 
might happen in 25 years, given they themselves are already advanced in years. The 
loop effect of property protection works – described in the hazard policy literature as 
causing a false sense of security and leading to more value accumulated in sites at risk 
(Cooper and McKenna 2008a) – can already be observed. Sitting in their living room 
overlooking the Pacific Ocean, Mr and Mrs Watkinson draw the connection between 
their retirement options and the Council’s protection plans. Mrs Watkinson explains: 
We actually had thought about coming out here in our retirement but had done 
nothing about it because we were worried about the erosion, and then when the 
Council put out one of their quarterly publications and said they were going to go 
ahead with the beach protection, my husband and I thought, right, the time’s right 
for us. So that’s when we decided to remove the bach that was here and build this 
place. (Interview with Mr and Mrs Watkinson, Waihi Beach) 
 
This is not to say that these beachfront residents see alternative options to the revetment 
as fundamentally unthinkable, rather Mr Watkinson assumes that 
it just got left for so long, with nothing having happened, that I guess, this then be-
came the only sort of alternative that people could come up with – the experts. But 
there probably will be, as time goes by, things that they will work out but they’ll 
have to do it this time before they could just sort of […] put it in the ‘too hard’ 
basket. (Interview with Mr and Mrs Watkinson, Waihi Beach) 
 
 
So temporalities remain an important category for understanding the “Waihi Beach sa-
ga” (Healy and Soomere 2008: 459). The conflict around the protection scheme re-
volves to a large part around different imaginations of temporality. What was perceived 
by different sides as the relevant timeframe – the immediacy of coastal hazard risk to 
private property versus the long-term cyclicity of the coastal environment – translated 
into different preferred reactions. The Council’s aim to solve the problem here and now 
translated into a preference for hard measures. In contrast, those stressing fluidity and 
open-endedness were leaning towards soft measures like the backstop wall and dune 
restoration. Or, going further, arguing for managed retreat and nature’s freedom to be 
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left alone. The spatial dimension of the scarcity of coastal space remains the reason for 
its desirability as much as its vulnerability. Will the issue forever stay in the “too hard 
basket”? Arguably, the Council has already started to engage in a transition to softer ap-
proaches. It is important to remember that besides the seawall, the protection scheme al-
so features two other measures (which were not within the scope of the appeal): geotex-
tile creek training and dune “enhancement”. The next chapter will be opened with a 
closer look at these elements. 
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5.   Possible Futures 
 
5.1  Soft Options: “A Sob to the Greenies” 
 
From early on, the design of the protection scheme had included an area designated to 
“dune enhancement”. This technical term was meant to refer to the reconstruction and 
subsequent planting of a foredune area as the only coastal protection along a couple of 
hundred metres of the beach adjacent to the seawalled part. When beachfront property 
owners protested, this idea was temporarily abandoned. However, when another con-
sultant report estimated significant cost increases for the revetment, alongside continu-
ing resistance of the seawall opponents, WBOPDC returned to the original plan for a 
soft options part. Robert Cook of the Waihi Beach Protection Society put it quite suc-
cinctly: The Council’s decision was partly based on cost, plus 
it was really a bit of a sob to the greenies, you know, look at all this, and then we’ll 
put sand on the end of there or we’ll just build a sand dune (Interview with Robert 
Cook, Waihi Beach). 
 
This version of the story is backed up by the documents accepted by the Court and the 
seawall supporters and opponents alike. An employee of the engineering consultant that 
provided the design, however, told me his company did not promote the dune enhance-
ment and assumed it was the will of the property owners. While this version seems un-
likely, it highlights the perception that everything in Waihi Beach is more of a political 
than an engineering decision. Read alongside the judge’s claim that the appeal Court’s 
task could be reduced to a decision about the “scientific viewpoint”, one might argue 
that the two main positions which represent the power of truth claims (the law and sci-
ence/engineering) both refer to what is respectively out of their sphere of influence. 
Could this be an attempt to reject full responsibility for the outcome if the engineers 
complain that they have to build structures that work first and foremost in a political 
way, and the judge asserts that he is only weighing scientific evidence?  
Discussing the case with a Council employee, he thinks of Waihi Beach as some-
where where everything is disquietingly political. The man, who has an engineering 
background himself, feels that scientific facts are disregarded by the local activists: 
The people living up there in Waihi Beach, including those who have bought the 
beachfront properties are quite special. When I talk to someone, and explain things 
to people, and it makes sense, that usually works. In Waihi Beach, it doesn’t. I re-
cently came up with a good best example to explain the Waihi Beach people. If 
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somebody asks you, can penguins fly, what is your answer? (Interviewer: Uhm, no 
I don’t think so). Yes that’s right, they can’t fly. Penguins can’t fly. And the prob-
lem is, the Waihi Beach resident then says, why not, they have wings! So, the thing 
is, if you give them a scientific explanation, or common sense, that doesn’t work. 
For whatever reason, which I don’t know. It doesn’t work. (Interview with Mike 
Schwartz, Western Bay of Plenty District Council) 
 
However, my interview partner also seems to think that this makes Waihi Beach an ex-
emption – but one might argue that to question or reject scientific lines of argument is 
neither uncommon, nor should the interpretation jump to the conclusion that this is nec-
essarily a sign of ignorance on the part of the public50 – especially in the light of these 
citizens’ experience in a court case where contested political questions were repeatedly 
(re)framed as questions of science and/or engineering.  
Stating that the dune enhancement area has been used as a bargain throughout the 
process is one thing. But how was the soft options part of the project eventually put into 
sociomaterial practice, and how did it work – on a technical as well as social level? In 
order to address these questions, a side glance to Coast Care is useful. I will address the 
objectives, practices and structure of the volunteer dune restoration programme Coast 
Care Bay of Plenty in much more detail in the second empirical part. Important to note, 
for now, is the substantial overlap that can be seen in Waihi Beach between the constit-
uency of Coast Care and seawall opposition. As mentioned before, the main expert wit-
ness for the appellants’ case of a backstop wall is also a well-known dune restoration 
professional. The decision for the seawall also had wider repercussions for the Coast 
Care programme as a whole. The diversity of local groups is organized and coordinated 
by a Regional Council officer, a highly visible role in the volunteer dune restoration 
universe; all regional coordinators I met were extremely popular and highly respected 
public figures. The Coast Care BOP coordinator active during the Waihi Beach appeal 
and decision later received a Queen’s Birthday Honour “for services to conservation” 
(in 2011). It therefore hit the (local) news(paper) when the “Coast Care man resign[ed] 
over [the] seawall decision”: 
Environment Bay of Plenty’s dune restoration co-ordinator has resigned, citing his 
opposition to Waihi Beach’s $5 million rockwall as a reason for his decision. Greg 
                                                
 
50  I encountered similar irritation also on other occasions. Another professional with science training re-
ports from a trip to another seawall conflict site: “There is no understanding of science at all. You 
could present everything in Court. You could say it’s octopuses migrating that cause the erosion. Peo-
ple would say, ‘Oh well, we better build a seawall then’.” (Fieldnotes, 05.07.2011)  
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Jenks claims the rockwall revetment is not coastal protection but is instead de-
signed to protect private property and will eventually fail. Mr. Jenks says his strong 
opposition to the work – which went to the Environment Court and means all 
Western Bay ratepayers will contribute – was a contributing factor in his resigna-
tion. ‘This revetment is $5 million worth of hard surface engineering – read big 
rocks – which failed to gain support of any New Zealand coastal scientists,’ he 
said. Mr. Jenks said the work would reduce pedestrian access to the beach and in-
duce further beach erosion. He said he’d had a number of years experience rebuild-
ing dunes similar to Waihi Beach and said there were alternatives. ‘I feel very sad-
dened by the decision,’ he said […] It’s my own opinion but there was no rush to 
build a seawall – there was time to restore a dune there’ […] (King 2008) 
 
A coastal management specialist who is familiar with the case underlines the wide-
spread agreement of Coast Carers with this opinion: 
I think it’s fair to say the people who are interested in dune restoration think that 
that seawall project is a stupid waste of money and that those properties that stick 
out too far [laughs] should have been first of all asked to put their dwellings at the 
back of the property. Or secondly, this is the first example of where some sort of 
managed retreat process should have perhaps been put into practice rather than go-
ing, ‘Oh crikey, they keep threatening us with legal action’. (Interview with Scott 
Myers) 
 
The understanding that dune restoration could have been an alternative to installing an-
other hard structure is mirrored by this local volunteer writing to the local paper: 
Sir, dunecare is the answer to much of the beachfront erosion at Waihi Beach, and 
people can do their bit to help with planting at the following times and places: […]. 
Helen Meiklejohn, Waihi Beach (Meiklejohn n.d.)51 
 
This call to do one’s bit stresses the perceived connection between actual physical work 
and moral obligation in volunteering work. Many of the members of the Coast Care 
group have been actively involved in the protest and the appeal against the protection 
scheme. Engaging with them, I was trying to figure out if they understood Coast Care 
not only as a pool of seawall opponents (which they clearly did), but if maybe Coast 
Care was also in itself a form of seawall resistance, especially because it gained mo-
mentum in Waihi Beach around the time the District Council had begun assessing op-
tions for the seawall replacement. Was part of its success attributable to the shared dis-
approval of the seawall project? However, this interpretation of mine was rejected by 
people I spoke to. What remained unquestionable though was that “all the Coast Care 
                                                
 
51  Newspaper clipping provided by informant without source.  
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volunteers in Waihi Beach hate the wall and they want nothing to do with it” (Interview 
with Scott Myers). 
This uncompromising attitude also had consequences for the soft options part of the 
protection scheme. Suzanne, who occasionally worked for Coast Care as well, felt this 
when she took up a contract with WBOPDC to carry out some planting work on top of a 
section of the seawall (van Leeuwen 2010). While her goal was to “make the best of a 
bad situation” by trying to provide the best possible restoration work to these areas, 
some volunteers had difficulties accepting her position:  
I think I explained myself to the volunteers but I think some of them felt like, 
‘Well, you’re doing Coast Care but then you’re actually going and planting on the 
seawall that we are completely against and you’re completely against’, you know. 
So I think some of them found that hard, because I was kind of like in the opposi-
tion kind of thing. But I just would say to them, ‘Well, it’s going to happen, it’s 
here, and if we’re gonna have plants in it then you might as well get them planted 
really well and they might be able to like trap some sand in and you might lose 
some of the rocks and you’ll start covering [them] in the sand’, or you know, ‘you 
have to see that the planting is a positive thing’. (Interview with Suzanne Fischer, 
former Coast Care BOP) 
 
While rejecting this realpolitik, some of the local volunteers nonetheless engaged in 
some planting on areas outside the dedicated Coast Care areas as well. One of my Waihi 
Beach contacts told me how he and his friends would take home surplus dune plants 
provided free of charge by the Coast Care programme at volunteer events, to then sneak 
back secretly to the beach and plant them in the area that had been earmarked for the 
dune enhancement – trying to prove the point that the plants alone were enough to trans-
form the area into a functioning dune system. Both the uncompromising attitude and the 
remnants of informal Coast Care efforts were then resurfacing in relation to the dune 
enhancement works.  
The dune enhancement is a simple technique: sand is either directly scraped off the 
beach closer to the surf zone, or sand sourced somewhere else is trucked to the site. In 
Waihi Beach, this sand was piled up directly in front of property boundaries, thereby 
covering remnants of the prior protection works (rocks and gabions), and existing vege-
tation, some of it native dune vegetation resulting from volunteers’ clandestine Coast 
Care exercises. The Coast Care coordinator at the Regional Council had been aware of 
this and, when consulted by the project managers, strongly advised that instead of 
dumping new sand on top of existing vegetation, it would be better to remove the top 
layer including plants, heighten the dune with additional sand, and then “transplant” the 
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existing vegetation back onto the dune. This advice was not followed. Therefore, the 
new dune had to be planted with new sand binding plants in order to stabilize it.  
The Council decided that the work should be done by volunteers. The motives for 
that decision were interpreted differently by different actors. The responsible Council 
employee presented it as giving the public a welcome opportunity to participate and be 
engaged in the project, and plantings were advertised in analogy to the Coast Care vol-
unteer events, in the hope of attracting the Coast Care constituency as well as the beach-
fronters. This came after the Coast Carers had declined to support the dune enhance-
ment because it was a part of the overall protection scheme. Elise Vanderbek, a local 
Coast Carer, recounts why the Council initiative to enrol the usual Coast Care suspects 
as volunteers was met with great disapproval. On the one hand, she criticizes that the 
dune was “artificially built in a day or two; it wasn’t allowed to, to build up naturally, 
like we work with the other dunes, we work with nature”. On the other hand, she ques-
tions that this is in the public interest and deserves the efforts of volunteers’ work: 
Also the public felt, our rates are paying for it; why are we expected to go and vol-
unteer, to do voluntary work as well? I mean the Council have got a contract for 
someone to do that work and we’re paying for it in our rates, so why do we have to 
also pay for it with our time and labour? And so that’s what people felt, and also 
people feel that the people getting the benefit of that dune is the property owners 
who live next door but the property owners won’t come and help so why should we 
go and help their properties when they don’t – they never come and get involved in 
Coast Care work. (Interview with Elise Vanderbek, Waihi Beach)  
 
Quite predictably, the Council strategy did not work out. The locals, who strongly sus-
pected that the Council was mainly trying to count on “cheap volunteer labour”, simply 
didn’t show up for the first event scheduled. A group of school children took up the task 
of planting one half of the dune – with Coast Carers addressing this sardonically as 
“slave labour” or a “PR exercise”. I took part in a second attempt to organize a public 
planting. Most of my Coast Care friends had already declared that they were “boycott-
ing the Council thing”. The composition of the group finally doing the work was indeed 
unusual: the only Coast Carer present was Elise Vanderbek. Always willing to “do her 
bit”, she finally went regardless of all her convincing arguments against it. Apart from 
her and two beachfronters, the group consisted of the engineer who had designed the 
protection scheme, his wife and children, as well as a subcontractor and his sister. While 
we were working on the dune, the boycotters were walking up and down the beach past 
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the plantings, stopping to watch it together and discuss what was happening, pointing 
out their disapproval through non-participation52. 
Finally, the whole project turned into an utter sociotechnical failure when only two 
weeks later the new dune was washed away in a storm event with high tides. The event 
made the headlines in the local newspaper, which titled: “Dune efforts washed away”, 
explaining that “the work to build up the dunes was not supported by the local group 
Dune Care group” (Tagg 2011). Once again, rocks and gabions reappeared, as well as 
the underlying layer of already existing Coast Care plants. Upon inspection of the dam-
age, a Coast Care volunteer came to the conclusion that this storm had just come in time 
to uncover “their” plants before there were finally choked by the sand added. Trying to 
figure out what had gone wrong, the Council followed the usual procedure of commis-
sioning a peer review from a coastal engineer. A close reading of this review provides 
some insights as to why the project failed from the engineering point of view, but also 
into the objectives of the project seen from this perspective. The reviewer begins by de-
claring that  
in the normal hierarchy of coastal management options, dune enhancement is a pre-
ferred choice and should always be considered ahead of so-called “hard” protection 
works such as a revetment (Lumsden 2011: 13). 
 
According to the reviewer, the objective was to “build a dune capable of protecting 
property along the shore”. In regard to the beach scraping (the physical process of piling 
up sand for the dune taken from the inter-tidal zone, and the prerequisite of the subse-
quent planting exercise) he argues that it  
can be considered to be enhancing or working with nature insofar as the sand, giv-
en favourable conditions, would eventually end up in the dune (Lumsden 2011: 
12). 
 
                                                
 
52  In practical terms as well, the planting was different from the many Coast Care events I had partici-
pated in before. The dune formed by from the additional sand was much steeper than the about 20° 
angle that dunes with native vegetation cover usually form in the region, and I found it difficult to 
move along the slope of loose sand and plant without “messing it all up”, as I was accused of by Elise 
Vanderbek. In contrast to the standard dune restoration practices (see Chapter 6), no fertilizer was 
added to the planting holes. Suzanne Fischer comments on how the planting was done and stresses 
that Coast Care would not plant anything steeper than 25-30 degree angle. Regarding fertilizer she 
says: “If they’re not planting with fertilizer, I mean that’s just, that’s like the biggest... if I’m planting 
and run out of fertilizer I’ll say, ‘Look that’s it, I don’t care, we’re not planting these plants anymore 
because we’ve got no fertilizer left’.” (Interview with Suzanne Fischer, Coast Care BOP) 
  123 
This is ‘working with nature’, because it is speeding up nature, or so the reviewer ar-
gues. The peer review further states that the “design intent” of the scheme was to 
provide a small dune system matching the existing dunes to the north, with the ex-
pectation that dune growth would occur over the longer term due to improved sand 
binding vegetation based on the experience of the dune growth that had occurred at 
the central and northern areas of Coronation Park without any additional sand 
nourishment (Lumsden 2011: 8). 
 
What is not mentioned is that the dunes at the northern end which are taken as a refer-
ence point of a healthy dune system (functioning or “capable” in the sense of protecting 
property), are in fact a result of ongoing care work by the dune restoration volunteers 
from Coast Care. The “favourable conditions” necessary to apply the same ‘working 
with nature’ approach to the dune enhancement area of the protection scheme would 
mean recognizing the actual human work and ongoing maintenance necessary. As a re-
sult of this work, the dunes at the northern end feature already existing sand trapping 
vegetation that holds the sand which is moved up the beach by the means of wind and 
water – and there is sufficient space. In the case of the dune enhancement, no one 
seemed willing to invest into maintenance work (the Coast Carers refused to be in-
volved, and the beachfronters seemed unaware of the ongoing work needed), the func-
tion of the clandestine Coast Care plants already there had been disregarded and com-
promised by covering them with the sand scraping, and the dune was squeezed into a ti-
ny zone of transition between people’s private lawns and the beach. Most probably it is 
located too close to the high tide line to work. The reviewer, however, narrows down 
the argument to the material used to build the dune, by concentrating on his assessment 
that 
the amount of sand provided in the enhanced dune was not sufficient to withstand a 
major storm and leave enough dune with planting to provide a reasonable prospect 
that the eroded dune would recover naturally in time (Lumsden 2011: 13). 
 
After almost two years, the Council claimed that it was still “working on a mid to long-
term solution acceptable for all affected parties” (Council employee, pers. comm. 
25.03.2013). But is such a long-term solution possible? It might well be that ongoing 
maintenance of some sort is exactly what the project will require. During the Environ-
ment Court appeal, one of the appellants’ expert witnesses had already voiced his opin-
ion that the dune enhancement as planned would not only use far too little sand to be vi-
able, but that it would also need to be repeated regularly. “In principle”, he argued, “the 
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dune reconstruction by beach scraping along the less-eroded shoreline sectors is a rea-
sonable temporary approach”, but again it is not addressing the “long term sediment 
deficit that has caused the erosion in the first place” (Healy 2007: 5). This framing of 
‘working with nature’ as a temporary approach is counterintuitive if one expects nature 
to maintain itself over time without ongoing human assistance. But in regard to dune 
restoration, this ongoing human maintenance work is a fundamental necessity, especial-
ly vis-à-vis the introduced flora and fauna outcompeting “native nature” (see Chapter 
9).  
Ongoing maintenance is also a main point of critique in regard to beach nourishment 
in general, which has been discussed in Waihi Beach in combination with artificial 
reefs, but was considered unaffordable under the circumstances. It is however the “soft” 
technique of choice in many developed nations, where high values of dense infrastruc-
ture, public and private assets are measured against the costs of re-nourishing the beach 
at regular intervals (for Germany see for example the island of Sylt, see Reise 2009). 
With this technique becoming more and more widely used, suitable sand becomes an 
increasingly scarce and expensive resource. Where sand is not readily available, for ex-
ample in the form of off-shore sand deposits, sand has to be imported. Sand-mining is a 
burgeoning international business – for example in Asia – and is in effect capable of re-
producing environmental injustice on the global scale: taking sediment out of natural 
systems inevitably results in an unbalanced sediment budget and can cause coastal ero-
sion, locally or downstream53. In fact, Waihi Beach has been a historic site of sand min-
ing, too. During World War II, sand from the beach was allegedly used for sandblasting 
military aircrafts (Fieldnotes February 2010; see also Peart 2009: 50 referring to other 
locations).  
                                                
 
53 Sand is not only used for beach nourishment, but also for coastal reclamation projects worldwide, as 
well as for the construction industry. In Singapore for example, increasing demand for sand has 
fuelled conflict over the resource with neighbouring (poorer) countries. After some South East Asian 
countries introduced sand export bans to stop illegal extraction from their beaches, they accused Sin-
gaporeans of paying smugglers to import “stolen beaches” (Gray 2011). I thank Michael J. Fischer for 
calling my attention to this case. In the New Zealand context, sand is mined mostly to produce con-
crete, abrasives and glass. Recently, mining of the seabed has become a vital interest of the industry, 
especially on the west coast of the country where substantial black ironsand reserves are located that 
can be smelted to iron. Protest groups like KASM (Kiwis against seabed mining) protest the extrac-
tion of sand from the seabed (KASM n.d.). 
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To handle the Waihi Beach dune enhancement area while working on a “solution”, 
and especially to address beachfronters demands for direct access to the beach, the 
Council installed makeshift stairs out of geotextile bags as what are called “temporary 
access structures” (Council employee, pers. comm. 25.03. 2013). Similar geotextile 
bags are used for creek training in Waihi Beach. Asking if they are a soft solution, too, 
brings us directly to the question of what a soft option is and ought to be – a central 
question that different actors answer differently. To be sure, the manufacturer promotes 
them on the company website as “a flexible alternative to ‘hard rock’ solutions for 
coastal works” (Maccaferri New Zealand 2013) and claims that for Waihi Beach’s 
Three Mile Creek, 
ELCOROCK® was chosen as the best solution as it was seen as a ‘soft engineer-
ing’ option – environmentally and user friendly while being extremely robust to 
withstand the harsh abrasive conditions found in a coastal environment. (Geofab-
rics Australasia n.d.) 
 
The name Elcorock, however, does not support the claim that the geotextile containers 
are fundamentally different from common hard protection structures. In fact, after a re-
structuring of the company, a revised website continues to praise the “flexibility, versa-
tility and proven performance” of the containers, but argues primarily with the econom-
ic advantages of the technology: 
[…] ELCOROCK® [is] a cost effective alternative to ‘hard rock’ solutions for sea 
walls and revetments as well as for the construction of groynes and breakwater 
structures. (Geofabrics, formerly Maccaferri NZ Ltd. 2015) 
 
An employee of the engineering company involved in the Waihi Beach project also per-
ceived of the bags as a hard measure, because the containers are used to form a barrier 
just as much as a seawall made of rocks. Most of the seawall opponents I spoke to were, 
however, in favour of geotextiles. If people disliked them, they stated aesthetic reasons: 
they argued that the bags were unsightly, especially after they have been out on the 
beach for some time. However, the visual effect of a wall built with geotextile bags still 
seemed to be much less of a nuisance than a rock wall. The geotextiles gained remarka-
bly little attention by local informants who rarely discussed them at all, so I can only 
speculate what made them this inconspicuous in an atmosphere where everyone seemed 
to have turned into a coastal engineering expert, constantly discussing options. Was it 
“because of the colour”, as an employee of the engineering firm suspected? Their sandy 
beige colour allows the bags to blend into the beach environment, which he saw as the 
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main reason why the bags were perceived as “soft” at all. Another reason though might 
be that, theoretically, the bags could be emptied and taken away again. Even though the 
use of a new “vandal proof” generation of geotextiles means that they cannot just be slit 
open with a common knife, the idea of a sandbag – however big it might be – still en-
tails its removability. Compared to the seawall, this makes for a different scale, depth 
and duration of intervention.  
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Fig. 9: Waihi Beach dune enhancement area: planting day. Picture by author, June 
2011. 
 
Fig. 10: Waihi Beach dune enhancement area after storm erosion. Picture by author, 
June 2011. 
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Fig. 11 and 12: Waihi Beach dune enhancement, four years later. The sandbags have 
been added in some parts as a “temporary access structure”. Pictures by author, 
March 2015 
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5.2 Civil Disobedience Continued: The Council Change Petition 
 
“It is disappointing that despite all of our efforts, we have 
Councillors who have closed their minds to intelligent debate. 
There are good reasons for Council to seriously rethink both the 
matter of costs and its decision to pursue the seawall. Instead, 
our Council is taking a big stick to this community and forcing 
us all to pay for the destruction of a part of our beloved beach 
under a pile of rubble.” (Keall and Mason n.d.b)  
 
Some of the supporters of the unsuccessful Environment Court appeal also tried to ex-
plicitly address the social end of the sociotechnical problem they faced: In 2010, a num-
ber of Waihi Beach citizens initiated a petition to leave Western Bay of Plenty District 
Council (Gibbs 2010; The Weekend Sun 2011). With this remarkable step, the initiators 
attempted to vote out of being governed by WBOPDC any longer, instead promoting 
the joining of the neighbouring Hauraki District Council.  
Discontent with Western Bay of Plenty District Council was further fuelled on the 
side of the seawall opponents when WBOPDC decided to pursue 14,000 NZD in costs 
for the appeal from the appellants. The main argument of the Environment Court to al-
low this was again missing engineering evidence. The cost awarding procedure is based 
on the prerequisite that an appeal is “vexatious or without merit”, a disciplinary instru-
ment meant to prevent the courts from being overloaded with cases; however, in prac-
tice Environment Court appeals are often the only option for the public to engage in re-
source planning decisions and carry a substantial risk of high court costs being awarded 
if unsuccessful (Hayward 2008a: 57f.; Ministry for the Environment 2009). Six hundred 
members of the community signed yet another petition asking the Council to refrain 
from pursuing costs. The argument revolved once more around public and private re-
sponsibilities, the appellants having to make the case that the appeal was not unreasona-
ble, but driven by public interests. In correspondence with the Council’s lawyer, the ap-
pellants’ legal counsel insists on his clients’ good intentions: 
I have known [my clients] for approximately 15 years. Kathy and Peter are hard-
working, decent people who have enormous integrity. Their opposition to the 
Council’s proposal to construct a seawall along part of the foreshore of Waihi 
Beach, was not driven by some philosophical, anti-development mindset, but rather 
by a committed view that there was a better option which would be visually less 
obtrusive, and would maintain public access along the beach at all tides. (R Fisher, 
29.08.2008, see Keall and Mason n.d.a: 22) 
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He also argued that the subsequent change to the NZCPS underlined the soundness of 
the appeal; even though at this point only the proposed statement had been issued, it 
nonetheless, he argued, 
 
demonstrate[s] that at the national level the position advocated by Kathy Mason 
and Peter Keall is supported. […] Ms Mason and Mr Keall had a sound base for 
advancing the case they had, and this is born out of the change of approach in the 
New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement, a factor which was not available to be 
placed before the Court. (R Fisher, 29.08.2008, see Keall and Mason n.d.a: 22)
  
 
In a letter to the editor, one of the appellants expressed her frustration about learning 
(from newspaper coverage) that the Council had in fact already decided to pursue costs 
before they were heard on the issue:  
This is outrageous. […] To find subsequently that the decision has already been 
made leaves us stunned as to the complete disregard of fairness or democratic pro-
cess. […] Unfortunately this seems to be how the Western Bay of Plenty District 
Council operates: make a decision before it has the information, then defend it no 
matter what. One can only rue the day that Waihi Beach was arbitrarily split from 
Waihi [in Hauraki District] and cast in with a Council where we have no effective 
representation and are merely treated as a cash cow. (Mason and Keall, n.d.b) 
 
Being “treated as a cash cow” for WBOPDC means, from the point of view of the 
Council critics, that Waihi Beach residents do not get the benefits they expect in relation 
to the relative high rates they pay (which are coupled to the rising property values). This 
is not only a “no taxation without representation” argument, but also contains a basic 
critique of the decision-making process, especially the role of litigious action and the 
costs caused by this. As another Waihi Beach resident comments, “there is something 
wrong with the system when ratepayer’s have to go to the Court to solve problems with 
their own Council”, something he argues could have been prevented had the Council 
been open to other ways of considering alternatives, including mediation. Pointing to 
the limited resource consent for the scheme, this commentator concludes: 
But in 12 years time, the Council has to look at alternatives, thus the wall may well 
be then removed! There is anarchy down at Waihi Beach! (Watt n.d.) 
 
This statement points to a general questioning of the relationship between Council and 
citizens, or of the state of representation as such: is the Council us/ours? How does 
rightful governance look? And how is it connected to public reasoning (Jasanoff 2012)? 
The 2010 Council transfer initiative took up some of these considerations, arguing that 
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under Hauraki Council governance, Waihi Beach would have almost 15% of that dis-
trict’s electors, twice as large a proportion as within WBOPDC (Fairfax NZ News 2010; 
Gibbs 2010). In the local newspaper, the deputy mayor of Hauraki District commented 
that the decision-making process as a whole would be more democratic than in the 
WBOPDC structure: 
A Hauraki District Council submission introduced by Deputy Mayor Mary Car-
mine welcomed a boundary change if it was wanted by the Waihi Beach communi-
ty. Mrs Carmine said the beach’s current ‘five representatives on a Community 
Board’ were very different from the direct decision-making process of Hauraki’s 
ward system: ‘I fail to see how a Community Board has the same influence’. 
(Gibbs 2010) 
 
A total of 954 signatures were collected for the petition supporting the transfer, includ-
ing two of the five Waihi Beach Community Board members. In the following submis-
sion process, 134 written statements were submitted; however, 90% rejected the Coun-
cil change plans. The WBOPDC mayor commented:  
I appreciate the time the Waihi Beach community has put into expressing their 
democratic right. […] We’re very positive about working with the community 
(Gibbs 2010). (The Weekend Sun 2011) 
 
WBOPDC Community Board members are representatives only in the sense of repre-
senting the community to the District Council, but without a political mandate. Never-
theless, the Waihi Beach Community Board is representative of the community’s re-
sistance to the wall, as supporters of the protection scheme were voted out of the board, 
and the board is now completely made up of seawall opponents. But the Community 
Board does not have the political power to stop the District Council’s project. Is the 
Council change petition another move against the seawall? The local paper quotes the 
initiator saying he  
denied that disgruntlement over the controversial Waihi Beach seawall, under con-
struction, was the motivating factor for the boundary change proposal. Rather, as 
acknowledged even by opponents of the move, Waihi Beach shared a community 
of interest with its Hauraki neighbour Waihi. (Gibbs 2010) 
 
But other informants mentioned the initiative in the context of the seawall case. In one 
of the interviews (Henry Tamm and Samuel George, Interview 11), two Waihi Beach 
Coast Carers discuss the connection of the seawall opposition and the Council transfer 
petition by drawing a comparison to a decade of protest against plans to raise the water 
level of Lake Manapouri for hydroelectric power generation on the South Island. The 
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ultimately successful “Save Manapouri” campaign is now considered New Zealand’s 
first major environmental protest, referred to as “the birth of the modern conservation 
movement” or simply “A Green Awakening” (Bird 2008). Almost 10% of the country’s 
population signed a petition against the project in 1970, and the issue became a deciding 
factor in Labour winning the general election in 1972 (mkiwi n.d.). 
We never came to blows here or anything like that, but, you know, there were ex-
amples of people being definitely divided on the issue. But it went a step further 
when we decided, well, if our Council isn’t gonna listen to us, we gonna take our 
business elsewhere. So we tried to join Hauraki [District Council], across the hill. 
And, the result of that Council [is] still denying that there were people in favour of 
that. They will, to their dying day believe that the majority here wanted to stay with 
them, however, the elections showed somewhat differently [laughing], when four 
out of five swept into power [in the following Community Board elections], 
[laughing] wanted to go to Hauraki. – And the fact that people were virtually grab-
bing the [petition] form out of my hand as I went from house to house [laughing], 
wanting to sign it, you know.  
 
It may well be worth noticing that the boundary change episode – though unsuccessful – 
is something that makes these seasoned seawall opponents laugh, as it points out that, 
while not being able to change things, they have at least managed to voice their ultimate 
disagreement with the Council. The whole “Waihi Beach saga” (Healy and Soomere 
2008: 459), or the “Waihi Beach problem” as the Environment Court Judge Bollard 
called it (Environment Court of New Zealand 2007: 10), is very much a matter of scales 
of (local) governance. Blackett et al. (2010) argue that from a sustainable coastal man-
agement perspective, it is detrimental that local authorities (District and City Councils) 
have to make decisions about coastal protection issues with little national guidance, 
without backup from the regional level, and at their own (rates) expense – decisions 
with far-reaching consequences for the future.  
In the Waihi Beach case, there is agreement beyond factions upon at least two points: 
that seawalls are at best a questionable solution, and that problematic decisions of the 
past (development too close to a dynamic coastline, earlier instalment of hard protection 
measures that kept the line but further aggravated erosion) make it very difficult to tran-
sition to a different regime of coastal management. However, the community, repre-
sented in this not-very-democratic sense by the Community Board, represents a local 
(community) within the local (District Council area) that does not feel represented at all. 
So while the decisions are arguably made at a level “too local” looking at the possibly 
large-scale temporal and spatial effects of coastal management, they are “not local 
enough” from the viewpoint of participation, local decision-making, and the sense of 
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being represented for those who live in these communities. In terms of representation, 
another important group has to be included into any future discussions of the Waihi 
Beach case: tangata whenua or local Māori.  
 
 
5.3 “Things are Changing”: Tangata Whenua  
  and the Cultural Pillar of Sustainability  
 
During the hot stages of the Waihi Beach seawall conflict, tangata whenua (local Māori) 
remained remarkably absent from the political stage. Some of my Pākeha (European 
New Zealander) informants told me that diverting the creeks into Tauranga harbour 
would have been incommensurable with Māori values and thought of this as yet another 
reason why this option had not been investigated further. But these concerns are not 
documented in relation to the Council decision or Court proceedings, apart from a 2002 
WBOPDC document noting that “the cultural significance of Three-Mile-Creek will re-
quire further consideration prior to any decision to divert the creek” (Environment 
Court of New Zealand 2007: 15); “cultural” being a code for Māori, universally under-
stood in Aotearoa New Zealand54. Aotearoa New Zealand anthropologist Michael Gold-
smith argues that this framing of “the cultural” is inappropriate since 
everyone takes part in culture, has culture, and is cultural to the same extent. […] I 
also recognize that the underlying cultural symmetry may coexist with political in-
equality, as in the oppression and marginalization of indigenous peoples. Neverthe-
less, I do not see how a truly anthropological analysis can subscribe au fond to the 
view that some actors are more cultural than others. (Goldsmith 2009: 326f.) 
 
However, as will be shown below, Māori representatives readily use this understanding 
of the cultural for their political causes. The potential of creek diversions being met with 
disapproval by Māori lies in the possibility that polluted water – runoff/stormwater 
and/or treated sewerage – would enter the harbour. Water pollution is a serious concern 
for indigenous groups in Aotearoa New Zealand for at least two reasons. Firstly, water 
is considered a spiritual matter and different sorts of water have to be prevented from 
mixing – especially water that has travelled through human bodies. Polluted water must 
not be disposed into a different body of water (McCan and McCan 1990; Ruru 2009). 
                                                
 
54  My Coast Care contacts also remembered that Māori representatives came to one of the consent hear-
ings and voiced their opposition.  
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Also, the natural harbour continues to be an important fishing spot and harvesting site 
for seafood or kai moana, and preventing pollution of these food resources is a vital po-
litical cause that is often raised by tangata whenua. These subsistence practices are car-
ried out in accordance with kaitiakitanga principles or Māori guardianship of the envi-
ronment and therefore also encompass a spiritual dimension. In the decision-making 
process in Waihi Beach, however, Māori concerns have been almost invisible. Why?  
As mentioned before, the next marae or meeting house, named Otawhiwhi is located 
in Bowentown, a neighbouring settlement in the Waihi Beach ward55. The marae chair-
person Tūhua Brown also works for the Runanga o Ngai Te Rangi Iwi Trust, a tribal 
organisation based in Mount Maunganui. Tūhua explains the cultural significance of the 
site: Three Mile Creek or Waiorooro has been identified as the location of a historic 
Māori village or pā site, and significant archaeological findings were made in the area in 
the 1960s, when storm erosion uncovered some unusual artefacts. A pa kahawai (fish 
hook) with a mother of pearl oyster shell lure (not common in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
therefore probably brought there from Polynesia), and other implements like tooth picks 
and sewing needles carved from human and albatross bones were found there56.  
During the earthworks for the Waihi Beach seawall construction, an iwi representa-
tive acted as cultural monitor on-site to watch for any artefacts or taonga tuku iho 
(treasures), and for especially koiwi (human bones) that must not be uncovered. Tūhua 
explains that while Māori clearly voiced that they were “in total opposition” to the hard 
engineering parts of the project, they did not follow through the consent process in the 
same way as the other opponents at Waihi Beach: 
It’s unfortunate that we weren’t fully involved with the process. We probably 
weren’t educated or aware enough at that stage, also, to be involved. So it was a bit 
from their side, they weren’t too forthcoming, but we weren’t too savvy on dealing 
with the issues too; it was in the too hard basket for our marae at that stage. So I’ll 
have to say that we probably weren’t as involved as deeply as we would have liked 
to have been with the whole consent process, but throughout that whole process we 
made it clear that we were in opposition to this rock wall. (Interview with Tūhua 
Brown, Otawhiwhi) 
 
This statement addresses several intersecting aspects. It refers to the formal organiza-
tion, the Trust and its resource management unit, the recent setup of which is related to 
                                                
 
55  The members affiliate to Ngai Te Rangi Iwi and Tauwhao Hapū (Naumaiplace Ltd. 2007). 
56  Other findings from this site are tethering for kaka birds and tuatara jaws.  
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a changing political landscape in general. Many iwi (tribal groups) and hapū (sub-tribal 
groups) are still in the process of settling Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal claims with the 
Crown to gain back land or compensation for unlawful seizures. In the case of Ngai Te 
Rangi, the allocation of a fishing quota brought much needed financial resources for the 
Runanga, education programmes, scholarships and lawyers57. This marks a difference 
from the time when the Waihi Beach seawall was decided upon: 
Our marae wasn’t set up to do so, so we didn’t go down the road of putting in sub-
missions; we didn’t go down the path of doing a cultural backed assessment. So 
pretty much we missed the time frames and the project went ahead anyway. But we 
were supportive of the care groups that were in opposition of it also and we had a 
number of meetings on the marae actually, in regards to have discussion and re-
gards to the kaupapa [cause, or political strategy]. (Interview with Tūhua Brown, 
Otawhiwhi) 
 
So is the situation different now that the iwi or tribal institutions are getting set up 
more? “That’s right, things are changing. Things are changing.” And rapidly so: 
“We’ve got a lot more say now than we did, say, 10 years ago”.  
Tūhua embodies a new generation of leadership: much better educated in the formal 
ways of the majority society, but also deeply aware of Māori principles, culture and 
cosmologies, and able to strategically relate indigenous values to mainstream political 
categories. Their cause is also about anchoring normative understandings of Māori in 
the law – and working on testing the teeth of the legal provisions already existing. All 
matters decided under the scope of the RMA also have to take the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi legislation into account (Quality Planning n.d.), which is extremely 
relevant to environmental politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, because tangata whenua 
are often the only organized protestors in an economic and political climate where envi-
ronmental concerns are often mainly framed as unduly impeding essential economic de-
velopment. So if tangata whenua had been involved in the Waihi Beach Environment 
Court appeal, they would have insisted on a cultural impact assessment. Tūhua draws 
the connection to another (current) Court case – three local iwi appealing against the 
                                                
 
57  For more information on the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement process, see The Office of Treaty Settle-
ments (2015).  
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Port of Tauranga’s plans for dredging deeper shipping channels in Tauranga harbour 
(Bay of Plenty Times 2011; Helliwell 2012)58: 
Like, you would have noticed this year [2011] we went to the Appeal Court [Envi-
ronment Court], to fight the dredging. […] They now know that we’re not gonna 
sit down here and do nothing, we’re actually gonna fight them to the bitter end and 
not fold no more. Yeah, we’re sick of it, we’ve had enough; these are tipping 
points now on the scales, we believe that any more development, any more applica-
tions or proposals like this rock wall; we’re no longer gonna sit down and just let it 
happen, we’re gonna fight it and now we have the backing of law to enable us to 
do that […] So what it’s come down to is a battle between the Treaty legislation 
and the Resource Management Act legislation, and if he [the presiding E.C. judge] 
makes a call, a decision; it’ll be case law forever and it will set a precedence. (In-
terview with Tūhua Brown, Otawhiwhi) 
 
I raise the point that not only the Resource Management Act and the Treaty of Waitangi 
legislation are contributing to these developments, but also that coastal policy generally 
seems to be changing to incorporate more environmental concerns, especially the New 
Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010, which might be interpreted as further strength-
ening “soft” coastal protection. Tūhua attributes this change in mainstream coastal poli-
cy to tangata whenua input as well. He explains that in Aotearoa New Zealand, Coun-
cils have already adopted a model of sustainability that incorporates “the cultural” as 
another aspect of sustainability beyond the three usual areas (social, environmental and 
economic). This recognition of the cultural as the “forth pillar of sustainability”59 also 
provides opportunities for participation and engagement of Māori because in its very 
definition, Tūhua argues, “cultural” represents Māori values and philosophy: 
We know that model inside out; we were brought up with it. The only thing that 
they can’t do – they can do the environment, they can do the social, they can do the 
economic, but they cannot do the cultural – only we can provide the cultural pillar 
for all these consents that they’re making their decision on. (Interview with Tūhua 
Brown, Otawhiwhi) 
 
Tūhua sees this Māori cultural renaissance as part and parcel of a globally shared space 
of indigenous resistance. This point of view shows Aotearoa New Zealand Māori oper-
ating in political registers that practically connect the categories of the local and global, 
which are often so unwieldy when discussed in theory. Not only that, as Tūhua under-
                                                
 
58  See also the successful protest of Te Whanau O Apanui and Greenpeace against Petrobras offshore oil 
prospecting off the East Cape (NZ Herald Business Desk 2012). 
59  For this concept used in the Aotearoa New Zealand context, see for example 37 Degrees South – Ao-
tearoa (2013).  
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stands it, Māori concepts are translated back into mainstream Aotearoa New Zealand 
political culture via the international stage:  
It’s a worldwide thing, it starts off with the world indigenous rights and that’s 
when we start to push all our issues through meetings that we have with the World 
Indigenous Rights of people or something60, and then it filters down to the coun-
tries from there. Yeah, that’s where we’ve been influential, as Māori, we’ve been 
influential when we’re having those meetings with other indigenous peoples 
around the world. We’re leading the way. […] So that’s where it filters down and 
that’s where these four pillars actually were introduced through. […] It’s a Māori 
philosophical model and that’s how it actually become, eventually, filtered down to 
Councils in New Zealand. (Interview with Tūhua Brown, Otawhiwhi) 
 
Tūhua believes that indigenous peoples worldwide share similar norms and values, with 
only subtle differences – but the political position and influence of Māori is more fortu-
nate because they can rely on the Treaty of Waitangi: 
[I]t’s Māori that have led the way because we actually have, through the Treaty of 
Waitangi, a stronger say in this country than say, the Indians do in Canada; you 
know they don’t have the same sort of treaty that we have and so that’s how we are 
leading the way. Because of what our ancestors did before us. Thank God for our 
ancestors going into that treaty because if they didn’t, we’d be in the same boat as 
the Aboriginees, we’d be in the same boat as those Indians in Canada. But because 
our ancestors were a little bit more clever, I believe, in that time, we were able to 
make sure that this treaty represented tangata whenua properly. (Interview with 
Tūhua Brown, Otawhiwhi) 
 
While Tūhua sees a fundamental difference between indigenous and white people (who 
may share the same values, but base their decision-making on economic principles in-
stead), he acknowledges that the majority of Pākeha Waihi Beach residents also object 
to the seawall, and discusses this as a matter of democracy, or politics of nature: 
Council needs to wake up because they don’t listen to the people. It wasn’t just 
Māori that opposed that rock wall, it was, I’d say 90% of this whole area here op-
posed it, and they didn’t listen. They’re meant to be there to listen to the people 
and they didn’t in this case, it just shows that they’re more about – I believe – more 
about money than they are about the environment. (Interview with Tūhua Brown, 
Otawhiwhi) 
 
In terms of coalition forming, Tūhua makes clear that Māori support Coast Care. How-
ever, he sees “the cultural element” missing here as well, that what only tangata whenua 
can provide: the necessary knowledge about wahi tapu sites of cultural significance and 
how to protect them, and generally ensure that the cultural protocols are adhered to, for 
                                                
 
60  Tūhua here probably refers to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII).  
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example not to start any work in the dunes without speaking karakia (prayer) first. In-
deed, the Waihi Beach Coast Care group is almost completely Pākeha. In Tūhua’s per-
spective, this is a common problem: people are “fully focussed on their issue but they’re 
forgetting about other people affected”. He comments:  
It’s quite a funny thing because these care groups also only really come and ap-
proach us when they want something. It’s like a kid wanting the keys to the car. So 
we’re very careful about getting involved too, because we see that we’re only to-
kenism sometimes, so we want things to be a bit more meaningful when they want 
us to take part in their groups. (Interview with Tūhua Brown, Otawhiwhi) 
 
There are certainly possible points of contact. Tūhua frames his concerns with the sea-
wall project also in visual terms. Such a sense of belonging to a certain landscape and 
the threat that unwanted visual change can pose to it are certainly shared by many New 
Zealanders, not only Māori, for example in widespread criticism of increasing coastal 
development (Peart 2009). Kearns and Collins argue that New Zealanders’ “Feeling for 
the Coast” (Kearns and Collins 2012) expresses Pākeha’s empathy with Māori 
worldviews as well as a general “distinct cultural relationship with the coast” (Kearns 
and Collins 2012: 942; see also Chapter 3.1). What Tūhua outlines as specifically Māori 
is the narration of this connection to the land and landscape enfolding through ancestral 
linkages: 
It’s the damage that all that digging could possibly have upon that area, but also 
it’s the visual, it’s our visual relationship to that area. When we used to go there 
we’d be able to go there and see the dunes and we feel like we’re still part and par-
cel of our tūpuna [ancestors] and carrying on the traditions of our ancestors, but 
when we go there now what do we see? We see this heavy infrastructure, this rock 
wall, these sand banks coming out of the Waiorooro stream and it just takes away 
our sort of, our visual relationship to that area with that we sort of connect to our 
ancestors, carrying on a customary practice that our ancestors did for over a thou-
sand years in that one particular spot. (Interview with Tūhua Brown, Otawhiwhi) 
 
Asked for his vision, Tūhua strongly speaks for a ‘working with nature’ approach, in-
cluding dune restoration, enhancement and the use of geotextiles. He frames this from a 
Māori perspective:  
Us as Māori, tangata whenua here, we’d rather see other ways of protecting the 
foreshore, which is more of quite a simple thing really; it’s more about planting the 
dunes, protecting the dunes, enhancing the dunes, if we have to, by putting more 
sand in there. And just monitoring it like that, because we know it works. The other 
option that we did look at was, you know how they have that big [sand-filled geo-
textile] sausage? That was another option that the dunes could carry on building on 
like that; we would have supported that, so any more natural sort of remedy for that 
erosion would have had the 100% support of tangata whenua, but because they 
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were going to have diggers on the beach and they were going to be ripping up the 
beach and then they were going to put that rock wall back in place because we 
knew it didn’t work before. What’s to say it’s not gonna work again you know. (In-
terview with Tūhua Brown, Otawhiwhi) 
 
Like other seawall opponents, Tūhua openly speaks out for managed retreat. He tells me 
that erosion is a natural process, the story I heard so many times from dune restoration 
promoters (see Chapter 8) – just that nature is a different principle here, personified as 
the god of the seas: 
We feel sorry for those people in those houses, but we feel the Council should have 
paid them out, relocated those houses and let nature take its course, naturally, natu-
rally. Our belief is, you know, tangaroa will eat away at, at, at... well – cause ero-
sion, that’s what tangaroa does. (Interview with Tūhua Brown, Otawhiwhi) 
 
With these statements, it could be argued that the iwi representative advocates soft pro-
tection through the lens of a decidedly Māori worldview and politics. The current 
changes in the bicultural political landscape and the emerging coastal policy change to-
wards soft management could then possibly reinforce each other in productive ways. 
Maybe when the Council has to embark again on its search for “long-term options”, 
Tūhua and his people will be ready to intervene, and this indigenous understanding of 
nature might then become another building block for the community of soft protection 
practice. So far, the ‘working with nature’ imaginary is gaining most of its authority 
from science – but sometimes the scientists are frustrated about running up against 
(sea)walls. 
 
 
5.4 Dystopia Waihi Beach: Enrolling the Seawall’s Materiality 
  into Future Coastal Policymaking 
 
Those who were involved in the Waihi Beach case tend to see it as proof that coastal 
management and policy has so far been incapable of moving beyond hard protection. 
Edward White, the outspoken seawall opponent, fighter against the “dark side” (see 
Chapter 4.3) and former backbone of Waihi Beach Coast Care is a wise, old man. He 
still feels he has nothing much to say to me I don’t know already. However, his clear 
concern is to make me understand that while he couldn’t agree more with what I am 
writing in my consent form and information sheet for our interview about ‘working with 
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nature’ and people speaking of paradigms shifts in coastal management, his experience 
has taught him that 
we can go through and together we can think of all the things that should be done 
and everything else, but then we can’t, you can’t get through the blockage up top 
that it needs to be done, that they’re incapable of doing it, don’t ask me why […] 
People can think a lot of things but to implement them is a different story isn’t it? 
We all know what should be done. (Interview with Edward White, Waihi Beach) 
 
Asked about the supposed paradigm shift in coastal management, and the new (2010) 
New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS) – hasn’t that changed things? – a 
coastal scientist from the marine consultancy ASR tells me a similar thing: “I’d like to 
think so, but let’s look straight back at Waihi Beach, how can that happen?”61. The po-
litical signs at the time of the Environment Court appeal were actually pointing towards 
a change, or even a paradigm shift in coastal management, but maybe this made the de-
feat even more painful for those involved in Waihi Beach.  
On the side of the seawall opponents, a network of people, or a community of prac-
tice, emerged which implicitly and explicitly claims to be fighting for the greater good: 
for democratic decision-making, for better representation of the public as well as the 
more-than-human nature of the beach. From this perspective, the minority of beachfront 
property owners is pictured in pursuit of their private interests alone – above all finan-
cial, backed up by a local Council fearful of litigation. On the side of the protestors, 
coastal scientists claim that they have knowledge that is superior, too, and more in tune 
with the present and future: holistic, open to understanding change, natural dynamics, 
processes and cycles, as opposed to engineering which is framed as narrow-minded, 
static, too narrowly focused on solving a particular problem defined by its client, the so-
lutions it offers being mere hang-overs or band-aids (see Black et al. in Chapter 4.3). 
Why were the protestors not more successful? The New Zealand Herald, a national 
newspaper published in Auckland, commented on the Environment Court decision:  
‘Managed retreat’ has itself retreated before the practical realities of what former 
Prime Minister Sir Keith Holyoake once called our “property-owning democracy”. 
(Collins 2002) 
 
                                                
 
61  ASR Ltd. was an Aotearoa New Zealand-based company well-known for its artificial reef design. 
Chapter 10 provides a closer look at this approach, based on fieldwork at the ASR office in Raglan.  
  141 
Therefore, my informant and collaborator Jim Dahm believes that understanding prop-
erty as a fundamental cultural, political and legal category is the key to understanding 
the case: 
That’s where we are, we’re in that battle where we’ve got all the values enshrined 
in policies, we got all the right policies, but we’re hard up against this engrained, 
cultural idea of property. (Interview with Jim Dahm)  
 
The concept of private land ownership, first introduced in the course of British coloni-
zation, is not congruent to ideas like “let nature take its course”, especially since proper-
ty is thought to be eternal, and not to disappear, washed away by the sea during a storm. 
Importantly though, Jim stresses that in most cases where conflicts about hard protec-
tion emerge, the properties concerned are not under threat of being lost completely – a 
situation which he says would make the desire for engineering options easily under-
standable. It is more about the integrity of the property (in the sense of the section of 
land) which people want to have protected entirely and without any compromise:  
Usually, in the situations I work with, it is simply about the most seaward few me-
tres of a property; dwellings are not at risk and a natural dune could be restored 
over the area impacted – which dune would of course come and go. But any incur-
sion of the sea is resisted – the line must be held at or about front property bounda-
ries – even if this severely damages the beach. (Jim Dahm, pers. comm. 
11.03.2014) 
 
The Waihi Beach seawall opponents have been recognizing that, in this regard, there is 
also a dimension of language politics to the Council’s protection politics. Henry Tamm 
who was a member of the Beach Environment Society remembers that initially, the pro-
tection scheme 
went through the Court as property protection. And then, because that didn’t sound 
nice, it got changed to Shoreline Protection. And we correct them every time they 
say it. It is a bit of a laugh. No, it is not a laugh, it’s not funny, it’s sad this has 
happened. (Interview with Henry Tamm, Waihi Beach) 
 
So in this regard the renaming is a two-edged sword for the activists, because at least 
the initial project title made it very clear what they perceived this to be all about. This 
echoes Cooper and McKenna’s earlier point about the different meanings of protection. 
They note that in case of conflicting understandings, the meaning with the greatest dis-
cursive power is usually protection in the sense of protecting private property or infra-
structure against coastal hazard (Cooper and McKenna 2008b: 315, see also Chapter 1). 
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With reference to the situation in Europe, the authors argue that property issues are one 
of the major social obstacles for approaches of “working with natural processes”:  
Most European countries are property-owning democracies. Properties including 
land and buildings have been passed down from earlier generations. Families, par-
ticularly farming families, have a strong sense of emotional and historical attach-
ment to their properties. More practically, in many cases a house and associated 
land is the sole repository of family assets. [...] In modern times coastal property 
has became so sought after that those inheriting it have acquired enormously valu-
able assets. It is natural that owners will demand protection of these assets. The 
strong desire on the part of property owners and property developers to defend 
their assets is assisted by low societal appreciation of the consequences of interven-
tion at the coast, and the ambiguity associated with ‘coastal protection’. (Cooper 
and McKenna 2008b: 328) 
 
For many of those who have been involved at Waihi Beach, the seawall remains a sensi-
tive issue and the sight of the beach a constant reminder of their lost cause. Some field-
work contacts reported avoiding going near the protection works; however, whenever I 
visited, someone offered to take me down to the beach for a look at the latest develop-
ments, closely monitored by the seawall opponents who would alert Council staff 
whenever they felt something was deviating from the course set by the resource con-
sent. For outside visitors interested in coastal management, the place has a strange fas-
cination, and I witnessed myself how irritated the locals can feel if those coming to see 
Waihi Beach are getting excited about all the things to be seen, while the local activists 
perceive the revetment as a monument of their helplessness in defending themselves 
against various perceived enemies: the Council, the out-of-towners, the local plutocracy 
that leaves wanting the shared imaginaries of good old New Zealand and its supposedly 
classless society.  
My very first visit in Waihi Beach was a field trip as well, where one of the Waikato 
professors who had served as an expert witness for the Environment Court appellants in-
troduced faculty and students from Bremen University to relevant coastal science re-
search sites around Tauranga. This happened in February 2010, just before the work on 
the rock revetment started. Our guide showed us the house sticking out the most (67 
Shaw Road), and explained in his usual moody way that the “bloodymindedness” of 
these people was the reason that the appeal case was lost, because this was where the 
backstop wall would have needed to go. He said that there were people who would 
think that burning down this house was the easiest solution to the problem and conclud-
ed his lecture by stating that “the science is done. […] [But] we need a better way of ar-
guing science in Court” (Fieldnotes February 2010).  
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If the science is done, what isn’t done yet that makes these things happen? The poli-
cy is done as well, as we heard from Jim Dahm above62. Many of those involved in the 
Waihi Beach case are wondering how a transition towards ‘working with nature’ could 
be brought into being. As Edward White puts it: 
And then they put some rocks up and of course you’re gonna have rocks ever after 
once you put rocks up. But how to break the cycle, how can we undo what’s done? 
(Interview with Edward White, Waihi Beach) 
 
How can a sociotechnical imaginary become more prominent, how can ideas become 
reality? Certainly, they have to be put into practice. We have seen in Waihi Beach that 
soft options have also played a role, even though they were overshadowed by the rock 
seawall and the surrounding controversy. Policymaking is a practice as well, and one 
that can encompass the materiality of actual protection structures. What follows is a 
closer look at policymaking after the seawall.  
The Waihi Beach Environment Society understood the decision to build the protec-
tion scheme not only as a defeat for their cause, but also as a step backwards in terms of 
coastal management and soft protection in general. They commented on the resource 
consent granted by the Minister of Conservation in 2008, stating that “[t]oday’s an-
nouncement […] sets back coastal management many years and opens the floodgates 
for more favourable rock wall decisions” (Waihi Beach Environment Society Inc 2008: 
1). 
As noted before, current coastal planning documents for the Bay of Plenty Region 
take a very critical stance towards hard protection projects like the one in Waihi Beach, 
and have instead set out to “promot[e] the philosophy of adaptation planning including 
‘managed retreat’ and protecting the natural vegetative defence mechanisms of the 
coast” (Bay of Plenty Regional Council 2010: 26)63. However, BOP-RC was also the 
agency that approved the consents that were later confirmed in the Environment Court. I 
                                                
 
62  Some pieces of the steel seawall from the 1970s (removed during the construction of the new protec-
tion scheme) have even been transformed into pieces of art: the sculptures “Memorial to Seawall #1-
3” by artist Colin Dray who “was lucky to be able to purchase, and cart home, two tons of scrap steel 
from the contractors who are building the new rock wall at Waihi Beach” (Dray 2013). 
63  This sentence was included in the proposed version, which is the next step in the policymaking pro-
cess. However, Linda Pierce explains to me that this is how policymaking and planning works: the 
first version contains what the planners believe to be best practice, or leading the way, and then it will 
be modified according to submissions from interested parties and the anticipated political feasibility, 
which Linda calls the “reality check”. 
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met with Linda Pierce, a BOP Regional Council coastal policy officer who has been in-
strumental in writing these policies to ask her how she accounts for the huge difference between po-
litical will, policy and practice. Linda explains that “[i]n reality it takes a long time to change people’s minds 
about this sort of thing; and the policy, in my mind, is the front end of change” (Interview with Linda Pierce, 
Bay of Plenty Regional Council). 
And the complemental back end of change – in Linda’s words – can be found also in 
a case like Waihi Beach where for the time being, hard protection is being installed. To 
illustrate her point, she draws a connection to an application for another project in Wel-
lington, where someone wants to rebuild an existing seawall protecting his property. In 
only ten years since the man first placed protection works, the understanding of the en-
vironmental managers and Council employees has changed, as have general public per-
ception and media discourse. New questions are asked by the public vis-à-vis such de-
mands for protection works, questions about the common future of the country that go 
beyond the immediate interests of some property owners: 
And I think people have become more aware that, if you step back and look at this 
issue, it’s not just about protecting one house from the sea but it’s all wrapped up 
in climate change and on an island such as New Zealand, are we gonna allow eve-
rybody that owns coastal land to build a $100,000 wall in front of their property? 
Because the cumulative effects of that are gonna be unpalatable. And it’s not until 
you get to a place like Waihi [Beach], where the wall is required actually [along] 
quite a stretch of beach, that people start changing their minds on these issues. And 
I think the Waihi Beach scenario will be a good way of getting the public percep-
tion changed, because people would look at it and think, ‘Actually, we don’t want 
that here’, and actually people start thinking more long term about these things. 
(Interview with Linda Pierce, Bay of Plenty Regional Council) 
 
Linda seems to think of Waihi Beach as visualizing the perils of a future New Zealand 
that has been turned into a dystopia of misguided coastal protection strategies. So do 
people need to see the detrimental effects of hard protection measures?  
I think so, and I think that’s the part that Waihi Beach is gonna play in this whole 
scenario and it might be that people think it’s a complete disaster. And like you 
said, ‘Do you hope that this is gonna be the last scenario’, where we actually con-
sent to build a big hard protection structure whilst at the same time we’ve got a 
policy document that says we shouldn’t be doing this? Well yeah, I hope it is the 
last scenario, but I think it’s gonna have an active part to play in that being the 
case, too, because I think that it’s not until people start to see that and they start to 
think, ‘actually when I was here as a kid we never used to have any of these big 
seawalls, and actually it does, it is detrimentally affecting my experience of the 
beach in this community. And what happens if it, we in 10 years time or 20 years 
time when it comes time to relook at this issue, we need to build a longer seawall 
or a deeper seawall, or a wider or higher seawall? Do we want that to happen? Ac-
tually I don’t’, yeah, and that’s just all part and parcel of the process I think. (Inter-
view with Linda Pierce, Bay of Plenty Regional Council) 
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Linda’s interpretation of the current situation she has to deal with in her role as a poli-
cymaker compares to the argument brought forward by anthropologists of policy like 
Janine Wedel and others (Wedel et al. 2005): Policy is a process, where the initial inten-
tions of policymakers not always connect to outcomes in any linear sort of way. Linda’s 
framing of the current situation and its possible long-term outcomes could be called an 
attempt at reverse engineering; her aspiration is that the apparent failure to realize the 
‘working with nature’ approach may turn into a massive stepping stone towards her in-
tended goals. Doing so, she explicitly takes into account the very substantial, and above 
all visual presence of the seawall at this beach, and incorporates it into the envisaged fu-
ture of coastal policymaking in her region. A truly material turn, one might argue, with 
a policy practitioner following a kind of Actor Network Theory approach of coastal pol-
icy, avant la lettre: the seawall is getting enrolled (Callon 1986) into the transition be-
yond hard protection.  
To this effect, climate change, or more precisely the public discourse about (antici-
pated effects of) future climate change provides crucial arguments against hard protec-
tion. Seen in this light, the seawall also makes climate change visible: it serves as the 
materialization of an elusive problem frame that is otherwise difficult to grasp, because 
its effects are mostly expected to happen some time in a future difficult to predict, or 
leading to gradual changes difficult to observe. Furthermore, Sheila Jasanoff observes 
that climate change as a scientifically defined entity is not compatible with common 
forms of experiencing human-nature relationships: 
That the climate changes is not news to communities with long histories of living 
with nature, but ‘climate change’ – the scientific phenomenon – employs tech-
niques of aggregation and deletion, calculation and comparison that exhaust the 
capacities of even the most meticulously recorded communal memories. Indeed, 
climate change arguably displaces the very notion of community by displacing 
human beings, both as a species and as a source of norms, in favor of an imperson-
al, but naturalized, object of concern. (Jasanoff 2010: 237) 
 
Jasanoff argues that climate change and the science of it complicate what she calls “or-
dinary human experience” on the levels of social and political organization, as well as 
spatially and temporally: 
Climate [...] is spatially unbounded. It is everywhere and nowhere, hence not easily 
accessible to imaginations rooted in specific places. And, unlike the weather, cli-
mate change occurs over spans of time that are not easily assimilated to circadian 
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or seasonal rhythms: it is not perceptible nor provable as a day or year of human 
life shades into the next. (Jasanoff 2010: 237) 
 
Most importantly for this context is her point about the co-productive nature of 
knowledge about climate change and the environment more generally. With the copro-
duction idiom, Jasanoff points to the interrelations between epistemic and normative 
dimensions of knowing about the natural world. She calls this the “is and the ought” 
(Jasanoff 2010: 236) of things and argues that  
[d]urable representations of the environment […] do not arise from scientific activ-
ity alone, through scientists’ representations of the world as it is, but are sustained 
by shared normative and cultural understandings of the world as it ought to be. 
When it comes to nature, human societies seem to demand not only objectively 
claimed matters of fact but also subjectively appreciated facts that matter. Envi-
ronmental knowledge achieves robustness through continual interaction – or con-
versation – between fact-finding and meaning-making. (Jasanoff 2010: 248) 
 
Climate change, Jasanoff argues, is difficult to grasp exactly because the universalizing 
scientific way of understanding it separates itself from the normative dimension of hu-
man encounters with the world, with local values and understandings of how the world 
should look; “without regard for the layered investments that societies have made in 
worlds as they wish them to be” (Jasanoff 2010: 236). 
Could the visual quality and materiality of the seawall, provoking local engagement 
and conflict over value judgments as it did, provide the necessary link to grasp the nor-
mative questions that climate change poses? Another Council employee who also pro-
vided expert evidence in the Waihi Beach appeal case argues that while right now, hard 
protection structures remain an exception, this will fundamentally change under condi-
tions of climate change impacts. He takes the Coromandel peninsula as an example: 
See the trouble is, at the moment we have only three kilometres of hard structures 
on our coast, but with sea level rise, unless we do something differently we’re gon-
na end up with 18 kilometres of hard structures. (Interview with Robert Miller, 
Waikato Regional Council) 
 
And such a scenario would mean that “a lot of our very beautiful beaches on the Coro-
mandel wouldn’t be beautiful anymore” (ibid). Keeping the beauty of the landscape re-
quires care. Translated into the language of planning documents, “amenity value” be-
comes an objective to move beyond hard protection. Maintaining this value is a matter 
of economic interests as well, the informant argues, because tourism relies on it. Again, 
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climate change is framed as a threat to the beauty of the coast. The visual aspect makes 
it possible to grasp coastal protection decisions as a normative, a value judgement: 
Climate change helps the discussion in a way because it creates an imperative to 
act. It creates a reason to do it because without climate change, people would say, 
‘I don’t know what you’re talking about, it looks good to me; now, go away’. 
Whereas with climate change they’re gonna say, ‘Yes it looks good today but to-
morrow it’s gonna look bad. We need to do something now so it still looks good’. 
So it is actually helping. (Interview with Robert Miller, Waikato Regional Council) 
 
The seawall then works as a bridge to the future, making the predicted effects of climate 
change more tangible and concrete. Where hard protection is discussed under the signs 
of climate change, another politically charged topic also enters the discussion: managed 
retreat. A Ministry for the Environment guidance manual on coastal hazards and climate 
change for local Councils argues for managed retreat as an alternative to hard protec-
tion:  
Given the level of existing coastal development in coastal margins around New 
Zealand, the use of planned or managed retreat will need to become a fundamental 
and commonly applied risk-reduction measure within the next few decades. The al-
ternative would be a considerable increase in the scale of hard coastal protection 
works that are installed. This may be an appropriate long-term strategy in certain 
(exceptional) circumstances, but such an approach does not fit comfortably with 
the values and principles of sustainably managing coastal margins: it would impact 
significantly on beaches, and on natural character, amenity and public access val-
ues. (Ministry for the Environment 2008: 70) 
 
In the same vein, “Planning for Climate Change Effects on Coastal Margins” (Bell et al. 
2001) argues that “[m]anaged retreat or adaptation are the only reasonable long-term 
(100-year) options for most communities or infrastructure at risk”; however, the argu-
ment is first and foremost economical here: 
For most coastal communities that have already experienced periods of erosion or 
inundation, managed retreat is eventually likely to be the only long-term option, as 
alternative protection or adaptation options will increasingly become too expen-
sive. (Bell et al. 2001: 59) 
 
As a coastal expert puts it, New Zealand as a country could simply not afford anything 
else than managed retreat in many locations, especially given the low population density 
in most places64. However, this remains a problem revolving around private property 
rights, and this is how Linda, the Council planner, addresses the Waihi Beach case. 
                                                
 
64  Bell et al. also refer to managed realignment projects in the United Kingdom (Bell et al. 2001: 60). 
 148
Echoing Jim Dahm, quoted in the previous section, for her the whole issue is very much 
framed around the rights associated with private property. As a Regional Council repre-
sentative, she will need to develop and implement coastal policies that will probably, in 
the ubiquitous “long term perspective”, affect people’s property rights.  
Okay, so some houses might fall into the sea – [but] no one’s gonna die, you know. 
Some houses might have to be removed, or they might fall into the sea, to enable 
the coast to retreat – we need to be adaptable to that. I think it’s not until you start 
seeing walls like that go up, that people have the opportunity to change their mind, 
because before that the public perception is very much, ‘We don’t want these 
houses [fall into the sea] – you know we’ve gotta protect our assets; we’ve gotta 
protect our private property’. (Interview with Linda Pierce, Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council) 
 
As a necessary prerequisite for a managed retreat strategy, Linda argues, Regional 
Councils would need to have the ability to transfer some of the responsibility towards 
the national level. At the time of the interview in September 2011, Linda had – like oth-
er commentators – mostly lost hope that the central government would further pursue its 
plans for a National Environment Standard (NES) on sea level rise. The Ministry for the 
Environment (MfE) had been investigating a national guideline to define minimum lev-
els of projected sea level rise, with the aim of creating binding planning principles for 
Regional and local Councils. This would have protected these regional and local author-
ities from having to defend their individual sea level allowances against possible legal 
actions of their citizens. The work on the NES eventually was abandoned in March 
2012, with the statement that the government would decide in reference to the upcom-
ing IPCC 2013 report (The Science Media Centre 2012). However the question to be 
revisited, according to the Ministry, is not whether the 80 cm initially envisaged will 
need to be revised, but rather “whether to progress a National Environmental Standard” 
at all (Ministry for the Environment 2013). 
Aotearoa New Zealand is sailing an unsteady course in relation to climate change 
adaptation. Climate change is already having its (second order) effects on coastal policy 
and planning, though the question of how to move from “promoting a philosophy” to 
creating political instruments to implement managed retreat remains as yet unanswered. 
Nevertheless, as has been shown, (anticipated) climate change is already utilized as a 
main argument against hard protection measures. It therefore seems to fit well that one 
of the Waihi Beach Environment Court appellants relates her perception of changes in 
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coastal policy to climate change, because “you have to believe in it” to make something 
happen: 
I also think that times are changing. […] I think at the stage we were at, we were 
almost ahead of our time, you know. Even the coastal policy statement has changed 
since we had that hearing. […] I almost think that it’s a little bit like climate 
change. You go for a while and no one believes it, and then all of a sudden they 
start, and I think the same thing’s happening with this whole coastal erosion issue. 
People are starting to get it. (Interview with Environment Court appellant) 
 
The relation to climate change is also a reminder of the global scale of the issues 
touched upon in the Waihi Beach case: managed retreat, a proclaimed paradigm shift 
beyond hard protection, and the emergence of ‘working with nature’ approaches. In 
spite of the scope of questions about current and future coastal politics of nature, the 
Waihi Beach controversy did not get much attention beyond the local scale, neither 
from politics nor the media (but see Collins 2002; Stevenson 2003; Gaynor 2004; Ste-
venson 2004). This is one symptom of what Linda Pierce alluded to above as missing 
national guidance, and might also be one reason why advocates of soft approaches for 
coastal protection argue to look beyond the national scale. In their “Submission of Fur-
ther Technical Information Prior to Waihi Beach Hearing”, Black et al. explicitly use 
the example of coastal policies and politics of public protest against hard protection 
structures in New South Wales (Australia): 
New Zealand is in a very good position to learn from, rather than repeat, the mis-
takes of overseas countries. With respect to seawalls it is worth noting that there 
are now many locations world-wide where seawalls are no longer a permitted 
coastal protection option. The public outcry for these traditional structures that do 
not protect the coast but the land behind them is well demonstrated by the protest 
actions at Collaroy Beach in Sydney, Australia. On 17 November 2002, several 
thousand people made a human ‘wall’ in protest to the proposed 1.1 km seawall. 
This project did not go ahead. (Black et al. 2005b: 1) 
 
The local activists themselves are actively drawing on examples such as this as well. 
One of my main informants from the Waihi Beach Coast Carers entrusted me with a 
whole collection of newspaper clippings and other materials, containing information on 
hard and soft protection measures implemented in Aotearoa New Zealand and over-
seas65. Through this engagement with the discourse of ‘working with nature’ as much as 
                                                
 
65  The collection included information on artificial reefs, geotextiles and an experimental technique 
named “Holmberg Beach Stabilizer”, as well as an issue of an infrastructure management journal enti-
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through the practical approach of Coast Care work, he becomes part of a larger commu-
nity of practice of soft coastal protection (Wenger 1998). 
This community is defined around a specific imagination of nature. Care for the fu-
ture environment, or sustainable coastal management, also entails a certain understand-
ing of the meaning of time, where coastal nature is characterized by a cyclical, open-
ended movement of material. The hard protection advocates and their engineers, on the 
contrary, tend to focus on immediate threats and problems to be solved. As Cooper and 
McKenna have argued, the implications of coastal protection decisions are very differ-
ent when assessed over different scales of space and time (see Chapter 1): the longer the 
timeframe applied, the more the negative implications of hard protection become clear. 
Future generations will have to bear the financial and ecological costs of present-day 
decisions. Without taking climate change into account, the latter approach of addressing 
the “here and now” masks in fact the externalisation of costs over time:  
With currently rising global sea levels and predictions of near future accelerations 
of sea level rise (Rahmstorf et al., 2007), the cost associated with the maintenance 
of coastal defences will certainly increase. If they are not abandoned, this cost will 
have to be borne by future generations of taxpayers while future generations of 
coastal property owners enjoy an increase in the value of their assets. (Cooper and 
McKenna 2008a: 300) 
 
The hard protection faction has in fact embraced the idea of a nature constructed in the 
literal sense: the coast features an environment always in interaction with humans, teth-
ered and made, productive according to human values. Both parties are concerned with 
their understandings of value: on the one side, house owners aim to protect their proper-
ty values and financial investments into the future. The seawall opponents counter with 
attaching value to other imaginaries: of Good Old New Zealand and its rural coast. 
Their defeat is symbolized in the very visibility of the large pile of rocks on the beach. 
In contrast to property rights and scientific arguments though, these tangible aesthetic 
values are not easily translated into the political and legal spheres (Froude et al. 2010). 
                                                                                   
 
tled “Drawing the Line on Coastal Erosion”, featuring an article on the “Need to work with – not 
against – nature” (Trade Publications Ltd. 2003). Also included was a clipping from the real estate 
section of a newspaper, featuring a property close to Nelson on the South Island. The ad shows a piece 
of land completely bordered by a concrete seawall, with the remark that this is “one of the few re-
maining pieces of private, unspoiled coastal land”, featuring “unobstructed views” and protected by a 
“professionally engineered, 210 metre long, permanent seawall graces the sea frontage, fitting well in-
to the natural environment”. This textual and visual example shows what the Waihi Beach activists do 
not understand to be an unspoiled natural environment.  
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Therefore, the local activists and their sympathizers are at ills to make their case around 
arguments about natural coastal processes and resource management law. But the dis-
turbing presence of the wall revolves much more around its visual nuisance – so one has 
to see Waihi Beach to understand, they claim. This encompasses understanding that 
coastal erosion becoming a problem has only been the beginning of this vexatious situa-
tion. 
Through these other, more latent imaginaries, the different positions vis-à-vis the 
protection scheme are entangled with different senses of the community and its historic-
ity. As Kearns and Collins observe in relation to the Ngunguru spit case, people emo-
tionally connect to the beach environment and form “everyday geographies of coastal 
experience” (Kearns and Collins 2012: 948). It is important to note, the authors stress 
with regard to their empirical findings, that such a sense of attachment is not limited to a 
“relatively natural setting”, but can be felt strongly also toward modified and developed 
coastal landscapes (Kearns and Collins 2012: 952). Furthermore, this emotional connec-
tion also has a social dimension, which furthers community action if these shared eve-
ryday geographies come under threat by coastal development projects, or, as in the 
Waihi Beach case, by a new coastal protection scheme. Kearns and Collins argue for 
consideration of these emotional dimensions in social science research on coastal issues: 
[T]o achieve more ‘fully human’ accounts of the coast, we contend that there is a 
need to take people’s feelings as well as their perceptions (e.g. how coastal land-
scapes are seen) and embodied experiences (e.g. how the coast is used) seriously. 
[…] First, emotions are central to the people/place relationship at the coast, to the 
extent that ways of thinking not grounded in emotional attachment may have lim-
ited purchase with local people. Second, emotions are not only produced by en-
gagement with coastal landscapes but also, in turn, can produce collective mobili-
sation in favour of place protection. [...] Because this experience is shared, it can 
form the basis for cooperation and a common sense of purpose at the community 
scale. (Kearns and Collins 2012: 951)  
 
For those objecting to the seawall, the out-of-towners are not a part of this community, 
but invaders representing coastal change they do not want. Seen in this light, the con-
flict opens up the question which is the right way to live with nature: as a Waihi Beach 
resident, and as an New Zealander – questions that go far beyond the issues discussed in 
the technical terms of coastal science and engineering. Kearns and Collins argue simi-
larly when they conclude that their Ngunguru case study “opens space to see the coast 
as generative of deeply human experience and more than simply property relations and 
geomorphic processes”. In this vein, their work seeks to “reclaim the coast as a site, as 
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well as a set of sights, that is more geographically complete”, because “the politics of 
emotion and the work of sharing feelings can make a world of difference” (Kearns and 
Collins 2012: 952f.).  
The Waihi Beach conflict is a struggle about imaginaries of the future. It is a conflict 
about alternative visions that have severe consequences for how the people involved 
imagine the place of humans in the world, and in coastal naturecultures. But how can a 
better ecology, a more sustainable entanglement of nature and humans be achieved, 
“how can things be assembled in ways that are more sustainable”, as Steve Hinchliffe 
wonders (Hinchliffe 2007: 186)? How are community and belonging tied to a right state 
of nature? The upcoming chapters of Part III will follow up on these questions, focusing 
on ‘working with nature’ put into practice. 
 
  
  153 
Part III:  
Material Practices of Working with Nature, or: 
Making Coastal Naturecultures 
 
 
 
This part of the book is designed around the discussion of different material practices of 
working with, or making coastal naturecultures. Spanning from the use of dune plants 
as a means of do-it-yourself coastal protection to the development of large-scale soft-
engineering technologies, the following chapters engage with exemplary cases of soft 
coastal protection and related practices in Aotearoa New Zealand. What the examples 
have in common is that the sociotechnical imaginary to ‘work with nature’ (and not 
against it), as well as specific coastal naturecultures, are coproduced in the process. By 
zooming in on these practices of nature-making, other important concepts become dis-
tinguishable that all play a role for actors that strive to ‘work with nature’ in concrete 
projects: a specific Aotearoa New Zealand approach to biodiversity, native nature and 
culture, a unique do-it-yourself ethics, the role of surfing, as well as emerging ideas 
about mimicking or enhancing nature with the help of models and calculations.  
Chapter 6 introduces the volunteer dune restoration programme Coast Care Bay of 
Plenty (BOP). I describe the practices employed by Coast Care members to address the 
impacts of widespread environmental change in coastal dune environments and show 
how much ongoing work is put into maintaining coastal nature. Chapter 7 provides a 
closer look at the economies of volunteer and other labour in Coast Care projects, fo-
cussing on a large-scale project that uses dune restoration as a means of reclaiming the 
dunes as public space. Chapter 8 focuses on dune restoration projects that are explicitly 
designed to serve as coastal protection, providing a “soft” alternative to hard protection 
structures. Chapter 9 focuses on another sociotechnical imaginary that is fundamental 
for dune restoration: the aim to replace invasive species with indigenous plants, or what 
I call ‘reconstructing native nature’. Chapter 10 follows practices of caring for the coast 
beyond dune restoration. It explores a different world of coastal experts, or surfer-
scientists, and scientist-activists, at a company that designs multifunctional artificial 
reefs which are claimed to be working “in concert with nature”. 
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6.  Restoring and Maintaining Nature:  
  An Introduction to Coast Care
 
The community-based dune restoration programme Coast Care Bay of Plenty (BOP) is 
the main initiator of dune restoration projects in the Bay of Plenty1. Its stated goal is to 
restore “form and function of the dunes in the Bay of Plenty” (Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council 2013a) by preserving and reintroducing native coastal vegetation2. The pro-
gramme operates within Regional Council borders in terms of administration and most 
of the funding, and relies to a large part on recruiting volunteers on a local basis, though 
by no means exclusively (as will be shown in Chapter 8). The Coast Care BOP pro-
gramme started in the mid-1990s, when Regional Council employees brought back the 
Coast Care idea from an educational trip to Australia (Landcare Australia Limited n.d.). 
The first project involved removing Sidney Golden Wattle trees at suburban Mount 
Maunganui beach which residents had complained ruined their sea views. Also, at the 
Mount and in neighbouring Papamoa Beach, concern rose about erosion which had pro-
gressed closely towards houses and a surf club. Furthermore, the removal of wind-
blown sand from the beach promenade had been causing significant costs at Mount 
Maunganui, which is also a popular holiday resort. Both issues were successfully tack-
led by planting native dune plants: Pingao and Spinifex. A formal Coast Care coordina-
tor position was created at the Regional Council office and filled with an enthusiastic 
proponent of dune restoration, who committed much work to promoting Coast Care, es-
pecially as a means of erosion control3. Today, Coast Care BOP provides equipment 
(including tools, free plants and fertilizer), education and logistical support for volunteer 
dune restoration work throughout the BOP coast, with 100,000 plants per year planted 
by 2300 volunteers (de Monchy 2010). 
                                                
 
1  Coast Care BOP, as well as a similar Beachcare Programme in the Waikato Region (covering the up-
per West Coast of the North Island as well as the Coromandel region bordering the BOP to the North), 
have been the first of their kind in New Zealand. They have served as models for other regions (e.g. 
Northland), which are also establishing volunteer dune restoration initiatives (Northland Regional 
Council: 2013; Waikato Regional Council: n.d.).  
2  For a thorough discussion of restoration and the native-alien species binary, please turn to Chapter 9. 
3  The first Coast Care coordinator eventually resigned after disagreements with the Regional Council 
over the Waihi Beach seawall (see Chapter 5).  
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Projects are realized in about 20 different locations throughout the Bay of Plenty and 
have varying objectives: property owners are trying to combat coastal erosion that 
threatens their beachfront houses at Pukehina Beach, whereas a few kilometres up the 
coast in Maketu, nature lovers restore an uninhabited sand spit, the habitat of the native 
dotterel bird. Funding for the programme comes from the Regional Council, local 
Councils (the four coastal District/City Councils of the region) and the federal Depart-
ment of Conservation (DOC). Logistically, Coast Care BOP remains closely linked to 
the Regional Council where the Coast Care coordinator is located4.  
The relatively large area of the BOP coast is divided into three parts assigned to so-
called Coast Care contractors who do much of the work on the ground: they are present 
at all “working bees”, the official volunteer work events which are often scheduled on 
weekends to be accessible for the working population. The contractors store and 
transport plants, fertilizer and tools, give instructions, hand out tea and muffins after the 
work is done, and chat with the volunteers, providing a welcoming environment where 
people feel their efforts are valued and they are encouraged to come back5. Apart from 
contract work which involves controlling unwanted plants with agrichemical substanc-
es, all other restoration tasks are carried out without the use of paid labour. Coast Care 
BOP was founded upon a principle of collaboration between the (local) authorities and 
the public:  
The Coast Care concept is about community groups and local government working 
together to protect and enhance the coastal environs of the Bay of Plenty coast. 
(Boffa Miskell 2008) 
 
Following this rhetoric of working with local communities, Coast Care BOP is official-
ly organized into localized groups. Some places in fact feature distinct, often close-knit 
local groups, whereas in others only one individual is occasionally joined by more vol-
unteers from within or outside the local community, or no continuous group structure 
exists at all and volunteers are solely recruited through advertisements in the media 
and/or via the Coast Care database. The Coast Care coordinator is clear about the fact 
                                                
 
4  During the time of my fieldwork, one of the RC’s Land Management officers had the duty of Coast 
Care coordinator in addition to his other tasks.  
5  In line with the ruling objective to downsize, streamline, and privatize public services, this work is not 
delegated to other Council employees, but instead subcontracted on a competitive basis. At the time of 
my fieldwork, Coast Care BOP had three such positions: for the Eastern BOP, for the Western BOP 
excluding Waihi Beach, and a Waihi Beach local contracted only for this group. 
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that while the idea to work with the community is an important factor for Coast Care, it 
remains a continuum between groups anchored in the local community and settings 
where the Council, or Coast Care initiates the project following its own goals: “some-
times, we push the community idea too far”, he says  (Fieldnotes 26.05.2011).  
The emphasis on the local, on working with the community, will be an important as-
pect for thinking through the discourses and practices of Coast Care. In fact, some of the 
work is advertised as public working bees in local newspapers, leaflets and via an email 
list for volunteers, whereas other events are organized specifically for pre-existing 
groups like school classes, international volunteers from organizations like Conserva-
tion Volunteers New Zealand, or company groups travelling to a coastal location for a 
day of joint volunteering. In more remote locations, the events are frequented mostly by 
locals and regular volunteers, whereas in the more popular holiday destinations Coast 
Care working bees are popular with families and younger kids, who are recruited 
through public advertising and usually do not regularly attend events. Waihi Beach 
Coast Care, on the contrary, whose members have been instrumental in the seawall con-
flict described in Chapters 4 to 5, is especially close-knit. Apart from being bound by 
the shared resistance to the protection scheme, the group is also defined by its relative 
distance from the Coast Care headquarters in Mount Maunganui. “Waihi Beach is its 
own fiefdom” (Fieldnotes 13.05.2011), the local contractor comments on the situation; 
the Coast Care coordinator, asked for his visions of future Coast Care groups, pointed to 
this group for its extraordinary social cohesion, hoping the group will be able to main-
tain itself with minimal input from the head office.  
Besides the volunteers, there are also involuntary workers involved: citizens on a pe-
riodic detention (PD) community work scheme are another important source of labour 
for Coast Care (the economy of paid and unpaid work will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 8). In any case, the Coast Care mission is defined loosely enough to allow 
for a diversity of actors, objectives and technologies of caring for the coast; and just as 
the coastal environment is always in motion, Coast Care features a certain fluidity as 
well. Not every project is working to the same extent towards all of the Coast Care 
goals of “education, community involvement, biodiversity, infrastructure protection” 
(de Monchy 2010). 
There are, however, shared practices, carried out against a larger backdrop of envi-
ronmental change and native nature conservation, the logics and implications of which 
will be further explored in Chapter 9. At this point, I concentrate on shared practices I 
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encountered in my engagement with Coast Care groups. While the localized projects are 
quite different, the shared practices of planting, fertilizing, weeding and pest control de-
fine them as Coast Care projects; since all the working bees are supervised by Coast 
Care staff, people tend to stick to the practices they have been instructed to use. 
Generally speaking, the most popular task is the planting of native dune plants, espe-
cially Spinifex and Pingao. The dune grass Spinifex sericeus is found on Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s North Island and on the upper half of the South Island (down to the Christ-
church area in New Canterbury), as well as in Australia and the Pacific Islands. The 
golden sand sedge Desmoschoenus spiralis, commonly known under its Māori name 
Pingao is endemic to Aotearoa New Zealand and can be found throughout the country 
(Wassilieff 2012). These species are saltwater-tolerant and develop deep roots and run-
ners, which can trap wind-borne sand and thereby lead to a progression of the frontal 
dune. Other species planted further backwards include Muehlenbeckia complexa, Eu-
phorbia glauca and Coprosma acerosa.  
The plants are put relatively deep into the ground (together with some slow-release 
fertilizer), so that some extent of sand movement can occur without the roots being ex-
posed. However, contrary to widespread public perception, Coast Care is doing more 
than just planting Spinifex and Pingao. Weed and pest control are also important com-
ponents of the dune restoration work. In most cases, existing cover with introduced 
plants is removed before planting the native plants. But weeding is also a continuous 
task of maintaining coastal nature. According to Pim De Monchy, the Coast Care coor-
dinator, the relation between planting and weed control work necessary is about 20:80 
per cent. However, the volunteers are much more enthusiastic about planting: 
Planting is the first thing that comes to people’s minds. Advertise a community 
planting day and there are lots of people interested in coming along. But advertise a 
community weeding day, that’s different. (Fieldnotes 26.05.2011) 
 
In many locations, weed control is outsourced to contractors who apply agrichemicals 
that kill unwanted vegetation like African iceplant (Carpobrotus edulis), Kikuyu grass 
(Pennisetum clandestinum) or Agapanthus (Agapanthus praecox). In terms of physical 
labour necessary for those who subsequently plant the dunes, this preparing procedure is 
a substantial difference. Digging out Kikuyu grass with a spade, for example, is an ex-
tremely tiring, seemingly endless task, further complicated by the fact that the roots are 
very similar to Spinifex roots, so that a dune restoration novice can easily mix them up 
and destroy “the good ones” instead of the “the bad ones”, as people would sometimes 
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put it. The task becomes even more unsatisfying being aware of the fact that, most like-
ly, the unwanted plants will quickly recover or recolonize the area.  
A dune that has been prepared by spraying and removal of existing vegetation means 
planting is an easy task, comparable to digging sand on the beach just below. Only a 
few groups are following what they call a “spray-free” approach, even though, “a lot of 
people who are interested in Coast Care are also interested in organics and maybe a 
general decrease in the environmental impact from human activities”, as Pim de Mon-
chy puts it. However, he argues, weed control with chemical means is a necessary evil 
given the dimensions of the Coast Care task: 
 
With some of the weed problems that we have, combine that with the scale of the 
modification of dune environment in the Bay of Plenty region – and it just seems as 
though, if we’re too precious about the methods that we use, i.e. if we restrict our-
selves to mechanical removal of weeds we will only ever be able to restore such a 
tiny portion of the dune environment that it seems like – it’s a compromise that we 
have to make. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care)  
 
However, it remains surprising that this argument seems to work so well, especially 
since the Coast Care constituency often seems to be so uncompromising. In relation to 
the Waihi Beach seawall for example, Coast Care members rejected to contribute any 
restoration work in relation to the hard protection scheme (see Chapter 5.1)6. With the 
general public, weed control is not always popular, but mostly not because people are 
critical about the use of herbicides (though this can be an issue), but because what resto-
ration enthusiasts call invasive weeds, others think of as pretty plants in the dunes. This 
conflict will be discussed in more detail below in regard to the removal of gardens 
which have been extended into the dune-bordering properties. 
Besides weed control which targets introduced plants on the dunes, pest control tar-
gets animals. Rabbits were introduced after European colonization, and, without natural 
enemies in the Aotearoa New Zealand environment, they extensively feed on Pingao 
plants. Cats and stouts are a concern too, because they prey on native birds like the New 
Zealand dotterel. Common pest control practices are poisoning, trapping, and shooting, 
as well as pest-proof fences that keep these animals out of the replanted areas. Pest con-
                                                
 
6  The issue of allegedly unavoidable compromises for the greater good will emerge in Chapter 7.3 in re-
lation to forced (periodic detention) labour, an essential part of large-scale Coast Care projects. 
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trol is an essential part of the projects, even though volunteers often care most about the 
planting. Pim distinguishes between the emotional attachment to planting and the prag-
matic aspects of his large-scale task: 
The replanting is almost more of a participation feel good aspect of it and the weed 
control and the rabbit control, and the fencing and the vehicle law changes are 
where the big gains are made. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
While the Coast Care coordinator here acknowledges that weed and pest control are not 
the “feel good” part of Coast Care work, these practices are widely accepted as neces-
sary. Pim de Monchy sees the reason for this in the agricultural history of Aotearoa 
New Zealand, making pest control a familiar issue for most people: 
Some people are surprised. Some people are anti. Most people see it as a necessary 
evil, because the rabbits are such a well known agricultural pest and they have been 
for over a hundred years – people know that, generally speaking, rabbits are bad. 
So you’re not having to convince people of the need for it, and then of the need for 
poison. It’s a case of they know it’s bad so they go, ‘Oh well, if that’s how you 
have to control them that’s okay.’ (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast 
Care) 
 
Increasing volunteer participation in weed control activities is a major goal for the fu-
ture of Coast Care. A press release issued during the time of the fieldwork by the Re-
gional Council about an internal evaluation of the programme states that 
[m]ost people associate Coast Care with planting, so the challenge for staff and 
contractors now is to try and harness volunteer energy for the control of weeds 
which threaten existing and newly established plants (Wassilieff 2012). 
 
To accomplish this, volunteers are offered free enrolment in the weed control courses 
mandatory for people who handle chemical substances on public land:  
We’ve now put thirty something volunteers through that and then we supply them 
with the chemical and the equipment, and advice and so on; and hopefully they can 
nibble away at the problem. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
Apart from enrolling more volunteers, the coordinator also uses an increasing number of 
funds for contractors, because in difficult locations weed control work is not suitable for 
volunteers. The ubiquity of controlling unwanted flora and fauna is also reflected in the 
shared language of dune restoration people. Especially in regard to pest control, the tone 
of the discourse can be surprising when encountered for the first time.  
I was first introduced to the common language of pest control by a talk given at a 
conference of the Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand. A Department of Conserva-
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tion (DOC) biodiversity manager presented the latest on poisonous carrots (containing 
the controversial 1080 or Sodium fluoroacetate) and kill traps. We learned that traps are 
distinguished in cage, leghold, and kill traps, and that all models need to pass a National 
Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC) humaneness test. A faintly giggling 
audience was informed that “cages are good where sensitive non-targets are present”, 
and that “feral cats require heavier duty hardware,” which is why “Soft Jar Victor 1.5 is 
the most effective trap for cats”. What the presenter called the “ultimate cat trap” was 
developed especially by the Kaki Recovery Programme he worked for. Though the de-
vice did pass the NAWAC test, the speaker warned before showing the picture that this 
“is not for the fainthearted” (Fieldnotes March 2010). During the course of the field-
work, I got accustomed to the sight of such devices, but the ubiquity of killing unwant-
ed animals and the common ways of talking about this in a technocratic way – as shown 
in the term pest control itself – remained irritating to me. The tasks associated with it 
are highly operationalized and converted into numbers. For rabbit control, for example, 
the so-called McLean scale is used as a means to determine the intensity of rabbit pres-
ence on a scale from 1-8, which then translates into action being taken to kill the ani-
mals: 
 
So, 8 being – you look out there and you see rabbits seething all over the place, and 
1 being no rabbit sign having been found. What we do is every year in November, 
the contractors and I will assess the whole coastline […] Every two hundred metres 
we stop, walk up the dune and have a look around, and carry on. And if we get two 
or more pieces with a score of 3 or higher then we do a control operation. (Inter-
view with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care)  
 
In remote areas, rabbits are also shot in organized operations by squads of hunters using 
night-sight devices. As explained above by the Coast Care coordinator, these practices 
are relatively uncontroversial, because they link up well with the experiences of farming 
in a country where introduced animals strive and agriculture relies on large-scale pest 
control. However, not all animals impacting the dunes are perceived as pests by the 
wider public. While people might agree with the necessity to kill rabbits and the prac-
tices used to do so, they may object to killing other species that they find cute and care 
for: hedgehogs, for example, which are popular characters in classical English chil-
dren’s literature (Potter 1905; Grahame 1908). 
Furthermore, pest control practices that might work in agricultural settings or in a na-
tional park context may need to be adjusted to the public space of the beach. In the 
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Eastern Bay of Plenty, volunteers are now laying out toxic bait for rabbits, because paid 
pest control workers, used to work in remote bush areas, failed to account for humans 
and their dog companions also present in the beach environment. Not taking enough 
care to warn people in advance, and laying out baits along the walking paths as well, re-
sulted in dogs that showed symptoms of poisoning. After people complained, the local 
Coast Care contractor appealed to the kiwi belief that the best way to ensure things are 
done properly is doing it yourself, and recruited locals for pest control work, including 
the dog owners themselves, who now take care to inform everyone about the baits, us-
ing several channels from the schools, to the marae, to the hospital.  
Contrary to the comments made by Pim de Monchy above, some care groups are en-
thusiastic about pest control, and this may even lead the way to new affiliations beyond 
Coast Care. An article in the Dunes Trust newsletter reports on a Coast Care group that 
joined Weedbusters, a community weed control and education programme (Weed-
busters n.d.), and encourages other Coast Care groups to similarly expand their scope 
(Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand 2013). Weeding and pest control are similar in 
that they are both ongoing tasks: the bulk of the work often amounts to maintaining na-
ture. For those not familiar with restoration, this can feel counterintuitive: Is not restora-
tion about giving nature a hand in order to get it back into a state where it can sustain it-
self? Does it still “count” as nature if it is this high-maintenance? Experienced Coast 
Carers have encountered such questions and talked to people who argue that dune resto-
ration work is useless because it has to be done again and again. Elise Vanderbek, the 
hands-on volunteer from Waihi Beach puts it like this: 
I think it’s just like a lot of things; you’ve just got to keep nibbling away at it and 
doing what you can. Some people say to us when we’re down there working that 
we’re just wasting our time, that the sea will take it, that the public will trample on 
it or that the plants will die because of climate change and all that sort of thing. But 
I just say to them, well at home we mow our lawns every time they grow; we don’t 
just say it’s a waste of time cause they’ll grow again, I mean you paint your house 
when the paint starts flaking off it or it needs painting, you don’t just say, ‘Well, 
it’s going to need painting again in 10 years if I paint it now, so I won’t bother.’ 
It’s like cutting your hair or washing your hair, it’s gonna get dirty again, but you 
know, to me it’s just stupid to say it’s a waste of time because it will need doing 
again later, or more weeds will come, or more rubbish because that’s life isn’t it? 
(Interview with Elise Vanderbek, Waihi Beach Coast Care) 
 
Because of the amount of work, and the need for ongoing maintenance, Coast Care 
works best in locations close to where people live: within the city boundaries, the dunes 
are therefore in better condition, regardless of the intensified human use pressures. As 
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the Coast Care coordinator explains, the reasons lie in better control of vehicles on the 
beach and in the much larger group of possible volunteers that could be recruited. Tau-
ranga and surrounding suburban regions are currently undergoing massive growth – this 
might result in positive impacts on the dune environment:  
It is interesting. If you look at that area between Papamoa and the Kaituna River; 
the plan under SmartGrowth which is this fifty year joint agency plan, is for some-
thing like 41,000 people to be housed on the Te Tumu and the Wairakei develop-
ment blocks. And that’s gonna seriously change that environment. In some ways 
though the dunes from a biodiversity perspective might end up better off than they 
are now where they’ve got this low level grazing; it’s just some draining of wet-
lands, and there’s not a lot of protection going on7. On the other hand, once it’s ur-
banized you will get all the heavy metals and the storm water run-off. So there’s 
kind of like different pressures coming on. But in the places that are reserved inside 
an urban space, the protection is quite good and so you could replant threatened 
plants with confidence that they’ll survive and they’re not gonna get eaten by 
cows, rabbits or driven over by vehicles to the same extent as they might do if it 
was out in the country. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
However, one might argue that the negative effects of increasing coastal development 
are simply less visible. Whereas damages caused by grazing stock, rabbits or vehicles 
might be more effectively controllable once an area has reached a certain level of urban-
ity, the invisible environmental threats from pollution will nonetheless multiply.  
In any case, Coast Care projects most often involve nature restoration within a sub-
urban setting, where human presence is an important part of the natural-cultural envi-
ronment. The Coast Care coordinator considers the relations to this larger public and the 
visibility of dune restoration when he is asked to speak about possible futures of Coast 
Care. Three different ideals of restoration work in its relations to the human community 
determine his visions. Firstly, the “gold standard beach” shows the potential for dune 
restoration in areas with high usage and public profile:  
What I’d love to see is some gold standard beaches, so at least one place in each 
district where we can show a fully restored dune sequence from front to back, with 
no weeds in, kind of like the end point: This is what dune restoration could achieve 
in this environment given a certain amount of resources. […] At those places 
where lots and lots of people visit, we wanna make sure that the dune is in as good 
a condition as possible, given the constraints of that site. (Interview with Pim de 
Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
                                                
 
7  Since the interview there have been a number of partnership agreements between landowners and 
Councils in this area that have identified and protected dune and riparian areas of significance from 
grazing and development (Pim de Monchy, pers. comm., 05.03.2014). 
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The goal is to give people an idea of  
what does the beach look like in the Bay of Plenty? ‘Ah, that’s right, Spinifex, and 
Pingao, and some Pohutukawa trees, okay.’ So they got the right mental picture of, 
what a sandy beach environment is. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast 
Care) 
 
Secondly, beyond constructing this physical and mental picture of the possibilities in 
the here and now, Pim also aims to show the potential of restoration to return closer to 
“the way it would have been”. This second approach is limited to areas with more 
space, which allows for a more self-sustaining community of native plants and animals: 
[W]here you’ve got a natural dune system that goes further back, that’s kind of 
where you can demonstrate, at an ecological level, [how to] get a functioning 
community back again. And I guess looking forward maybe another five or ten 
years, that should be not just plants, but animals as well. (Interview with Pim de 
Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
This goal is now pursued under the new instrument of Biodiversity Plans. Pim gives an 
example of a dune area where a rabbit-proof fence has been constructed as a matter of 
“removing one of those animal threats to trying and rebuild the animal community as 
well as the plants” – in hope of gradually turning the area back to “the way it would 
have been” (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care). How these measures 
will influence the development of the dune ecosystem is yet to be seen, also because of 
the unknown effects of interactions between native animals and plant communities. The 
loss of native fauna has most probably also accelerated the demise of native flora, be-
cause seed dispersal by native animals like geckos and skins was disrupted. Apart from 
these visions of a self-maintaining coastal community of native plants and animals on 
the dunes, Pim also points to the role of human communities in determining the possi-
bilities of restoration: 
So that’s my vision. I’d also love to see a few places where you have an autono-
mous care group that sets its own vision and comes to the agencies. ‘So this is what 
we need to achieve the vision’, and the agencies work together well enough that 
they can say, ‘righteo, there you go, great, make it happen, what is the support you 
need?’ So as well as actually seeing the outcomes on the dunes, I’d love to see that 
participation raised from – we advertise a planting day and people turn up – to 
people advertise amongst themselves the planting day, and they are also the ones 
[who say] which plants are required and when they want to do the work, and what 
they want to see at the end of it, and all that kind of thing. (Interview with Pim de 
Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
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Coast Care remains a lot of work, productive and reproductive at the same time – and 
like all care work, it is potentially endless. The following chapter will unravel the 
‘working with nature’ imaginary more explicitly from the work angle. I will focus on 
the motivation and aspirations of different actors to provide their labour force, mostly 
without getting paid. Community dune restoration in the Bay of Plenty (and elsewhere) 
is based upon local volunteers’ work force. However, I will use my empirical material 
to show that this is only one part of what is happening on the dunes. International “vol-
untourists” (Callanan and Thomas 2005), offenders sentenced to do community work, 
as well as people who try to gain access to the formal labour market are all becoming 
part of a complex economy of volunteering that is coproduced in the process of restor-
ing coastal dunes.  
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7.   Working with Nature, Working with Communities 
 
“If the government had to pay them [the volunteers], they’d 
have been broke years ago. But yeah, we just do it because we 
believe in it and we can see, if we put our heart and soul into it 
we can see what we’re doing; we can see the benefits.” (Inter-
view with Walther Smith, Papamoa Beach Coast Care) 
 
 
This chapter looks at ‘working with nature’ by zooming in on the meaning of work and 
community. It will discuss the economies of Coast Care work (moral and otherwise), 
and the diversity of volunteers’ motivations. As will be shown, volunteer work is not 
necessarily best understood by opposing it to paid work. Rather, paid and unpaid work 
are linked up in the scope of Coast Care projects, and some actors see volunteer work as 
one step towards paid work – or as a compensation for not being able to do paid work 
(anymore), a welcome opportunity to do something “useful”. The chapter elaborates on 
this continuum of work emerging through practices of caring for coastal naturecultures. 
In the opening quote, Coast Care volunteer Walther touches upon a central feature of 
this and other care group programmes: volunteering is a way for the authorities to or-
ganize work that assumedly could not be funded otherwise. While some work in pest 
and weed control is given to contractors, Pim, the Coast Care coordinator, is clear in 
that he “never pay[s] contractors to do planting”. And people are more than willing to 
do this unpaid work. In order to learn more about the phenomenon, I became a volun-
teer myself, and took part in Coast Care events throughout the Bay of Plenty for a 
whole (southern hemisphere) winter season between April and October 2011. This part 
of my fieldwork consisted first and foremost of countless instances of planting, weed-
ing, and helping the contractors with sometimes unexpected tasks: how does one organ-
ize a planting day with dozens of girl scouts and their families running excitedly 
through the dunes? The Western Bay of Plenty contractors, a friendly couple in their 
late 40s, had just started their contract and turned out to be happy to be followed around 
as long as I made myself useful. As a consequence, I entered into the exchange of vol-
unteer labour as a physical, labouring body and received not only much of the fieldwork 
material which built this book, but also their recognition of my work as a volunteer. 
While greatly enjoying it, this almost felt like betraying the idea – was I not doing this 
all for myself after all, for my degree and academic career? Was it maybe selfish to vol-
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unteer? As it turns out, of course, all the volunteers have their own personal motives to 
get engaged. This is how volunteering works. 
 
 
7.1 Keeping Busy: Senior Volunteers Doing Their Part 
 
Walther is a kind and modest man in his 70s who lives in Papamoa Beach, a suburb of 
Tauranga, together with his wife. He spends significant amounts of his time with Coast 
Care work, much of it outside of the officially announced working bee events (though 
he joins those, too). Being well-known by the coordinator and contractors, they provide 
him with plants and spraying equipment, so that he can go out to the dunes close to his 
house on his own time, and “check on things” (Interview with Walther Smith, Papamoa 
Beach Coast Care). 
Working silently, dressed in blue work coveralls, Walther gives a resolute impres-
sion at first sight: he is not there to chat, but to work, this is clear. Though handicapped 
by a stiff knee, he goes about his work in a decisively straight manner, determined, and 
without unnecessary breaks. However, he has a great time out on the beach. Recounting 
another working bee some days earlier, he tells me: 
We mucked about quite a bit, but it was lovely out on the beach. That’s another 
thing I like about it, it’s beautiful out there, absolutely beautiful. And it sort of 
gives me a purpose to get out of bed in the morning too, you know, you sort of, 
otherwise you can sit around and you can mope about and think of all the doom 
and gloom and that; whereas, you know, life’s good, life’s good – if you’re occu-
pied. So many people don’t consider that everything’s running right but they don’t 
get out and do anything about it, you know. They can’t criticize me for not getting 
out and doing things. (Interview with Walther Smith, Papamoa Beach Coast Care) 
 
Life is good – if you’re occupied. This is how Walther lived his whole life, starting 
from his childhood on a dairy farm where he and his siblings had to feed calves and 
chooks before going to school. Again at night, upon returning from school, they had to 
help their father milk and do other chores on the farm. “Farming is a very intensive 
thing, you know, it’s not a nine till five job, no way, no way.” In hindsight, he thinks of 
this infinite work as a blessing and a curse, or rather the other way round:  
But you know, we hated it at the time. We thought our parents were being unfair 
on us, but when you look back it was awesome – kept us occupied. And I mean 
look where I am, I’m still playing round with the land and animals and loving it. 
(Interview with Walther Smith, Papamoa Beach Coast Care) 
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In fact, Walther mostly concentrates on the less popular work of weed control and 
spraying, which is also potentially endless. Well aware of his age and physical handi-
cap, he is also already working towards his own future, thinking of the times ahead 
when he will not be able to do Coast Care work anymore. Then, he imagines, he will 
cherish fond memories of past projects. In a way Walther is producing not only coastal 
dunes rid of invasive plants, but also memories of practice, of working: “I make a pic-
ture of everything I do so when I am immobile one day I can sit on the couch, look at 
them and dream”, he explains (Interview with Walther Smith, Papamoa Beach Coast 
Care). Sitting on the couch is to him only imaginable this way, when he will have some-
thing to dream about, something he has done.  
Elise Vanderbek from Waihi Beach is another Coast Care volunteer well beyond re-
tirement age, but nonetheless very actively engaged. She never misses a working bee, 
and also does not stop there in her caring for the beach: 
I still like to do my own thing, if I’m out walking, I pick up litter always and I pull 
out weeds when I see them, put the rubbish in bins and that; notify the Council if 
someone’s smashed a sign or vandalism or erosion or something that they need to 
do something about. (Interview with Elise Vanderbek, Waihi Beach Coast Care)  
 
At the same time, she often makes jokes about the cheap labour the Councils get 
through volunteers like herself. However, that is how things are, she believes: 
Our Councils seem to have no money which is really disappointing, for doing a lot 
of stuff; anyway that’s the way it is. And they rely on volunteers hugely, to do all 
this type of work, to notify them when there’s things happening that need to be at-
tended to. So, I think we all need to do our part. You can’t expect Councils and 
governments to pay for everything, and I think we’ve all gotta contribute and not 
just with taxes [but] with your time and that sort of thing – picking up litter, report-
ing damage, pulling out weeds, planting native plants and things. I mean we’ve got 
lots of friends who don’t actually do anything; they don’t belong to anything and 
they don’t contribute anything; that saddens me. I think, because I think they miss 
out. I think they miss out, on social things and [on] just contributing to things. (In-
terview with Elise Vanderbek, Waihi Beach Coast Care)  
 
Volunteering becomes a matter of “doing your part”. And while Elise clearly enjoys her 
voluntary work and her active engagement with the Council, picking up the phone 
whenever anything “need[s] to be attended to” – a behaviour which Coast Care bro-
chures acclaim as coastal residents “taking ownership” of their environment (Western 
Bay of Plenty District Council 2010) – some rationalization work still seems necessary 
for her not to feel exploited in a way. For the tight-knit Waihi Beach group, Coast Care 
is much about caring for and protecting the community understood as rooted in a specif-
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ic place (Agnew 1993), and about making things look good and proper there. These sen-
timents are a domain of the long-term residents, and Elise is well aware that Coast Care 
groups generally tend to have difficulties recruiting younger members. This situation 
contributes to the fact that the older people have to carry all the work and responsibility 
on their shoulders.  
Our volunteer population is getting older and older; like we don’t get so many 
young people wanting to join in […] Not very often, you know, we get new people 
who just come to do a little bit. Now and again, but sometimes when they come 
you find it’s because it’s part of a course they’re doing, that they’ve got to do so 
many hours voluntary work or it’s the periodic detention type people, or people 
like you where it’s part of your course work; we’re getting quite a few people from 
Waikato University or whatever and it’s part of their course work to do something 
like this. So that’s good for us but in the end it really boils down to the local com-
munity taking ownership of this sort of work. But there’s not a lot of people, and 
we’re all getting older. (Interview with Elise Vanderbek, Waihi Beach Coast Care)  
 
The younger people who join the working bees – including myself – too often turn out 
to follow other objectives of their own in relation to university degrees or other qualifi-
cations for the job market, objectives that relate to a world outside of Waihi Beach. In 
the next section, I will follow up on some of these volunteers. 
 
 
7.2 Volunteering as a Means of Working Towards Paid Work 
 
I meet Jasemine Baker and her partner Justin at a Papamoa Coast Care event. In their 
early 40s, they are younger than the majority of Coast Carers, and they do not live on 
the coast, but in a nearby inland community. Jasemine and Justin juggle a couple of 
small agriculture jobs to feed their patchwork family. Jasemine has started a BA degree 
in Environmental Studies with the distance-learning programme at the Open Polytec 
college, but has not finished it yet as her financial means are limited and enrolment 
costly. However, Jasemine uses volunteer work for Coast Care as well as for Depart-
ment of Conservation (DOC) projects as a real-world extension to continue her studies: 
I wanted to find a way that was free, with free training, to infiltrate the system that 
way. I didn’t want to study so much any more, I was ready to get into – get my 
hands dirty, basically, and also not spending so much money. So I might return to 
it one day but right now, having a passion for the environment and wanting to sort 
of get my hands dirty and get the experience. (Interview with Jasemine Baker, Pa-
pamoa Beach Coast Care) 
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Not having to pay for the training is one thing; the other thing is learning in a practical 
way while establishing contacts that might one day lead to paid employment, thereby 
working a way up to paid work.  
I hear that people get employed because they’re there; people know that they’re 
there, ‘Oh, she might want to do it’, and then you start getting paid. […] So I’m 
getting to know my native trees by experiencing them, you know – not just in the 
books. But today there was the four sorts of natives which are different from the 
ones that we plant with Coast Care. I don’t know what the fertilizers are that we 
use, but I know that we’ve gotta put a handful of fert[ilizer] down in the hole; you 
know like we plant Wiwi and Pohutukawa down on the beachfront. Whereas fur-
ther back, like in the backdunes where we were at the saltmarsh, we’re planting 
cabbage tree and Manuka. So learning the different zones in different places, you 
know. So it’s still training and it’s all free and it’s sort of the same thing. It just 
means that if there’s a manager’s position going, […] I haven’t got my degree, I 
probably couldn’t work for big companies and things, come in at the top, it’d be 
somewhere down the bottom, but it doesn’t matter. I will still get employment in 
an around about way. (Interview with Jasemine Baker, Papamoa Beach Coast 
Care) 
 
Through her studies – where, as one of her study projects, she looked into the Waihi 
Beach protection scheme case – she got to know Pim, the Coast Care coordinator, as 
well as some Regional Council employees, who she asked questions about environmen-
tal issues and stayed in contact with via email.  
And then I wanted to get my Agrichemical licence and Pim says, ‘We will shout 
you your licence, but you have to do volunteer work first’. I went and did volunteer 
work so then he got me my licence, you know [laughs]. Because DOC won’t hire 
you if you don’t have quad bike licence, chainsaw licence, agrichemical licence, 
workplace first aid, you know. So I set about getting all of those things, so ... talk-
ing to different people. (Interview with Jasemine Baker, Papamoa Beach Coast 
Care) 
 
Through different agencies and programmes, including Coast Care, she managed to get 
government-sponsored places on the courses for all the licences she needs. She is happy 
that her plan seems to have worked: 
So it was basically what I was hoping would happen through not studying, other 
doors would open up so you know, some people think, ‘Oh yeah, but you’re giving 
your time away and you’re being used’. But it’s [rather] like: No, because I’ve got 
all this free training. I now know how to trap and monitor and report back to office 
and plant trees. (Interview with Jasemine Baker, Papamoa Beach Coast Care) 
 
In Jasemine’s case, it is evident why she does not think of her volunteering work as ex-
ploitive, but as a way forward in her career.  
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Also people who already have training, but are out of employment, use Coast Care in 
a similar fashion. Tom, a Mount Maunganui resident, had to give up his job after an ac-
cident. While still in recovery, he regularly joins Coast Care working bees and has re-
trained in Environmental Studies as well. Joining Coast Care was an important part of 
his initial recovery process: 
So, getting back on […] I just wanted to get, like do something because, you’re 
housebound for three months; you just want to get active, so I just thought about 
this Coast Care thing. (Interview with Tom Butler, Coast Care Mount Maunganui) 
 
Now, Tom is aiming to get paid for his work, too. But this has been a frustrating experi-
ence so far, as he did not manage to gain paid work as a contractor for neither Coast 
Care nor DOC, in spite of his formal training, the necessary licenses to handle chemi-
cals, and also practical experience, including voluntary work for DOC, where he was 
involved in trapping bird predators. He convinced the responsible ranger that pest con-
trol work has to be intensified but: 
When I met them he said, ‘Well, if you can put some more traps in’, and I said, 
‘Well yeah, I’ll do it, but I’ll do it on a contract basis because I give up enough of 
my time voluntary’, and he said, ‘Well, we’ll get someone else to do it.’ I said, 
‘Well, and you’ll pay them?’ and he said, ‘Yes.’ I said, ‘So, I’ve been doing this 
for a year…’ […] He said, ‘No, you’re not on our list for contractors’. ‘So, so 
you’ll be happy for me to do it voluntary but not to pay me’, and he said, ‘Yes’. 
(Interview with Tom Butler, Coast Care Mount Maunganui) 
 
So the passage from unpaid volunteering towards paid work can be difficult. And in a 
situation where public funding is scarce, the Aotearoa New Zealand public sector is 
subject to ongoing downsizing, privatization and outsourcing. Therefore, the situation 
of paid staff is often precarious as well. The Dunes Trust Newsletter reminds the volun-
teers that their work is actually supporting those working in the few paid positions:  
But – there are still challenges. The sands have, and are still moving, for Council 
and DOC staff with numerous restructures and programme changes. This is one ar-
ea where Coast Care groups can really help by continuing your restoration work 
and being a stable (yet dynamic) part of the local landscape. In my experience, op-
erational staff get huge satisfaction from working with community groups and they 
have invaluable knowledge and experience – so support them by keeping them in-
volved. (Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand 2013) 
 
But, as Tom’s example above shows, the collaboration between volunteers and paid 
staff – especially when working with volunteers only to save money – can lead to ten-
sions. At Mount Maunganui Beach, I joined a planting day that was advertised by Coast 
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Care as a public working bee, but was initiated by a city ranger who was seeking help 
with a stormwater project. Here, large concrete pipes that carry surface water from the 
streets onto the beach had caused erosion. The ranger managed to have the pipes ex-
tended further towards the sea, in hope that the erosion effect would become less severe 
this way. Now the dune area needed to be planted. Most of the volunteers present that 
day were tourist families with small kids. I partnered with the ranger, who was working 
along the beach very effectively and told me to just dig the holes; she planted the plants, 
this way the progress was the quickest. When I did as asked, she commented: “You’re a 
good girl” (Fieldnotes 22.05.2011). She explained that it is sometimes hard to work 
with volunteers because they are more difficult to keep under control than the paid staff; 
however, she did not have the funds for those at that moment.  
At another instance, I was recruited by a new contractor together with some long-
time local Coast Care volunteers to take care of a large group of international students 
and school children from a neighbouring town. When I did not follow through all her 
instructions – collecting litter first, then planting, then picnic – because I had trouble to 
manage such a crowd, she told me, “if you wanna volunteer, you have to do as you’re 
told” (ibid). That day, the other experienced volunteers were also disappointed because 
the contractor had forgotten to bring muffins. There is something that every volunteer 
wants to get out of their work, be it feeling useful and keeping occupied, getting free 
training or a paid job in the future, or meeting friends and having a tea break and a free 
muffin that feels well-earned.  
While recruitment of new local volunteers is difficult, there is no shortage of supply 
of labour from other economies of work. The next section will turn to people who work 
on the dunes because they have been ordered to by the justice system to pay something 
back through community labour, and to international volunteers who pay to work. 
 
 
7.3 Reclaiming the Public Space of the Beach: The Anti-
Encroachment Project  
 
During the time of my fieldwork in 2011, the by far largest Coast Care BOP project in 
terms of spatial scale and the number of events and people involved takes place at sub-
urban Papamoa Beach. The site stretches several kilometres along the beach: foredunes 
bordered by sea-front houses. These dunes are subject to numerous public working bees 
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held on weekends (frequented not only by Papamoa Beach residents, but also by people 
from nearby Tauranga city), and many non-public events with other groups that last an-
ything from a couple of hours to a whole week. The aim of this large-scale project is to 
restore so-called “dune encroachments”.  
Until the 1980s, Papamoa used to be a small village on the Bay of Plenty coast east 
of Tauranga. It has been the nucleus for the construction of Papamoa Beach, today the 
city’s largest suburb with about 20,000 inhabitants. The farmland connecting the city 
and Papamoa is being developed at a quick pace under what is called the SmartGrowth 
Plan by the local Councils (TCC and WBOPDC); thousands of new homes and new 
highway connections are under construction and in planning. Papamoa Beach is almost 
completely residential; shops, restaurants and public spaces are all adjacent to the big 
shopping centre. There is almost no public space other than the beach.  
Directly along the beach, houses are mostly owned by relatively affluent people who 
enjoy their retirement close to the beach or visit their holiday home. The houses further 
back are more affordable, and some areas have the reputation of being bad neighbour-
hoods. Except for some areas with a wider strip of coastal dune reserve, the seafront is 
built-up with a chain of houses. These streets are off the main road and are only used by 
those heading for the seafront houses or to the beach. The street is on the front side of 
the houses; the beach can only be reached via public access ways between the proper-
ties, typically located at every 5th to 10th section. Otherwise, the beach is not visible 
from the street, but the houses have fantastic views over the Pacific Ocean and towards 
off-shore Motiti Island. As elsewhere, simpler beach houses or baches have mostly been 
replaced by more expensive, bigger houses in recent years1. 
Currently, Papamoa’s expansion abruptly ends towards the east, where an area of 
Māori land begins, organized in several land trusts. There are conflicting stories about 
whether Māori do not want development here or whether they are excluded from the 
promise of developing the land. In any case, the SmartGrowth Plan, which is addressing 
future development of the area, already includes these lands east of Papamoa as poten-
tial development areas (SmartGrowth n.d.). 
                                                
 
1  Even though the planning regulations have been changed in the 1990s and the definition of hazard 
lines meant that new buildings would no longer be allowed, people have used loopholes (and a lack of 
enforcement) to build new houses which are declared as renovations and/or replacements. One resi-
dent showed me his neighbour’s house where one pole was left of the old house and re-integrated into 
the new, much bigger one; this way it counted as permissible renovation.  
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Along the extensive strip of beach-front properties, the houses are located directly on 
top of the foredune, which has been flattened for building platforms and to allow for un-
impeded sea views. Here occurs what Tauranga City Council (TCC) now calls “en-
croachments onto reserves” (Tauranga City Council 2006): people habitually use the 
flat space on the dunes regardless of the course of the actual property boundaries. Gar-
dens and lawns therefore technically extend into the reserve area. There are benches and 
laundry spindles, and sometimes also structural features like decks, steps, or even spa 
pools. Tauranga City Council already addressed this phenomenon in a Coastal Reserves 
Management Plan in 1997 (Tauranga City Council 1997), but before the anti-
encroachment policy was issued in 2006, most property owners had no idea that they 
were accused of encroaching onto public land. They were just using what they believed 
to be theirs, often unaware of the survey lines. Aotearoa New Zealand is a property 
ownership society, and houses often change owners. When buying a house in this area, 
the existing gardens were a fait accompli, and the new owners saw no reason to ques-
tion their right to use this space that seemed so visibly marked as theirs. 
After years of revisiting the issue, the City Council decided to enforce the anti-
encroachment policy, aiming to reinstall what one representative calls “really clean ge-
ographical boundaries” (Interview with Elizabeth Marshall, TCC Ranger). It was not 
until the City Council joined forces with Coast Care in 2010 that this project really de-
veloped momentum. Starting from where the eastward boundary of the Tauranga City 
Council area runs along the outskirts of Papamoa Beach, the objective is now to rein-
stall the proper boundaries of the coastal reserve by removing the encroachments and 
replanting the dunes in native vegetation. Coast Care volunteer Walther explains the 
reasons why he believes the encroachments need to go:  
I have a section that I live on, a residential site that I live on at Papamoa and it’s 
got boundary pegs in it, on every corner and every bend and that’s my property. 
And the next door people they’ve got theirs. But these people out the front, because 
it’s sand dune they think it’s extra land for them, but I’m sorry it’s not. It is a no 
man’s land, it’s crown land as we call it. And leave it at that. And there’s 20 kilo-
metres of it or thereabouts in Papamoa or from Mount Maunganui down to Papa-
moa, and that we are sort of trying to bring back into line. (Interview with Walther 
Smith, Papamoa Beach Coast Care) 
 
This sentiment reminds one of the arguments used by Waihi Beach seawall opponents. 
Another volunteer I talked to, glancing at my research information sheet mentioning 
“soft approaches” (to coastal protection), exclaimed: “Don’t be soft on them!” – refer-
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ring to the encroaching beachfront property owners (Interview with Tom Butler, Mount 
Maunganui Coast Care). Unlike the beachfront residents at Waihi Beach who could not 
be stopped from claiming the public space of the beach for the seawall that protected 
their property, the Papamoa Beach encroachers are brought back into line by the local 
authorities. As in Waihi Beach, Coast Carers play a role here too: 
It started through Coast Care volunteers, but not necessarily the beachfront ones. 
People who think that dune ecosystems are valuable. And they saw this as an intru-
sion on that ecosystem. Often they’ll be living two or three or four streets back 
from the beach, but they don’t see it as fair that those people should be able to do 
what they’re doing. And so they put pressure on both Councils. (Interview with 
Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
Again, this is about fairness and the kiwi imaginary of an equitable, or classless, socie-
ty. In his 1969 classic “A history of New Zealand”, Aotearoa New Zealand historian 
Keith Sinclair stated that “[i]t must be more nearly classless, however, than any other 
society in the world. Some people are richer than others, but wealth carries no great 
prestige and no prerogative of leadership” (Sinclair 1969: 276, quoted from Phillips 
2012). 
This idea still defines idealistic imaginations of Aotearoa New Zealand as a country 
and seems to be a driving motivation for the volunteers just as much as their concern for 
the coastal ecosystem. For the Coast Care coordinator, however, the involvement of 
Coast Care in the encroachment removals is a way to ensure that it has a restoration 
outcome at all: 
Because if they [the City Council] only enforce the encroachment policy in a strict 
way, then they would only be doing those properties which were encroaching, and 
nothing in-between. So you’d end up with this piece of lawn being returned to na-
tive dune vegetation, but the weed infested stuff in-between, which is not techni-
cally an encroachment, being left as it was. Which would mean that that restored 
piece would very quickly degrade back to a weed infested area as well. (Interview 
with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
The public Coast Care events at Papamoa Beach are plantings on bare dunes, a task so 
easy that many school classes or other groups of children – girl scouts, for example – 
join in. This, however, is only the tip of the iceberg of the whole project, or the last of 
many steps. Behind this lie a lengthy administrative process and a multilayered econo-
my of restoration work. First, the residents receive a letter from TCC informing them 
that an encroachment has been identified at their property. The project started at the 
eastern end of the city area, where several hundred metres were already replanted in the 
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year before my fieldwork. Most people along the strip tackled in 2011 have already 
heard about the project from their neighbours further eastwards, or have seen it happen-
ing there. The residents are demanded to remove everything outside their property 
boundaries, including plants. If the property owners dispute the Council’s version of the 
property boundary, land surveyors will be sent to formally identify it. Once the legal 
boundaries have been defined and the time set by the Council to remove things has 
ceased, subcontractors arrive and take care of everything that is left, except for a strip of 
about two metres which will be turned into a walkway. What once was gardens and 
lawns is treated with herbicides to kill off the unwanted vegetation completely. 
 
 
 
7.3.1 “I am Concerned About the Plants, not the Politics”: Tensions Between 
Coast Care and Council Objectives 
 
The two agencies involved in the encroachment removals try to draw clear boundaries 
as well: it seems important to separate between the different stages of the project, and, 
thereby, between the responsibilities of the City Council and Coast Care. The removal 
of existing vegetation is a task for which the Council has signed up, and not Coast Care. 
Tauranga City Council (TCC) employee Elizabeth Marshall explains the role of her 
employer: 
And so we try and keep that separation between the legal stuff [and Coast Care], 
i.e. the landowner, TCC, saying to the property owners, ‘You’ve got three months 
to remove the structure; here are a couple of options for the restoration of the dune 
that you’re currently encroaching on: (1) We will spray it out; we will arrange for it 
to be planted up and we will maintain it to a large extent. (2) If you don’t agree 
with us you can take us to court. If you do that and the court finds that you do have 
to restore the encroachment, all the costs will be borne by you.’ And everyone has 
said, ‘Oh okay, oh well we’ll go with this option [1]. (Interview with Elizabeth 
Marshall, TCC Ranger) 
 
Through this division of labour, Coast Care tries to keep a distance to the political deci-
sion of the Council to remove the encroachments, which is, not surprisingly, seen as 
very controversial by the beachfront residents concerned. To a degree, this strategy 
seems to work: for most of the property owners, the Council ranger is the person they 
direct their frustration at, and not Coast Care. Tilda Finch, who owns a house at the Pa-
pamoa Beach beachfront, voices her frustration about the Council ranger’s approach 
that she perceives as unreasonably hardline:  
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I’ve never known 120 beachfront owners to be so irate about one person. They just 
absolutely ... we all just hate this one girl who was just – nothing would bend, ‘It’s 
gonna go, it’s gonna go’, you know and [she] wouldn’t listen to anything. She 
wouldn’t listen to anyone. [A] lot of the grasses further down [where the en-
croachments have been removed already] are growing, but there’s weeds all grow-
ing up through everything. Their gardens were much nicer [before]. […] I work in 
an operating theatre, and I had a patient through the other day and I saw his name 
and saw his address and I said, ‘Oh, where are we?’ So we spent the whole opera-
tion, he was under local anaesthetic, the whole operation discussing how terrible it 
was, you know. (Interview with Tilda Finch, Papamoa Beach resident) 
 
One of the things that irritate her is what happened to the “sand ladders”, rope ladders 
built from timber planks connected by a chain. The sand ladders had been installed by 
property owners three years earlier to prevent erosion on informal beach access ways 
from the properties down over the dunes; this was done on advice from the Council, but 
paid for by the beachfronters. Now, as part of the anti-encroachment project, the sand 
ladders are removed again, and replaced by a two-metre walkway between the restored 
dunes and the newly installed property boundaries. The walk-way will connect several 
access ways to the beach, each shared by a couple of houses. The residents dislike the 
idea of walking along that way, as it feels like walking through their neighbours’ private 
space, invading the privacy of their remaining gardens and decks. And the responsible 
Coast Care contractor who deals with the project on the ground agrees that this is a silly 
plan. This is not the only aspect of the project in which Coast Care and the Council fol-
low different forms of logic. The boundary work between the Council part and the 
Coast Care part of the project is not always easy:  
There’s been some problems between who’s managing what. Well, there’s quite a 
clear distinction in some ways; that if it’s replanting then it’s Coast Care and if it’s 
legal issues then it’s Tauranga City Council. But what about the stuff in-between? 
What about the spraying of the weeds and what about the removal of the dead veg-
etation? So we agreed […] that the removal of the dead vegetation was a Coast 
Care responsibility, but that the spraying of the weeds was a Tauranga City Coun-
cil responsibility. We’ve split that in half. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP 
Coast Care) 
 
The distinction between Council and Coast Care work also includes the funding of the 
different tasks involved. Spending public money is tied to monitoring and evaluation 
controls, and here the objectives of Tauranga City Council and Coast Care are in ten-
sion. As mentioned above, the project works its way along the dune from the eastern 
limits of Papamoa towards the city centre. But in some areas, there are no targets for the 
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anti-encroachment project; though, nonetheless, there are dunes that Coast Care wants 
to restore.  
Next year we get a dilemma because from Taylor Reserve the next two kilometres 
of dune there’s no seafront housing, […] so there’s no encroachments. So what do 
we do here? Tauranga City Council policy says, deliver a minimum of 20 en-
croachment resolutions per year until they’re all finished. So they have to go to the 
next place where there’s seafront residents. From a Coast Care perspective that’s a 
bit sad because it means we’re leaving that big stretch of reserve and we’re jump-
ing straight to the next place where there’s houses. On the other hand, that’s where 
the worst problems are too, in front of the houses. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, 
BOP Coast Care) 
 
Another important factor from the “Coast Care perspective”, especially in such a tense 
situation vis-à-vis angry residents, is to show quick success. To accomplish this, the 
“PD boys” arrive on the scene once the spraying has been finished. 
 
7.3.2 “Giving Something Back to the Community”: More Unpaid Labour on 
the Beach 
 
PD workers are on so-called “periodic detention”, a non-residential sentence which in-
cludes supervised work hours. It can also be imposed on people who received a fine 
they are unable or unwilling to pay (Ministry of Justice 1999: 67f.). The periodic deten-
sion workers – almost exclusively men, the majority of them young Māori – are present 
not only at Papamoa Beach, but also at other Coast Care locations where they do work 
which is unpopular or unsuitable for “regular” volunteers. In Papamoa Beach, they re-
move the dead plants, unearth the remaining plant material, collect it, pile it up and 
transport it in a wheelbarrow to the truck parked in front of the houses. The PD workers 
are not involved in the spraying itself because of safety regulations which do not allow 
them to handle the equipment, arguing it could be used as a weapon against their super-
visors or other people (as their supervisor remarks, the tools they use to dig up the re-
maining roots would make just as good weapons).  
Even Coast Care staff call these workers “the PD boys” in a rather patronizing way. 
Sometimes they are referred to as the “naughty boys” (Fieldnotes 23.01.2011). These 
expressions might be a combination of trying to downplay their potential criminal aspi-
rations (something which the property owners are vividly aware of, who tell stories 
about their houses being “checked out” by PD workers on the job, drawing connections 
to burglaries happening in the neighbourhood); but it also seems a way of rationalizing 
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the use of involuntary work within the scope of what is advertised as a community vol-
unteering programme.  
Pim de Monchy, the Coast Care coordinator argues that Coast Care has four different 
goals: education, participation, infrastructure protection and biodiversity. And some-
times, he says, if one wants to achieve infrastructure protection and biodiversity, “you 
have to accept that it’s not all possible through the participatory community model” (In-
terview with Pim de Monchy). And he has some arguments explicitly in favour of the 
PD workers’ involvement. Firstly, he says, his job is to educate the public, “and that’s 
of any beach user irrespective of whether or not they care about it; this is just trying to 
build up their idea that there’s something of value in the dunes, and that we shouldn’t 
bust them” (Interview with Pim de Monchy). The PD work is thus justified by subsum-
ing it under the education theme. More important for the project as a whole, however, is 
how PD work allows for a different level of preparation of the dunes, which then trans-
lates into more options for volunteer participation: 
Sometimes, to get the participation, you need to have a site which is ready for 
planting. To get a site which is ready for planting you either need to use contractors 
or PD workers to do the hard work first. So you call in the big guns and then they 
do the hard work, if you like. And then you can invite the volunteers in to join in 
the process for the part that they’re prepared to do and that they do well. And then 
you probably have to have the contractors again every now and again to make sure 
that it’s maintained and kept alive if the group is not particularly strong. [….] I 
don’t feel bad about it at all. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
In the suburban areas, where most fluctuation happens in terms of working bee partici-
pants, and where many volunteers are recruited through schools, the possibility to plant 
on a well-prepared, weed-free dune makes Coast Care much more attractive to volun-
teers. Luke Linderman, a Pākeha New Zealander who works as a supervisor with the 
PD workers, confirms this connection between the PD work and the involvement of 
school children:  
We do the hard, the backbreaking work and then the volunteer groups go out 
[laughs] and do their little plantings, yeah, yeah. Well actually what they’re doing 
now is they’re using all the school kids and stuff which is good, yeah. So I don’t 
mind, I think that’s very reasonable; it’s a good job for the guys [on PD] because 
they’re out on the beach. […] It’s a tough day being out all day on the beach be-
cause, you know, it’s exhausting. (Interview with Luke Linderman, PD Supervisor) 
 
Tilda, the beachfront resident quoted above, also suspects that sending out kids to do the 
planting may be an attempt by Coast Care to calm down the angry property owners. 
New Zealanders love kids, and who could take offence at a group of girl scouts enjoy-
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ing themselves while planting native plants on the dunes? In any case, involving chil-
dren is a major part of the education outreach. For the contractors, however, it means 
additional work: filling in as outdoor teachers, and often also replanting large areas 
again, because the kids did not do it properly, for example did not dig the planting holes 
deep enough. The “PDians” (as they call themselves, fieldnotes 01.07.2011), on the 
contrary, rarely do any planting, but when they do, they tend to be very effective, Luke 
says:  
I’ve seen it a few times. We don’t do it very often, but we have been to other plant-
ing days and we generally form the backbone of any planting day we go to, and ac-
tually two pillars [laughs]. Our crews usually plant 70-80 per cent of the plants as 
you probably witnessed, you know. Some of them can motor along, can’t they? 
They might not be as nice, gently and careful, as the community volunteers who 
wanted to kiss each plant and save this little bit of dune – they were psshh psshh, 
digging holes and dirt flying everywhere and going for it. And we got all those 
plants planted that day, didn’t we. (Interview with Luke Linderman, PD Supervi-
sor) 
 
Luke is not really decided if the Coast Care job might count as a good job for the PDi-
ans. Yes, because being out on the beach is a plus – but, as he says, “they like to have 
jobs with meaning” (ibid). But how to define meaningfulness? While the Coast Care 
coordinator (and the contractors) tend to think of their education goals, Luke is not sure 
that this opinion is shared by the PDians – he himself may see the positive outcome, but 
what about his workers? 
You know some of them work on the dunes but you don’t get a lot out of the job. 
They can’t see the end picture. I think criminals are very short-term thinkers, from 
what I observe. Because I feel it’s a great job for observing people in their situa-
tion. They’re short-term thinkers […]. If you finish with a sand dune, you know 
you might only go from here to there, you know [with] 10 people – that’s from 
here to there, through a bunch of weeds you know, like Agapanthus or something 
like that. We’ve been through it back, I’ve been through it three times in three dif-
ferent days; you’ve got a lot of people and they are working you know, yeah. It’s 
incredible. (Interview with Luke Linderman, PD Supervisor) 
 
In his view, the tediousness and indefinite character of the work makes it hard for the 
PD workers. Ironically, they are enrolled in the task to allow for the quick success of 
those who come after them – to the task of planting a well-prepared dune – and to the 
project as a whole, where a speedy succession of the plantings along the beach area is 
deemed essential to gain public acceptance for the controversial project. 
While the official long-term objective of the project might be defined differently, de-
pending on whether the perspectives of the City Council (reclaiming public space) or 
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Coast Care (restoring native nature) are taken into account, it in any case revolves 
around the removal of introduced plants. However, Luke reports that the Corrections 
department stopped him from arranging a meeting with an expert who wanted to explain 
to the PD crew which plants needed to be removed in the areas further down the fore-
dune where native and introduced plants grow. The manager there thought this was a 
waste of time. I suggest that the job might be rather pointless without the background 
knowledge about which plants need to be pulled out. Luke replies: 
Yeah, but then it’s our job, as far as I am concerned, is to look after, babysit these 
criminals without them getting into trouble. They don’t really think much about the 
end product of actually producing something. […] They didn’t use to be such an-
gels, but they’re angels now from what they used to be, you know, even the ones 
that used to be badly behaved are really well behaved now. (Interview with Luke 
Linderman, PD Supervisor) 
 
After all, Luke’s job is first and foremost PD supervision, not coastal restoration. He 
likes his job, and while he speaks of the PD workers in this rather sloppy way, he still 
seems to take them seriously. He does not have any educational training, nor does his 
immediate superior who had been working in truck logistics before.  
The guy they put in charge of it was really onto it; it was all by accident because 
the Corrections department don’t seem to know how to run anything. And he was a 
truck logistics guy […], so [before] he had 40, 50 truckies to deal with every day, 
getting them to the right place, having to deal with them, deal with customers. All 
that sort of thing, and he ran it very well, in partnership with the administration, the 
office lady, ‘cause she knew her business and she knows a lot of the local people. 
Because she grew up in Maketu which is a bit of a hard ... you know we get a lot of 
customers from Maketu, another Māori-dominated area. Yeah and we worked hard, 
we got rid of the supervisor who was giving them fish and chips, and possibly even 
smoke pot on the crew and things like that and letting them get away with it, so 
blurring the boundaries for them which made them more grumpier. (Interview with 
Luke Linderman, PD Supervisor) 
 
They achieved what Luke refers to as “creat[ing] a cultural change” in the groups, be-
cause the supervisors started to “work like a team” (ibid) themselves. Under the lead of 
an experienced supervisor, they paid more attention to “stick to the rules” and clarify 
the boundaries between supervisors and work crew members. They started sharing their 
experiences with crew members that were difficult to handle or aggressive in a way that 
affected the crew as a whole. The supervisors figured out that there were enough PD 
workers who just wanted to get the work done, and if they were able to become a criti-
cal mass in the group they tended to take over “control of the crew” (ibid), in the sense 
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that they determined the atmosphere to a point that new members were blending in bet-
ter. Luke gives an example:  
You know, ‘cause like I’d have someone in my crew – he was a hard man you 
know, tattooed, muscular; you know there’s a fair lot of aggression in the person, 
even though you didn’t feel like he’s gonna attack you, but you know there ap-
peared a lot of aggression. And by working with my crew he just eased up and he 
was more relaxed because you know when you come into a new environment 
you’re a bit tense, and he relaxed until he found he could fit in and could just do, 
you know he could just work. And he worked, he worked really hard and he was 
happier, happy; happier in the crew. (Interview with Luke Linderman, PD Supervi-
sor) 
 
Now, there is “so much trust now” between supervisors and crews that Luke feels much 
safer; he is convinced that if someone would want to attack him now, the other PDians 
would step in. “They’d react for me, even though we make them work. But you know, 
you’ve got to have boundaries, you’ve got to have boundaries, yeah.” (ibid) The Papa-
moa Beach encroachments are just one of many projects the PD crews work on. How-
ever, it seems worth noticing that the enforcement of boundaries and rules – both physi-
cal and social – are central in the dealings with PDians and the beachfront property 
owners. After all, the beachfronters will now be kept from overstepping boundaries, tak-
ing what is not their property, the public space of the dunes. 
Another day, I meet Luke and his crew on the beach (Fieldnotes 01.07.2011). The 
PDians wonder what I am doing there if I am not one of the volunteers who come to 
plant. I explain that I am doing research, finding out about how the project works, and 
who is doing the work. This is met with booming laughter: “It’s the PDians! And it’s all 
free! Research solved! Criminals!” They tell me they do this work “because nobody else 
wants to do it”. Some have more fundamental doubts about the whole project. One of 
them explains it is only happening “because the Council is dumb”. Then his comrade 
adds: “They wanna create back land.” He elaborates:  
They’re trying to put the sand dunes back to prehuman [state]. That’s never gonna 
happen. Especially when like half the plants they’re trying to get rid of, like Aga-
panthus, is growing in the walkway there. So just every time they flower they blow 
their seeds down there. (Fieldnotes 01.07.2011) 
 
During lunch break, I am told that “they don’t call it PD any more; it’s now called 
community work, because you’re giving something back to the community”. We eat tua 
tua shellfish that some of the guys have collected on the beach, and Luke jokes:  
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We didn’t look for them! We found them coincidentally! I mean you can’t have a 
Māori stumbling across tua tuas and not let them eating them! That would be total-
ly culturally insensitive. We don’t want to be culturally insensitive! (Fieldnotes 
01.07.2011) 
 
That such a joke by a Pākeha New Zealander is met with laughter by his mostly Māori 
crew suggests that he was right in what he has told me about the atmosphere of trust. 
Then he explains, pointing to a pack of cup noodle snacks stored in the van:  
It’s a way to feed them without breaking too many rules. We’re not allowed to go 
the shops, so I buy these [noodles]. That’s possibly the worst thing you can have, 
not nutritious, not filling [….] We’re not supposed to have fun. We’re not sup-
posed to take advantage of where we are. (Fieldnotes 01.07.2011) 
 
When I tell the PDians that the other group of young people working a couple of hun-
dred metres away are volunteers who have paid to come here and take advantage of the 
possibility to work on the dunes, they cannot believe their ears. “What, they are getting 
paid?” they ask. When I insist that the international volunteers are paying, this is met 
with dismissal. Clearly, I must have misunderstood something.  
 
7.3.3  “I Hope Prince Harry is Gonna Shake my Hand”: The Voluntourists  
 
Tasks similar to those of the PDians are also done by another group working on the an-
ti-encroachment project. They are volunteers, but they are not locals. While most of the 
PD workers come from socially deprived indigenous communities with high rates of 
unemployment, drug abuse and domestic violence, these volunteers are college students 
from Western Europe, the US or Singapore. They come to Aotearoa New Zealand with 
organizations like “Conservation Volunteers NZ” or “AustraLearn” to take part in na-
ture restoration projects. They buy expensive plane tickets, and pay about NZD 250 a 
week for room and board. Coast Care pays for the work too: the Coast Care coordinator 
calls this “Rent-a-volunteer”. The international volunteers not only get a lot of work 
done in the week they are booked by Coast Care. Pim also hopes that their presence on 
the dunes will help to recruit more local volunteers. 
I talk to Eva, a young Englishwoman who chose her programme because it included 
a stay with a host family. She seems to know what she wants, and the trip to NZ is only 
one part of a larger project of hers: getting the prestigious Duke of Edinburgh Award. 
To achieve that, she will have to prove her efforts in several areas (called physical rec-
reation, skill, volunteering and adventurous journey) over a sustained period of time. 
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For the volunteering part, Eva has already worked at a Red Cross shop every Saturday 
for half a year, but to progress to the gold level she now has to venture into a fifth area, 
the “Residential Project”. For this she has to spend at least one week abroad on a volun-
teer work trip. The Duke of Edinburgh award shows your commitment, she explains, 
and looks great on your CV. This is confirmed by Elisabeth, also from the UK. Already 
in her late 20s, she claims that the award has been of more interest to possible employ-
ers than her university degree. Only a few people manage all three levels – bronze, sil-
ver and gold – and those who do get a badge handed to them by the Queen and the 
Prince Consort. And she is looking forward to it already: “I hope that Prince Harry is 
gonna shake my hand!” (Fieldnotes 02.08.2011) 
Callanan and Thomas (2005) speak of such “voluntourism” as one of the major 
growth areas of contemporary tourism markets. Since the late 1990s, they have ob-
served a “‘volunteer tourism rush’ influenced by an ever increasing ‘guilt-conscious’ 
society” which turns international volunteer trips into a “mass niche market” (Callanan 
and Thomas 2005: 183). Through this worldwide phenomenon, this local Coast Care 
project is linked to an economy of voluntourism. Sin (2010) subsumes volunteer tour-
ism under the larger concept of “responsible tourism”. From a geographies of care and 
responsibility perspective, she remarks that while there are many assumptions about 
volunteer tourism being beneficial for local communities in host destinations, much of 
the research so far has centred only on the perspectives of the volunteers. Sin concen-
trates on projects that follow social justice and “pro-poor” goals in developing coun-
tries. While there is also a company operating in the Bay of Plenty that includes a “cul-
tural” experience into their volunteer schemes – a marae visit, for example – Coast Care 
or DOC projects which host international volunteers do not usually focus on interaction 
with local (or disadvantaged) communities. The volunteers are accommodated at central 
locations and driven out to their restoration site by minibus each day. Given that Aotea-
roa New Zealand tourism marketing concentrates on remoteness and empty landscapes 
– nature as wilderness, not inhabited by humans – the volunteers probably do not expect 
to work in a suburban environment. But still, like the PDians, they talk about “giving 
something back to the community”. It sounds cliché – which community? Giving back 
what? The volunteers seem unaware of the objectives of the project, so they do not real-
ize that those members of the community who live in these beachfront houses do not 
feel they are getting anything. On the contrary, they feel that something is taken from 
them: their garden, their privacy.  
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Another international volunteer I meet that day is Jennifer from the black forest in 
Germany. Her aspirations and whole attitude seem much less elitist compared to the 
English girls. She has just finished school, her business training will not start before 
(northern hemisphere) autumn, and she doesn’t expect to ever again have such a long 
free time in her life. So why is she working? Working for free, paying to work? Well, 
Work & Travel would have been an alternative too, but then she would have needed to 
organize everything by herself. She does not seem to be the adventurous type, but she is 
good at figures, and now she wonders if it is even worth it. Room and board are includ-
ed. Every week they go to the supermarket and can buy whatever they need; last week 
they spent NZD 380 for 6 people. “But then I think I could buy a lot more for the 250 
dollars I pay here!” (Fieldnotes 02.08.2011, translation by author) The holiday camp she 
and her fellow volunteers stay at in Papamoa Beach has eight rooms (“theoretically eve-
ryone could have a room on their own!”), four bathrooms and a spa pool.  
For this, she works about six hours a day, and often the work is much harder than the 
work here on the dunes. Yesterday, she was climbing along a mountain slope full of 
gorse with 20 trees to plant and a sack of fertilizer on her back. The week before, at 
Mount Taranaki, it was raining all day and there was no heating in their cabin. In four 
days, she is going to fly back to her native Germany, after 4 1/2 weeks of volunteer 
work: “Ach, das wär ja schon schön, die letzten 3 Tage noch mal frei zu haben” (“Well, 
it would be nice to have the last three days off”). It seems Jennifer is paying a high price 
for her volunteering experience. However, just like the “local volunteers” introduced in 
the opening of this chapter, she seems to come from a background with a very strong 
work ethic. Whether it is called “keeping busy” or “giving something back to the com-
munity”, the volunteer work seems to be a structuring element that is a prerequisite for 
enjoying the beach, or going abroad to spend four weeks in a country far away. As a 
justification for the pleasure, it is not just for fun, it is work. 
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Fig. 13: Planting day with Girl Scouts, Papamoa Beach. Source: Picture by author, 
May 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14: Papamoa Beach property with encroachment removed and replanted.  
Source: Picture by author, May 2011. 
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Fig. 15: Papamoa Beach, 4 years later. Source: Picture by author, March 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4 “It Makes You a Better Person”: Suzanne, a “Great Kiwi 
Example” 
 
Besides all the different kinds of volunteers encountered in the course of this chapter, a 
few people do have paid jobs or contracts with Coast Care. One of them is Suzanne 
Fischer, who worked as an assistant for one of the former Coast Care coordinators. Her 
job included many tasks: organizing and attending working bees, keeping in contact 
with the volunteers, distributing materials, tools and information. But for her, the job 
was more than anything else about working with volunteers in all their diversity along 
the spectrum of motivations this chapter has been trying to describe. This job requires 
dedication and commitment at the level of personal relations. Suzanne has given a lot of 
thought to this herself. In hindsight, she thinks that the Coast Care work has greatly 
contributed to her own personal development:  
I basically expanded myself so much, I learned so much about myself because I 
had to kind of grow up in some ways, to be able to deal with all these different 
people and it’s made me much, much more able to deal with all types of people, 
you know. […] So it was good for me. I really, really loved the people side of 
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things. […] You learn lots about yourself as well as other people. It’s really good. 
(Interview with Suzanne Fischer, former Coast Care Contractor) 
 
But the “people side” of Coast Care was also sometimes the difficulty. Her personal 
growth depended on successfully dealing with the diversity of people involved.  
I can tell you what, some of the people I’ve met – it makes you a better person be-
cause if you’re in your normal group of people, you don’t have to deal with some-
one who’s a grumpy old shit. Deal with someone who’s so full of themselves; you 
don’t have to deal with someone who’s got a personality disorder or you don’t 
have to deal with some little five year old kid that doesn’t understand what you’re 
saying. Cause one person needs to be told in a certain way and then another person 
doesn’t get it that way; you have to tell them another way and then one person 
wants lots of attention and you have to give them all that attention, and another 
person doesn’t want you to come over; they just want to go over there and do it 
themselves and you actually have to be able to read people quite quickly to work it 
out. If you want them to come back you actually have to give them their kind of 
space and let them do it the way they want to do it. (Interview with Suzanne Fisch-
er, former Coast Care Contractor) 
 
However, it took Suzanne some time to figure out that the approach to the Coast Care 
work needs to be adapted to the people who are doing it: 
There’s lots of different ways of doing something and as long as the outcome is the 
same then you can’t worry too much about the process. I mean obviously you tell 
them how to plant the plants properly and all that kind of stuff, but if they want to 
plant them all in a straight line then maybe you just let that go. I mean you might 
say to them, ‘Oh, all straight lines, oh well in nature you know things like to be all 
over the place’, and if they get it then they get it, but if they don’t they don’t and it 
doesn’t really matter. (Interview with Suzanne Fischer, former Coast Care Contrac-
tor) 
 
Different groups of volunteers pose different challenges. With young people, the educa-
tional message is especially important, although it needs to be adapted in relation to age 
and interest: 
The youngest kids I ever had were like kindy [kindergarten] kids, so they were like 
three or four and you’d have to explain to them on their level […] how to look after 
your dunes and why dunes are important, and get them to plant. And then you’ve 
got teenagers and they’re all different again because you have to make it cool, be-
cause [they say] ‘I don’t wanna be there’, so you have to make it fun. […] And 
then you have first year Marine [Science] students, and they want to know the Lat-
in names of everything and […] so you have to give them all that kind of level of 
information. (Interview with Suzanne Fischer, former Coast Care Contractor) 
 
With the many elderly people involved, she had to look after their physical wellbeing as 
well and make sure they would take a rest if the work was too hard. Suzanne was also 
working with people who have intellectual handicaps or Alzheimer’s. Here as well, her 
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job was about much more than simply organizing a dune restoration project. What she 
describes is care work, not just caring for the dunes, but for people with special needs. 
And because of the involvement of the PD workers (see above), she also partly took 
over the role of a supervisor: 
You have to work with them as well, who are saying things to you like, ‘Oh Miss, 
we only get like two minute noodles and bread for lunch. It’s not fair, I want fish 
and chips’, and having to get their respect because you’re the white little girl and 
they’re all the big bros. So at the end of the day, really, how you have to handle 
everybody is you have to treat them as they are, as you have to treat them like you 
would like to be treated. So with the PD guys, I would tell them why we’re doing it 
and tell them all the background and nine out of ten of them would not even want 
to listen to you but one of them would come up to you afterwards and go, ‘Oh 
Miss, oh yeah, that was really interesting eh man?’ You know, and they had this 
really interesting conversation. Instead of thinking, ‘Oh PD guys’, I'm just not 
gonna talk to them about that because they’re not gonna want to know about it. 
You have to treat everyone the same. Because you have to treat them like you want 
to be treated. (Interview with Suzanne Fischer, former Coast Care Contractor) 
 
Suzanne was very successful in this kind of multiple care work. The measurement of 
success here goes beyond the outcomes of the dune restoration projects – it is about 
making people come back. And they also came back because of her work; it was tied to 
her as a person, as the “face of Coast Care”:  
And […] people would say to me, ‘We come back because we like you’. If I pissed 
people off all the time or if I was always telling people what to do or ‘you’ve done 
that wrong’ or whatever, people wouldn’t come back; and some would say to me, 
‘You’re the face of Coast Care on so many levels because you’re the person that 
actually people work with’. And people are really really fickle and really finicky, 
and if they don’t like you for whatever reason they won’t come back. (Interview 
with Suzanne Fischer, former Coast Care Contractor) 
 
Only a small number of people she encountered argued against Coast Care work itself, 
telling her that this was destroying the dunes. But she had to deal with that as well. All 
in all, the contractor position is very popular, and when a successor for Suzanne had to 
be found, many people put in tenders. But, she insists, this is a multi-faceted job that is 
not for everyone:  
I think you have to be […] really rounded, so it’s not just about planting and hav-
ing all that knowledge; you have to be able to stand up in front of people and edu-
cate people. You have to be able to write reports and do stuff on the computer you 
know. So you have to be like – it’s a huge range of skills and not everyone ... like 
some people would have that particular skill but they might not necessarily be great 
being a face of Coast Care where people actually want to come back you know. 
(Interview with Suzanne Fischer, former Coast Care Contractor) 
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This awareness of the capabilities and skills she needed for the job is rather unusual in 
the Aotearoa New Zealand context, where self-assurance, as appropriate as it may seem 
to others, easily smells of self-adulation. The proverbial “tall poppy syndrome” of New 
Zealanders – the tendency to chop off the heads of the more ambitious poppies on the 
field daring to grow larger than the average – is still a vital part of a culture that values 
humility (Young 2009; Taylor 2013). However, just as the volunteers tend to be proud 
of their achievements, Suzanne is too. The specific combination of care work – for peo-
ple, for the environment – allows her to make it clear that she has profited a lot herself 
in terms of personal growth, and that she has done good work. The regular Coast Care 
volunteers still remember her fondly. Walther Smith from Papamoa Beach praises her 
personal attitude:  
She was a sweetie. That lass had so much personality and, you know, she was so 
appreciative of what you did. And you’re only doing it to help her, and she felt that 
she was imposing on you, but she wasn’t. Yeah, anything she does I hope it all 
turns out good for her and her husband. She’d make an ideal mother too. She’d be 
a great Kiwi example. (Interview with Walther Smith, Papamoa Beach Coast Care) 
Calling Suzanne “a great Kiwi example”, Walther underlines how close the Coast Care 
work and the people representing it are connected to his imaginaries of New Zealand as 
it should be: working together in the dunes, with everyone’s work counting as a contri-
bution towards the future of the country. 
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8.   “It’s a Frontline of Defence” –  
Dune Restoration as Soft Protection 
 
This chapter focuses more specifically on dune restoration as a means of soft coastal 
protection. It will show how the practices introduced in Chapter 6 as well as some more 
invasive dune-scraping techniques are employed by different actors with the goal of es-
tablishing dunes that provide natural coastal protection. Collaborators from the field of 
professional dune restoration are shown to pursue the sociotechnical imaginary of 
‘working with nature’ from below and above, trying to open up the conversation about 
the full scale of soft options via people’s engagement in Coast Care. The chapter con-
cludes with discussing the connection between dune restoration and climate change ad-
aptation.  
The idea that vegetated dunes form natural costal protection is by no means new. 
Similar to the practices that have been established in Europe since 1100 AD (Clarke and 
Rendell 2011), early considerations were focusing on stabilizing migrating dunes and 
preventing sand drift. Leonard Cockayne (1855-1934) was the founding figure of New 
Zealand botany. In his 1911 “Report on the dune-areas of New Zealand”, Cockayne 
writes:  
A well-shaped and plant-fixed foredune is a land-form of the greatest importance, 
since it […] forms a natural protection against the inroads of the sea, thus safe-
guarding the coast. (Cockayne 1911: 11)  
 
This statement makes it clear that Cockayne’s idea of coastal nature is not a space of 
wilderness beyond the sphere of human interference. Rather, he understands the dune as 
a useful object serving to protect the coast, a function of natural features and appropri-
ate human workings with nature, where people take care of the dunes and “fix” them 
with planting – a socionatural object, so to speak.  
His imaginary links up well with the Coast Care mission, and not surprisingly, the 
above quote has been used in this context (Jenks n.d.). In the original source, Cockayne 
goes on to address the issue of natural coastal protection as a matter of political deci-
sions and as a scientific endeavour, calling for rigorous botanical experimentation in the 
dunes (in analogy to the then-popular experimental farms), as well as for rearranging 
state responsibilities in relation to private interests, including the dispossession of native 
lands for the greater good of the nation. In his chapter on “Dune Reclamation from the 
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National Standpoint”, Cockayne describes a form of mixed land tenure characteristic of 
the post-colonial situation of his time, with dune areas split between private, native and 
Crown land. This structure, he argues, poses a problem for his idea of functioning dune 
areas, especially in regard to combating sand drift:  
Dune reclamation, the world over, has been considered the work of the State rather 
than of the individual. The labour involved is too vast, and the interests too diverse, 
for it to be undertaken by private individuals. The most such can attempt is to make 
their holding secure for the time being. [...] Native lands are in many instances a 
great source of danger. Usually nothing is being done upon them. In any national 
scheme of dune-reclamation the State would probably have to take over the Native 
dune areas, most of which are at present worth less than nothing. (Cockayne 1911: 
65) 
 
Contrary to Cockayne’s vision, however, the increasing number of “plant-fixed fore-
dunes” to be found in Aotearoa New Zealand today is not the centralized work of the 
(national) state, but instead evidence of the ongoing collaboration between civil society 
and an array of local, regional and national government bodies characteristic for Coast 
Care (or Beachcare) programmes.  
However, the desire “to make their holding secure for the time being” is still one of 
the driving motivations for Coast Care. In regard to the role of the state, now faced with 
the challenges of climate change, scientific experts as well as local and regional deci-
sion-makers still lament missing national guidance that could back them up in their vast 
task of adjusting coastal policy and planning according to the realities of sea level rise 
and changing weather patterns. Local authorities are facing the challenge to protect ev-
er-increasing values against coastal erosion, to reconcile public interests with private 
property rights, and to prepare the way for climate change adaptation, precautionary 
planning and sustainable coastal protection practices.  
 
 
8.1 Erosion is a Natural Process  
 
“Dune restoration is part of the new paradigm of coastal man-
agement, which focuses on working with natural processes, not 
against them.” (Jenks n.d.) 
 
The last chapter has shown to what extent Coast Care projects rely on ongoing care of 
coastal nature and how volunteering is based on accepting the need for constant mainte-
nance work. Another fundamental building block of the Coast Care philosophy is the 
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understanding that erosion is a natural process. This is of specific importance in relation 
to projects where dune restoration is used as a means of coastal protection, or more pre-
cisely erosion control. In personal communication, presentations, info sheets, at work-
ing bees and workshops sessions, Coast Care experts frame their educational messages 
about coastal management around the statement that erosion is a natural and common 
coastal process. This message is meant to separate the natural process of erosion (and 
accretion) from its social, cultural and political dimensions through which it becomes a 
problem. Similar statements can be found in the literature on sustainable coastal man-
agement in general and are not limited to the Aotearoa New Zealand situation. Writing 
from the European context, Cooper and McKenna for example state that  
[c]oastal erosion problems arise from the presence of human infrastructure in areas 
threatened by erosion; identifying erosion as a problem is therefore a human value 
judgement (Cooper and McKenna 2008a: 296, emphasis in the original). 
 
Discussing case studies from Ireland in their paper “Working with natural processes: the 
challenge for coastal protection strategies” (Cooper and McKenna 2008b), Cooper and 
McKenna come to the conclusion that regardless of existing coastal management prin-
ciples within the EU (European Parliament and Council 2002) there is still a dominant 
discourse within policy documents that depicts coastal erosion as a general threat and 
danger to coastal areas in itself. Cooper and McKenna conclude that the  
adoption of any system of working with natural processes will require a fundamen-
tal change in attitude from the prevailing view of coastal erosion as a problem. 
Coastal erosion is a natural process that creates, modifies and destroys coastal land-
forms through linked processes of erosion, transport and deposition. (Cooper and 
McKenna 2008b: 316f.) 
 
Subscribing to such a perspective on coastal erosion can be understood as a kind of rite 
de passage into the Coast Care world. Only in rare cases, the Coast Care novice learns, 
is coastal erosion a long-term or chronic phenomenon that is caused by imbalances in 
the sediment budget, with more sand being washed away from the dry beach zone than 
that which is accreted2. In contrast to this rather rare situation, there is a regular process 
of storm cut and recovery happening at “every beach of the world” (Fieldnotes, New 
Zealand Dune Restoration Trust Annual Conference 2011). During storms events, large 
                                                
 
2  The reasons for this imbalance can be manifold and include natural and human-induced causes. For 
more detail, see National Institute of Coastal and Marine Management of the Netherlands (2004).  
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quantities of sand can be washed away from the beach in a very short time and deposit-
ed further off-shore on the seafloor in a so-called off-shore bar. From there, the waves 
will, over time, slowly push the sand back towards the dry area of the beach.  
The Coast Care angle on this phenomenon lies in the role of dune plants for the dune 
recovery phase. The sand-binding species Spinifex and Pingao develop deep roots that 
stabilize the dunes, and their runners trap sand which is blown landwards by the wind. 
The dune rebuilds, and the steep cut develops back into a more shallow angle (Dune 
Restoration Trust of New Zealand 2011a). The restoration of native dune vegetation is 
therefore framed as making this natural recovery process possible, or speeding it up by 
replacing plants that have been washed out: working with nature. This understanding of 
coastal erosion and the role of sand-binding vegetation forms the basis of all attempts to 
use dune restoration as a means of coastal protection. Importantly, erosion cannot be 
prevented (this would mean working against nature): 
The plants do not stop erosion (no vegetation can do this) – their importance lies in 
natural repair of the dune after the storm. Storm cut erosion and recovery is a nor-
mal coastal process where the shoreline is simply fluctuating backwards and for-
wards over time. (Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand 2011d)3 
 
One dune restoration professional who is particularly active in spreading this message is 
Jim Dahm, who already played a role in part II as expert witness for the Waihi Beach 
appellants. He founded and worked for the Waikato Beachcare programme, as well as in 
other managing positions at Waikato Regional Council, and now works as an independ-
ent coastal management consultant. Instead of calling erosion a “problem” that needs to 
be managed, Jim argues that it is human uses of the coast that should be seen as the 
problem, and human expectations and fears that need to be addressed: 
The analogy that I use in talking to communities is, if I think I’m good with cats, 
you know, my cat looks a bit hungry and I give it a glass of milk and pat it on the 
head and it starts purring, I think ah, I’m pretty good with cats! So I go to the Zoo 
and I see the tiger and the tiger looks a bit sad, so I jump into the cage and ‘puss, 
puss’... and I get mauled. Now that’s not a tiger problem, that’s some other kind of 
problem, you know. And the same thing, if we go jumping into the cage on the 
coast and we get mauled, that’s not the tiger, that’s not a coastal erosion problem, 
that’s another kind of problem. We’ve called it a coastal erosion problem, and our 
                                                
 
3  The Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand or short, the Dunes Trust is a network of people and 
groups interested in dune restoration. Its history will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter. 
For now, the information material provided by the Trust is one of the main sources of the message 
discussed in this section and reproduced in Coast Care brochures as well. 
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language is very revealing, because it reflects the way we want to think about, and 
the way we want to manage that problem. Naughty coastal erosion will be smacked 
with a rock wall, you know, which is – coastal erosion needs to be managed. (In-
terview with Jim Dahm) 
 
Jim makes a clear line of argument here between the ontological state of the coastal 
zone (being dynamic, subject to phases of erosion and accretion, which are natural), and 
what ought to be done: no coastal armouring, instead dune restoration that works with 
nature and assists the natural processes. The message is based upon understanding the 
beach as a dynamic system that is never static, but continuously changing. At the same 
time, however, the beach features an underlying stability on a larger system scale, or 
dynamic equilibrium in coastal science terms (Dean 2005). The beach not only works in 
natural cycles, it is also much larger than commonly thought, because areas usually 
covered by water – like the off-shore bar – are also parts of the larger beach system.  
All this is uncontroversial within coastal science; however, the dune restoration ex-
perts and professionals clearly perceive a lack of public understanding and knowledge 
about the natural dynamics of the beach. They see this lack of understanding as the rea-
son why people react emotionally or frightened when they encounter the effects of 
coastal erosion. Within the STS literature, this move of attributing unwanted reactions 
of the public to their lack of understanding is widely criticized (Wynne 1995). These 
critiques are, for example, addressing public reactions towards emerging biotechnolo-
gies, and concentrate on what can be learned from resisting publics about how debates 
are framed by powerful institutions and what might be left out (e.g. a focus on lab secu-
rity that leaves out possible risks of GMO contamination in the environment, discussed 
by Gottweis 1995). Experts arguing to educate the public in order to fight irrational or 
ignorant beliefs or behaviour are therefore potential red flags from the STS point of 
view. In the case of understanding coastal erosion as a natural process, the dune restora-
tion professionals stress the fact that erosion is usually not dramatic if certain conditions 
are met: enough space, the right dune plants – and the right attitude: 
[W]ith storm cut erosion and recovery the shoreline is simply fluctuating back-
wards and forwards over time. Unless the beach is losing more sand than it gains 
(which is far rarer than we think), the erosion is not permanent. If you have all 
three factors in place at your beach – sufficient dune width, cover of native sand 
binders, [and] an understanding that storm cut and recovery is natural – you can sit 
back and enjoy the natural spectacle of storm cut and recovery! (Dune Restoration 
Trust of New Zealand 2011d: 4) 
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The call to enjoy coastal erosion might be overstating the message that it is not neces-
sarily scary, and might sound cynical from the perspective of somebody owning a house 
at the beachfront. However, the point this pamphlet is trying to make is that there is no 
need for dramatic reactions – and this is where a connection is drawn between the mes-
sage that erosion is natural and the paradigm shift beyond hard protection that is pro-
moted by the same actors. The following quote is taken from a Dunes Trust article that 
claims to “explain the natural process of storm cut erosion and recovery and how best to 
live with this natural process and avoid the need to cover our beaches with rock walls 
and other structures” (Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand 2011d: 1). The argumen-
tation relies on addressing what is understood to be a common misunderstanding:  
Storm cut erosion is probably the most widespread and impressive natural process 
operating on the sandy beaches of the New Zealand coastline. In just a few hours, it 
can radically reshape beaches, lowering beach levels and seriously eroding dunes. 
The result is towering vertical cliffs of sand where a gently sloping vegetated dune 
previously existed and the equivalent of hundreds of truck loads of sand having 
disappeared from sight. This can evoke strong emotions and even fear. It common-
ly leads to demands to ‘do something’ and for the erosion to be ‘controlled’. The 
concern is that if it is not ‘stopped’ the erosion will just keep coming. This misun-
derstanding commonly leads to the placement of rock and other seawalls. (Dune 
Restoration Trust of New Zealand 2011d: 1) 
 
This altered understanding of coastal erosion as a natural process is slowly making its 
way into Aotearoa New Zealand’s coastal planning legislation and legal praxis. In the 
1995 Environment Court decision about appropriate coastal protections measures for 
Wainui Beach in Hawkes Bay (quoted in Chapter 4.2 in relation to the Waihi Beach 
seawall controversy), the judge argued against the appellants’ right to install hard pro-
tection measures exactly with the argument “that it is no longer taken for granted that 
the natural process of erosion is necessarily an evil or mischief to be avoided wherever 
possible” (Environment Court of New Zealand 2002, see Jacobson 2004a: 52). As the 
Coast Care coordinator puts it, speaking of his own constituency:  
I think that’s where I’d like Coast Care volunteers and coastal residents generally 
to be at with their thinking, is that; erosion and recovery is a great natural process 
and example of nature. And erosion is not necessarily a bad thing. (Interview with 
Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
This is not nature thought of as multiple, as a natural-cultural entanglement of human 
and non-human worlds. The natural in this understanding is clearly distinguishable from 
the human world and the political (or here, legal) decisions humans make as to how to 
live in this world. It seems like the sea as a force of nature is employed here to mark the 
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limits of human agency. This is a spatial understanding: there is a line in the sand be-
tween the liminal coastal space where humans live in and with nature, and the uncon-
trollable natural forces of the sea they have to reckon with. There seems to be a slip be-
tween the idea of natural forces and the conclusion that this makes it easier to accept 
erosion, or even perceive the whole phenomenon as a “natural spectacle” to be enjoyed. 
This is remarkable especially in an environment like Aotearoa New Zealand, where 
regularly occurring events like earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides or cyclones make the 
forces of nature a matter of much concern. 
Nonetheless, many Coast Carers identify strongly with this line of the argument. 
However, these natural cycles of storm erosion and recovery take time, and the Dunes 
Trust leaflet quoted above remarks that shoreline fluctuations “often occur over periods 
of decades, rather than years” (Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand 2011d: 3) – 
though this part of the message usually gets less attention. The remainder of this chapter 
will describe some of the attempts to speed up nature, to enhance the dunes, or to pro-
grade them towards the sea, practices which can be seen as indirect answers to this 
problem. Employing dune restoration as a means of natural coastal protection has a lot 
to do with meddling with the time of nature. And, as will be shown, it sometimes takes 
time to convince people as well.  
 
 
 
8.2 Do-It-Yourself Erosion Control: A “Kick Cowboy” 
Approach to Coast Care 
 
Pukehina Beach is a small village at the Bay of Plenty coast, about 50 kilometres east of 
Tauranga. Here, I meet Kenny Cooper, who owns a dairy farm in the Waikato region, 
about a two-hour drive inland. Kenny owns a bach at the seafront, which he bought 
twelve years ago; he spends all his free time at the sea. Though not a permanent resi-
dent, he is an active part of the community and organizes the local Coast Care working 
bees. As captain of the Surf Rescue Club, he has managed to get the Coast Care events 
onto the schedule of the Surf Club as well.  
Similar to Waihi Beach further up the coast, Pukehina Beach is just far enough from 
sprawling Tauranga City and its suburbs to have kept the “kiwi” feel, though it is small-
er and mostly residential. There are no shops at Pukehina Beach, just a pub – the Hippy 
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Pipi, named after a popular local shellfish, and this remoteness is a matter of pride for 
the permanent and semi-permanent residents who praise the local touch and help each 
other out with shopping errands when they drive into town. There seems to be no split 
between absentee owners and “real” locals comparable to what I encountered at Waihi 
Beach. Many baches are regularly rented out to summer visitors, and there are visible 
markers of an active real estate market – an agent’s office, and the usual offering signs 
at some properties – but the longer distance from Auckland might be one reason while 
Pukehina Beach is not (or maybe not yet) a hotspot of coastal development.  
Its location on a narrow sand spit makes the settlement especially vulnerable to storm 
erosion (Eco Nomos Ltd. 2003; Gordon and Fraser 2005: 32). Only a single road 
stretches down the spit and eventually ends at the surf club close to the tip, with only 
dune fields beyond. On both sides of the street are one or two sections. Only in the wid-
est areas have some of them been further subdivided to make room for additional hous-
es. The houses on the landward side of the spit face the estuary, whereas the properties 
on the opposite side of the street face the open sea. The tip of the sand spit behaves like 
a barrier island, consisting of shifting sand that keeps continuously moving. At the same 
time, Pukehina Beach features (together with Waihi Beach) the BOP’s “lowest mini-
mum setback distance of 10 metres” (Environment Bay of Plenty 2007: iv; see Healy 
1993), which means that in both locations, most seaward house(s) are located not more 
than 10 metres from high tide line, or mean high water springs (MHWS).  
Kenny has sold the original bach on his property and is currently replacing it with a 
new building that is more suitable as a second home, which also means he is familiar 
with the Western Bay of Plenty District Council (WBOPDC) hazard line policies. 
Asked why he chose a house in this location, he says Pukehina has a community feeling 
that the other affordable option – suburban Papamoa Beach – lacks. And why at the 
beachfront? “Why I chose it, where I’ve got a bach in Pukehina? As my wife says, I’m 
not going to the beach to look at somebody’s washing.” (Interview with Kenny Cooper, 
Pukehina Beach Coast Care) So it had to be the front row – and on the ocean side, not 
towards the estuary, because “I’m not going to look at mud”, as he puts it (ibid).  
Similar to what many Waihi Beach residents told me about their situation, Kenny is 
vocal about his opinion that “Pukehina should never have been built on” (ibid). While 
he is upgrading his dwelling as well, he does not build as far seaward as he is technical-
ly allowed to do, and thinks it is “silly” that the current policies grant him the right to 
extend his building about seven metres closer to the shoreline. Kenny was well aware 
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before his involvement with Coast Care that the dunes are “a frontline of defence”: “I 
knew when we bought the bach that it was if the dunes aren’t there, the bach ain’t 
there.” (ibid)  
Before buying, Kenny did some research and asked around, so he knows quite a bit 
about the history of erosion at Pukehina Beach. He tells me that after Cyclone Bola 
struck Pukehina in March 1988, big logs that had stranded on the beach were pulled up 
with bulldozers and diggers and placed in front of the eroded dunes, covering steep 
drops of up to 12 feet (3.65 m) in some areas. So far, only at the tip of the spit – close to 
the surf club – did some of these logs wash out again during a severe storm. His 
knowledge gives Kenny a sense of security in light of what others perceived as a dra-
matic event: 
Everyone else was going on, ‘Oh Jesus, that’s a pretty big storm; it’s washed a lot 
of sand away’. And I says, ‘Mate, we haven’t even got back to cyclone Bola yet’. 
(Interview with Kenny Cooper, Pukehina Beach Coast Care) 
 
In front of his house, an estimated 100-150 ton log is thought to have been buried un-
derneath the dune. Being a hands-on guy himself, Kenny recounts how these do-it-
yourself approaches to coastal erosion events were still common in the recent past:  
A couple of years [ago] there was some big blow-outs where a lot of the dunes had 
got washed out. And different ones would just get a bully in and push the sand up 
from along the beach and do their own repairs, and say well, you know, Council’s 
nowhere to be seen. We’ll just get in, do it, and when Council would turn up saying 
you can’t do that, they said, ‘that’s alright mate, I’ve already done it’, you know. 
And it was too late. And that’s a bit of a kick cowboy attitude. (Interview with 
Kenny Cooper, Pukehina Beach Coast Care) 
 
Coast Care entered this situation promoting the idea to use dune plantings in order to 
stabilize the dunes. Kenny is certain that these plants have had a considerable effect on 
the dunes, which have accumulated more sand since the plantings started. He explains 
that this is less about adding to the height of the dunes, but more importantly about add-
ing to the depth – resulting in a less steep dune that is less vulnerable to wash-out dur-
ing a storm. This, he says, is a direct result of removing introduced South African ice-
plants which “don’t do anything” to stabilize the dunes, and replacing them with na-
tives. Of the two main native fore dune species, Kenny has especially good experience 
with Pingao plants:  
Once they get going, that Pingao is the one. If you can get that going in large 
clumps, in a big sea it won’t wash away. […] The Pingao, once it gets a root sys-
tem, it’s so big and huge that a big sea can come in, and if you’ve got an area of it 
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like the size of this room, it could undermine it and cut it right back, but it will still 
be there. And once the tide drops away and drops off, straight away it’s just accu-
mulating sand. […] And then all the wind will blow both ways and actually keep 
growing it out from that one point, so it’s actually a really, really strong plant, 
whereas the Spinifex will run out and it’ll wash off and the salt will do the damage, 
or the sea will do the damage on it, and then it’ll start growing [again]. But that 
Pingao’s unreal, especially out at Pukehina. It’s done a fantastic job. (Interview 
with Kenny Cooper, Pukehina Beach Coast Care) 
 
The problem with Pingao, however, is that “the rabbits absolutely love it” (ibid). Pest 
control is therefore an important part of the project – as is educating people that kids 
playing in the dunes cause damage to this natural protection. While the points Kenny 
addressed so far fit well with the Coast Care objectives, he has other ideas for which he 
is not getting the support he would like to have. While he is convinced of the protective 
properties of the native-clad dunes, he acknowledges that even with that, the sea is “eat-
ing in” at times and takes the sand away. Kenny would prefer to speed up things a bit, 
and intervene by adding more sand to the system. Crucially though, he argues, this ap-
proach would need to be accompanied by planting dune vegetation: 
If they can put the sand back, it’ll mitigate it really, really quickly and you plant 
that, you know. If you can bring sand in or something in and cover it up and fill 
that hole [without planting it], it’ll be gone in no time and it’ll never do anything. 
It’ll only be a very localized effect and that can be for whatever reason, [it] could 
have started from kids playing there and taking the dune plants out, or there may 
not be enough dune plants on the beach, or it could be just a big storm that had 
pushed in one area, you know. But if you can get that sand back there and get it 
planted again, […] that dune will keep growing back out and it will restore itself 
really, really, really fast. The biggest thing is Coast Care doesn’t wanna put that 
back in quickly, alright, is that it’s a natural thing, yes. (Interview with Kenny 
Cooper, Pukehina Beach Coast Care) 
 
Instead of “sit[ting] back and enjoy[ing] the natural spectacle of storm cut and recov-
ery” (as the Dunes Trust leaflet advises) this “great natural process” as the Coast Care 
coordinator calls it, Kenny criticizes that “the biggest thing […] is that it’s a natural 
thing, yes” (ibid). Being more than a bit of a kick-ass cowboy himself, after all, this line 
of argument does not have him convinced. He is thinking practically, and feels re-
strained by an approach where human intervention is kept to a minimum. Kenny argues 
against this from his practical point of view. He explains that the Little Waihi estuary is 
silting up, a widespread problem in the Bay of Plenty that is related to land-use changes 
and soil erosion. He suggests that the sediment blocking the estuary could be dredged 
out and applied to the ocean beach, because either way “that sand should be out in the 
sea”. That this doesn’t happen is a symptom for Kenny to suspect that Coast Care puts 
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too much stress on things being “natural”. In his understanding, such an intervention 
seems to be much more a question of degree than of kind. He then frames his plan as 
helping Nature help itself; “that dune will keep growing back out and it will restore it-
self really, really, really fast” (ibid). 
Kenny’s take on the situation points to the tension of too neatly grounding the ration-
ales of dune restoration work – obviously a practice of human intervention – on a singu-
lar Nature, while downplaying the assemblage of practices that involve decisions, polit-
ical and technical, of what to do in each case. There is no clear line that can be drawn 
between some practices (planting, fertilizing, pest control) and others (dredging and 
beach renourishment) in terms of what is sufficiently “natural”. Why then not extend 
the practice to adding sand? Pointing to the nearby tourist location of Mount Maunganui 
Beach, which has already repeatedly been nourished with sand that the Port of Tauranga 
has dredged from shipping channels and dumped off-shore, Kenny remarks that  
they take a lot of sand out there, and that slowly works its way back in, you know, 
and it’s made an artificial beach. But no one looks at it as an artificial beach do 
they? (Interview with Kenny Cooper, Pukehina Beach Coast Care) 
 
As the section below will show, the construction of artificial dunes is in fact a technique 
that is already used in other dune restoration sites. However, the main problem with 
Kenny’s dredging idea turns out to be framed as a “cultural” issue (ibid), a term he uses 
to signify what he perceives to be local Māori interests. The estuary is a traditional food 
source, which is why tangata whenua have in the past objected other projects here with 
possible impacts, including the laying of an underground water pipe that connects two 
settlements across the estuary. Again, Kenny clearly thinks that the whole problem 
should be seen from a more practical point of view. In response to the concern voiced 
by Māori over the effect on cockles and pipi (shellfish), he explains that these species 
grow under water anyway, claiming that the dredging would increase water levels and 
tidal flows in the estuary and “therefore there’d be more shellfish, right” (ibid). It 
doesn’t seem to occur to him that tangata whenua might not only be interested in shell-
fish numbers, but would probably also argue for as few interventions as possible, for 
“the natural thing”.  
The Coast Care coordinator has made it clear to Kenny that he would support dredg-
ing and beach renourishment only if the local hapū (subtribal Māori) groups were to 
agree on it. Kenny’s conclusion at this point: dredging the estuary to gain sand for the 
dunes would work technically, but culturally it doesn’t, and this he regrets:  
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There’s certain things at Pukehina, if you could do it, it would be fantastic, you 
know. […] For coastal protection in Pukehina, the best thing you can do is have a 
deep estuary, alright. That’s my opinion, because you’ll define a channel, right, and 
you’ll get sand or accumulation of stuff along that beach front. The stuff will move 
out. You know, that’s just my opinion. […] But culturally you can’t do it, and 
that’s what it is. (Interview with Kenny Cooper, Pukehina Beach Coast Care) 
 
Calling things “cultural” in the Aotearoa New Zealand context is also a strategy of in-
digenous politics. As we have seen in the Waihi Beach case, tribal organizations pro-
mote a “four pillar” model of sustainability which includes the cultural as an essential 
component and is meant to lead to greater Māori involvement in political decision-
making (see Chapter 5.3). At the same time, the cultural marks the boundaries of what 
is non-negotiable for tangata whenua, that which is claimed as traditional knowledge or 
custom which needs to be maintained. This can be used for a no-compromise strategy 
which is often met with frustration by Pākeha who do not reflect on the non-negotiables 
of Pākeha institutions and norms, most of all the growth economy. It also provides an 
entry point into politics, because the New Zealand Resource Management Act (RMA) 
and other legislation make it mandatory to at least listen to cultural concerns (Bay of 
Plenty Times 2011). On the other hand, as Michael Goldsmith has argued, this cultural 
asymmetry effectively blinds out that the dominant Pākeha majority also gives mean-
ings to the world according to shared, “cultural”, principles (Goldsmith 2003a).  
Kenny’s critique is not limited to interpretations of the appropriate natural protection 
by Coast Care and local iwi, he is also concerned about how decisions are made in gen-
eral. He is dissatisfied with the governance structures, which in this case do not line up 
well with his own do-it-yourself ambitions. He laments that while there may be sand 
made available to address acute erosion, he cannot access it directly, only via Coast 
Care (or the Ratepayer’s Association):  
There’s no short cut. My thing, there should be a short cut that’s ‘Hey man, my 
place is washing out. I want sand’. I only have to ring one person up – ‘I want 
sand’. I’m gonna do it. That’s it. Get in there and do it. So, I’d like to see it a damn 
sight bloody quicker but, you know... (Interview with Kenny Cooper, Pukehina 
Beach Coast Care) 
 
Otherwise, the “kick cowboy” attitude still remains an option. It happened in the past, 
and if need be, it could happen again:  
I know different ones out there [who] are contractors and as they said, if the sea 
was washing into their place they’d have no hesitation of putting a digger in there, 
doing what they have to do and then sitting back later and going, ‘Oh well, fine me, 
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you know. Sorry, I’ve done what I’ve done’. (Interview with Kenny Cooper, Puke-
hina Beach Coast Care) 
 
What Kenny calls the “kick cowboy attitude” is also known as “number 8 wire mentali-
ty” (Kiwianarama 2010) or “kiwi ingenuity” in Aotearoa New Zealand. This important 
aspect of national identity relates to the presumed ability to fix everything with a stand-
ard piece of wire, or with limited means in general, fostered by New Zealand’s isolated 
location in the Southern Pacific, as well as by a settler society on often rough terrain, 
where travelling especially over land remained difficult well into the mid-20th century. 
This well-developed ability to help oneself goes hand in hand with a refusal of external-
ly defined rules, as Kenny explains: 
Kiwis are pretty like, ‘You don’t tell me what to do’. You know, ‘Don’t stick me 
behind a wire. I’ll do what I wanna do’. You know, ‘She’s right mate’, and that’s a 
Kiwi attitude and that’s why we’ve got where we’ve got for such a small nation. 
(Interview with Kenny Cooper, Pukehina Beach Coast Care) 
 
Since its introduction in 1991, the RMA has been met with resistance that can, at least 
partly, be attributed to the fact that some people find it difficult to accept that they are 
not allowed to do as they like, even on their private property, and that natural resources 
are to a certain extent treated as part of the commons. Coast Care as soft coastal protec-
tion, however, usually operates well within the limits of the RMA, and is actively pro-
moted in the accompanying New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (Department of 
Conservation 2010: 24). 
 
 
8.3 Beyond Coast Care: Dune-Reshaping as an Alternative to 
Hard Protection? 
 
In the section above, Kenny laments that Coast Care is clinging to an idea of what is 
natural that seems to limit the range of accepted practices. Coming from his interest in a 
do-it-yourself approach to coastal protection, Kenny is already engaged in doing nature 
(as a practice). When he runs up against resistance with his ideas about dredging and 
reverting sand, which he thinks could be legitimate practices of ‘working with nature’ 
wasn’t it for the possible protest of local Māori, this could be interpreted as evidence of 
the actual multiplicity of possible coastal natures. Any argument for working with natu-
ral processes is also an argument for a specific politics of nature, with different ambi-
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tions and potential outcomes. Within Coast Care though, a tendency can be observed to 
discursively demobilize nature. By claiming to reconstruct nature in its original (read, 
pre-European) state, the practices of nature-making in the dunes can become seemingly 
self-evident, a matter of restoring the (scientifically-defined) past and less a matter of 
political deliberation. This tendency, one might argue, could be further reinforced by the 
increasing focus on biodiversity and the restoration of native nature (see Chapter 9).  
Dune restoration pioneers within and beyond Coast Care rely on science when argu-
ing for their understanding of coastal nature. The chapter above has outlined the tenden-
cy to attribute public concern about erosion to being misinformed about the scientifical-
ly proven truth of the beach as it is seen through the eyes of the coastal scientist. Sci-
ence is used to argue against hard protection, as well as for restoring coastal ecosys-
tems. It is, however, an open question how much interference into what is regarded as 
the natural coastal system is possible without compromising the building blocks of a 
dune restoration concept that relies on a stable concept of a singular nature. This be-
comes visible by looking at emerging practices that aim to expand the potentials of dune 
restoration as natural coastal protection, developing new techniques beyond those de-
scribed in Chapter 6. The Coast Care coordinator himself, for example, thinks of beach 
nourishment as a possible way to provide Coast Care with more room to work in the 
suburban areas in the future. At a public workshop on “Empowering coastal communi-
ties to adapt to climate change” he underlines that if all the material recovered from 
maintenance dredging in the Port of Tauranga shipping channels were to be used for 
beach nourishment, this would add about 50 metres of width along the 30 km of beach 
between the Mount and Maketu (Fieldnotes 26.05. 2011).  
Especially under the influence of rising sea levels, the limits of Coast Care are often 
the borders of private properties at the beach (on how Coast Care works on maxing out 
the public space of the dune, see Chapter 7.3). At the moment, however, the port com-
pany dumps some of the sand off-shore (to the advantage of Mount Maunganui main 
beach), but most of it is stored and sold to construction businesses; with this, the port is 
also digging into the profitable market of sand-mining (Delestrac 2013). While, without 
the cooperation of the port, large-scale beach nourishment is beyond the capabilities of 
Coast Care, dune reshaping is a possibility that seems worth exploring, and there are 
experiments and trials doing this. We already encountered a similar project in chapter 5: 
the construction and planting of an artificial dune was part of the larger Waihi Beach 
coastal protection scheme. In this case the work was carried out by Western Bay of City 
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Council and its contractor (a landscaping company), because local Coast Care volun-
teers did not want to participate in anything related to (re)building the protection 
scheme, and perceived the dune reshaping project as an attempt of the Council to high-
jack the successful Coast Care idea for their goals. Given this example where dune re-
shaping was met with a boycott by the locals, how can such an approach go along with 
the Coast Care philosophy?  
The Coast Care coordinator is aware that the heavy machinery necessary to accom-
plish reshaping projects is seen as questionable by parts of his constituency who may 
perceive it as inappropriate. After all, most Coast Carers have been exposed to the edu-
cational message about the negative impact the history of coastal development and lev-
elling of dunes has had on the coastal environment. “If we are on the dune with an ex-
cavator people think we’re going back to the 1950s” (Fieldnotes 26.05.2011), the Coast 
Care coordinator remarks, which is probably why the BOP Coast Care newsletter care-
fully explains what is done and why at a test site in the Eastern BOP (Coast Care BOP 
Programme 2012: 5). 
Dunes reshaping as a restoration technique is used by Coast Care BOP with two dif-
ferent goals in mind. On the one hand, it is employed as a means to get rid of unwanted 
vegetation. The top layer of the dune and its dense vegetation is removed completely: 
weed control by mechanical means. On the other hand, eroded dunes are reshaped and 
then quickly replanted as a means of erosion control, again speeding up the natural dune 
recovery. In the example mentioned above, Coast Care BOP used the technique in a 
field trial, aiming to collect scientific evidence on the question if native plant cover en-
hances the dunes’ capacity to work as a natural barrier for coastal protection. So far, this 
seems to confirm that native plant cover cannot prevent natural erosion of the dunes: 
Since June 2009 Coast Care staff and contractors have been conducting a trial at 
Ohope and in the Opotiki District to see whether re-contouring steep dune scarps 
and re-planting with Spinifex has any effect on the rate of erosion in places where 
the coastline is retreating landward. The results to date show that Spinifex does not 
slow the rate at which sand dunes erode during storm events. If the sea wants to 
take the sand, it will. […] Longer term, the trial will also be used to compare rela-
tive rates of accretion between recently-planted Spinifex and areas of exotic vege-
tation when the current erosive phase ends. (Coast Care BOP Programme 2012: 5) 
 
The Coast Care BOP coordinator is therefore trying “to put the message out” that the 
native plant cover alone is not able to stop the storm erosion more than minimally – but 
that during the critical months following a storm event, the native vegetation is vital to 
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make sure that “the wind and wave-borne sand that is delivered post storm cut is re-
cruited back to the sand dune as quickly as possible, to rebuild that buffer” (Interview 
with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care). 
The dune reshaping technique has also been used to provide coastal protection spe-
cifically for beachfront housing on the Coromandel peninsula (part of the Waikato re-
gion and subject to the Beachcare programme, which is comparable to Coast Care 
BOP). Coastal consultant Jim Dahm has been engaged by local property owners to ad-
dress severe acute erosion at Whangapoua Beach. A row of beachfront houses came un-
der threat when parts of the front dune were washed away during storms in 2008. Jim 
implemented a dune reshaping and planting scheme that was paid for by the beneficiar-
ies. While this was not part of Beachcare activities, it nonetheless linked up closely to 
the volunteer scheme, because: 
[t]he only reason we got a good change at Whangapoua was because that commu-
nity had worked for ten years for the dune; they saw that it went backwards and 
forwards and they saw what you could achieve. That erosion scarp looked awful – 
three or four metres high and the top was five metres from some houses. Ten years 
ago or fifteen years ago that would have been a rock wall; there would have been 
nothing you could do. I would have been a voice from the wilderness saying, ‘We 
don’t need to protect, it’s not that serious.’ The response would have been: ‘Rub-
bish!’ and it would have been rock wall. (Interview with Jim Dahm) 
 
Jim attributes the openness of people to a soft solution – instead of a seawall – to the 
time invested into spreading the Coast Care ethos.  
I mean, I’ve actually got a few sites now where we’ve got communities to live with 
natural processes, where I’d never be able to do that 20 years ago but I’ve picked 
up skills to do that. A relatively simple case I admit but nonetheless we’re making 
progress we wouldn’t have made 20 years ago simply by getting involved in taking 
this fight but hell – prevailing paradigms are enormously difficult to change. (In-
terview with Jim Dahm) 
 
This take on the situation is confirmed by a representative from the Whangapoua Rate-
payer’s association, who sees Jim’s long-term engagement in the village – as a former 
Council officer, then as Beachcare coordinator, and now as a private consultant – as the 
main prerequisite for the trust which the locals put into his deep knowledge of the 
beach, and following from that into his ideas of addressing the erosion scarp by reshap-
ing the dune.  
In December 2008, the Whangapoua beach was scraped and subsequently planted to 
great success. In 2010, the New Zealand Coastal Society Conference was held in the 
Coromandel region and as part of the conference field trip, the Whangapoua Beach site 
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was presented as a best practice example, with Regional Council officers and a local 
resident joining the meeting and reporting on what all sides saw as a positive outcome. 
But the reshaped dune itself, of course, also remains subject to the same dynamic cy-
cles. Less than three years after the scraping, in August 2011, large parts of the dune 
were eroded once again in a storm event. I wonder, is it not frustrating that the scraping 
might need to repeated, now that the dune planting has just really taken off and the site 
looked “natural” (read: covered with native vegetation) once again? But when I call Pe-
ter Jackson from the Whangapoua Ratepayers Association, he tells me that they had an-
ticipated this happening sooner or later, and that for this reason the resource consent 
contained a provision that the beach scraping can be repeated without going through the 
consent process again. Another factor enabling repeated beach scrapings are the rela-
tively low costs associated with it – according to Jim Dahm about 3-4 % of the cost of a 
seawall (Dahm 2010).  
When I revisit the place in March 2015, the Whangapoua project is once again pre-
sented as a best practice example, this time to the participants of the annual Dune Resto-
ration Trust conference (held in Whitianga, Coromandel), by Jim Dahm and his local 
client, a retired environmental lawyer who owns a beachfront property there. On this 
occasion, however, Jim is careful to stress that the beach scraping is a transitory meas-
ure only, and that while the goal for now is to prevent the construction of a seawall on 
Whangapoua Beach (at least one of the beachfront residents would prefer a “hard solu-
tion”), in the long run some form of retreat from the coast will be needed in this loca-
tion. As it turns out, the effects of the 2011 storm event had not been addressed with 
another scraping, but the dune had recovered over time with the help of new plantings 
alone. But now we stand in front of a dune that had been rebuilt from beach scrapings in 
order to ease out the effect of another large storm that happened some months earlier. 
Things remain in flux, and every new storm becomes a problem as long as the dune has 
not been covered by new vegetation yet, and the residents remain concerned about the 
outcome of the project. The same week Jim has to postpone a meeting because he had to 
drive up to Whangapoua again; to discuss the project and calm down those residents 
who still want a seawall. 
In any case, these more invasive methods of dune restoration might stretch the limits 
of what people perceive as natural coastal protection. In the Whangapoua case, the resi-
dents welcomed (and payed for) the artificial dune as a progression of Coast Care prac-
tices in a difficult environment, while the “fake Coast Care” dune in Waihi Beach (5.1) 
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was widely criticized by local Coast Carers as non-natural. The places might not be 
comparable in terms of the environmental conditions; the consultant thought of Whan-
gapoua as a promising location for beach scraping, whereas the Waihi Beach “dune en-
hancement” plan was criticized in the external project review because of its limited 
scale (Lumsden 2011). However, both instances of constructing a dune in front of sea-
front houses, whether to speed up nature (as in Whangapoua) or whether to use it as a 
protection where there might not be enough space left for a dune to build naturally (in 
Waihi Beach) proved difficult. In both cases, the dune was washed away again. Still, the 
Whangapoua clients remained willing to stay with their decision and try the method 
again, which they perceived as a soft alternative to hard protection measures.  
With these two examples in mind, one could argue that for a project to function as 
soft protection, and to be understood as ‘working with nature’, not only the state of the 
physical environment needs to be taken into account. A constructed sand dune can be 
perceived in different ways. In Waihi Beach, it was seen by local seawall opponents as 
merely a cover up of the larger hard protection scheme, an opinion shared by their 
beachfront antagonists alike. It was “a sob to the greenies”, and not taken seriously as a 
means of natural protection. In Whangapoua, the beachfront residents came together 
and decided to trial the method as an alternative to a seawall, in order to keep their 
beach as “natural” as possible. A socio-natural object that seems comparable on first 
sight in terms of how it was made – a dune built with the help of bulldozers, not cur-
rents and winds, over a very short time span – emerged as something very different in 
both places. The same object can be natural protection, or something totally different. 
‘Working with nature’ is also a matter of who does this working, of what actors are in-
volved and how, and of the political objectives which are followed. In the end, the soci-
onatural object of the artificial dune is only the visible tip of the iceberg of a larger so-
cionatural network that may or may not stabilize (Latour 1988) and form an example for 
a successful attempt to ‘work with nature’ – and not against it. 
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Fig. 16: Whangapoua about two years after the initial beach scraping. Picture by 
author, November 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17: The same area shortly after another storm event. Picture by Michael Flitner, 
September 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18: After repeated scraping. Picture by author, March 2015. 
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8.4 Changing Paradigms: Coast Care as a “Soft Approach to 
Hard Issues”  
 
“Every site I’ve ever gone to where we managed to get ac-
ceptance of working with nature, it takes 10 times as much ef-
fort to get a solution [compared to getting acceptance of an en-
gineering solution].” (Interview with Jim Dahm) 
 
Are these techniques an alternative to hard protection? And if so, what is the role of 
Coast Care in this? And, thinking of the vital part Jim Dahm played in realizing the soft 
measure discussed in the previous section, what is the role of trusted experts in this? In 
the newspaper coverage of a Dunes Trust conference that took place in Nelson on the 
South Island in 2013, Jim Dahm is interviewed during a field trip to a recently restored 
beach. He is paraphrased as presenting the Spinifex plantings as “a good example of 
working with nature to manage erosion rather than imposing hard engineering solu-
tions”. In the verbatim quote that follows, he argues against hard protection on account 
of the successes of dune restoration: 
  213 
You could turn this beach into a nightmare overnight if you put in a rock wall. 
We’re probably one of the worst places in the world in terms of overuse of sea 
walls. We’re engineering our natural coasts into non-existence. It’s great to see 
what’s been done here. We’re just gradually learning that nature has got most of 
the answers. The process of erosion is extremely dramatic. People overreact, and 
we end up rocking another beach. (Pearson 2013) 
 
Jim’s technical expertise and experience in coastal management links up with his expe-
rience in working with people through community groups and consulting, which makes 
him one of my most important fieldwork contacts, and one that is emerging in more 
than one place in my text. Jim wears many hats in these stories, from expert witness 
(promoting the backstop wall approach in the Waihi Beach environment appeal), to 
former Beachcare coordinator, to the author of many reports, as a Council employee or 
nowadays as an independent consultant.  
As soon as people asked me if I had seen Waihi Beach (see Chapter 4), they suggest-
ed that I needed to talk to Jim. I met Jim at conferences, workshops and for two inter-
views at his house in the Coromandel, both several hours long. Listening to his anec-
dotes and explanations – about the shared “cultural soup” we all come from, how cul-
tural understandings of private property contribute to the problem that shoreline changes 
are perceived as unacceptable, or what he calls “the prevailing engineering paradigm” – 
were the moments I felt closest to the idea of a para-ethnographic encounter described 
by Holmes and Marcus (Holmes and Marcus 2006; Holmes and Marcus 2008) and dis-
cussed in Chapter 34. Jim insists that the fortunes of a Coast Care/Beachcare approach 
to dune restoration hinge completely on successfully working with communities. In a 
report on community-based dune restoration he wrote together with the then BOP Coast 
                                                
 
4  It was clear that Jim enjoyed sharing and discussing his views. When I introduced him to my supervi-
sor visiting from Bremen University, he told another anecdote, this time about how he spoke to a col-
league after one of our first encounters at a coastal science conference: “I said I have no idea what 
she’s doing but we have to support her, she’s a social scientist!” While I sometimes felt uneasy with 
his expectations – that I and fellow social scientists should produce some knowledge assisting his par-
adigm-changing project, overcoming resistance against soft protection or managed retreat – I felt very 
much connected to his approach of taking language seriously, especially in relation to framing erosion 
as a problem (see previous section). As Jim puts it: “This attitude of managing the coastline, you 
know, of wanting to control it – it’s everywhere, it’s just everywhere in our society. It’s like Pavlov’s 
dog, ring the bell, ‘coastal erosion’, and you know, ‘rock rock’ [imitates barking dog], it’s just [that] 
it’s not a joke. I mean it is really there and so retreat has got an enormous challenge because there’s 
this paradigm that goes to our bones. It’s in part [the concept of private] property, it’s part rooted in a 
fear of this erosion, like maybe a fear of vampires or something like this, you know, it’s irrational 
fear.” (Interview with Jim Dahm) 
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Care coordinator Greg Jenks and another colleague involved in the Dunes Trust, the ar-
guments for this reach from empowerment and awareness-raising to long-term success 
and cost-effectiveness of volunteer restoration. The authors conclude that: 
The success of the groups to date suggests that community-based approaches have 
considerable potential in promoting increased awareness of coastal hazards and 
climate change and assisting in the development of more resilient coastal commu-
nities. (Dahm et al. 2005: 21). 
 
Coast Care then not only relies on communities and their willingness to perform volun-
teer work, it can be understood as a matter of making communities, or making commu-
nities work in a double sense – as volunteers, and as vehicles of a more resilient society 
in the face of global change.  
Coast Care may not, in all cases, be able to replace the structural approaches fa-
voured under the “engineering paradigm” because – as Jim and his fellows readily ad-
mit – there are situations where hard protection is the only possibility to maintain 
coastal development and infrastructure, especially in urban areas (Healy and Soomere 
2008; Ministry for the Environment 2008). Commenting on an early version of the 
book, Jim asked me to make it more explicit that he is not an outright opponent of hard 
protection under all circumstances:  
Frieda – bear in mind again that I am not talking about sites where there is a real 
and serious risk to dwellings or major infrastructure, we all easily understand engi-
neering in that context. We’re talking about the inability to live with or accept even 
quite minor erosion, we’ve demonized this natural process to such an extent. (Jim 
Dahm, pers. comm., 11.03.2014) 
 
The grey zone, however, seems to lie in those low-density rural and suburban coastal 
settlements which are so typical for Aotearoa New Zealand and the kiwi lifestyle. Here, 
the question of how far-reaching property rights actually are under given regimes of 
private property and how private and public interests should be balanced seems more 
open to intervention. In this situation, Coast Care (or Beachcare for that matter) works 
as a practical way to open up possibilities and discursive space for practices of ‘working 
with nature’. Remarkably, Jim explicitly links up discourse or thought with action: this 
reminds me of Jasanoff and Kim’s definition of how sociotechnical imaginaries operate 
“in the understudied regions between imagination and action, between discourse and 
decision, and between inchoate public opinion and instrumental state policy” (Jasanoff 
and Kim 2009: 163). Seen in this light, Coast Care can be reframed as a means of trying 
to push the ‘working with nature’ imaginary from below, in the most literal sense:  
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We sort of work at ground level, with dunes. The thing we like about the Coast 
Care thing is you all can see good outcomes very quickly, when you restore a dune 
[…] and that brings a lot of people into it, and success breeds involvement. And 
then you can bring a lot of other messages into that environment. So we use Coast 
Care as an avenue to bring all these messages in. You try to create an environment 
where everybody feels we are part of this success. And then there are certain mes-
sages which are a part of that environment, which come as part of the total pack-
age, you know the ‘Why are we here?’ We’re here for these values, this is more 
about protecting these values. And what we’re doing with dune restoration is com-
plemented by setbacks which make sure that houses stay well back. [….] And we 
have another setback for global warming so we’re internalizing awareness of that 
potential. And you’re just preaching those messages […] But Coast Care, because 
it’s such a successful thing; you can see that it is – visible returns. It’s a Trojan 
horse in which you can bring a lot of these other messages in. (Interview with Jim 
Dahm) 
 
This idea is employed from “above” as well; similar thoughts can also be found in bro-
chures and handbooks for Council staff published by government agencies, for example 
“Coastal Hazards and Climate Change: A guidance manual for local government in 
New Zealand” (Ministry for the Environment 2008) which lists Coast Care as a so-
called “non-statutory approach” to climate change adaptation and recommends: 
Coastcare initiatives may be supported in regional and district plans and be allocat-
ed funding support in annual plans. Such programmes have proven to be highly 
successful in enhancing the buffer provided by the natural dune system and are an 
effective way of empowering communities and raising their awareness of coastal 
hazard issues. (Ministry for the Environment 2008: 76) 
 
This is not coincidental, but shows another inroad into coastal policy and politics: Jim’s 
“advice and assistance” (amongst others) is acknowledged in the report, written by ex-
perts commissioned by the Ministry for the Environment. I interviewed a BOP coastal 
planning officer and asked if she was confident that Coast Care BOP has already 
reached these goals: to educate the public and promote soft protection. She directly 
links up the objectives of regional planning documents – to further a transition to sus-
tainable coastal management – with the Coast Care work, which  
has really got that message out into the public realm. […] There’s really good his-
torical photographic evidence that dates back and shows the Mount main beach et-
cetera, before Coast Care got hold of it. And I think the philosophy was about use 
and development of the environment as opposed to protecting it because it has its 
own innate capacity to act as a barrier to coastal hazards. That’s only been some-
thing that we’ve recently started pushing as a role and responsibility of the Region-
al Council, and I think if you did a survey of the coastal residents along Mount 
Maunganui, Omanu, Papamoa, and even up to Waihi [Beach], [...], I think you 
would see that the public perception of the use of soft protection methods has real-
ly increased in traction over the last ten years or so, five to ten years. (Interview 
with Linda Pierce, Bay of Plenty Regional Council) 
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The militaristic metaphor Jim uses above – Coast Care as a Trojan horse – makes sense 
because the spectrum of approaches that people are meant to digest via Coast Care ex-
tends to the managed retreat option, another tactic of warfare that could be employed 
when fighting coastal hazards, including anticipated climate change effects like sea lev-
el rise and increases in extreme weather events. Coast Care is understood as a “soft ap-
proach to hard issues”, as another informant puts it (Fieldnotes February 2010), and 
managed retreat is part of this conversation. Jim’s orientation is set towards the future 
he is trying to build – the sociotechnical imaginary of ‘working with nature’.  
There’s a famous New Zealand scientist, […] Rutherford, a nuclear scientist. And 
he had this saying: ‘The money has run out, we have to use our brains’, and I think 
that has to happen almost. The money has to run out and then we will use our 
brains you know, we may then suddenly realize, no we don’t need to engineer all 
the rural coastline, we can actually live with it and we can transition to a peaceable 
relationship with that natural shore line. But at the moment it’s just entrenched in 
our institutions, in our thinking, to engineer it. But I mean on my mind, at least we 
can start getting people to talk about the transition to retreat. What are the chal-
lenges, what are the obstacles to that and how might they be overcome. (Interview 
with Jim Dahm) 
 
In public debates, managed retreat is unpopular, and is so far mostly discussed as the 
last resort against which other options are weighed. Managed retreat features as what 
needs to be prevented by making planning decisions more wisely, or the terrible truth 
that needs to be faced for the future, setting incentives to start addressing this future 
now, guided by manuals like “Planning for Climate Change Effects on Coastal Mar-
gins”: 
For communities or infrastructure that are vulnerable, managed retreat and adapta-
tion are the only reasonable long-term options, given that sea level is projected to 
continue rising for several centuries. (Bell et al. 2001: ix)  
 
While managed retreat remains controversial, Coast Care features a host of positives to 
concentrate on: nice outdoor activities, educational goals, do-it-yourself protection, 
making things look nice, and (as the next chapter will show) helping native nature get 
back on track to where it once was. Both managed retreat and Coast Care are part of the 
portfolio of sustainable coastal management, but in discursive terms, they are located on 
almost opposite ends of a continuum between dystopian narrative and the benign (and 
practical) action.  
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8.5 Hibernating Through the Financial Crisis: The Mōkau Spit 
Camping Ground Investment 
 
The experts’ expectations that Coast Care is a sure way to foster the principles of sus-
tainable coastal management can also be counteracted by actors on the ground, who 
may be clever enough to employ the practice to serve other ends not always congruent 
with all parts of the Coast Care philosophy. One of the latest additions to the Waikato 
Beachcare5 portfolio is a group of permanent campers at Mōkau spit. Their campsite is 
located directly at a remote West Coast beach, just before the road turns away from the 
coast and inland towards the Waikato plains. The nearby river is famous for whitebait-
ing: juvenile fish that is very popular in Aotearoa New Zealand, fished from little stands 
on the riverside (Haggerty 2007). The campsite itself is very basic and full of whitebait-
ers. Here, the kiwi imaginary still strives: Good Old New Zealand, where a little spot by 
the sea, and be it a caravan, was affordable to each and everyone, and where being out 
for fishing all day was the thing to do. My contact at Waikato Beachcare is excited 
about the enthusiasm and motivation of this new group of dune restoration volunteers. 
However, speaking to the manager of the campsite, it turns out the project started be-
cause the campground was bought by an investor planning to turn it into an upmarket 
holiday chalet development. 
The manager explains that while the seafront part of the property is subject to strict 
hazard line policies, the rear part is free from such building controls (Fieldnotes 
24.09.2011). Here the owner is planning to build the chalets and then sell them to free-
holders. The beachfront would remain a campsite, but the campers there would need to 
upgrade their old and ramshackle-looking mobile homes and caravans so the chalet 
owners could have a nice view from their properties. However, because of the ongoing 
financial crisis, it became difficult to get investors for the building project, and the own-
er found that while waiting for a better economic climate, part of his property that ex-
tends down to the beach (and includes the dune area) started to erode away. The 
campsite manager was tasked to find a solution and discovered Beachcare on the inter-
net. He and the owner agreed that this was perfectly suited to their situation. Calling up 
Beachcare, they realized that the programme would pay for all the plants and even or-
                                                
 
5  Similar to Bay of Plenty Coast Care, which was the main focus of my fieldwork, Waikato Beachcare 
is a volunteer dune restoration programme.  
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ganize excavation of the top layer of the dune, which was densely covered in non-native 
vegetation. The campground only had to pay the contractor for the latter part. The man-
ager organized some of the permanent residents, most of them retired farmers who en-
joy keeping themselves occupied with physical work (see Chapter 7.1). Some campers 
had already started other projects on the campsite, including building a new walkway, 
and were hard to stop anyway. At the first planting, 18 people showed up, an impressive 
number given that planting is done during the winter season when the campsite is not 
fully occupied.  
Consequently, private land is being protected with a dune that is built on public 
funds and volunteer labour. The land behind is kept in a stand-by mode, so that it will 
still be there for development once the economic situation gets better. Converting this 
campsite into an upscale chalet development is exactly the kind of coastal change so 
fiercely opposed by many who perceive themselves as environmentally minded – the 
typical Coast Care/Beachcare constituency. The development plan behind the 
Beachcare project is a repercussion of the widely lamented loss of quintessential kiwi 
features through the ongoing development of the Aotearoa New Zealand coasts. And 
those doing the volunteer work here are those who might eventually be those impacted 
by the resulting changes – when they might have to invest into upgrading their mobile 
homes or will be threatened with eviction. They dig their own graves here, or put less 
dramatically, they work voluntarily for somebody who is himself actively working on 
destroying their kiwi dream (or planning to do so). This shows that Coast Care/ 
Beachcare can be employed to various ends, sometimes contradicting its built-in objec-
tives. This new group of volunteers, one could assume, is nonetheless fulfilling the ob-
jectives of the Beachcare programme, under pressure to produce measurable success. 
However, compromises have to be made here in order to make dune restoration and 
property protection fit. This extends to the material qualities of the Mōkau dunes as 
well: 
[At] high tide, the water only comes up to only a few metres away from their land, 
and the campsites are right there. So you really wanna come back into their 
campsites, and they’re not willing to do that. So you’ve only got a sort of five-
metre dune rather than a ten-metre dune. (Interview with Lucas Pinnacles, Waikato 
Beach Care) 
 
Here again, the possibilities of dune restoration evolve around the use of the limited 
coastal space. The minimum requirement for a functioning dune needs to be weighed 
  219 
against the unwillingness of the campsite owner to give up any usable space. After all, 
protecting his economically viable land is the driving objective for this Beachcare pro-
ject, even though the campers and the Beachcare coordinator clearly see other benefits. 
 
 
8.6 Managing Coastal Naturecultures  
 
When Jim Dahm and others speak about shifting towards the management paradigm, 
they think about managing humans instead of managing nature: “the idea of transition-
ing, from managing, or controlling nature, to [a paradigm] where we actually manage 
our own expectations” (Interview with Jim Dahm). It might be worth asking, though, if 
it is appropriate to think about this as an outright paradigm shift. The management of 
natural and social worlds is a principle deeply embedded in modernist approaches to 
governance (as described, for example, by Foucault 2007 and 2008). The move towards 
managing humans (instead of natural processes) then seems to be a change in degree at 
most, and not in kind.  
The idea of managing nature has long been criticized, amongst many others, by Es-
cobar (1999) as a fundamental principle of capitalist nature turned into commodity or 
resource. Now that capitalism has entered what Escobar calls its “ecological phase” 
(Escobar 1999: 7) there is no longer a uniform nature to be discovered which is then 
disciplined, scientifically managed and accumulated centrally. Under post-Fordist con-
ditions, the management of natural resources and populations is increasingly turning to 
the more flexible regimes of sustainable development and biodiversity conservation 
(ibid), which now complements the continuing forms of “modern, reckless” commodifi-
cation (ibid).  
In regard to ‘working with nature’ in coastal protection, nature cannot said to be 
there before the practices of making it. Coastal restoration is the work of human and 
other forces which together produce nature. Coast Care and soft protection approaches 
are not so much about managing humans (or their expectations) instead of managing na-
ture, as it is about constructing and managing specific coastal natures, or naturecultures. 
This runs contrary to a capital-N understanding of Nature as something that is clearly 
distinguishable from human interference, and located outside the social and political 
world. The effects of such a practice-based understanding of nature as multiple can be 
especially useful for thinking of climate change adaptation, which is a main driving fac-
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tor for emerging coastal policy and planning. Climate change is seen by many commen-
tators as the ultimate sign of the end of a nature independent of humans – which is what 
the term Anthropocene (Sayre 2012) indicates; humans are influencing the planet even 
on a geological time scale now. 
However, large-scale human-induced environmental change is not a new phenome-
non, and the Aotearoa New Zealand coast has been a primary location of human-
environment interactions for centuries (see Chapter 9.3). Climate change, however, 
seems to work on a rhetorical level as an argument that questions any clear distinction 
between human and non-human nature. Castree (2005: 225) makes a similar argument: 
New technologies make intelligible that the boundary, once taken for granted, between 
society and nature has been trespassed by new creatures and objects. But, importantly, 
this should not turn the attention away from the fact that this boundary itself was the so-
cial construction of specific historic periods: naturecultures are not limited to techno-
scientific objects, but a fundamental state of the world in which humans have been en-
gaging with natural objects, landscapes and companion species for millennia. Latour ar-
gued in a similar vein that there have been hybrids all along: while Western modernism 
was ostensibly separating two ontological spheres of the natural and social world, this 
separation was only covering up the fact that the same “constitution” constantly pro-
duced socio-natural chimeras or hybrids (Latour 1993). Under conditions of (anticipat-
ed) climate change, the practices of distinguishing between nature and society (what 
Latour calls purifying), or nature and culture at the coast might be increasingly difficult 
to make, and therefore the subject of intensified questioning. This could open up discur-
sive and practical spaces in which the making of coastal naturecultures emerges as a po-
litical object that can be discussed and decided as such. The coming section will focus 
on Coast Care’s relationship to climate change policy and politics. 
 
 
8.7 Coast Care as Climate Change Adaptation?  
 
Talking to Kenny from Pukehina Beach (see Chapter 8.2) about how Coast Care suc-
cessfully introduced the idea of dune plantings as a means of erosion control, he explic-
itly points to the role that he attributes to climate change in this development:  
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I think before then there wasn’t a lot of planting; there was a little bit of Coast Care 
work. […] It’s been going for quite a few years but lately it seems to have become 
more and more of an issue. Global warming and everyone’s worried about things 
and they’re starting to look at what you can do in your little, your little patch. (In-
terview with Kenny Cooper, Pukehina Beach Coast Care) 
 
Kenny draws a direct link between climate change discourse and people’s motivation to 
get engaged in Coast Care. While looking after your own patch might be dismissed as 
NIMBYism (not in my backyard) in other contexts, the connotation is completely posi-
tive here, with Kenny not criticizing the fact that people are concerned about their little 
patch, but stressing that they are “starting to look at what you can do” (ibid).  
In this vein, the momentum that Coast Care has been gaining in recent years can be 
called a “second order” effect of climate change. This concept focuses on the indirect 
effects of socio-natural change, especially social, political and cultural reactions to an-
ticipated environmental changes. It has been used for example in the rich literature on 
the climate change and migration nexus, which explores, amongst other issues, how se-
curity discourses gain strength in Europe vis-à-vis expected migratory flows from areas 
specifically vulnerable to climate change impacts (Gupta 2009; Hartmann 2010; Her-
beck and Flitner 2010). 
But can dune restoration also be a means of adapting to the first order geophysical 
effects climate change might bear on coastal areas? Here, the answer is less clear. The 
founding Coast Care BOP coordinator had been actively pushing the idea that Coast 
Care could work directly as a means of climate change adaptation. The reports and leaf-
lets produced during the roughly 10 years of his appointment feature statements like this 
throughout: “Partnership dune restoration programmes may be the most effective and 
affordable method of managing climate change impacts on the coast in the short to me-
dium term at least.” (Jenks, n.d.) 
Collaborating with Willem de Lange from Waikato University, Jenks sought to un-
derline this hypothesis with scientific credentials. In a joint presentation at the yearly 
Coastal Society meeting in 2007, the authors state that thanks to the Coast Care efforts 
in the Bay of Plenty, restored dunes are accreting to an extent that allows them to level 
out future sea level rise: 
With respect to coastal hazards, the restored dunes provide improved protection 
from tsunami, storm surge inundation, and coastal erosion. During 5-10 years of 
dune restoration over the last decade, all of the restored sites show a significant 
trend of accretion, despite climatic conditions favouring erosion. The measured 
rates of accretion are an order of magnitude larger that would be required to miti-
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gate the worst sea level rise predicted by the fourth assessment report of the IPCC. 
(De Lange and Jenks 2007) 6  
 
This optimistic assessment of Coast Care’s potential in climate change adaptation is, 
however, not univocally shared. A senior Regional Council manager comments that 
Coast Care is a really temporary measure that is only “delaying the inevitable” (Field-
notes February 2010) for what he estimates to be about 1,000 houses under risk in the 
region within a 100-year time frame; only managed retreat will be a viable adaptation 
measure in the long run, he thinks.  
Pim de Monchy, the coordinator of Coast Care during my period of fieldwork in 
2010/11, also has his own opinion on the adaptation question: He makes it clear that he 
sees limits to the coastal protection function of Coast Care and dismisses his predeces-
sor’s theory that restored dunes are accreting enough sand to make up for future sea lev-
el rise. And he is also much more careful about the potential of Coast Care as a means 
of natural coastal protection in general. Pim remarks that the beginnings of Coast Care 
BOP in 1994 coincided with a historic low in sediment supply in the Bay of Plenty; 
from there it was easy to see how quickly the dunes recovered and grew forward: 
I think it’s fair to say that a lot of Coast Care volunteers initially got involved with 
the programme in the mid-nineties during a period of erosion. In 1996 there was a 
minimum in the [beach] profiles […] and then they started to progress. […] So in 
some respects what people attribute to Coast Care is just natural accretion happen-
ing. And I think that it’s quite possible that what Coast Care can achieve with ero-
sion control has been overstated and is definitely thought of by some people, in 
much higher terms than it can actually achieve. I think all we can do with vegeta-
tion is accelerate the recovery. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care)  
 
This specific situation might have been caused by the effects of a row of so-called El 
Niño years. The El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon describes a sys-
                                                
 
6  Prof. De Lange made similar comments in his expert witness statement in front of the Environment 
Court during the Waihi Beach protection scheme appeal: “In the 21st Century, sea level rise is fore-
cast to accelerate, although current data indicate that sea level rise is slowing. Assuming the worst 
case scenario in the IPPC 2007 forecast, numerical modelling indicates that accretion of 0.1-0.2 m.y-1 
would be sufficient to mitigate against [sic] any erosional trend induced by an accelerating sea level 
rise over the 21st century. This is more than a order of magnitude less than the rates achieved by dune 
restoration programmes operated around New Zealand, such as the Coast Care Programme operated 
by Environment Bay of Plenty. It is also comparable to the observed historical long-term trends for 
many New Zealand beaches. It is likely that if human impacts on beach processes are minimised, that 
natural processes can provide the necessary mitigation against sea level rise for sandy beaches around 
New Zealand.” (De Lange 2007: 12f.) 
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tematic climate fluctuation in the Pacific atmospheric and oceanic circulation that influ-
ences sea surface temperatures, air pressure, wind and rainfall patterns. The extremes of 
this cyclical fluctuation are so-called El Niño and La Niña events. In Aotearoa New 
Zealand, El Niño leads to stronger or more frequent winds, lower temperatures and oc-
currences of drought in the north-eastern parts of the country, where the Bay of Plenty 
is located (Mullan et al. 2012; NIWA n.d.). 
Presenting Coast Care as a means of climate change adaptation relies on the belief 
that under a dune restoration regime, the dunes will continuously prograde. This contra-
dicts the now dominant understanding that coastal erosion is a natural, cyclical process 
of sand moving around in the dynamic equilibrium of the beach, a theory widely circu-
lated throughout the Coast Care constituency by the main promoters of dune restoration 
in Aotearoa New Zealand (see Chapter 8.1). However, the expectation of ever-growing 
dunes was deliberately encouraged in the early years of Coast Care. For example, datum 
posts were installed at Coast Care locations to measure sand levels before and after res-
toration; images of these featured in numerous photographs circulated to prove accre-
tion and advancement of the restored dunes. While these posts show erosion rates as 
well, they were widely perceived by volunteers as measures for their success only, sup-
ported by the beneficial influence of periodic accretion.  
The Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand stresses the role that community in-
volvement plays in order for Coast Care to work as a means of climate change adapta-
tion. The description of a workshop series called “Empowering coastal communities to 
adapt to climate change” makes the connection between Coast Care and climate change 
adaptation without promising quantifiable results:  
The aim is to provide coastal communities with an adaptive approach to help miti-
gate the effects of sea level rise and increased storms resulting from predicted cli-
matic change. The emphasis is on working with communities to provide them with 
the skills to assess the state of their dunes and build resilient sustainable coastal 
communities. The focus is on restoring natural dune form and function and manag-
ing dunes systems using native plants. […] Free workshops are being run through-
out the whole country with the aim of empowering coastal communities to better 
understand and manage their beaches and dunes systems, and to raise awareness of 
the likely effects of climatic change along their coast. It will provide practical 
methods that will enable local communities to maintain and restore natural dunes 
and dune function to better adapt to the likely effects of climatic change along their 
beaches. (Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand n.d.) 
 
People’s engagement in voluntary restoration efforts here becomes one building block 
for resilient coastal communities, which are also more capable of adapting to the effects 
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of climate change. Dune restoration emerges as a shared practice for the making of fu-
ture coastal natures – or naturecultures.  
A colleague of Pim’s, employed at one of Aotearoa New Zealand’s other Coast Care 
programmes, is careful not to suggest too strongly the links between dune restoration 
and the climate change adaptation issue. He says that Beachcare is about adapting to 
climate change, amongst other things,  
but it just opens up a whole other kind of argument, you know. So, I mean we do 
use that. But we just have to be careful, because, you get new [elected] councillors 
in every three years. And the ones we have got now, with this whole global finan-
cial crisis people are kind of freaking out about putting money into climate change 
and stuff. And these councillors wouldn’t be sold on that. You couldn’t sell the 
project on climate change. They probably wouldn’t go for it. So that’s why I don’t 
go so hard on that sort of aspect. […] I usually go more for, what it used to be like, 
and now just try to bring it back to that kind of natural state. Cause I think people 
prefer naturalness to, that kind of stuff. […] There’s funds for climate change adap-
tation, and we can tap into those. So, there’s an opportunity there as well. But then 
you wouldn’t want to get a Council full of climate change sceptics come in, and 
don’t want putting more money into climate change related projects. (Interview 
with Lucas Pinnacles, Waikato Beachcare) 
 
To prevent Coast Care being perceived as too closely associated with climate change 
adaptation, he makes sure to stress the other major benefits of restoring coastal nature, 
including community participation and education and the restoration of native biodiver-
sity. His approach of “selling” Beachcare on multifunctionality links up well not only 
with the soft engineering measures discussed in Chapter 10, but also with arguments 
used by advocates of the ‘working with nature’ imaginary worldwide (Michael Otto 
Stiftung 2010). At the same time, he makes recourse to a “natural” state where things 
should be brought back to, that does not need explanation, and that seems to fall out of 
this controversial realm of politics. Climate change adaptation is a possibly conflictive 
political issue, whereas bringing nature to “what it used to be like”, or so Lucas argues, 
is something outside this realm of conflict and changing political powers, something 
that people could agree on. 
 
 
8.8 “A Moving Target a Little Bit”: Coastal Restoration from 
Foredune to Backdune 
 
This chapter has shown how dune restoration (Coast Care and beyond) makes use of the 
dunes to provide coastal protection – within the limits caused by development located 
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too close to allow for the natural processes of erosion and accretion, storm cut and re-
covery to occur. While the promise of dunes as a natural coastal protection feature, and 
to some extent as climate change adaptation, has been strongly advocated during the ini-
tial phase of voluntary dune restoration in the Bay of Plenty, priorities are shifting. 
While the stated goals of Coast Care remain the same (education, community involve-
ment, biodiversity, infrastructure protection), the order of importance seems to have 
changed under the current coordinator. He argues that because native dune vegetation is 
not preventing erosion, but only speeding up dune recovery, this alone is not a sufficient 
justification for planting native plants:  
I think we have to be really clear with people about that. And so when you try and 
justify this planting of native species, you say, ‘Yes, it’s to help the recovery of the 
dunes after a storm cut.’ But the majority of the reason for putting native plants 
back in there is because this is a suite of native plants that live in a very restrictive 
environmental niche and they face a wide range of threats. And if we don’t address 
those threats and maintain those plants they’ll, to some extent, disappear. So the 
biodiversity component I think is a much more robust reason for doing the planting 
than the erosion control. (Interview with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
The Dunes Trust actively supports the increased attention to biodiversity conservation 
as a goal in its own right. The Trust is also working to back up the more normative line 
of the argument – if we do not restore the dunes, native plants will disappear – with sci-
entific authority and a more functionalistic point, by referring to the coastal ecosystem 
in its entirety: 
Many groups have moved from looking solely at foredunes, to considering entire 
ecosystems including wetland and riparian margins, a full range of fauna as well as 
flora, and long term restoration of coastal shrublands and forests. (Dune Restora-
tion Trust of New Zealand 2013) 
 
A Coast Care group participating in experiments on backdune restoration conducted by 
the Trust will be introduced in Chapter 9.7. Besides the normative and scientific argu-
ments, there are also more practical reasons for Coast Care to move beyond the fore-
dunes. Pim speaks of changing opportunities:  
I think when [my predecessor] was involved, there were much bigger areas of bare 
sand. Which you could look at and go – ‘Oh!!’ That’s quite clear that this needs ex-
tensive Spinifex planting and then maybe a little bit of fencing to stop the wind 
blowing sand. So, over the years, those areas have been done, you know. (Inter-
view with Pim de Monchy, BOP Coast Care) 
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The Eastern BOP Coast Care contractor tells a similar story: in his part of the region, 
with fewer sandy beaches (and lots of school classes enrolling into Coast Care events), 
there are simply almost no foredunes left to tackle. The task is done. So the way for-
ward leads towards the backdune areas. Pim again:  
And now it’s a case of what – if we still want to have a Coast Care programme, it 
now means we have to tackle the slightly more problematic areas. You know those 
weed-infested places, or the places where there are lots of rabbits, or where the ve-
hicles are a problem. So we simply do different stuff. (Interview with Pim de Mon-
chy, BOP Coast Care) 
 
This is why he calls Coast Care a “moving target” (ibid) – because the practices can be 
associated with different objectives. And even though these objectives grounded in 
practice link up to sociotechnical imaginaries of global reach – soft protection, ‘working 
with nature’, or the invasive/native binary addressed in the upcoming chapter – they are 
tied to specific places (Tsing 2005). In the Bay of Plenty situation, Coast Care is devel-
oping in scope from the starting point of coastal protection towards a more specific Ao-
tearoa New Zealand take on biodiversity conservation. The social nature of the Aotea-
roa New Zealand coastline more generally, combining isolated location and evolution-
ary development without mammals, the colonial history and postcolonial situation, 
make the intentional and unintentional introduction of species a central concern. The 
following chapter will delve deeper into native Aotearoa New Zealand nature and its re-
construction through Coast Care work.  
These shifts in priorities do not translate into to a linear process leading from coastal 
hazard protection to biodiversity. Even though biodiversity has been getting much atten-
tion lately, with central actors arguing for the restoration of native nature as a goal in its 
own right, coastal protection aspects are by no means disappearing from Coast Care. 
Evidence of this continuing interest in Coast Care as a means of natural coastal protec-
tion is the recent involvement of Quinovic Property Managers as the Premier Principal 
Sponsor of the Dunes Trust. The “largest New Zealand-owned residential property 
management firm” explains its interest in sponsoring the Trust, and through it Coast 
Care groups:  
It’s apparent that we’re going to be relying increasingly on our dunes to protect the 
land and our communities from erosion by the sea, just as our business is based on 
managing our clients’ properties for the future. (Quinovic 2012)  
 
The company website argues further, drawing on the kiwi beach myth:  
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Kiwis love their beaches. Every region holds some piece of our coastline dear, and 
has ownership of its particular environmental story. Our dunes perform a key role 
in helping protect our coastal communities from the threat of erosion and we all 
need to do our bit to keep them in good shape. (Quinovic n.d.) 
 
However, there has definitely been a change on the spatial scale; Coast Care has lately 
been moving from the foredunes to the backdunes. In a changing climate, however, it 
seems important to keep in mind that these are relational scales, and not absolute, fixed 
locations – also moving targets, in the sense that where the foredune is today, there 
might be the rising sea of the future. The following chapter will comb through Coast 
Care again, now looking at it from the vantage point of biodiversity restoration, native 
nature and native narratives. 
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9.  Reconstructing Native Nature 
 
Erosion control remains a central goal of Coast Care. However, many projects increas-
ingly focus on coastal protection in a different sense: the protection, preservation and 
reconstruction of native coastal nature. The stronger emphasis on nature protection goes 
hand in hand with the extension of restoration projects beyond the immediate foredune 
areas targeted in early erosion control attempts. As mentioned earlier, the Coast Care 
Bay of Plenty programme is defined around four objectives: participation, education, in-
frastructure protection and biodiversity. Stressing the biodiversity aspect of Coast Care 
does not necessary add to the popular appeal. As Pim, the Coast Care coordinator, dryly 
comments, “there’s a much, much narrower group of people who were excited about bi-
odiversity compared with erosion control” (Interview with Pim de Monchy, Coast Care 
BOP). 
While there is a small group of people that is specifically interested in biodiversity 
(see Chapter 9.7), the driving concept is often a slightly different one: people are inter-
ested in caring for native nature. The objective to restore and (re)construct coastal na-
ture emerges in line with a generally growing recognition of native flora and fauna in 
contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand. Looking at Coast Care from the angle of native 
nature, the local – an important category for the idea of a community-based, volunteer 
dune restoration – is gaining yet another meaning. The following comment on the 
Dunes Trust website provides a general description of New Zealand dune restoration, 
stating:  
Approaches to dune restoration have developed considerably in the past 20 years in 
New Zealand. Historically, hectares of coastal land was [sic!] planted with exotic 
marram grass on an almost cropping-based planting regime – now the approach is 
more site specific, involving local people and local plants with a more long-term 
understanding of the dynamics of New Zealand coastal dune systems. (Dune Res-
toration Trust of New Zealand 2001: 64) 
 
This mission statement – involving local plants and local people – links the local to the 
native. By describing how native nature is realized in practice, this chapter will also try 
to address how these categories are becoming entangled. In the process, ‘reconstructing 
native nature’ emerges as a shared vision of how national nature ought to be(come 
again), providing a specific version of the ‘working with nature’ imaginary.  
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9.1 Why Restore (Native) Nature? 
 
Restoration, in the broad and practice-centred definition offered by Paul Gobster and his 
collaborators in “Restoring Nature”, are “intentional human practices to actively man-
age areas for their desired natural qualities” (Gobster 2000: 11). Most often, restoration 
projects are attempts to reverse the effects of previous environmental change or damage. 
This opens up difficult questions – scientific, political and normative – about the past 
and present. What is a desirable outcome, how are means and ends made to meet, and 
against which former state of the environment are changes determined? Or as Hull and 
Robertson put it: “Which nature should it be?” (Hull and Robertson 2009: 229)  
In the context of postcolonial settler societies, this question is especially wide-
ranging. These regions of the world have undergone rapid environmental change over a 
relatively limited historical period of European colonization, caused by land-use chang-
es, deforestation and the introduction of flora and fauna from the Old World. Privatiza-
tion of land and new agricultural modes of production interfered with and often de-
stroyed existing indigenous subsistence practices and altered human-nature relation-
ships. Put differently, the existing socio-natural ensembles of the colonized lands were 
fundamentally changed because the political, social and cultural conquest had immedi-
ate effects on the natural environment – and vice versa (see Cronon 2003 for a classic 
study of the New England case). 
The binary of native versus introduced, alien or invasive species remains a common 
theme of restoration practice and discourse that is especially prominent in postcolonial 
settler society contexts. However, setting the beginning of European colonization (e.g. 
the date 1492 for the Americas, Sayre 2012, 61) as a baseline for the rightful belonging 
of flora and fauna can be problematic, because such a move fixes natural systems at a 
specific, static point in time, not taking into account that ecosystems do change over 
time even without such significant events, such as the sudden arrival of completely new 
species or classes of animals and plants. Such an approach runs up against other diffi-
culties as well. Setting the baseline for restoration at the time of European arrival poten-
tially directs the attention away from indigenous agency, including the use and modifi-
cation of landscapes and the engagement with non-human species. There is a danger 
that indigenous people are viewed as either a part of nature or necessarily living in har-
mony with nature. Such othering idealizations of native humans are reminiscent of ro-
mantic European concepts of nature as wilderness (Castree 2005; Descola 2013) and the 
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“noble savage” as necessarily living in tune with nature in a timeless fashion (Sayre 
2012: 60f.).  
However, like any human-nature relationship, indigenous encounters with the mate-
rial world always produced “social natures” (Castree and Braun 2001), even though the-
se interactions might have been less destructive than modern capitalist forms and tech-
nological means of appropriating nature. Anna L. Tsing, in her fieldwork among Mera-
tus Dayaks in the Kalimantan rainforests of Indonesia, explores how farm and forest, 
cultivated and wild, overlap in this productive zone of human-nature encounter. Far 
from being untouched wilderness, a closer look at the rainforest with its tended trees 
and temporary swiddens reveals a “history of weediness” (Tsing 2005: 171f.). Anthro-
pology has only recently begun to pay more attention to the human in multispecies 
(Kirksey and Helmreich 2010) or interspecies relationships (Tsing 2012), for example 
exploring the entanglement of humans and other animals with microbial worlds (Paxson 
2008; Helmreich 2012). Amongst others, such work draws on Donna Haraway’s more 
recent preoccupation with dogs and other companion species (Haraway 2003; Haraway 
2008). In her view, humans have not only been forming their companions over time, but 
what it means to be human has also been co-produced in countless interactions with 
non-humans.  
There has also been a renewed interest in issues of conservation from anthropology 
that combines anthropological theory with data derived from digital technologies like 
accelerator mass spectrometry dating or computer simulations. Christopher Fisher and 
Gary Feinman, for example, argue for a refined perspective on landscapes, one that is 
attentive to long-term changes in the socio-natural ensemble:  
It is productive to conceptualize that environment and culture change in tandem 
and that this relationship is continually renegotiated at a variety of temporal and 
spatial scales. As humans engage with the environment, they construct their own 
niche, or landscape – that is, they modify the environment in pursuit of social, po-
litical, and economic goals. Of course, at the same time, there are certain environ-
mental challenges and perturbations that may be beyond human control, and these 
can be met with a suite of alternative responses. (Fisher and Feinman 2005: 64) 
 
Recently, conservation and restoration practices have been discussed under the impres-
sion that human modifications of nature have reached a novel level: the Anthropocene 
(Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Johnson et al. 2014). Nathan Sayre remarks that this con-
cept, which has recently gained currency in public and scientific discourses, has a ten-
dency of differentiating the world in a “before” and “after” large-scale human interven-
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tion that is similar to older ideas about baselines (Sayre 2012: 61). However, as Jamie 
Lorimer (2012) observes, there is a growing body of work that does problematize the 
natureculture dualism exactly by referring to the Anthropocene. These are approaches  
where recognition of the Anthropocene challenges prevalent and powerful under-
standings of biodiversity as Nature – a pure and timeless collection of objects, best 
removed from Society. For an emerging body of conservation biologists and social 
scientists the Anthropocene demands fresh approaches to biodiversity conservation 
that need not make recourse to Nature. (Lorimer 2012: 594) 
 
Nature restoration projects can be read as serving cultural ends, as well as natural ones: 
they have a redemptive function in that they work on reversing sins of the past (Lien 
and Davison 2010). The vast literature on restoration shows how this can lead to signif-
icant conflicts when people are attached to the modified landscapes or the species that 
inhabit them now, even though they are relatively recent arrivals. In his introduction to 
“Restoring Nature”, Paul Gobster recounts a plan to restore forests back to savannah in 
the outskirts of Chicago, which was met with fierce criticism. His analysis of objections 
showed that people were mostly not criticizing the goals of the project, but specific 
practices, in this case the killing of healthy trees, the use of herbicides, the effects of 
prescribed fire, and the justification of deer control as well as concern over the methods 
used (Gobster 2000: 7). But he also found concerns about how, where, and why restora-
tion was carried out in the first place, including “fundamental ideas about the meaning 
of nature” (Gobster 2000: 8), which let him conclude that the critics were not simply ig-
norant protestors, but instead were raising serious concerns and complex issues. 
In the context of Coast Care projects described in the previous chapter, conflicts over 
nature restoration could be observed in relation to the Papamoa Beach encroachment 
project (see Chapter 7.3), where people were protesting against the removal of their il-
legal gardens from the coastal dune area. However, while Gobster makes clear that “res-
toration-related concepts such as naturalness, health, and integrity not only are norma-
tive but have multiple and competing definitions” (Gobster 2000: 14), Coast Care on the 
whole is remarkably uncontroversial. With Coast Care, redemption is a manageable 
task: a limited number of species needs to be reintroduced into a clearly defined coastal 
space. Space for restoration might be limited because of coastal development that has 
occurred, but still the dune area is small and has rarely been put to other uses. The land 
is exposed to the forces of wind and sea, limiting other potential uses, and in most areas 
a public coastal reserve has remained. The changes in human behaviour that need to be 
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achieved in order to protect the plantings (staying on access ways, no driving on the 
beach, etc.) are easy and address all the citizens as beach users. No large-scale changes 
in human-nature relationships are necessary. The overall positive connotation of Coast 
Care style restoration, however, seems to be in large part due to the ubiquity of framing 
coastal restoration around the reintroduction of native plants. However, the native/alien 
binary has recently received some critical attention – both from within the ecological 
sciences, as well as from cultural scientists who question the links between biology, 
identity and belonging, and argue that regardless of actual environmental damage, these 
concepts carry a lot of cultural baggage.  
 
 
9.2  Anthropological Perspectives on Native and Invasive  
  Species  
 
In his ethnography about marine microbiologists, “Alien Ocean” (Helmreich 2009), 
Stefan Helmreich addresses classifications of non-human species along binary catego-
ries in the Hawaiian context: native, endemic, or indigenous species as opposed to alien, 
introduced, or invasive species. Each of these categories mirrors specific scientific and 
at the same time political and cultural preoccupations with species presence in the post-
colonial island environment of Hawai‘i, where Helmreich conducted his fieldwork: 
Global phenomena like alien species are at once technical and social objects, and 
the ways they are defined with respect to the ‘cultural’ question matters a good 
deal – not only, in this case, for how alien microbes or algae are interpreted but al-
so for how they are delimited as such. (Helmreich 2009: 148f.) 
 
In the field, Helmreich was irritated by the prevalence of discourses and practices that 
revolved around alien and invasive species, and by the different taxonomies he encoun-
tered. Concentrating on red and blue-green algae, Helmreich takes a closer look at the 
surprising variety of scientists’ (invasion biologists’) and lay people’s categorizations of 
species belonging, including indigenous Hawaiian names. The crux of his analysis is 
not the attempt to state a cultural difference between these groups, but to “show how 
definitions of nature and culture themselves, of figure and ground, are put into flux by 
the very idea of alien species […]” (Helmreich 2009: 150).  
Such a move asks for a symmetrical analysis, which not only focuses on the defini-
tions of invasive/alien/introduced species, but also on the corresponding definitions of 
nativeness and indigeneity. Different classification systems then turn out to be struc-
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tured around human agency (Helmreich 2009: 150). Native species are defined as “natu-
rally occurring and not introduced”, and include both endemic species (only found in a 
certain area) and indigenous species (also native to other areas). If the species has been 
introduced, the question becomes, how did the species arrive in Hawai‘i, with intention-
al or unintentional human assistance? The definition of invasive species includes that 
they are not only introduced (intentionally or not), but that additionally they are per-
ceived as harmful or threatening by certain groups, adding another normative layer to 
the definition (ibid).  
One point of possible tension within the classifications defined for the Hawaiian and 
other Pacific Island contexts is the (unanswered) question whether species introduced 
by the Polynesian first settlers – so-called “canoe species” should be considered native 
or introduced, suggesting “that not all human agency is to be treated identically” 
(Helmreich 2009: 153). What is native or indigenous can change over time; it is a his-
torical category: 
Another means of approaching the question of how scientists think about natives 
would be to ask how scientists think about Captain Cook. Cook marks a difference 
in either degree or kind in the character of biological introductions to Hawai‘i. 
Those who think Cook’s arrival only accelerated the rate of a process already in 
motion – a difference in degree – will not class canoe species with the natives. 
Those who think Cook’s arrival ushers in a different regime of introduction – a dif-
ference in kind – will be more likely to class Polynesian introductions with natives: 
Much turns on ideas about the history of nature and culture. (Helmreich 2009: 160) 
 
As the quote indicates, the native-alien species binary translates into the much larger 
categorical work of defining nature and culture. Helmreich also observes a tendency 
towards a strategic essentialism in regard to identity claims by native Hawaiians, which 
gets linked up with native species discourses (Helmreich 2009: 155). Claims to certain 
species as the natural inheritance of native Hawaiians are used to argue for example 
against marine bioprospecting activities.  
In contrast to the situation that Helmreich observes for Hawai‘i, indigenous New 
Zealanders do not use the term “native” as a self-description. Instead the expressions 
“Māori people” or “tangata whenua” (people of the land) refer to the indigenous people 
of Aotearoa New Zealand in general. The terminology is, however, ubiquitous in every-
day discourse in regard to non-human species. In terms of practice, Aotearoa New Zea-
land is internationally perceived as having extraordinary high standards of biosecurity 
legislation and control, especially in relation to governing the import of natural objects. 
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Kezia Barker states that “New Zealand’s contemporary regime has been described as 
the most comprehensive and integrated biosecurity system in the world” (Barker 2008: 
1615). Barker criticizes the bulk of social science engagement with biosecurity for con-
centrating too neatly on emergencies, on “dramatic events which are dramatic because 
they entail failures”, thereby asking for more symmetry of the analysis (see Pinch and 
Bijker 1984) – because importantly, “the practice of biosecurity is not simply about 
emergency responses, but also about controlling the pervasive, mundane strangeness 
that is alien nature” (Barker 2008: 1600). Barker reminds us that in other contexts, the 
term biosecurity often refers to the containment of infectious diseases, including the 
prevention of bioterrorism (see Collier et al. 2004). In the UK, the term became widely 
used in relation to foot and mouth disease management (Barker 2008: 1598; Law 2006; 
Hinchliffe and Bingham 2008).  
However, Aotearoa New Zealand has “150 years of social practices related to native 
and alien species concerns” (Barker 2008: 1598). Barker puts her focus on the practices 
of “internal pest management”, which targets species that already occur in Aotearoa 
New Zealand, as opposed to the surveillance of border crossings. Here she attests the 
Aotearoa New Zealand concept a large degree of flexibility, enshrined in pest manage-
ment plans and policies which explicitly consider values. These values include biodi-
versity, but also the relationship of Māori to land, water and taonga (treasures), human 
health, economic wellbeing, and recreational value of the environment. Plants catego-
rized as pests are classified in relation to proposed management strategies, recognizing 
that in case pest plants are widely disseminated it might be more practicable to aim for 
containment than for eradication.  
Also, pest control management strategies are regularly reassessed, including public 
consultation. Barker’s example, gorse, shows biosecurity as an evolving practice and an 
open-ended process, where control categories produce a “complexity of overlapping 
physical and conceptual boundaries of differing permeability and mobility” (Barker 
2008: 1611). Experimentation can occur, and controversies arise about “what plant bi-
osecurity is trying to achieve: an aesthetic reproduction of native New Zealand, or an 
ecologically correct native assemblage.” (Barker 2008: 1610). Barker concludes: 
At first glance, with its high-profile border-control systems and powerful legisla-
tion, New Zealand’s biosecurity regime does seem to involve the imposition of 
static territorial boundaries onto a complex entanglement of people, plants, and dif-
fering values. It is doomed, it would seem, to failure. Through a detailed empirical 
engagement, however, what emerges is rather different. Instead of the inert, author-
 236
itative, ‘all-or-nothing’ governing approach expected, by drawing together institu-
tional practices, public negotiations, and the ongoing surprises brought by a host of 
nonhuman elements, space has been made for an alternative narrative. (Barker 
2008: 1611)  
 
A flexible approach to managing introduced species is also advocated by biologist and 
invasion biology critic Mark Davis, who in a 2011 Nature article demands: “Don’t 
judge species on their origins” (Davis et al. 2011, see also Borell 2009). Davies and his 
co-authors understand the native-alien binary not as a given, but insist that such charac-
terizations have normative underpinnings which are part of the explanation for their 
success in framing discourses and practices towards introduced species:  
Over the past few decades, ‘non-native’ species have been vilified for driving be-
loved ‘native’ species to extinction and generally polluting ‘natural’ environments. 
Intentionally or not, such characterizations have helped to create a pervasive bias 
against alien species that has been embraced by the public, conservationists, land 
managers and policy-makers, as well by as many scientists, throughout the world. 
(Davis et al. 2011: 153) 
 
Davis et al. argue that nativeness itself neither indicates evolutionary fitness nor positive 
effects of a species within an ecosystem. The rhetoric of invasion biology and the use of 
military metaphors, they state, have unduly generalized the effects of introduced species 
and marked them as “enemies of man and nature” (ibid). However, the existing data 
does not confirm earlier claims that introduced species are posing the second-greatest 
threat to biodiversity survival (Wilcove et al. 1998):  
The effects of non-native species may vary with time, and species that are not caus-
ing harm now might do so in the future. But the same is true of natives, particularly 
in rapidly changing environments. (Davis et al. 2011: 153) 
 
While Davis et al. admit that invasive or introduced species may cause very serious im-
pacts, they argue to concentrate decisions about restoration efforts on the function and 
not the origins of a species. They remark that 
[m]ost human and natural communities now consist both of long-term residents 
and of new arrivals, and ecosystems are emerging that never existed before. It is 
impractical to try to restore ecosystems to some ‘rightful’ historical state. (Davis et 
al. 2011: 154) 
 
Davis et al. argue for the management of species according to “rational, not emotive 
reasons” (ibid). However, pushing this critique of the socio-cultural underpinning of 
species management even further, it might be worth asking if not function as well is a 
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culturally constructed category that is not just out there, objectifiable or measurable. 
When can a species be argued to be functional – in what sense, for whom and to what 
ends? Seen in this light, the coupling of the native-alien dualism with the natureculture 
binary is even more instructive. Not only is the native-alien dualism deeply entrenched 
with cultural meanings, but also the underlying nature culture split itself is a blurry con-
struction that does not hold as a straightforward foundation to distinguish human agency 
from non-human, natural worlds.  
The increasing number of critical accounts on the native/alien species binary from 
the social sciences and humanities (see Warren 2007 for a comprehensive review) gen-
erally focus less on questions of how to determine or manage the (negative) effects of 
non-native plants. The contributions discussed by Warren point less towards the admit-
ted difficulties of categorizing native/non-native species along spatiotemporal scales, 
but instead concentrate on xenophobic or racist undertones of the discourse, and the 
dangers of slipping between terms attributed to human and non-human foreigners 
(Subramanian 2001). A more nuanced critique is offered by Hettinger (2001), who ar-
gues that “nativism” is not per se xenophobic, and that there may be good reasons to 
remove introduced plants in order to preserve “the diversity of ecological assemblages 
from the homogenising forces of globalisation” (Hettinger 2001: 193). Mastnak et al. 
(2014) argue further that in postcolonial settler societies, it makes more sense to think of 
introduced plants as remnants of the “multispecies colonial endeavor” (Mastnak et al. 
2014: 363). Instead of comparing native plants to underprivileged alien immigrants and 
taking sides with the unwanted, Mastnak et al. insist on seeing invasive plants as a re-
maining legacy of settler colonialism. They call for a conscious act of “native plant ad-
vocacy as part of a broad process of botanical decolonization”, serving as “a strategic 
location for ethical action in the Anthropocene” (ibid). 
For the Aotearoa New Zealand context, anthropologist Eveline Dürr argues that the 
classification of native and foreign relies on the belief of a static concept of nature, even 
in “a pre-existing, naturally given, primordial order, determining the belonging of par-
ticular species to a defined territory” (Dürr 2007: 5, see Olsen 1999). In her article about 
imaginaries of New Zealand purity, Dürr reminds us of the conquest and simultaneous 
romanticization of nature in settler societies, a dual war against natives and nature (Bird 
2003). Dürr observes that  
[t]he imagery of war against nature, rooted in the historical settlement process, 
does still persist in New Zealand. […] It is interesting to note that the present envi-
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ronmental discourse is shaped by a similar language, but applied with a different 
connotation. Today, the native environment should not necessarily be dominated or 
conquered, but, rather, must be protected and conserved. Due to ancient isolation, 
New Zealand’s nature evolved without human interference producing a distinct flo-
ra and fauna (Clark, 2004, p.12). The fervour to protect these peculiar species from 
imported, ‘alien’ plants and animals, threatening Native wildlife and vegetation, is 
omnipresent. (Dürr 2007: 5) 
 
In her critique, Dürr also addresses the influential imaginary of Aotearoa New Zealand 
as a bicultural nation. The idea of biculturalism – a postcolonial society consisting of 
Māori and Pākeha New Zealanders – also assumes a rather unproblematic binary (in and 
out, indigenous or not) that covers up the complexities of belonging and makes it in fact 
difficult to think about other subjectivities and cultural affiliations. Dürr argues that like 
the concept of multiculturalism, biculturalism is not good in picturing hybridity, or else 
representing the diverse make-up of Aotearoa New Zealand’s postcolonial immigrant 
society (ibid).  
Since the concern with being “native” so clearly points to the colonial past of settler 
societies, it seems instructive to look at other postcolonial situations and approaches to 
native nature. In the Australian and Tasmanian context, David Trigger and Lesley Head 
(Trigger and Head 2010) as well as Marianne Lien and Aidan Davison (Lien and Da-
vison 2010) point out the contested politics of nature in relation to landscapes, where in-
troduced plants are perceived as markers of identity and belonging by the descendants 
of immigrants from Europe and elsewhere. Lien and Davison describe a “remarkable 
growth” of voluntary community care groups that seems comparable to Aotearoa New 
Zealand (including Coast Care, but also Bushcare and Rivercare); these groups are sup-
ported by the authorities that hand over responsibility and funding (Lien and Davison 
2010: 249). This sort of care work often entails aspects of a redemptive practice for 
Non-Aboriginals: 
As expressed in countless grant applications, the majority of urban landcare groups 
are acting upon a general concern to defend what are taken to be the precolonial 
ecologies against weedy invaders. Equipped by an Australian preoccupation with 
gardening (Head and Muir, 2006), and with gardeners’ familiarity with weeding, 
they seek to ‘reclaim’ and ‘restore’ a variety of urban open spaces, from waterways 
and coastlines to remnant bushland and disused landfills. One could say that they 
work to rectify the wrongdoings of the past, seeking to resolve non-Aboriginal 
Australian tensions about belonging through resistance against the spread of non-
human invaders of Australia. (Lien and Davison 2010: 249) 
 
Trigger et al. observe that Australians are deeply preoccupied with questions of belong-
ing, questions that come to the fore especially in regard to thinking about the possibility 
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of “naturalization” of non-Aboriginal Australians (Trigger et al. 2008; Trigger and Head 
2010). What is specific about settler-descendant Australianness, and how to define it as 
an identity? These sensibilities can complicate the situation for restoration projects, 
when some settler-descendants champion native nature restoration, whereas others want 
to keep socio-natural objects that are non-indigenous, but symbolize belonging and nat-
uralization for them79. In the Tasmanian case which Lien and Davison describe, conflict 
arises around a pair of introduced Pinus radiata earmarked for removal firstly because 
they are introduced trees, and secondly because an aboriginal midden (archaeological 
waste disposal site) was uncovered underneath them during the restoration process, 
which is now eroding. Protest arises, because the trees have been there for a long time, 
and local residents care about them because, as Lien and Davison put it succinctly, the 
pines “have also rooted themselves in memories of children-turned-adults who grew up 
in Taroona”, the suburb in question (Lien and Davison 2010: 234f.).  
Jean and John Comaroff discuss alien species concerns in post-Apartheid South Af-
rica (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). Here, the story about natives, identity and nation 
building hinges upon yet another locally important concept of belonging: autochthony 
as “a first-principle” defined as “the ineffable interests and connections, at once material 
and moral, that flow from ‘native’ rootedness, and special rights, in a place of birth” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 635). Autochthony works as a naturalized binary that 
can be ascribed to humans and non-humans alike:  
[W]hen it comes to the limits of that difference, autochthony constitutes an ulti-
mate line. Whatever other identities the citizen-subject of the twenty-first century 
polity may bear, s/he is unavoidably either an autochthon or an alien. Nor only 
s/he. It too. As we have seen, and will see further, nonhumans may also be ascribed 
the status of indigene or other. (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 635) 
 
In their article, the Comaroffs interpret two instances of public concern over “alien” 
species as a matter of working through questions of membership, belonging and the po-
licing of borders. In the first example, native bush (“fynbos”) fires have been fuelling 
public hysteria over the loss of national natural heritage, even though biologists under-
stand such fires as normal, regularly occurring events. Secondly, the destructive effects 
of flooding events have been blamed on the replacement of native trees with planta-
                                                
 
79  Interestingly, Aboriginal people have been known to incorporate non-natives like cats and water buf-
falos into their natural cosmologies (Trigger et al. 2008). 
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tions. The authors make clear that they neither question the actual danger posed by the 
fires and floods nor the connection to native or invasive plants – but nonetheless argue 
that the extent of this public obsession asks for explanation. The analysis then opens up 
possibilities to understand social tensions and preoccupations with boundaries and their 
transgression, membership and citizenship, that are not easily articulated in a direct 
fashion, but become intelligible through the native-alien framing: 
[D]iscourses of nature cast a sharp light on the everyday actions and events through 
which definitions of belonging and citizenship – and their dark underside, the poli-
tics of exclusion – are being reframed in the postcolony. In particular, they illumi-
nate the question of why it is that autochthony – a form of attachment that ties peo-
ple to place, that natures the nation, that authorises entitlement – has become so 
central in an epoch when nationhood seems at once critical and yet in crisis, when 
borders everywhere present themselves as paradoxes, when a beleaguered political 
imagination strives to make sense of social being in a world of laissez faire. (Co-
maroff and Comaroff 2001: 651) 
 
The Comaroffs understand the framing of the events via the botanical native/alien bina-
ry as an expression of deep-lying obsessions with the policing of borders and the limits 
of sovereignty under the conditions of a globalized world, where frontiers become ever 
more permeable, with flows of objects, people and information no longer controllable 
by the nation state (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 635). At the same time, in the post-
Apartheid state native plants come to stand for a new South Africa. This is a story about 
“naturing the nation” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 637). Referring to the fynbos 
fires, the Comaroffs observe “the promise that there might arise, out of the ashes, a 
greater good: a distinctly local, ‘new’ South African, sense of community, nation, civil 
society” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001: 637). 
This “naturing” of the South African nation further includes the reframing of indige-
nous West Cape plants that had mostly been called “Cape Flora” before, but are now 
known as fynbos, the establishment of a commercial market for such plants, and a new 
sense of endangerment of this native nature. This is a recent historical development; the 
authors argue that during the 1950s, fynbos was considered “an invader whose expan-
sion threatened the mixed grassveld of the southwestern Cape” (Comaroff and Co-
maroff 2001: 638). This shows how the preferred state of nature informs the definition 
of species belonging. 
In Aotearoa New Zealand, the appraisal of native bush is also relatively recent; here 
as well, native tree cover was long seen as what needed to be removed in order to allow 
European-style farming and pastoral practices. In regard to decorative plants, so-called 
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acclimatization societies have been actively promoting the introduction of new species 
from the mid-19th century (Star 2009; Walrond 2012: 52f.). In South Africa as well, 
species introduced during colonization had been naturalized and even gained the status 
of national symbols, but are now getting reframed as unwanted outsiders (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2001: 645).  
 
 
9.3 Postcolonial Natures: A History of Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
Coastal Dunes 
 
The Aotearoa New Zealand coasts are iconic pieces of national nature, and people often 
identify very strongly with coastal environments they inhabit or visit regularly (Kearns 
and Collins 2012). Dune restoration addresses postcolonial coastal natures, which are 
highly valued, and is as such met with growing interest. The goals informing coastal 
restoration projects are not limited to reversing environmental change brought about 
during the colonial past, but – as just described for the South African situation by Co-
maroff and Comaroff – also speak to pressing political issues of an insecure present. In 
line with widely voiced concerns over the increasing development of rural and remote 
coasts of Aotearoa New Zealand over the last decades (Freeman and Cheyne 2008; 
Peart 2009), Coast Carers claim to be motivated by the necessity to “protect what’s 
left”. Mark Dean, founder of the Naturally Native plant nursery (see Chapter 9.5) 
frames restoration, especially dune restoration, as a matter of protecting Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s national natural identity: “I used to say I wanted New Zealand to be like Ao-
tearoa and not like a mini England, and that was what we worked on.” (Radio New Zea-
land National 2012b: 00:02:51)  
Concerns with (wanted and unwanted) human modification of this distinct Aotearoa 
New Zealand coastal nature date back to botanist Leonard Cockayne who travelled ex-
tensively through the country in the early 20th century in order to prepare his “Report on 
the dune-areas of New Zealand” (Cockayne 1911). Summarizing his findings, Cock-
ayne states: 
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It is not altogether easy to present a picture of the virgin dunes of New Zealand. 
[…] There are few places where man, his fires, and his grazing animals have not 
wrought great changes. (Cockayne 1911: 17)80 
 
The report was published about 150 years after Captain Cook and his crew were the first 
Europeans to successfully land on Nova Zeelandia, the European name for the islands 
of the time, in 1769. At that point, no grazing animals inhabited the islands, though they 
were soon to be introduced by the European settlers that followed the explorers. How-
ever, Cockayne does not elaborate if, when writing about “virgin” dunes as void of 
“man”, he is including indigenous human interference or if he thinks of pre-European 
nature as static and undisturbed by humans. The Māori people, however, had settled on 
the islands of Aotearoa for around a thousand years already, after arriving from Polyne-
sia on voyaging canoes.  
Today, scientists use several indicators of human presence to reconstruct the early 
human history of Aotearoa New Zealand, including archaeological findings, evidence of 
species introduction and extinctions, and fire disturbance (Wilmshurst et al. 2004). Ra-
diocarbon analysis is used to determine the age of fossil pollen, seeds, sediment and 
charcoal samples, and to produce paleo-ecological data. There are many questions, 
some of which are controversial not only from a scientific point of view, but also in 
their intertwining with contemporary political struggles. When did the Polynesian peo-
ple that eventually became the Māori of Aotearoa New Zealand arrive, and where did 
they come from? What impact did their presence have on the natural environments they 
found during the long period of settlement before European arrival? The past recon-
structed with natural scientific methods also relates to questions of identity, belonging 
and responsibility that enter political discussions about the current state of Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s nature.  
Conservation science, policy and practice are deeply entrenched in such questions, 
because – as mentioned above – many decisions about actual restoration projects in-
volve a definition of baselines for an assumed pre-human or pre-European state of the 
environment. As one informant, a dune restoration professional, put it during a field-
                                                
 
80  There was a practical reason for farmers to let their cattle graze on the dunes: New Zealand soils tend 
to lack the trace element cobalt, and this malnutrition causes the so-called “bush disease” in cattle. 
Because the dune plants came in contact with seawater, they contained these essential minerals. Until 
the cause of bush disease was discovered in the 1930s and cobalt was added to soil and/or food, occa-
sional dune grazing has been the only known remedy (Tonkin 2013).  
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work encounter, his goal lies in “restoring dunes to how they have been before humans 
came”. “We still remember it”, he said pointing to the beach, “that’s only 100, 150 
years ago, that this was a natural, unmodified environment” (Fieldnotes Dunes Trust 
Conference, February 2010). This opinion is not held up by scientific evidence; howev-
er, such misrepresentation of coastal environmental history is not uncommon. Already 
in 1989, New Zealand botanist McGlone wrote that two factors have impeded early re-
search on anthropogenic environmental change: a “marked reluctance to accept that the 
settlement of New Zealand by Polynesians brought many environmental changes”, re-
sulting from the belief that these people lived in harmony with nature, and an overem-
phasis on the effects of historic climatic changes (Mc Glone 1999: 126). Today Māori 
settlement is thought to have caused significant impacts on the natural environment. 
New species arrived with the Polynesians: kiore (Polynesian rats), kurī (dogs) and food 
crops for cultivation, including sweet potato (kumara) and uwhi (yam). To clear the land 
for horticulture, an estimated half of the country’s forest was cleared by fire, and horti-
culture was pursued mostly in the coastal areas (Wilmshurst et al. 2004; see also Peart 
2009: 33f.). 
However, it is unquestionable that the speed of environmental change grossly accel-
erated after European arrival. Dune ecosystems have been fundamentally modified 
throughout the country; Dahm et al. (2005: 12f.) suggest that “coastal dunelands are 
probably among the most modified of all New Zealand ecosystems”. The introduction 
of grazing cattle and other mammals (for example rabbits) had large-scale effects, as 
had forest removal, wind erosion due to the disruption of stabilising dune vegetation, 
damage caused by vehicles, stock and pedestrians, coastal subdivision, and, importantly, 
the displacement of native dune vegetation by exotic species: the deliberate planting of 
European Marram grass (Ammophila arenaria) and the unintentional introduction of 
vegetation from gardens or garden wastes dumped in the foredunes. Today, only a small 
number of coastal sites exist that still feature what is presumed to be the natural succes-
sion of vegetation from foredune through backdune and into coastal forest (ibid). 
In Coast Care brochures and reports, large emphasis is put on the ongoing impact of 
humans: coastal development, walking or driving (squad bikes or cars) through the 
dunes, horse riding, and the spread of garden weeds. But what are the arguments used in 
favour of the reintroduction of native dune plants in the Aotearoa New Zealand context? 
Why natives? What makes them preferable over the existing vegetation? Not everyone 
arguing for native plants is as enthusiastic as Greg Jenks, who writes in the New Zea-
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land Journal of Botany about “the incredible functional and aesthetic superiority of New 
Zealand’s native dune plants”: 
[N]ot all sand-dwelling plants are created equal, with native dune plants again, for 
the first time in over 100 years, demonstrating their clear superiority in all regards. 
[…] The differences in dune function and aesthetic appeal of native versus intro-
duced plants are very pronounced and unequivocally in favour of the perfectly 
adapted indigenous species. (Jenks 2007: 293) 
 
Jenks’ argument of functional and aesthetic superiority hinges on native plants being 
“perfectly adapted” for their environments. While arguments like “keeping what we’ve 
got” centre on moral claims about the need to preserve a national natural identity, pro 
native arguments can also embrace a narrative where natives offer better natural coastal 
protection functions, especially in comparison to the introduced Marram which has been 
widely used in the past in order to stabilize coastal dunes. A dune restoration specialist 
interviewed for a Radio New Zealand programme about the work of the Dunes Trust 
argues: 
[A]round the country where you got big Marram dominated dunes, they are very 
tall, very steep, and they don’t rebuild, they don’t grow forward as they would 
when you had the native [plants]. Which is understandable, because the natives 
have been here for a million years or so, and these guys have just been dropped 
here in the last hundred years. (Radio New Zealand National 2012b, 00:10:24) 
 
Because native dune plants work better, they should again replace the introduced spe-
cies – be they sand binders common in Europe where they originate, or decorative 
plants and “garden escapees”. Similar arguments are frequently put forward in the pro-
grammatic literature, as below in “Community-based Dune Management for the Mitiga-
tion of Coastal Hazards and Climate Change Effects”:  
While many exotic species have been used to stabilise dunes such as Marram grass 
(Ammophila arenaria), ice plant (Carpobrotus edulis), and Kikuyu grass (Pennise-
tum clandestinum), experience has shown that these species are not as effective as 
Spinifex and Pingao in repairing storm-damaged frontal dunes. Without a good 
cover of Spinifex and Pingao on the seaward dune face, natural dune repair be-
tween storms tends to be very limited. This can result in the next storm picking up 
where the last one left off, giving rise to more serious dune erosion than would 
have occurred with some more natural dune recovery between the two events. 
(Dahm et al. 2005: 9) 
 
However, while native plants are promoted because of their unique adaptive capacities 
in relation to their original environment, there is also a discourse of threat at work 
which is not dissimilar to the South African examples discussed by the Comaroffs 
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above. In this line of argument, invasive plants have a tendency to “out-compete” native 
plants, which therefore have to be supported by restoration work, especially pest con-
trol. Bergin (2011) for example states: 
Control of pest plants is a major issue for dune restoration projects. Pest plants on 
foredunes, particularly invasive exotic grasses, often out-compete indigenous sand 
binding species and reduce or prevent natural dune form and function. It is essen-
tial that restoration programmes involving the establishment and management of 
indigenous coastal species have effective, practical, weed control. (Bergin 2011: 3) 
 
There is a noticeable internal contradiction in the discourse, with native plants framed 
as perfectly adapted, yet at the same time threatened – because the conditions of post-
colonial natureculture put too much pressure (from development, invasive species etc.) 
on them. Another variation on the theme is the statement that while European Marram 
grass does also stabilize sand dunes, it establishes the wrong – a less natural – sort of 
dunes. A Waikato Beachcare employee, for example, explains to me that these plants 
have “a different mechanism”, to the following effect:  
They create really steep and narrow dunes, whereas Spinifex creates a really wide 
dune. So the wider, the better. So Marram is better than nothing, but […] it doesn’t 
allow that accretion to go forward. And it also is so vigorous, that it sort of out-
competes the Spinifex. So you end up with these Marram dunes that are just so 
enormous. They’re not bad, it’s better than no dune, but, it just doesn’t allow natu-
ral dunes. (Interview with Lucas Pinnacles, Waikato Beachcare) 
 
The use of native dune plants – endemic Pingao, indigenous Spinifex, and other species 
common in coastal restoration projects – then becomes a matter of re-establishing and 
protecting the distinctive Aotearoa New Zealand quality of the coastal landscape as 
much as the natural barrier function of the dunes. The following section underlines this 
double effect by glancing sideways at another native coastal plant, the mangrove, which 
surprisingly turns out to be unwanted by many who care for coastal (and estuarine) en-
vironments. 
 
 
9.4 Invasive Native Plants: Mangroves  
 
Mangroves are native to the subtropical northern regions of Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
North Island and grow in sheltered estuaries and harbour environments. In the last dec-
ades, their distribution has expanded, and mangroves are now found further to the south 
then before (Harty 2009, Schwarz 2003). In areas where mangroves have already been 
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growing, they are taking up more space now, growing more densely and deeper into the 
estuaries. Most probably, the continuous spread of mangroves is caused by a combina-
tion of factors, increased sedimentation from land-use changes, and a warming climate 
being the most important ones. Framing of the issue at stake as a matter of increasing 
mangrove “colonization” of estuaries and natural harbours – a term used also in scien-
tific literature and reports (Morrisey et al. 2007) – shows the normative underpinning of 
the discussion and signposts its socio-cultural relevance. How mangroves should be 
“managed” – which often means removed – is subject to much public debate as well. In 
Whangamata on the Coromandel Peninsula, for example, locals have engaged in illegal 
acts of mangrove removal, using tractors and other heavy machinery (Peart 2009).  
In the Bay of Plenty region, manual removal by care groups had been authorized by 
the regional authorities before a resource consent was obtained for the mechanical re-
moval, which is now regularly undertaken by Council staff. Those arguing for removal 
or management claim that mangroves are “choking up” the estuaries, cause odours, 
make access (by boat) more difficult and are unsightly (see for example Leaman 2012). 
This is not how it used to be, how familiar places looked. The extent of disapproval 
with which mangroves are met in the Aotearoa New Zealand context can be surprising, 
given that globally, mangroves are considered a vital part of the coastal ecosystem, im-
portant for marine biodiversity and a significant natural coastal protection feature (Oth-
man 1994; Mazda et al. 2002; Winterwerp et al. 2005; Alliance Development Works 
2012). In the wake of the 2004 South Asian Tsunami, research has intensified into 
whether and to what extent mangrove vegetation can provide protection against tsunami 
impacts (Dahdouh-Guebas et al. 2005; Kathiresan and Rajendran 2005). Those who ar-
gue for human control of mangrove spread in the Aotearoa New Zealand context are 
therefore quick to stress that those species occurring here do not grow on the open coast 
and are therefore not useful as natural coastal protection (Morrisey et al. 2007: 3). How-
ever, an outdated version of the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS) none-
theless noted mangroves as worthy of protection: 
The ability of natural features such as beaches, sand dunes, mangroves, wetlands 
and barrier islands, to protect subdivision, use, or development should be recog-
nised and maintained, and where appropriate, steps should be required to enhance 
that ability. (Department of Conservation 1994: 9) 
 
This provision has been removed in the current 2010 version of the policy statement. 
The public concern over the expansion of coastal mangroves shows that identifying na-
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tive nature as the preferred natural environment is by no means self-explicatory, and 
that native species can also be perceived as invasive, unwanted colonizers when they 
move beyond the spaces people believe they belong to.  
 
 
9.5 Naturally Native: A Sustainable Business 
 
Dune restoration in Aotearoa New Zealand today is inextricably linked to the practices 
of reintroducing native coastal vegetation. However, before Coast Care could take off at 
the scale it is working at today, some fundamental problems had to be solved, first of 
all: where to get native plants from? Post colonization, dunes had only been planted 
with introduced species; there was no experience with planting native dune species, and 
no knowledge as to how to produce and cultivate native plants like Spinifex and Pingao. 
In the 1990s, a group of people professionally interested in nature restoration held a se-
ries of meetings in the Bay of Plenty region and started to collect existing expertise and 
to experiment with Spinifex and Pingao propagation. The group formalized its structure 
into the Coastal Dune Vegetation Network (CDVN) in 1997. In 2007, the network be-
came a charitable trust and changed its name to Dune Restoration Trust of New Zea-
land, or short: the Dunes Trust.  
Today, the Dunes Trust works closely with regional Coast Care/Beachcare pro-
grammes and has many members amongst dune restoration professionals and volunteers 
throughout the country. The annual conferences of the Trust resemble a national Coast 
Care meeting, something that does not exist on that level; Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
governance structure is highly regionalized and dune restoration programmes are exclu-
sively organized by Regional Councils. The Trust remains the agency through which the 
majority of scientific research on dune restoration issues in Aotearoa New Zealand is 
conducted, using competitive public funding sources like the Ministry for the Environ-
ment’s Sustainable Management Fund. The knowledge and information produced by 
the practitioners and scholars from the Trust has been taken up by Coast 
Care/Beachcare – or more precisely, it co-produced Coast Care, because the programme 
would not have been possible without it. A central node of the public-private “mesh-
work” (Ingold 2007: 80) of the Dunes Trust is the company that developed a method to 
grow Spinifex and thereby co-produced its own market niche: the Naturally Native 
plant nursery.  
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For more than 30 years now, Mark Dean has been running his nursery business. The 
company, Naturally Native is one of the country’s largest specialist native plant growers 
(Naturally Native NZ Plants Ltd. 2007). Mark is the chairperson of the Dunes Trust and 
was described as a “conservation champion” by the Minister of Conservation, Hon Kate 
Wilkinson, when she handed him the Loder Cup, a prestigious conservation award, in 
2011 (Department of Conservation n.d.b). While Mark always had an interest in plants 
and especially native trees, he originally started his career as a school teacher in Tau-
ranga. His parents lived on three acres of land in the hills outside of the coastal town, 
and when their workload became too high, Mark and his wife took over the property. 
Mark started to grow and sell some plants, mostly kiwifruit, a growing business during 
the 1970s. Soon he realized that he had enough land to start a full-time business, be-
cause “nurseries don’t need very much space”. But what would be a good thing to 
grow? 
I said to my wife that we needed something that would be always ongoing, because 
kiwi fruit would be no good, because one day the Bay of Plenty would be full of 
kiwi fruit and no one would need any more plants. And so we happened to go to 
north of Auckland for a holiday – January 1979, and we passed a farm house that 
had a sign up at the gate: Native Plants for Sale. And I said, ‘That’s it’. (Interview 
with Mark Dean, Naturally Native) 
 
They discovered that only a few nurseries were producing native plants, operating only 
on a very small scale, mostly selling their plants over the gate to botany enthusiasts with 
a special interest in native flora. Wholesale growing of native plants was a novelty. 
When Mark quit his teaching job and the couple started growing natives, this move was 
met with great scepticism by the people around them, because nobody thought it was 
possible to make a living by growing just native plants. Mark explains:  
Because in those days […], the attitude of farmers was, ‘I’ve spent 40 years chop-
ping the native plants off my farm, why should I plant them?’ And people thought 
of native plants as just being bush; they didn’t think of them as being able to be 
used in gardens. (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally Native) 
 
Mark is confident that he in fact contributed significantly to the development that 
changed this situation: native plants becoming ever more popular over the last decades. 
Evidence to this is also a growing market of books about New Zealanders “Living with 
Natives” (Spellerberg and Frey 2008). Drawing on his past as a teacher, Mark describes 
his business as fundamentally building on education: 
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The first 10 or 15 years of our life running the nursery was educating the public 
that native plants were actually a good thing to plant, and we made it fashionable. 
[…] Saturdays we ran seminars for the public at the nursery and that was – our 
whole marketing was based on education. (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally 
Native) 
 
This approach was also helpful when, slowly, other companies entered the market: “Our 
whole thing was to grow the market for native plants, and as we grew the market, so 
other competitors came in”, Mark recounts (ibid). Naturally Native was losing its de 
facto monopoly and had to face this new competition. For a while, the company “got a 
little bit left behind […] because we didn’t know how to market saying, ‘My plants are 
better than this grower’s plants,’ and so we were caught off in the back foot as it was” 
(ibid). But Mark held on to his marketing by education approach, and ran seminars on 
native plants for landscape architects and others working for Councils. 
In this situation, the production of dune plants for coastal restoration turned out to be 
another, even more specialized, manifestation of the native as a unique selling point. 
While looking for new opportunities, Mark and his team were approached by a land-
scaping company in the mid-1990s, which needed 5,000 Spinifex plants for a dune res-
toration project. At this point, Mark couldn’t help, because the only known way to pro-
duce these plants was from cuttings, which turned out too costly an approach. During 
the same time however, a Naturally Native salesman attended the first meeting of what 
was to become the Coastal Dune Vegetation Network (CDVN) and reported back to his 
boss:  
[He] went to the first meeting and said to me, ‘I think you’d better come along to 
the next meeting’ […], because it wasn’t really a sales function. [He] recognized 
that it wasn’t really for selling plants. It was to do about finding out how to grow 
them. (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally Native) 
 
The meetings were attended by restoration professionals and Council employees, in-
cluding the newly appointed Coast Care Bay of Plenty coordinator. Soon, the CDVN 
was formed as a means to further coastal restoration practices. Finding out how to grow 
Spinifex plants was defined as the first priority. Mark offered his nursery to the group 
and in 1997, experimenting started under the leadership of restoration scientist David 
Bergin:  
And very, very quickly, in the first year, we had them growing. And it wasn’t as 
difficult as what we had thought. (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally Native) 
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Conventional nursery industry practices, however, proved not suitable for growing 
Spinifex. The trials showed that pricking out (transplanting the plants from a seed tray 
to the next container) was not working as expected; the plants turned out to grow best 
when left in the place were the seed had germinated. The next year already, the team 
had produced 500 plants. The next step of the trial was the successful planting at Papa-
moa Beach (mentioned in Chapter 6). In 1999, Naturally Native took over another 
nursery at the Bay of Plenty coast, which had been run by Whakatane District Council, 
and the coastal environment proved perfect for growing dune plants. Also the nursery 
manager there had already been experimenting with growing Spinifex herself, and her 
knowledge was going beyond what the scientists from CDVN had found out. Using the 
manager’s experience with watering and warmth, 5,000 plants were produced the next 
year.  
Today, the Whakatane branch produces about 250,000 Spinifex specimen each year, 
as well as Pingao and many other coastal species used mostly by Coast Care groups81. 
The close links between nursery business and Coast Care remain. The plant production 
is exclusively based on pre-ordering, because, as Mark argues, “there’s no market for 
those sort of things unless it’s for a Council to supply to their Coast Care groups” (In-
terview with Mark Dean, Coast Care)82. This public-private linkage is remarkable since, 
as mentioned above, the company has taken over the main facility from Whakatane Dis-
trict Council, one of the authorities behind Bay of Plenty Coast Care. Now Mark’s busi-
ness is striving on producing plants for Coast Care – effectively, an outsourcing of the 
plant production necessary for the Coast Care programme83.  
Additionally, subscription to the principle of eco-sourcing means that only dune 
plants produced from local seeds are deemed suitable for Coast Care. Therefore, the 
plants have to be ordered the year before they can be planted; seeds are collected and 
cultivated to be planted the following year. This practice draws upon the question of 
how to define nativeness and localness – where to draw the boundary of the local when 
                                                
 
81  About 75% of the company business is now related to environmental restoration, while the garden 
centre market contributes the remaining 25%. Before entering into coastal restoration, the proportion 
had been the other way around. 
82  Mark mentions that only one or two small orders were made outside the Coast Care business: “Devel-
opers who are doing, like coastal development; you know building buildings or sub-division and have 
needed some Spinifex to meet their resource consent requirements. But so far that side hasn’t devel-
oped.” (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally Native plant nursery) 
83  In 2013, Mark sold the Whakatane nursery to the manager Jo Benner.  
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this category is defined along spatial terms that are always in part social constructs? In 
the Coast Care world, local is defined as falling within the area of the specific care 
group; in the nursery, plants are arranged according to these locations, featuring labels 
with village names that translate into Coast Care groups. Mark accepts this hegemony 
of the local and follows it through in his practices of plant production, though he juxta-
poses it with what he calls “the horticultural perspective” which would be more inter-
ested in producing the strongest possible plants84. While he subscribes to the idea of 
eco-sourcing as a means to “keep the difference”, to maintain existing, biographically 
defined biodiversity within this plant species, he states that  
if we approached it from a horticultural point of view we should be finding the 
biggest, fastest growing Spinifex that we can lay our hands on and planting that all 
over the place so that we get much better sand holding ability (Interview with Mark 
Dean, Naturally Native). 
 
Until recently, volunteers were also enrolled in seed collection for Spinifex production. 
Coast Care volunteer Edward White from Waihi Beach still takes pride in the high qual-
ity seed material he was picking in Waihi Beach. But effective collection requires 
knowledge and practice in distinguishing female from male flower heads, because the 
latter do not contain seeds (Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand 2011c; Coast Care 
BOP Programme n.d.b). The nursery staff now finds it more efficient not to use volun-
teer labour, but rather take responsibility for seed picking themselves. In any case, the 
combination of pre-ordering requirements and the insistence on local eco-sourcing 
guarantee maximum customer loyalty. This is a literal growth economy; the business 
with natives is growing steadily, the dunes are growing – and when erosion events hap-
pen, new plantings are needed by Coast Care to assist dune recovery. Therefore, Mark 
does not expect that the market will ever be saturated, or that Pingao and Spinifex can 
be expected to completely self-reproduce on the dunes:  
Because with Spinifex and Pingao, [one] would always get storm events, and peo-
ple will always want to augment plants; the beach will start recovering and they’ll 
want to put some more in there to make sure that they’re going to get the Spinifex 
and Pingao growing out to trap the sand. So, that’s one of the things that I don’t 
think will run out. […] That’s why I think the whole thing of Coast Care is about, 
                                                
 
84  Mark shows that two areas of his large greenhouse are separated by another geographical scale: Spini-
fex plants grown with seeds originating from the west and east coasts (of the North Island) are visibly 
different. Mark attributes this to the different climate and weather conditions: the wind and the sea are 
much rougher in the West, therefore Spinifex plants grown from West Coast seeds are stronger. 
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is building the buffer to be eaten away and then helping it build again later. [Inter-
viewer: “So you’re also growing plants to be washed away?”] Yeah! [laughs] Sac-
rificial plants! (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally Native) 
 
Mark is also actively engaged in Coast Care’s latest move towards the backdune areas. 
This is part and parcel of the founding of the Dunes Trust as a successor to the Coastal 
Dune Vegetation Network (CDVN):  
That developed like that because […] the Council started saying, ‘Oh well, we 
know how to plant Spinifex; why should we be contributing 3,000 [NZD] a year to 
the CDVN?’ And the CDVN didn’t […] really have enough money out of that to 
do big research projects. And so nothing was done; and so it became harder and 
harder to get funding. (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally Native) 
 
Through founding the Trust, the group became able to apply for competitive research 
funds. Producing knowledge proved to be the avenue to develop the dune restoration 
sector in general, and Mark’s nursery business in particular. The Dunes Trust, of which 
Mark is the chairman, has recently secured funding from the Ministry for the Environ-
ment (MfE) for planting trials on backdunes. As a result, he is getting more orders for 
backdune plants from Councils throughout the country. Building knowledge and build-
ing the business remains deeply entangled, as well as maintaining the public-private re-
lationship: 
[T]hat will build the whole market for planting on backdunes and that’ll give us 
more growth in that area. If it works as well as our Spinifex trials it’ll end up being 
like a big leap forward in confidence and it’ll give Councils confidence to order 
backdune plants and plant them. […] Hopefully at the end of the three years [of 
Ministry-funded research] there’ll be enough knowledge and experience to see 
what succeeded and what didn’t, and it’ll be enough to build the growing of back-
dune plants from there. (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally Native) 
 
Given Mark’s thorough (business and personal) interest in Coast Care, I am interested 
to know how he weighs the different objectives of the programme against each other. 
What is, seen from his central position in the meshwork of volunteers and professional 
actors, the main motivation for Coast Care practices? What role does dune restoration as 
coastal protection play, and how important is it to reconstruct native nature? Mark be-
lieves that aesthetics come before both for most of the volunteers: 
I think most people involved in doing the planting would most probably think 
they’re planting the beach to look nice, and they don’t think about the protection or 
the biodiversity and that side of it. (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally Native) 
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Mark argues that from this initial approach to Coast Care as beautification of the beach, 
the link between dune restoration and coastal protection was made thanks to the pio-
neering work by people like Jim Dahm: 
I think firstly they just wanted to restore the dunes and they never thought about 
coastal protection, and then there was a few instances where storms would wash 
away what they’d done and they were, ‘Oh, terrible terrible, its all been destroyed.’ 
But it wasn’t until Jim Dahm came along and said, ‘That’s actually what happens 
naturally’, you know with these workshops that we [the Dune Restoration Trust of 
NZ] have been running, and Jim said that it’s that you’ve gotta plant to protect and 
build the dune for the next erosion event. So people are now realizing that we’re 
doing it as a sacrificial thing and that one day it might all be washed away, but at 
least it will have a buffer to wash away, rather than nothing there, allowing it to go 
straight into the properties. (Interview with Mark Dean, Naturally Native) 
 
Mark himself has developed an interest in the promises of soft protection. When visiting 
family in Germany, he made contact with “Bestmann Green Systems”, a company spe-
cializing in “Biological Engineering Systems”. Their expertise includes fibre products 
that support plant growth and can be used in river restoration. The website features a 
variation on the ‘working with nature’ discourse: 
The use of living ‘engineering biology’ provides methods of construction which fit 
in with ecological needs. Such methods cannot always replace purely hard engi-
neering solutions, but they can in many cases come very close to natural develop-
ments. (Bestmann Green Sytems n.d.) 
 
Mark also advocates the backstop wall approach that has been discussed in Waihi 
Beach. Instead of regular seawalls, he argues for the use of buried walls and a planted 
dune to provide a buffer zone in front of the seawall. When asked if he sees any poten-
tial for coastal management practices developing in this direction, Mark also has high 
hopes for the role of Coast Care and its constituency:  
[A] lot of that ground swell comes from the likes of the members of Coast Care, 
the grassroots starting to say, ‘Why are you doing this, why are doing that?’ And 
eventually it filters up to the engineering division. I mean the attitude towards us-
ing plants for erosion control has changed dramatically in recent years. You know, 
engineers now specify planting plants to stop erosion. Sometimes with geotextile 
material underneath, and then the plants [on top]. But yes, there’s a lot more re-
search [that] needs to be done…. it’s an area that I’ve sort of often thought we 
should target with seminars, and try and find people to give talks about various 
plants and their ability to stop erosion, and that sort of thing. (Interview with Mark 
Dean, Naturally Native) 
 
With a good business instinct, Mark sees the promise of expanding his business towards 
soft engineering. Remarkably, this resembles closely what a representative of a geotex-
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tile company presented me as his vision of the future of soft coastal engineering. This 
points to an ongoing conversation between dune restoration and soft engineering pro-
fessionals and shows that Mark and his engineering counterpart both operate with an 
understanding of soft protection that allows human tinkering with and construction of 
coastal natures.  
Mark’s approach to the native business combines public and private sources of fund-
ing and knowledge production to make the native plants and his business strive. This 
way he navigates the restraints of the market, the administrative environment and lim-
ited research funds available in Aotearoa New Zealand. In the following section, I will 
further explore the role of narratives of nativeness, and start with turning to another pro-
tagonist of plant production who is operating on a completely different scale, following 
other visions. Here, the story is not about sustainable business development, but about 
community-scale restoration and education projects that combine the promotion of na-
tive plants with native knowledge and practice, especially weaving.  
 
 
9.6 Native Naturecultures 
 
At her Northland home, Betsy from Te Roopu Whakaoranga o te Taha Moana Trust is 
growing Pingao plants in a small-scale nursery, built with funding from the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF). The Trust is a volunteer group that also engages in education 
programmes centring on Pingao and its role as a traditional plant for Māori. The Trust 
members educate children in the local schools, sell native plants, and promote tradition-
al weaving techniques. These are small-scale projects drawing on do-it-yourself practic-
es – Betsy, for example, experiments with self-made seaweed fertilizer. Members of the 
Trust have produced several award-winning books. “Nana’s Koha” (McFadyen 2008) 
explains “how very important even the smallest things are in the ecology of the sea-
shore” through an illustrated conversation between Raniera and his nana (grandmother). 
Nana teaches the boy how to weave little flowers or puti puti, and tells the story about 
the origins of the Pingao plant:  
‘Well,’ says Nana, ‘as Māori we believe that the Pingao are the eyebrows of Tane, 
the god of the forest.’ ‘The eyebrows!’ exclaims Raniera. ‘Ae, he and Tangaroa the 
god of the sea were always fighting until one day Tane decided he had had enough. 
He plucked out his eyebrows and gave them to Tangaroa as a sign of peace. But 
Tangaroa wasn’t ready to forgive Tane and he threw the eyebrows onto the shore 
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and there they grow today as Pingao, which is the boundary between the forest and 
the sea’. (McFadyen 2008: 6) 
 
This traditional story of Tane’s eyebrows is very popular also amongst Pākeha members 
of Coast Care, and has been featured in Coast Care brochures (Northland Regional 
Council 2008; Coast Care BOP Programme n.d.a). Also, the use of Pingao plants for 
weaving, especially tuku tuku or wall panels for marae (meeting houses) gets often 
mentioned in conversations and brochures (ibid). Whereas Spinifex is a native plant too, 
it also occurs in other world regions, for example Australia. Pingao on the contrary is 
endemic, and maybe therefore more readily representing Aotearoa New Zealand’s na-
tive nature and culture. Spinifex is also not commonly used for weaving.  
Regardless of the central function of these narratives however, Pingao is not very 
central in contemporary weaving practice, even though the cultural renaissance of re-
cent decades has seen a revitalization of weaving with traditional materials. At a weav-
ing school in the Eastern Bay of Plenty, where people can learn the skill up to the level 
of a Bachelor’s degree, the teacher explains to me that Pingao is not being used very 
much in her class simply because it is not suitable for beginners: the leaves are too short 
and irregularly shaped. Most common for weaving are Harakeke (New Zealand Flax) 
plants. Today, Pingao is mostly used for little bags (kite), whereas tuku tuku panels are 
mostly fabricated from plastics because it is easier to handle. However, the students at 
the weaving school are encouraged to try many different materials, including Pingao.  
Pākeha New Zealanders who want to argue in favour of restoring native nature take 
up these narratives of nativeness and use them also to justify the importance of the ef-
fort (besides biodiversity or coastal protection aspects). Sometimes such stories are told 
in a way that seems largely ornamental. However, by acknowledging the spiritual value 
of native nature, and by expressing personal fascination with it, settler descendants 
might express a caring relationship to the land that embraces ecological and cultural 
values. But such narratives are also possible points of connection for Māori Coast Care 
volunteers. Moana from the Ngāti Mākino Coast Care group explicitly appreciates the 
links that are drawn by the Coast Care programme, connecting dune restoration, native 
plants and Māori cultural practice and values. Asked for the goals of her Coast Care 
work, she explains that it is done 
[…] so that sand dunes will form and will help protect the land. Also I guess too, 
the other thing is, because we can utilize the plants that we are using; the native 
plants – the Pingao which we use in our weaving on the marae for our tuku tuku 
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[wall panel] work, to make our kite [bags]. […] So it’s to protect the land so that 
the sea doesn’t come up; you know how it has a lot of areas […] where the beach 
comes right in and they’re coming quite close to the homes. (Interview with Moana 
Takutai, Ngāti Mākino Coast Care) 
 
Moana first heard about Coast Care at a public meeting held at Otamarakau Hall. Seeing 
before and after pictures of other Coast Care projects, she was immediately taken by the 
idea to protect the coast in this way. She went through the cultural protocols and got 
permission and support from her local marae, located on a small hill with an extraordi-
nary view over the seashore below. While the Coast Care programme targets the beach 
and dune areas exclusively, Moana – in line with Māori concepts – does not perceive 
the coastal environment as separate from the adjacent areas. Her projects also include 
riparian plantings along the river that cuts through cattle grazing land before flowing in-
to the sea. On her request, the local farm trust has fenced off the river to prevent erosion 
and pollution from cattle excrement and fertilizer, thereby also protecting native fish 
breeding grounds: 
They agreed about how it was really good for the environment, for the wairua 
[spirituality] and the cleanliness of the river. […] The spirituality of the river helps 
to try and keep it clean and fresh. Keep the spirituality of the river alive and well 
and protecting it. Growing all the native plants along there will help do that. (Inter-
view with Moana Takutai, Ngāti Mākino Coast Care) 
 
The native planting achieves the protection of the beauty of the scene, the spirituality of 
the river, and its cleanliness at the same time. As much as she subscribes to spiritual 
Māori concepts, Moana is also fascinated by natural science explanations provided by 
Coast Care for the cyclical changes she observes in the coastal environment:  
I lived here all my life and you always see the changing of the river and the moving 
of the sand but didn’t realize until I went to the National Conference [of the Dune 
Restoration Trust of NZ] when they explained the phenomenon, how the sand will 
be taken out but it will also come back again. So it was nice understanding, hearing 
it from the science point of view, whereas I’ve just seen it happen and think, ‘Oh.’ 
and just accepted it as part of what happens along the coast. […] You’ve seen the 
sand being washed out and see the sand come back in and see the river change 
from side to side, and accepted it as that, that’s it: that’s how nature works. (Inter-
view with Moana Takutai, Ngāti Mākino Coast Care) 
 
The greatest fascination, however, for Moana is that the objectives of restoration work 
so easily overlap with Māori cosmologies of belonging, care and relationships – not all 
of which concern only humans. Moana has started to grow a Pa Harakeke, a flax garden 
that assembles flax plants used for weaving. These plants do not all originate from the 
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surroundings of the local community or the marae – some of them are gifts by family 
members who live elsewhere, but share the same ancestral links:  
We’re connected through our whakapapa, through our genealogy and we’re also 
connecting through our Harakeke [flax] […]. Some of our family came to a tangi 
[funeral] here and I said to them, ‘You know that Harakeke that I came and asked 
you for [….], come and see the plant, here it is, growing beautifully’. That plant 
came from them over in Rotorua. My kuia [grandmother] who used to be a weaver, 
she weaved from this flax in Rotorua. So bringing it here was, you know, bringing 
her here; her plant here. When I see that Harakeke plant it reminds me of my rela-
tion, my kuia who has been dead for many years now. It’s really nice, that kind of 
connection. (Interview with Moana Takutai, Ngāti Mākino Coast Care) 
 
Here, the native plants are essential participants in the forging, remaking, and confirm-
ing of place-based and cultural relationships. In analogy to the “eco-sourcing” of native 
plants (which are collected at a specific place or from an ecological niche, see Chapter 
9.5), this could be called cultural sourcing: the choice of appropriate plants according to 
the genealogy of the humans who tend and use them as part of a caring relationship with 
nature. Such relations have never ceded to exist. On the other hand, they often have to 
be re-weaved, and only when Moana started taking weaving classes her appreciation 
grew for the native plants. While practicing the craft, something she says might best be 
called “a spiritual awakening” happened inside her that made her taking up the planting 
project as well (ibid). 
For Moana, this spiritual aspect of nature restoration is inextricably linked to the re-
introduction and preservation of native plants into the local environment, a natural and 
cultural resource:  
We’ve got the Pingao from the beach and […] a lot of these native trees we can use 
for Māori medicine. So we can use it in that way as well, as well as attracting the 
birds, protecting the land and the wairua [spirituality] of the river, and a lot of 
health-giving things from the Manuka plants, [and] from the flax. All those proper-
ties we can utilize cause they’re all natural and all culturally good for us. (Inter-
view with Moana Takutai, Ngāti Mākino Coast Care)  
 
Here, nature and culture are neither opposites nor binary concepts that split the world 
into two parts. Moreover, the properties of native plants, their naturalness translates into 
being “culturally good” for Māori. It does not come as a surprise that this strong vision 
of the cultural and natural role of native plants has been an inspiration for Coast Care in 
general, and that narratives like the story of Tane’s eyebrows enjoy such popularity. 
Seen in this light, the relationship between nature and culture is not organized in a 
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strictly dichotomic way; rather, what is happening is more of what Haraway calls “traf-
fic on the bridge between what counts as nature and culture” (Haraway 1997).  
Generally speaking, indigenous understandings of naturecultures can be a corrective 
that shows the historicity and place-bounded character of seemingly universal concepts 
like the nature culture binary. However, to not romanticize or essentialize indigenous 
cosmologies, it is important to note that the work of (re-) connecting nature and culture 
is a constantly evolving process for indigenous restorationists, as well as for others. The 
Māori concept of kaitiakitangi, or stewardship of nature relies on an active caring en-
gagement of humans with their natural surroundings (Te Ahukaramū Charles Royal 
2012). The focus on the connectedness of native natureculture is also not a given – it is 
a connection that is actively made. Hull and Robertson describe this in relation to resto-
ration practices in general as dancing with nature: 
By way of actively tending nature, restorationists develop respect and concern for 
the environment as well as a vested interest in its future – a deeper meaning […] 
By exposing our own loss of innocence and in turn celebrating our own natural-
ness, a restoration ethic allows us to dance with rather than on nature. Restoration 
blurs the distinction between culture and nature. It makes an open continuum out of 
the more simplistic and polarizing human-nature dichotomy. (Hull and Robertson 
2009: 300f.) 
 
Reconstructing native nature is not the only objective of Coast Care. However, the focus 
on and exclusive use of indigenous species is an essential characteristic that – together 
with using volunteer work for planting only – is central in defining Coast Care as com-
munity-based dune restoration. For people to perceive of projects as meaningful exam-
ples of nature restoration, several aspects can become important, but the use of native 
plants often comes down to a sine qua non85. However, not all restoration projects that 
focus on native species are drawing connections to native culture in the way I have de-
scribed here. The following section introduces a local group caring for native fauna and 
flora that tied its approach to science and universal ideas of nature protection. 
 
                                                
 
85  This became noticeable at a Dunes Trust conference presentation that introduced a large-scale com-
mercial dune restoration project on Great Barrier Island, which used European Marram as a pioneer 
species to provide for quick progression of vegetation cover. This “very innovative approach”, as the 
consultant who implemented it called it, relying on non-native species, was met with criticism from 
the Coast Care constituency. The audience questioned the use of non-native plants and herbicides, and 
the commercial background of a project where the principal’s time schedule was seemingly trumping 
the times of natural plant progression (Fieldnotes Dunes Trust Conference, February 2010). 
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9.7 Universal Nature and Local Crisis: Maketu Spit 
 
This section introduces a Coast Care project that concerns itself with native birds and 
the desire to turn agricultural lands into an internationally protected wetland area. The 
Maketu Ongatoro Wetland Society, also a registered Coast Care group, is working on a 
sand spit which is uninhabited by humans, but home to several breeding pairs of the rare 
New Zealand dotterel. According to the Department of Conservation (Department of 
Conservation 2004), only about 1,700 specimen of this once common endemic wading 
shorebird remain in Aotearoa New Zealand. Because the Maketu sand spit is separated 
by a cut from the long sandy beach that spreads many kilometres east of Tauranga, it 
can only be accessed from the mainland, or by boat from Maketu village via the Maketu 
estuary. This has limited the human interference on the spit.  
Protecting the birds on Maketu spit is the primary and immediate concern of the 
Maketu Ongatoro Wetland Society. The name, however, signifies that another, longer-
term project is also on the agenda: the protection and possible extension of the wetlands 
surrounding Maketu spit and estuary. The Maketu estuary itself has been created in its 
current form by diverting the Kaituna River mouth in order to prevent seasonal flooding 
of agricultural land. The Bay of Plenty Regional Council is currently planning to change 
the course of the river once again and create a larger wetland area: 
The goal of the Kaituna River Re-diversion and Wetland Creation Project is: to re-
divert as much of the Kaituna River as possible through Ongatoro/Maketu Estuary, 
and in the process to create new wetlands by 2018 to maximise ecological and 
community benefits while ensuring the cost and environmental effects are also ac-
ceptable. (Bay of Plenty Regional Council 2009; see also Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council 2012) 
 
The project is controversial and has been discussed for many years already. While some 
argue for the re-diversion as a way towards a more natural state of the estuary, others 
argue that the current level of pollution of the Kaituna River, especially from agriculture 
and pastoralism along the river bed, means that the estuary will be flooded with nutri-
ents and sewage residues. This fuels fear that the local seafood might be diminished or 
become unhealthy to eat.  
The Maketu care group ensures ongoing protection of the birds living on the spit by 
informing the public about their presence, and by trapping and fencing off pest animals. 
The spit is regularly sprayed to remove introduced vegetation and then planted with in-
digenous plants. These include not only the typical foredune plants like Spinifex and 
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Pingao, but also a succession of backdune plants as part of a trial project of the Dunes 
Trust (Dune Restoration Trust of New Zealand 2011b). While I am in contact with the 
group, the main organizer is a natural history writer from the UK who settled in Maketu 
some years ago. Lately, a young marine scientist has started to share the responsibility. 
Both leading figures are nature lovers who are driven by a science-based understanding 
of biodiversity protection. The natural history writer gives talks at the local Polytech-
nical College and organizes guided walks on the spit. He is in contact with an entomol-
ogist interested in the spit and becomes very excited when a new invertebrate species is 
discovered there.  
The group has been instrumental in preparing a Biodiversity Management Plan de-
fining future restoration work on the spit, including the resources and work contributed 
by the government agencies and the care group (Maketu Ongatoro Wetland Society 
n.d). This development of a management plan in collaboration with the Regional Coun-
cil is a novelty and one reason why the Coast Care coordinator regards the group as a 
role model. In relation to his vision for a future with care groups that work mostly inde-
pendently (voiced in Chapter 6), the coordinator sees the Maketu group as “probably 
closer than any of the other ones to fulfilling that objective” (Interview with Pim de 
Monchy, BOP Coast Care).  
When I revisit the project some three and half years after the initial fieldwork, the 
process of professionalization has become even more evident. This time, my contact de-
scribes his work as that of a “semi-professional volunteer”, having contracted himself to 
the Council in fulfilment of the objectives defined by the Biodiversity Management 
Plan. A lot of his work remains voluntary in the sense of being unpaid – the project has 
been extended into ever larger areas of the surrounding wetlands, and I am shown 
“walls of Pampas”: invasive plants common in the wetland area, ripped out and piled up 
several metres high along the channels, waiting to be burned in a large public bonfire. 
But at least part of the tedious work of pest control and trapping is now remunerated by 
the Regional Council. In the process, Damian Hurst, the main organizer of the group, 
and his wife Laura have assembled a whole garage full of tools and objects that play a 
role in producing biosecurity on the dunes and in the wetlands: a quad bike to enter dif-
ficult to reach areas, a trailer for transport, many small and large canisters of herbicides 
neatly arranged on shelves, several “spraypacks”, an assortment of spades and shovels, 
buckets of fertilizers, and a collection of warning and educational signs are crammed in-
to the small space of the garage. 
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The reliance on the authority of science and the willingness and capabilities to en-
gage with the existing bureaucratic tools define the group’s success – but also seem to 
contribute to a perceived weakness: the failure to enrol other locals, especially the 
Māori majority in the economically underprivileged Maketu village86. Substantial parts 
of the area surrounding the spit were returned to the Te Ārawa Lakes Trust in 2006 as 
part of a Treaty of Waitangi settlement. The Trust is the tribal organization of the Te 
Ārawa Iwi which is based in inland Rotorua but has ancestral links to Maketu, the his-
torical landing site of the Te Ārawa waka or voyaging canoe (Tapsell 2012). When in-
terviewed in 2011, Damian expresses his disappointment with what he perceives as 
missing care for the environment by the Trust:  
You know, the Māori make a big thing about kitianga [kaitiakitangi] or whatever it 
is, you know about guardianship and you think well, what do you mean by guardi-
anship, because you […] look at the land, you look at this gully here, and there’s 
one on the other side as well, that belonged to Te Ārawa [Lakes Trust] and you 
look at the wetland as you come into Maketu, all that great mass of Pampas grass 
[an introduced plant species tackled by Coast Care] […]. If you can’t make any 
money out of it, they’re not terribly interested. And so it doesn’t matter, they don’t 
mind if it turns into a jungle sort of thing, just a wasteland, you know. That’s the 
trouble, that once it gets invasive species in there, it’s very difficult to get them out. 
(Interview with Damian Hurst, Maketu Ongatoro Wetland Society) 
 
A recent arrival to Aotearoa New Zealand himself, Damian feels a lack of local support 
for his quest to remove unwanted invaders from the native ecosystem. Because he con-
siders weed and pest control to be of utmost importance, he argues that the occurrence 
of introduced plants on the tribal lands is a sign of missing care that also translates into 
non-participation of Māori in care group activities like planting or trapping. During a 
meeting of the group, a local guy, however, offers a different explanation: the jetty lo-
cated at the beginning of the spit is a very popular fishing spot for Māori (and migrants 
from the Pacific Islands living in the area), and the locals are concerned that heightened 
protection of the birds and the spit could lead to the loss of access to the kai moana or 
seafood so important in Māori cuisine and cosmology.  
This fear that the Maketu Ongatoro Wetland Society could pursue what Adams and 
Mulligan call a fortress conservation approach (Adams and Mulligan 2003) – protecting 
nature by excluding humans and their traditional uses – might be fuelled by the group’s 
                                                
 
86  67% of Maketu residents identified as Māori in the 2013 census, as compared to 18% for the whole 
Western Bay of Plenty District (Statistics New Zealand 2013a). 
 262
goal to turn the area surrounding the spit into a Ramsar site. This UN convention signed 
in Ramsar (Iran) in 1971 regulates the designation of protected wetlands sites (United 
Nations 1971). The connections made by the Maketu care group are oriented towards 
the global scale, to nature protection instruments that function through universalistic 
principles (Descola 2008). Seen from the perspective of what Annemarie Mol and John 
Law (Mol and Law 1994) call a topological approach, the group’s project might be 
closer connected to other sites defined by this international convention than to its im-
mediate surroundings, because the defining principles and narratives of protection are 
framed through international law and science, and not local epistemologies or indige-
nous understandings of caring for the local environment.  
Like in the quote above, Pākeha tend to interpret the low representation of Māori in 
community care groups as refusal to take on responsibility (for a different interpretation, 
see Tūhua Brown in Chapter 5.3). In the Maketu case, however, this hegemonic under-
standing was radically challenged in a situation of emergency. When a container ship 
ran ground close to Tauranga harbour in October 2011, and the Bay of Plenty coast be-
came covered in heavy fuel oils that spilled from the ship, the rocky coast of Maketu 
was cleaned by volunteers who were organized and equipped through Whakaue marae. 
Throughout the region, volunteers literally took the oily matter into their own hands – 
flocking to the beach in great numbers with bucket and shovel, ready to pick up the 
large clumps of sticky oil that soon started to arrive on the coast, but unfortunately also 
spreading the contamination because of insufficient protection gear and a lack of care. 
The authorities were practically forced to organize a volunteer response programme that 
took off in a matter of days after the accident, with tens of thousands of people register-
ing online and on the phone to take part in “Operation Beach-Clean”.  
Operation Beach-Clean was organized through the Maritime New Zealand control 
centre, where a whole division of seconded public servants worked 24/7 on the com-
mercial clean-up and salvage logistics. The Coast Care coordinator became part of the 
volunteer coordination team, and the Coast Care mailing list became one important 
channel of information and volunteer recruitment. Crucially, people were told to wait 
until contacted and assigned to a cleaning team (led by a team supervisor who had re-
ceived special training) and deployed to the beach, according to a grid that worked 
around the tides. After the acute phase, residents formed “Adopt-a-Beach” teams who 
regularly patrolled nearby beaches to quickly respond to occasional oil or cargo that 
continued to wash ashore, though in much smaller quantities. Some of these teams, in 
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turn, were continued as new Coast Care groups. Almost a year later, Pim de Monchy 
reported in a Radio New Zealand feature that 3 out of 11 former Adopt-a-Beach groups 
in the Tauranga area were still active Coast Care groups (Radio New Zealand National 
2012a). 
In the suburban areas around Tauranga, mostly Mount Maunganui and Papamoa 
Beach, this worked out well, and Pim was later named “Regional Coastal Champion” 
by the New Zealand Coastal Society, an award with which the professional society of 
coastal professionals “recognizes individuals who have shown a commitment to the sus-
tainable management of our coastal environment and have made a difference within 
their community”: 
As his nominators explained in their submission, ‘In his role as Volunteer Coordi-
nator on secondment to Maritime New Zealand, Pim stepped up when his commu-
nity needed him most and led an army of volunteers to clean up the beaches in the 
Bay of Plenty, including Mt Maunganui, Papamoa Motiti, Matakana Islands, and 
further afield. Within the first month of the Rena grounding, over 3,000 volunteers 
were organised by Pim and his colleagues to remove the oil and restore our beauti-
ful beaches and also our coastal identity.’ (Biswell 2013: 3) 
 
In Maketu however, everything was different, as “they were a couple of steps ahead of 
the response in terms of organizing themselves as a volunteer group”, as Pim put it on 
Radio New Zealand (Radio New Zealand National 2012a). There, the “coastal identity” 
for many was also essentially a tribal connection, and this required a response that 
acknowledged the principles of indigenous self-organization. The official response took 
this into account and organized a second tier of volunteer coordination structure for iwi, 
and appointed two full-time iwi liaison officers.  
Regardless of this double structure, in Maketu the “locals [took] the matter into their 
own hands”, as TV channel OneNews reported. Instead of waiting to be instructed by 
whatever outside authority, local people gathered at the fire station to organize the 
clean-up. At this public meeting, open conflict broke out over the question of who was 
responsible and who was authorized to make decisions in this situation. Deeper-lying 
questions about rightful belonging emerged and were framed through the question of 
appropriate ways to care for the environment and legitimate forms of participation. 
While the Maketu Ongatoro Wetland Society chair felt he and his care group were well 
positioned to take over the organizing role, it was the Te Ārawa people who successful-
ly insisted that they were the legitimate locals who would take care of the problem. 
Walking out of the public meeting, the marae representatives claimed to organize things 
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through their pre-existing structures, including family and tribal bonds to mainland Ro-
torua – and soon, helpers from there also arrived (Te Arawa 2011). The Whakaue marae 
representative who coordinated the response also stated that she would prefer to make 
the decision locally and then be able to get the necessary assistance from headquarters 
directly – not via the official Operation Beach-Clean iwi response channel. 
Maketu was initially not hit very hard compared to the sandy beaches further west 
which were quickly covered in a thick slick of black oil. In Maketu, two main concerns 
emerged: the rockiness of the beach, which meant that the oil could not be as easily re-
moved as on sand, and the threat that oil could enter into the mouth of the estuary. The 
necessary equipment for those doing the physical clean-up work was delivered to the 
marae and from there distributed to the helpers: locals, Māori affiliated to Te Ārawa, 
and also some people from throughout the country who had wanted to help out but were 
unwilling to follow the official policy of rightful volunteering. The volunteers from “the 
city” however, which had registered through the official database, seemed to vanish on 
their way to rural Maketu.  
On the first weekend after the oil started to spill from the grounded MV Rena, I en-
countered two old acquaintances from the Coast Care world. Simon and Peter, both 
with the experience of having worked for Coast Care, arrived in Maketu as a vanguard 
for 200 volunteers to be sent from “headquarters” in town (Fieldnotes October 2011). 
They were both unhappy about their task, which they perceived as highly politically 
charged; while some voices had called for as many helpers as possible, there remained 
much mistrust towards outside interference in the self-organized response.  
The bicultural underpinning of the conflict was obvious, and the Pākeha men arriv-
ing from the official authorities located in town felt uncomfortable in their position. But 
they reacted delighted to see me: “What do you know?” they asked me when they real-
ized that I had been around a couple of days already. At that point, I had been out on the 
beach around the Maketu surf club with one of the cleaning crews a few times, where 
we tried out a peat moss substance called “spill sorb”. The product was applied to the 
sticky patches of oil on the rocks and rubbed off with a gloved hand or a brush. On the 
day in question, I took off with the guys from headquarters to the spit to wait for the 
Operation Beach-Clean volunteers to arrive – feeling a little disapproval from the others 
who continued the tedious work around the rocks. On the spit, a group of soldiers was 
also waiting for the “civilian volunteers”, as their commander put it. The presence of the 
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army seemed to be much less problematic from the perspective of the marae organizers 
than the expected townspeople.  
Being official coordinators meant that Simon and Peter had to follow health and 
safety regulations, and we delved into a complicated logistical planning about how to 
move the volunteers along the 3.5 km long spit. People had to be called to find a person 
able to contribute a quad bike, to get the key to a gate closing off the spit, and to find 
somebody with a boat so that the volunteers would not need to walk all the way back on 
the spit once they had finished their task, but could be taken over the river mouth to the 
village. Also, a bus was needed to return the people to their cars parked at the spit. But 
then the volunteers never arrived. People at the marae in Maketu village claimed that 
they had sent some people out to the spit, however, nobody ever showed up. There 
seemed to be a tacit agreement between Simon and Peter not to ask too many questions 
about this, the whole story being too embarrassing, a worst case scenario as they told 
me, making a big fuss and in the end not providing any labour.  
The Maketu Ongatoro Wetland Society organizer eventually found a role for himself 
and took on responsibility for the deployment of oil booms across the estuary. Lobbying 
for this technical, precautionary response at Maritime New Zealand, using every contact 
he had, and welcoming TV teams and politicians to Maketu in search of first-hand expe-
rience, he concentrated on what he knew best and on what he cherished the most: the 
dotterel birds, who soon were to be caught and put into “pre-emptive captivity”. One of 
the marae clean-up coordinators approved, telling him in a matter of confirmation: 
“Okay, you can be our wildlife person”.  
This ethnographic vignette of the conflict about who had been entitled to organize 
and to take part in the crisis response shows that work, and also unpaid work, can be in-
extricably linked to questions of rightful belonging. The work in question might most 
appropriately be described as care work, and tangata whenua were determined to gain 
the authority over who can be entrusted with this work. In the times of sudden environ-
mental crisis, the local, and the “cultural” (in the sense of indigenous belonging) be-
came the categories that made most sense in thinking about rights and responsibilities – 
not the universalist nature protection agenda symbolized by the Maketu care group and 
their Ramsar plans. In Maketu, tribal connections re-emerged as the most powerful cri-
teria to define the limits of what counts as local, reaching out to include the inland kin, 
but not recent arrivals from Europe. In hindsight, the Regional Council’s report on the 
volunteer response states that Maketu exemplified the need to modify  
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the volunteer model to meet the differing needs of various communities. Maketu 
people, for example, mobilised local people quickly and began cleaning up their 
beach and estuary areas as soon as the oil arrived. For them, the centrally organized 
public clean-ups were not appropriate and the Volunteer Team needed to listen to 
local issues and concerns, modify their systems and provide support in different 
ways. (Fraser et al. 2012: 12) 
 
The simplest insight here is that just because work is voluntary, that does not mean eve-
ryone has the right to do it – however much they wish to take part. That volunteer work 
is at the same time unpaid work possibly complicates the situation, because it might di-
vert attention from the fact that there are rules to be followed. While Maritime New 
Zealand tried to hold up health and safety, with a centralized structure, instructions and 
protective gear for the volunteers, the Maketu locals concentrated on what they regarded 
most important: keeping the work to themselves. The following excursion away from 
the coast, and to a small, Māori-dominated village bordering Tauranga harbour picks up 
on this idea of ‘working with nature’ relying on a specific entitlement to engage with 
local naturecultues.  
 
 
9.8 “Soft Is What We Can Do Ourselves”:  
   Natureculture Restoration as Employment    
   Project for Māori Youth 
 
Te Puna is a small village on the branched shores of Tauranga Harbour. Mostly Māori 
from the Pirirakau hapū live here87. One of Te Puna’s traditional burial grounds, or uru-
pa, is called Epeha and belongs to Tu Tereinga marae of Pirirakau. Located on top of a 
headland with a fantastic view over the harbour, the site has been subject to cliff ero-
sion, with parts of the clay grounds breaking off and falling down into the estuary. So 
far, the area concerned is still some metres away from most of the graves; however, the 
situation is already a matter of serious concern for the people connected to the urupa. As 
an elder explains, the erosion has progressed since the old days; the graves weren’t as 
close to the edge back then. But also, he underlines that the site has most probably been 
                                                
 
87  Many locals carry French surnames as a reminder of Te Puna’s colonial history: in the 1850s, two 
French sailors from Honfleur on the French Normandy coast – Louis Bidois and Emile Joseph Borell 
– settled here and married women from Pirirakau hapū. The heritage of the “French Māori” is being 
held up by local character and children’s book author Tommy “Kapai” Wilson who self-published a 
book about “Le Whanau” (Wilson 2006) and organized a gourmet hangi for French Rugby supporters 
during the Rugby World Cup in 2011 (Bradley 2011; Irvine 2011). 
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chosen because of the spectacular location: “You will find that we bury our dead at the 
most prominent places, always, that is how we feel about the ones who have gone, that 
is where we think they should be.” (Interview with Pirirakau elder) 
Findings of weapons on an old part of the urupa where graves are unnamed indicate 
that it might have already been in use during the land wars in the mid-19th century. A 
new part was started by the elder’s grandfather in the 1940s. In the meantime, land had 
been confiscated and partitioned by the Crown; the area of the urupa changed hands and 
the new owners tried to prevent further use of the burial ground. However, the Māori 
Land Court decided in favour of this man’s whanau (extended family) which invested 
considerable amounts of money in legal costs “to fight this other family, to still have 
control of what happens with our family and to be able to bury our people there” – to 
gain the right to continue a practice that had never been completely abandoned.  
The current battle consists of ongoing attempts to stabilize the cliff edge. One possi-
bility would be to build a large retaining wall resting on deep foundations, covering the 
instable cliff, and to then fill the irregular gap between wall and cliff with more clay or 
another material. The locals are, however, sceptical about engineering solutions: they 
would be costly, would imply the need to contract technical experts from outside, and 
might even run the critical risk of exposing ko iwi (human remains). Burial grounds are 
considered tapu or sacred, and the exposure of ko iwi is the worst possible violation of 
this tapu. For the time being, another idea is being considered: using a “soft option” and 
planting trees into the cliff edge in the hope that their roots will hold onto it. This would 
be hard physical labour and involve abseiling down the instable cliff. And this is how I 
encountered Akona Miller and her boys from Papatuanuku Environment Care.  
Akona is a friendly, funny and energetic Māori woman in her forties. Her kids and 
her whanau come first for her, and even though money is scarce and they live in a con-
verted shed, “it’s a happy loving shed” (Fieldnotes 15.06.2011). I first met her at Te 
Puna school were she co-organizes an educational workshop for “kids at risk” who are 
unemployed, have dropped off school or have no formal tertiary education and are now 
enrolled into technical training programmes. 98% of the students are Māori, explains 
the trainer (Fieldnotes 15.06.2011). Akona runs the Papatuanuku Environment Care 
group which currently consists of six Māori rangatahi (teenagers), boys between the age 
of 16 and 18. The rangatahi carry out environmental restoration work for which they re-
ceive wages through a program of the Ministry of Social Development. They have an-
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cestral relations with (whakapapa to) Pirirakau, but also other hapū and areas. This ge-
nealogical link is an important aspect in Akona’s concept of the restoration work:  
I try and take the rangatahi out to lots of different cultural sites, not only in Pi-
rirakau, [but] throughout the Bay of Plenty region. And through my good relation-
ships with other tangata whenua they’ll come and give a historical korero [infor-
mation] about the site and tell them why the site’s so significant. But the rangatahi 
that I do have also whakapapa to many different areas. So some of the sites are 
quite specific to one person, so even though all the rangatahi might be enjoying the 
benefits of that knowledge, one in particular will have a strong whakapapa link to 
the tūpuna [ancestors] who used to live there; the ancestors that used to live there. 
So for me it’s all about giving these kids a sense of pride and belonging, and con-
necting to their history as they’re going into the future. […] For me, our tūpuna, 
when they worked, they didn’t have all the implements and tools that we have to-
day. So I think we’re quite privileged. But I still think the obligation to care for 
those sites is there and so while we’re privileged that we have those extra modern 
tools and things like that, we still have that same obligation that they had, and it’s 
an obligation to them and to our environment. And that’s the cultural significance 
for me. (Interview with Akona Miller, Papatuanuku Environment Care)  
 
Through the cultural significance of the sites, environmental restoration work becomes 
a form of working with the ancestors. This reminds of Moana in the previous chapter 
who works on restoring the river, the coast, and on reestablishing the ancestral connec-
tions with her flax garden project. The use of native plants is an obvious part of this 
work on the natural-cultural landscape, even though the need to do so is itself a sign of 
the changes that have taken place; there was no ancestral practice of planting natives: 
Pre-colonisation, everything was native for New Zealand anyway. So other than 
trying to spread their resources or have more intensive areas of resource gathering, 
I don’t think that they went out and planted as we do. But because there’s so many 
exotic species here, now – to preserve our people’s history, I’m all about planting 
natives, and I don’t plant exotics. Especially on cultural sites. (Interview with 
Akona Miller, Papatuanuku Environment Care)  
 
Akona stresses that she thinks of her work as having as strong a link to the past as it is 
providing a vision for the future. For her, this is an act of reconciliation, of finding a 
productive way forward that does not lose sight of the loss that colonization has caused:  
You know our people suffered a lot through the loss of land. You hear it all the 
time you know, our people are in an impoverished state. Would we be if we had re-
tained the land and we were still the major land holders? Would we be in this state? 
That’s the question I ask. I don’t hold anything against anyone post-colonisation 
because they can’t be held accountable today for what their ancestors did. But that 
still is the fact of the matter. And, you know, for us, we just have to get on with it 
and get over it. So that’s my contribution to getting over it, [it] is trying to do posi-
tive things. (Interview with Akona Miller, Papatuanuku Environment Care)  
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For Akona, everything comes down to relationships. This expands also to the Councils 
and government agencies she works with; she explicitly mentions that she met many 
“really good people”:  
So as long as we have people at that level that have the heart and a commitment to 
see tangata whenua being involved and included, you know there’s always hope. 
[…] I think it all comes down to how you relate to people. It’s no good going in 
there jumping up and down: this is what happened, it’s wrong. Because you know 
we don’t live there anymore; we don’t live in that time anymore. And [now], how 
can we work, you know, together to go forward? (Interview with Akona Miller, 
Papatuanuku Environment Care)  
 
Importantly though, this hope is connected to the possibilities of providing paid em-
ployment to Māori youth who are often still losing out in the education sector and the 
formal job market. Papatuanuku Environment Care is not a volunteer group, and a struc-
ture like Coast Care would simply not be suitable for these rangatahi (though some peo-
ple may be able to use Coast Care work as an inroad into employment, see Chapter 7.2). 
Akona makes the point: 
Care groups are often elderly people. We need to encourage younger people, but 
they often don’t understand voluntary work. I am talking about real kids here, not 
the university kids, kids that do not have these possibilities, ‘kids at risk’. (Field-
notes 15.06.2011) 
 
The actual funding structure of Papatuanuku Environment Care is complicated and crea-
tive: Akona is a registered contractor for all three Councils in the area. At different sites 
around the Bay of Plenty, the young men provide physical labour to restoration projects. 
Akona gets paid by the Council clients when she herself takes part in the physical work, 
but she does not charge for the young men’s work as they receive their wages from the 
Ministry of Social Development (MSD). This funding has to be reapplied for every year 
– when I spoke to Akona the project was already in its fourth year. Akona then puts 
most of the money she receives from the Council back into the project to buy tools and 
other provisions like agrochemicals. The MSD also provides some funding for supervi-
sion of the rangatahi – this money goes to Akona’s cousin who helps her and seems to 
need the money more urgently. With all this juggling of a precarious financial arrange-
ment, Akona is still positive and laughs away:  
It’s certainly not economic gain that’s for sure! That’s more like economic loss! 
But you know: get another job. If you haven’t got enough money, get another job! 
Yeah. I’ve got three, I wouldn’t want to have four. (Interview with Akona Miller, 
Papatuanuku Environment Care)  
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When I meet Akona and “the boys” at their seminar, Kingi Martens from the local Estu-
ary Care group (which removes mangroves from the Te Puna estuary, see Chapter 9.4) 
delivers a talk on why caring for the environment is important, and for Māori even more 
so. Kingi promotes the idea to work in the restoration business: “Learning about re-
source consents and about environmental stuff – that’s how we gonna protect our lands. 
Not with fitting tyres or picking kiwifruit.” (Fieldnotes 15.06.2011) He also speaks 
about “hard” and “soft” measures to deal with (coastal and cliff) erosion, and rests his 
case for the latter by exclaiming that “soft is what we can do ourselves” (ibid).  
However, when we visit the urupa again another day (Fieldnotes 04.07. 2011), the 
slip has worsened and Akona now thinks of contacting one of the engineering firms 
from nearby Tauranga; there she has had good experience with a trustworthy technical 
expert who shows consideration for Māori concerns. This will probably be approved of 
by the marae elder who said before about the erosion that “we have to do whatever we 
can do to stop it” (Fieldnotes 03.10.2011). This makes it clear that the use of soft op-
tions is not a matter of idealism here, nor is it the only way to protect the ancestral herit-
age. Rather, it is one option that might be preferred for the reasons already mentioned; 
however, the decision how to proceed is a pragmatic one. This is about a sacred site; as 
Kingi Martens puts it, “this is more important than just protecting property – it is about 
our tūpuna. If we loose this, we loose everything” (Fieldnotes 15.06.2011). The boys, in 
the meantime, look at the slip and discuss structural solutions. Even though they will 
not be able to take part in the project anymore if the engineering company steps in, they 
still have ideas; one of them shows me a sketch he drew of a retention wall – “put it rite 
in the ground”, he has written next to it, and included plans for the right material and 
where to plant trees afterwards. Akona and Kingi, in the meantime, inspect the urupa 
and decide where to clear vegetation to unravel the original trenches, another mainte-
nance project that will soon be worked on by the rangatahi.  
While the issue with Te Puna’s cliffs eroding into Tauranga Harbour is different 
from the effects of coastal erosion on the sandy beaches in the Bay of Plenty, many of 
the themes that have been emerging throughout the previous three chapters come to-
gether here: the complex economies of paid and unpaid work (Chapter 7), the use of na-
ture restoration practices as a soft coastal protection practice (Chapter 8), and the mak-
ing of native naturecultures (Chapter 9). 
 
 
 271 
9.9 Working with Native Natures 
From the exemplary field sites assembled in the course of this chapter, reconstructing 
native nature emerges as an important way of putting ‘working with nature’ into prac-
tice. This sociotechnical imaginary, as has been argued before, relies on multiple and 
material practices of making coastal natures (also including public discourse and 
knowledge production). The contemporary renaissance of native nature and culture in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, spanning across biodiversity conservation and bicultural poli-
tics, forms a backdrop against which the ‘working with nature’ imaginary currently 
fuels coastal restoration practices.  
This reconstruction of an imagined New Zealand coastal nature is an example for the 
coproduction of natural and cultural orders (Jasanoff 2004). The right state of Aotearoa 
New Zealand coastal nature is at stake here, with restoration practice as a way of trans-
lating ongoing self-reflection about the country’s bicultural past, present, and future into 
the politics and practices of nature. A pervasive sense of national natural identity is pro-
duced in the process, just as the Comaroffs have described it for the South African case 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). The practices of reconstructing native nature help ac-
tors to articulate a sense of who they are and to locate themselves in and through “spac-
es for nature” (Hinchliffe 2007: 6). For Māori, the recurrence to genealogical links can 
become a vital aspect of connecting native nature and culture. However, the nature-
making practices of coastal restoration play an important role for imagining the bicul-
tural nation, not only for those who themselves identify as indigenous. As Mark Dean 
has put it above, coastal restoration is about working on New Zealand being “like Ao-
tearoa and not like a mini England” (Radio New Zealand National 2012b: 00:02:51). 
What is at stake here is the distinctiveness of Aotearoa New Zealand’s natureculture, 
that is at least partly expressed through the native plants and the coastal landscapes they 
inhabit. 
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10. Understanding Nature, Making Waves:
Multipurpose Reefs 
Coastal experts set high hopes on scientific progress and the increasing knowledge 
about the natural dynamics of coastal processes produced by the relatively young disci-
pline of coastal science (Schwartz 2005: 1099). One of the most popular textbooks on 
coastal engineering for example – introducing students to the profession that designs 
and builds coastal protection measures – states that “[t]here is a trend toward softer and 
less obtrusive coastal structures”, characterized by “less negative aesthetic impact” 
(Sorensen 2006: 5f.). This development, the author explains, has been aided by advanc-
es in numerical modelling, as well as by political processes: “In some coastal areas 
coastal structures are discouraged” (ibid). This last empirical chapter deals with artifi-
cial reefs, a so-called soft engineering technology used for coastal protection. The ap-
proach differs significantly from the dune restoration techniques discussed so far: while 
also framed as soft protection, this is a high-tech intervention whose merits are argued 
on basis of its innovative and science-based character. The main focus of the chapter 
lies on fieldwork conducted at ASR, a former New Zealand-based company which de-
veloped artificial reefs for multiple uses. The chapter illustrates the incremental role that 
coastal science and surfing as well as the dream of artificial surf breaks have played for 
this technology to work technically, socially and economically. I will discuss exactly 
how the framing of the approach as soft, multifunctional, and working “in concert with 
nature” has been achieved. A failure in the eyes of the surfing community in terms of 
the goal to produce better surf breaks, the coastal protection aspect of the technology 
still seems promising, especially as it goes hand in hand with economic development 
agendas for the coast. 
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10.1 The Dream of Artificial Surfing Breaks  
 
My fieldwork takes place in 2011 at ASR, a marine consultancy that has its office in the 
small coastal town of Raglan on the west coast of New Zealand1 – a remote place even 
for New Zealand standards, while at the same time a centre of the globalized surfing 
world. Famous for its long right-handed break featured in the classic surf movie “End-
less Summer” (Brown 1966), Raglan is populated by surfing tourists, backpackers, and 
daytrippers during the summer months, and home to about 2,600 locals all year round, 
many of them seasoned surfers themselves. From Hamilton, the university town and 
centre of the Waikato region, one drives up and down around the typical mix of green 
hills, sheep and dense areas of Manuka trees, to the little town nestled into Whaingaroa 
Harbour. The road passes through the town and leads past a series of surf breaks before 
it turns into a windy gravel road that leads around Mount Karioi and towards some re-
mote farms and lonely beaches, beyond the scope of most summer tourists. 
The ASR office is located in the very centre of town, spanning the second floor of a 
building that hosts shops selling surfing equipment, souvenirs and clothes on the ground 
floor. On entering the office, one passes a kitchen area towards the reception, where 
Mary, the secretary, sits – a big, chatty, middle-aged matron with a good sense of hu-
mour. She is a daily commuter from Hamilton, and the only female permanent employ-
ee. While she might look like a typical secretary for a small company, the rest of the 
team emanates the spirit of a surfing picture. Most of the team are sitting in two large 
rooms: the technical staff in one, and the interns in the other. Whereas there are one or 
two female interns, only men are on the permanent team. It is easy to spot on first sight 
that most of them are surfers, even before the running gag of the “board meeting” 
reaches my ears, which means that the board of directors is on their boards, out of office 
in the middle of the work day, gone surfing. The surfing beaches and the general ameni-
ty of living in Raglan is a strong incentive for the interns, too: MA students coming 
from Europe – mostly Germany and France – to spend an average of six months of un-
paid work at the company2.  
                                                
 
1  The fieldwork was conducted one year before the company went into liquidation and the majority of 
the team started a new firm called eCoast, see below. 
2  There are no kiwi interns, I am told, because “Kiwis can’t afford it, we don’t have the socialized edu-
cation system that you have there; we need to f[…] work or we’re fucked”. 
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Under the motto “Understand, Innovate, Sustain”, ASR provides a number of ser-
vices in terms of coastal research and sustainable management, ranging from fieldwork 
and numerical modelling to marine spatial planning, port and infrastructure develop-
ment, and coastal risk assessments. Most people however know ASR as “the reef guys” 
– the company that designs and constructs artificial reefs. Originally named Artificial 
Surfing Reef, the technique is now marketed as MPR, the acronym standing for Multi 
Purpose Reef. This change in names is symptomatic of the history of ASR varying be-
tween promoting its reefs primarily as a means of enhancing surfing conditions, or as a 
coastal protection technique, or as a multifunctional approach combining both with eco-
logical benefits.  
The history of the technique and the ASR company itself is tied up in publicly fund-
ed research projects. In 1995, the University of Waikato and the National Institute of 
Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) started the Artificial Reefs Programme 
(ARP). Under this umbrella, Coastal Science Professor Kerry Black and a number of his 
postgraduate students started working on the design of submerged structures installed 
underwater and off-shore to influence wave patterns. In this regard, artificial reefs can 
be seen as a form of detached breakwaters, common coastal protection structures used 
to keep more sand on the beach (Herbich 2000). On the other hand, artificial reefs have 
long been used to attract marine life for fishing and recreational purposes, especially 
diving. Any structure located on a sandy seabed will be quickly colonized by marine life 
typical for naturally occurring rocky reef structures (Mead and Borrero 2011: 2). This 
effect is well-known, and artificial reefs have often been constructed throughout the 
world by sinking scrap materials ranging from old tires to washing machines, ship 
wrecks or retired subway cars (United States Department of Commerce National Ocean-
ic and Atmospheric Administration 2007; Urbina 2008). 
But Kerry and his team were thinking bigger: their aim was to use the latest advances 
in coastal science, including the growing capacities for numerical modelling, to design 
large artificial reefs that could predictably affect the surf zone in order to fulfil an old 
dream of the surfing community: to create artificial surfbreaks. A commercial enterprise 
developed out of the ARP when Kerry Black – followed by some of his former students 
– left the University after a conflict over how deeply the institution could be involved in 
the actual construction of New Zealand’s first artificial reef project at Mount Maun-
ganui in the Bay of Plenty. Science and business finally merged when ASR installed its 
Raglan office. 
 276
The quick progress that numerical modelling tools and data processing power have 
made during recent years means that effects of artificial reef structures can be modelled 
with the help of 3D computer software developed by the gaming industry. Physical 
models have to be built and tested only as a next step. The actual multipurpose reef is 
constructed of very large geotextile bags that are filled with sand. Dave Becker, who 
has worked for ASR since the start of the company, explains what makes the product an 
innovation even though submerged breakwaters themselves are nothing new:  
Submerged breakwaters have worked very well [in the past] … In some areas of 
the world they are used a lot: they have been used around the Mediterranean a lot, 
they use them in Japan a lot. […] The only thing we do different is one: look at the 
multipurpose purpose aspects of them, and that’s in terms of the surfing, and we’ve 
learnt more and more; that’s been a new thing, a very innovative and new thing. 
[…] The other thing really is applying that understand principle, we are measuring 
waves and currents and then we are modelling them and modelling the response so 
that they are designed properly. (Interview with Dave Becker, ASR) 
 
As the first student from the original ARP group to finish his doctoral degree, Dave 
wrote an analysis of famous surfbreaks worldwide. The coastal science questions he put 
to the characteristics of surfbreaks exemplify the ARP approach to develop its “under-
standing principle”: 
What is it that makes a good surfing break? I mean, you can describe it but I 
wouldn’t say it’s hollow, it’s fast, it’s heavy, whatever; surfers all know that and 
then surfers can look at a wave in a mag[azine] and say, ‘Oh, that looks like 
Chopes [a famous surfbreak at Teahupoo, Tahiti], that looks like so and so’, but 
how do we define the shape of that wave with actual numerical parameters, what 
[is] the shape of the seabed, how fast are the waves? All those things came out of 
the Artificial Reefs Programme. (Interview with Dave Becker, ASR) 
 
In talking about his PhD project, Dave relates surfing and science: his interest has de-
veloped out of his own experience as a surfer, but it is essential to define this as a sci-
ence question, which distinguishes it from the experimental knowledge of the common 
surfer. At the same time, this remains a difference in degree rather than in kind. What is 
described by Dave as really different is the discipline of coastal engineering, which he 
believes has a substantially different approach from coastal science:  
I mean the surfing was something that made me personally get into this thing, but 
the driving factor […] is that we’ve come out as academics […]. As academics 
there is the knowledge and the understanding within the world to do better jobs. 
We know that seawalls bugger up the thing, and that’s why I say it’s not being ap-
plied by the guy with the bucket and spade and a Civil Engineering degree, he 
should be building roads not pissing around on the coast. And that is my motiva-
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tion for sure – apply our understanding that we’ve got and also develop better un-
derstanding. It’s a young discipline. (Interview with Dave Becker, ASR) 
 
These coastal experts perceive their role as fundamentally opposed to what they call 
“the engineering approach” (Fieldnotes 20./23.05.2011). They have “gone down the 
modelling path” (ibid); they try to understand and quantify the environment before they 
start “messing around with it” (Interview with Dave Becker), whereas “most coastal en-
gineering is done without collecting any data”, but “standing on the beach and keeping 
dry feet” (ibid), applying standard solutions to complex issues and only addressing the 
small scope of property protection, not the bigger picture of the beach. The possible im-
pact of engineered structures on the waves – of vital interest for surfers – is usually not 
on the engineers’ agenda.  
Many of the existing surfbreaks worldwide are in fact artificial, because they are the 
unintentional result of coastal structures such as jetties that have been built in the 
coastal area and now influence the wave climate. An article in the “Surfer Magazine” 
online edition explains the phenomenon to its audience: 
Nature makes waves. Man makes surf. And pretty damn good surf, too. Granted, 
not deliberately. In fact, with almost no exception, any attempt man has made to 
design and produce rideable surf has met with lamentable failure. And yet the 
coastlines of the world are littered with breaks that without man’s helping hand – 
man’s uncaring and often destructive hand – would otherwise not exist. (Surfer 
Magazine 2010b) 
 
So why not try to deliberately design new surfbreaks or enhance existing ones? Already 
in 1967, a famous Californian surfer called Ron Drummond predicted that “specialized 
surfing reefs could be perfected to produce practically any type of wave desired” – 
which he found desirable not only for more variety, but also to “relieve the terribly 
overcrowded situation that exists” (Sanders 2005). In fact, the first attempt to create an 
artificial surfing break was meant to reduce overcrowding of a popular surf spot: Cable 
Station close to Perth in Western Australia. Another project, Pratte’s Reef, was built in 
El Segundo, California, in 2000, as a compensatory measure financed by Chevron. The 
oil company had constructed a jetty to protect an outfall pipe in 1984, a permitted ac-
tivity only under the condition that, if the wave climate were negatively affected, the 
company would make up for it. When monitoring showed that the surf had deteriorated, 
Chevron and the Surfrider Foundation – a political lobby group of surfers – agreed on 
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the construction of the reef, which was named after the Surfrider Foundation co-founder 
Tom Pratte (Sanders 2005).  
However, the reef did not perform as expected and was removed in 2008, probably 
because of its insufficient size (Mead and Borrero 2011: 4) – as “volume, volume, vol-
ume” seems the decisive factor for successful surfing reef design (Surfer Magazine 
2010a). Yet the episode triggered some discussion on the normative questions related to 
the idea of creating nature and the stance of the Surfrider foundation towards compensa-
tory measures – a difficult question for a group that had gradually turned from “a surf-
ing group concerned with the environment” into a “group of environmentalists who 
surf”, according to commentator Marcus Sanders from Surfline Magazine (Sanders 
2005). Sanders reflects on the commonalities with wetland mitigation projects in the 
US: 
Pratte’s Reef is essentially the same thing. Chevron is saying ‘whoops, we ruined 
this wave, so here’s another one to take its place. Sorry ‘bout that, guys’. If we fig-
ure out how to reproduce waves – whether for shoreline erosion or surfing or both 
– the challenge then becomes slightly more philosophical. Is it fair for a company 
to destroy a surf spot if it promises that it’ll build one to replace it? (Sanders 2005) 
 
Hamish Rennie, a New Zealand geographer who has been involved with ASR and the 
idea of artificial surfing reefs from the very beginning, is concerned with such off-
setting activities and insists that “natural surfbreaks are important because they are natu-
ral phenomena” (Fieldnotes 05.07.2011), resting his argument on a clear distinction be-
tween natural and artificial breaks. In a statement of evidence for the Proposed New 
Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2008 that Rennie prepared for the New Zealand Surf-
break Protection Society, he elaborates:  
It is important to recognise that artificial surfbreaks are relatively recent. Their 
long-term effectiveness is being monitored with interest. If proven, then they offer 
the potential to add new, improved or less damaged surfbreaks, but the technology 
does not yet exist to be confident that a natural surfbreak can be restored or recre-
ated artificially. It is clearly preferable at present to avoid damage to natural surf-
breaks, as opposed to attempting to use artificial breaks to mitigate or provide rem-
edies for their damage or destruction. This is not to suggest that there is not a place 
for multipurpose artificial reefs, especially where there are no existing natural surf-
breaks. However, given the time needed to adequately assess the effects of such ar-
tificial surf reefs, I do not consider they will be able to provide a proven means to 
mitigate or remedy damage of natural breaks in the next ten years. (Rennie n.d.: 9) 
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The idea to intentionally create artificial breaks – be they compensatory measures or 
meant to create new surfing spots – has in any case been a matter of vital interest for the 
surfing community. Tommy Hamilton, who also works at ASR, puts it: 
You’d just have to say the words artificial reef and surfers, just the idea of it, it’s 
like, ‘Fuck I’m sitting on this bank and it’s just turned to crap; it’d be great if we 
had a reef, if we could do something more permanent, if we could just change this 
little bit’. I’m sitting here, a 40 kilometre long beach and there’s crap everywhere, 
the whole beach is crap, and the idea that we could change and influence and do 
things to make better surf it’s just like, hoh! And we have, people have by accident, 
you know there’s plenty of artificial waves around the world that are insane and 
it’s like, ‘Well, shit, let’s try and do that on purpose’, so that’s the promise and you 
don’t have to say shit, and that gets people excited as hell. Then you start saying 
shit and you start saying that it’s gonna be good and phurrh, the expectations go 
through the roof. (Interview with Tommy Hamilton, ASR) 
 
The success of Surfrider and similar organisations such as Save the Waves, SurfAid in-
ternational or – in New Zealand – the Surfbreak Protection Society, are expressions of 
the deep connection that most surfers feel with the ocean, often described as a quasi 
spiritual experience (Kerby 2010; Moore 2011), which for many triggers the motivation 
to protect the coastal environment – in this case understood as safeguarding waves. 
ASR has been collaborating with the Surfbreak Protection Society in relation to a new 
provision introduced with the latest version of the New Zealand Coastal Policy State-
ment, which aims at protecting “surfbreaks of national importance” (Policy 16, Depart-
ment of Conservation 2010: 19). Again combining professional knowledge as coastal 
scientists and personal interests as passionate surfers, a new instrument has been devel-
oped: the Surfability Impact Assessment, a form of environmental impact assessment 
for coastal construction projects (ASR America LLC 2011).  
The ASR marketing concept heavily draws upon the credibility of being surfing sci-
entists – and on coastal science approaches as a means of ‘working with nature’. In a 
promotional video called “Making waves”, the business is presented as a “mission”: 
What drives us is protecting what is precious for us and for many people around 
the world. We work in concert with nature. Instead of building ugly seawalls, we 
build our geotextile reefs, which are far less intrusive than seawalls. […] Nature 
makes good reefs. We wanna reproduce it. We wanna understand how nature 
works, we’ve gone out, we’ve measured the shape of the seabed and the reefs. 
What we’ve been able to do is find what makes reefs so perfect. […] The people in 
our company, and all of us, you know, we’re surfers, and we really understand and 
love this environment. We go into the water on an almost daily basis, we interact 
with the ocean, and we take that overriding experience into what we do. We want 
to have an impact on how our beaches and coastlines are managed. Making waves, 
saving beaches, helping beaches […] On the journey we surf, we visit new places, 
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and always work hard to enhance coastal communities around the world. Halleluja! 
(ASR Ltd. 2010) 
 
However, the ethos of surfing has made it a difficult balancing act for the ASR team to 
translate between their roles as surfers, activists, scientists, and operators of a commer-
cial enterprise. This became especially noticeable when surfers started to fiercely criti-
cize the ASR’s artificial reef projects in internet forums and online comments on press 
coverage. The tenor of the critique was that the ASR projects realized in New Zealand, 
the UK, Australia and India had not produced better surfing conditions. ASR employee 
John Green attributes much of the disappointment to unrealistic expectations: 
We’re dealing with people who aren’t educated in this field either, you know. We 
know obviously because we work in this industry and it’s what we’ve been doing 
for a long time. But a lot of people think that you build a reef and it’s gonna create 
waves magically. We have that in Boscombe [in the UK]. We had finished the reef 
and we would have the public saying, ‘When do the waves start?’ And for a joke 
we’d say, ‘Well we have to run the cable. We have to run the cable from the reef 
up the beach and we have to put the switch in so that when we flick the switch 
you’ll see waves’. You know, people have got no idea that the reef is there to try 
and condition waves to break. It doesn’t make waves break or it doesn’t create 
waves itself you know. (Interview with John Green, ASR) 
 
Media attention itself has been negative too, claiming that that the projects had taken 
considerable overtime for completion and the final costs had exceeded budgets (Tele-
graph Media Group Limited 2010; Leighton 2011; McPherson 2011). Interview part-
ners at ASR argued that this was unfair and mostly unsubstantiated, that the responsibil-
ity for delays and unfinished projects often had nothing to do with ASR, and felt that 
the new US management had not addressed the issues in a constructive way. However, 
they also admitted that the original founder of the company had “oversold” or promised 
too much in terms of surfing enhancement. Nevertheless, surfing magazine articles did 
take part in celebrating the idea, testified by quotes such as the following lines introduc-
ing a 2004 interview with Kerry Black in the Surfing Magazine: “In the cosmos of surf-
ing there is God, there is Mother Nature, and there is Dr Kerry Black” (Walker 2004). 
At least, Kerry’s attitude contributed significantly to the popularity of the business. Dur-
ing the interview, Tommy tries to give me an impression of the matter: 
You haven’t met Kerry but I think five minutes with the guy you’d probably quite 
easily see that if he was enthusiastic and thinking that other people were wrong, he 
would react in a certain way and that burned a lot of bridges for us. But at the same 
time that enthusiasm and tenacity got the company where it is today. I don’t know, 
you’ve kinda gotta take the good with the bad in some ways […], that’s the way it 
is. And shit, there’s a lot of, it’s a small community, people, academics have big 
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egos and they tend to live for conflict and they argue amongst each other, that’s 
just the way it is. (Interview with Tommy Hamilton, ASR) 
 
At the time of fieldwork, Kerry had already left the business: he had sold his shares to 
an American investor who was putting high hopes into the artificial reefs technique, not 
only for surfing, but also as a means of soft coastal protection with a promising future in 
a world with increasing values concentrated in some areas of highly developed, but vul-
nerable coastlines. Tommy believes that the East Coast of the US could offer enormous 
possibilities for the company in case the US Army Corps of Engineers – the government 
agency responsible for coastal protection issues – would be willing to “accept the idea” 
of multipurpose reef construction for coastal protection (Fieldnotes 20./23.05.2011). 
From the start, the Artificial Reefs Program (and later ASR) had been exploring the 
use of artificial reefs as a coastal protection technique, regardless of the high hopes put 
into what the proponents called “surfing enhancement”. Framing the technique as an al-
ternative to hard structures has been essential – “build reefs, not walls” reads an ASR 
banner used for social media sites. Narrowneck reef on the Australian Gold Coast was 
“the first ever MPR designed primarily for coastal protection while attempting to incor-
porate surfing enhancement” (Mead and Borrero 2011: 4), and also the first project built 
by the founder-to-be of ASR in 1999. It received a Queensland Earth Environment 
Award in 2000 (Council of the City of Gold Coast n.d.). In light of the widespread 
doubts that the dream of creating or enhancing surfbreaks with artificial reefs will be-
come true any time soon, it seems a sensible strategy for ASR to concentrate more on 
the soft protection framing and function of the MPR approach. In a climate-changed 
world with a growing interest in sustainable or soft protection methods, this seems like-
ly to be a more promising option for the future of the business.  
Dave Becker is convinced that the deficits of the American office in dealing with 
setbacks and bad press in relation to the Boscombe reef, ASR’s first European reef pro-
ject constructed at Bornemouth beach in the UK, has closed the door to the surfing and 
tourism applications of multipurpose reefs, and that “the only way we will go forward 
with multipurpose reefs now is via coastal protection projects” (Interview with Dave 
Becker, ASR). But at the same time, the surfing aspect remains the unique selling point 
and the reason for ASR’s high degree of familiarity. As Tommy puts it, talking “about 
the coastal protection side of things” created only “a tenth or a hundredth of the excite-
ment from the surfing world” (Interview with Tommy Hamilton, ASR). 
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This double bind is also reflected when ASR employees talk about the role that 
MPRs play for the company’s self image. The ASR team is often perceived as “the reef 
guys”, because ASR’s reef projects are what is most widely known and associated with 
the company. But as Tommy insists, they are not just “fucking reefs salespersons” 
(Fieldnotes 20./23.05.2011) meaning that reef design is not the only answer to coastal 
management issues the company has to offer. In fact, as mentioned above, artificial reef 
projects continue to be only one part of the marine consultancy – between 20 and 30% 
of the projects and turnover each year; the core business remains numerical modelling 
(Interview with Dave Becker). Again, this perception is at least partly attributed to the 
company’s own strategic behaviour in the early days of artificial reef design. Tommy 
comments on what he thinks of as unrealistic expectations: 
Back in the day, ASR really pushed the idea of multipurpose reefs and I can under-
stand that at that time it was like, ‘Dude we’ve just come up with a technology’, 
that we feel like we’ve proved in Narrowneck, and the numerical modelling and all 
the work that we done. That would displace huge, huge, huge budgets that are gon-
na go into hard coastal protection that we could grab a hold of. So, you know, the 
promise was pretty huge and the excitement from a perspective of coastal protec-
tion was pretty, pretty big and it was probably, really, reasonably justifiable. What 
they probably didn’t realize is ... and this is probably a tale of it that happens all the 
time; you know engineers just presume that the people and society will react in a 
certain way to a development or a new innovation. And they probably should have 
realized that that doesn’t happen that way very often. (Interview with Tommy 
Hamilton, ASR) 
 
 
10.2 Towards Multifunctionality – A Soft Option? 
 
Promoting the reefs as a matter of surfing enhancement, versus framing them first and 
foremost as coastal protection, is also literally a material question, because it concerns 
the scale of the project necessary to achieve the desired effect. The coastal protection 
function of artificial reefs is based on an alteration of wave patterns which may lead to a 
stabilization of the beach. The objective is to stop coastal erosion by influencing the 
wave climate to keep more sand in the coastal system (or, in coastal science terms, to 
induce changes to the overall sediment budget). In theory, the additional sand will be 
deposited in the form of a salient, forming a wider beach, which in turn offers additional 
protection. Another possible application is to combine artificial reefs with beach renour-
ishment in order to keep added sand on the beach for a longer time span, extending the 
period before the nourishment needs to be repeated. The surfing aspect is more compli-
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cated to plan and realize and works on a different scale. To influence the coastal system 
in a way that has a measurable effect on the surf, the structure has to be specifically de-
signed and, most importantly, be of significant size.  
But what is it that makes artificial reefs count as a soft engineering approach? ASR 
explicitly promotes artificial reefs as a soft coastal protection method and claims to be 
“one of the few companies in the world developing innovative solutions for coastal pro-
tection that work in concert with natural processes rather than against them” (ASR Ltd. 
n.d.). Forming a wider beach, the argument goes, provides a natural form of coastal pro-
tection. As Dave puts it, “a wide healthy beach is your best form of coastal protection” 
(Interview with Dave Becker, ASR). While this is arguably achieved by manipulating 
natural processes, this intervention is framed simply as a matter of assisting nature, 
mimicking natural coastal dynamics or even improving nature. Dave Becker contem-
plates the question of how to define soft options: 
Yeah what is a soft option? Sand isn’t soft either, you know. But I guess... from my 
perspective it’s a soft option if it’s not on the beach and it’s not causing damage to 
the beach or elsewhere. If anything it’s enhancing it, yeah that’s where we got to. 
(Interview with Dave Becker, ASR) 
 
Since the sociotechnical imaginary to ‘work with nature’, here understood as natural 
coastal processes, is such a strong objective for the company and part and parcel of its 
marketing approach, it seems important for ASR to ensure that artificial reefs are de-
fined as soft protection in legal terms as well. However, in the context of recent coastal 
policy in New Zealand, the definition of artificial reefs has been subject to discussion. 
The now superseded proposed version of the current New Zealand Coastal Policy 
Statement (Department of Conservation 2008) listed artificial reefs as hard protection 
structures in a glossary of technical terms. Shaw Mead, ASR’s technical director, wrote 
a submission to the statement where he argued that 
artificial, or ‘multi-purpose’ reefs are located offshore of the beach and are sub-
merged – unlike hard protection structures, they are not built on the beach and are 
designed and built to address the causes of coastal erosion rather than the effects. 
Another important distinction is that they can [sic] and are usually built from sand-
filled geotextile containers, which can be easily emptied and removed if needed, 
unlike rock or concrete structures they are not ‘hard’. (ASR Ltd. n.d.) 
 
Here, more arguments for the softness of the technique are introduced: its reversibility, 
and that it explicitly targets the causes of erosion. Or, as Tommy puts it, the aim is to 
protect the beach and not only the properties built next to it. A seawall might achieve 
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the same, but at the expense of the beach: “If a seawall works as intended you don’t 
have a high tide beach. […] If you have a seawall and a high tide beach, you wouldn’t 
have needed the seawall.” (Fieldnotes 20./23.05. 2011) 
Geographers J. A. G. Cooper and J. McKenna, however, argue differently. In their 
paper on “Working with natural processes: the challenge for coastal protection strate-
gies” (Cooper and McKenna 2008b), they observe a continuum of approaches claiming 
to work with natural processes, spanning from what they call the “engineering perspec-
tive – the deliberate manipulation of the shoreline to satisfy human need/preference” to 
the “ecosystem perspective”, which they characterize as “permitting sufficient space for 
coastal adjustment to changing natural circumstances” (Cooper and McKenna 2008b: 
318, see Chapter 1). Quoting examples from the coastal engineering literature as well as 
from policy and coastal management plans, they observe a “range of visions of the con-
cept of ‘working with natural processes’” in coastal protection (Cooper and McKenna 
2008b: 317): 
At one extreme […] is the aim to allow sufficient space for natural processes to op-
erate […] while at the other is the construction of hard structures such as offshore 
breakwaters that are viewed as working with natural processes in the sense that the 
structure causes a change in the natural sedimentary dynamics […]. Between the 
two extremes are a range of ‘soft engineering’ approaches such as beach nourish-
ment, artificial dune construction, beach drainage, saltmarsh creation that seek to 
augment sediment supply, enhance sediment accumulation rates or minimise ero-
sion rates using human intervention in natural processes but avoiding permanent 
solid structures. (Cooper and McKenna 2008b: 318) 
 
Beach nourishment is located in the middle, as one example for an approach that is “re-
sisting natural trends with ‘soft’ engineering”. While Cooper and McKenna do not ex-
plicitly mention artificial reefs, it can be assumed that they would actually classify them 
– in analogy to offshore breakwaters – as hard structures (though ones that still claim to 
work with natural processes and not against them). 
In regard to ASR and the multipurpose reef approach, the disputed glossary entry 
was removed in the final version of the policy (Department of Conservation 2010). In 
any case, artificial reefs do substantially differ from other approaches framed as soft 
protection in regard to the amount of resources they require. Tommy explains the speci-
ficity of reef projects in comparison to managed retreat, but also dune restoration: 
It makes it come into an interesting dynamic because of the amount of resources 
that are needed, because of the understanding that’s required and the degree of ex-
pertise that’s required to make a multipurpose reef […] compared to ‘okay we just 
buy your property and you move’, you know. Or we revegetate the sand dune with 
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vegetation that’s going to cause or induce better dune shape and sand retention 
when storms happen; all those sorts of things. The difference [is that] there’s a 
quite a big jump if you think about the resources that are required and the investi-
gation that’s needed, between doing those sort of – for the most part – terrestrial 
soft options activities compared to building a structure offshore and under water 
[…]. (Interview with Tommy Hamilton, ASR) 
 
In terms of the scale of resources needed, soft engineering projects can easily equal tra-
ditional, hard engineering approaches. Even more so, artificial reef projects may require 
work in the design stages that tends to be more expensive than a conventional seawall 
design. Field data have to be collected to quantify the coastal morphology, currents and 
waves. This feeds into the modelling which is necessary to assess the feasibility of an 
artificial reef project at a specified location before a detailed design can be made. The 
construction phase is only the last step in this process; however, it is crucial as only a 
fully completed reef work may work as intended.  
In contrast to land-based soft options, artificial reefs are expensive technologies. 
While coastal restoration activities are to the most part low tech, low investment and 
volunteer-based – “soft is what we can do ourselves”, as Kingi Martens put it in Chapter 
9.9 – artificial reef projects require investments of millions of dollars. Tommy empha-
sizes that the idea of using soft options often coincides with the expectation that these 
are less costly, in his example compared to groynes, structures that are built perpendicu-
lar to the coast to act as wave breakers and to retain sediment: 
So yeah, it becomes a big jump between ‘okay, well soft options are all good’ and 
then you go, ‘oh, okay but we need a groyne field budget to be able to give a 
groyne field similar outcome’. (Interview with Tommy Hamilton, ASR) 
 
Not only is a considerable amount of money necessary, but the degree of invasiveness 
in the coastal environment might also be perceived as inadequate. Tommy explains how 
the construction process of an artificial reef might be incompatible with common no-
tions of softness or ‘working with nature’: 
It’s [perceived by people to be] okay to design something that can be done with 
volunteers and there’s a community involvement, but when you get all industrial 
and you build a big structure you’re jumping up in resources, and the actual con-
struction process is quite invasive on a beach. And […], there’s no sort of getting 
around it and there’s no sort of touchy feely, let’s all go plant some sand dunes or 
do a beach clean up or […] architecturally design our house so it can be moved or 
whatever. (Interview with Tommy Hamilton, ASR) 
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From the perspective of the ASR company, the question of cost and the availability of 
(public or private) funds remains the decisive factor in regard to the future success of ar-
tificial reef schemes. But the technique is still experimental and would require signifi-
cant investment to further develop and prove – “or otherwise!” comments Jim Dahm. In 
his opinion, none of the MPR projects so far has really delivered, though there might 
still be a chance for it to work – emerging technologies take a while to develop and per-
fect, you do not always get it right on the first few attempts. How to assess the promises 
of novel soft engineering approaches is also discussed in other national contexts. For 
example, a “Technical Advisory Committee on Innovative Erosion Control Measures” 
in the US state of Massachusetts observes that  
[i]ncreasingly, coastal property owners, engineers, and manufacturers are advocat-
ing for coastal protection approaches that incorporate the use of ‘new and innova-
tive’ protection alternatives. Lack of actual performance and impact data, coupled 
with difficulties fitting such proposals into the existing regulatory framework, often 
make permitting difficult. (Coastal Hazards Commission 2007: 21) 
 
The committee therefore recommends establishing a technical advisory body to evaluate 
and monitor such new and innovative protection approaches. To Jim Dahm, comment-
ing on the situation in Aotearoa New Zealand, it seems unfair that in the absence of suf-
ficient outside funding, the burden of financing these experiments lies with local com-
munities who are not informed and also not aware that these are experiments that could 
fail. If they did know this, would they knowingly pay for this out of their own pockets? 
If it worked, however, this would be the first engineering solution without visible struc-
tures that could widen beaches instead of directly or indirectly shrinking them.  
However, as long as there is no public money available for such experiments, propo-
nents have to “sell” them to local communities or Councils in New Zealand and else-
where, and people have commented that the multifunctionality argument might simply 
be used as a means to counter suspicions that MPRs are expensive protection devices 
for the rich. A multipurpose reef that enhances marine biodiversity, opens up tourism 
and surfing opportunities and creates a wider beach might be more easily framed as fur-
thering the public good and therefore justifying public funding. ASR has repeatedly re-
lied on locally organized trust structures, which not only lobby locally for the construc-
tion of an artificial reef, but also raise private and public funds towards the realization 
of the project.  
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10.3 Working Economically: Artificial Reefs as Coastal 
Development Projects 
 
Orewa Beach is a coastal destination about an hour north of Auckland. The beach is 
very shallow and bordered by a row of houses sitting next to an eroding dune scarp. 
Here, I meet Mark Manning from the Orewa Beach Reef Trust, a local surfer and tour-
ism marketing professional. Mark is doing a postgraduate degree in Economic Devel-
opment and is working on a thesis about “Economic development opportunities using 
multipurpose offshore submerged reefs at Orewa Beach”. Mark argues that for Orewa, 
“the beach is the asset”, as two key sectors depend on it: the residential property market 
and tourism. Therefore, he says, an artificial reef could provide protection for economic 
opportunities that rely on safe, high-tide beaches, referring to a scientific study that 
found that every tourist at Orewa Beach spends an estimated 50 dollars per visit. He 
concludes: 
Knowing that the biggest thing that drives that market away is coastal erosion and 
so on, we can say for every ten thousand people that turned away, because there’s 
no dry beach at high tide, we are losing half a million dollars. […] The beach is our 
reason for being, you know. If we didn’t have a beach we’d just be another inland 
farm community. (Interview with Mark Manning, Orewa Beach Reef Trust) 
 
With this economies of scale calculation, he and the Trust have been able to raise about 
NZD 500,000 so far for the initial stages of the reef project, one quarter from the local 
Council and the rest from private investors – “the community’s very supportive”, Mark 
says. To construct the series of reefs the Trust envisages would, however, require a far 
bigger investment, but Mark is confident that once the project has gained the necessary 
resource consent, more private funds will be contributed by local organizations and in-
dividuals who have promised their support. With his objective to use the reef as an 
“economic development initiative”, Mark explicitly links the project to earlier ASR pro-
jects, especially the Boscombe reef, the company’s first artificial reef project in Europe. 
A promotional video produced by ASR to promote the Boscombe reef also concen-
trates on the economic effects of the project, in this case an artificial reef primarily de-
signed for surfing enhancement. The reef is presented as part of a successful strategy of 
urban redevelopment, with a derelict pier area converted into commercial and residen-
tial properties. This line of argument implicitly addresses the question as to if and how 
the investment in artificial reefs could be of public interest. In the UK case, the reef was 
financed by the local Council through the sale of Council-owned real estate and land. 
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Now, the story goes, a formerly deprived area is blossoming again, well-off people have 
moved to the area and the tourism industry (including surfing) is striving. While local 
media refer to economic benefits as well (Robinson 2010), they argue that the reef has 
not worked properly in a technological sense, as the reef has reportedly failed to meet 
seven out of eleven predefined criteria for surfing enhancement. ASR disputed the pro-
cedure of criteria definition and insisted that only the wave length did not meet the re-
quirements (BBC News Dorset 2011); apart from that they blame the American man-
agement for its inability to deal with the press:  
 
There’s videos and all sorts of stuff showing from our numerical and our physical 
modelling; it’s doing what we promised. There’s a bunch of local surfers and body 
boarders that have got their own websites and Facebook pages and the local retail-
ers and the buzz of that whole place is amazing. So it has done everything that it 
should have, but for 14, 15 months now, as far as the rest of the world is con-
cerned, it’s a failure. And that has been solely, from my perspective the inability of 
our Venice [Beach] office to do anything about it in terms of managing the mass 
press. (Interview with Dave Becker, ASR) 
 
Another critical point for ASR is that the media did not pick up their definition of the 
project as a coastal protection measure, which shows that the general framing of artifi-
cial reefs as multifunctional can also work against the company’s interests: “The articles 
that came out you know, it was all about the surfing, even though this one was primarily 
for coastal protection, and how it had failed.” (Interview with Dave Becker, ASR) 
Since Mark is also framing his project in terms of economic advantages, the negative 
press coverage of the UK reef project is an immediate concern for him, too: 
This has been part of the problem, […] it’s annoying and it’s unfortunate because 
it’s badly reported and we’ve been very mindful to look at all those projects and 
see what’s going on, absolutely, we have to. And I’ve got absolutely no concerns 
about any of them because I understand it. And this will be the problem in the 
submission process. We’ll get a whole lot of people that will make comments 
based on what they’ve seen in the press, without actually understanding what’s go-
ing on. (Interview with Mark Manning, Orewa Beach Reef Trust) 
 
Mark argues that the crucial point will be to have enough money to build the reef pro-
ject to completion, which has proven problematic with some of ASR’s earlier projects. 
But, he insists that the UK reef works in an economic sense. Referring to a telephone in-
terview with a Bornemouth City Council representative, Mark elaborates: 
In terms of what it did in town regeneration and economic regeneration, it’s been 
massive and that whole Boscombe Spa project attracted £84,000,000 worth of out-
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side investment […]. And that’s a good reason to do it, you know? Socially, eco-
nomically, well demographically it was a very low area and they used to send a lot 
of the methadone users and junkies out of London down to get them out. So it had 
real social issues; alcohol, drug abuse, that kind of stuff. […] It was a really dilapi-
dated place, wasn’t somewhere it was safe to be. Now, after the reef project, and 
the chine gardens and all they did, he said to me, ‘look, the magic ingredient was 
the reef, that kinda captured the imagination of people and gave confidence that we 
were doing something that started bringing all this investment’. We’ve got cafes 
along there, they’ve got the Reef Restaurant, they’ve got all these apartments and 
stuff, heaps of people coming down there. The visitor market’s gone from 4 weeks 
a year to 52, which is just unreal. I mean that’s just bizarre stuff. And crimes, re-
ported crime, according to the police, is down by 40 percent. They’ve got universi-
ties bringing kids down there to do, kind of healthy outdoor activities. […] And ba-
sically that’s a screaming success. (Interview with Mark Manning, Orewa Beach 
Reef Trust) 
 
Not only that – according to Mark, the “Brits” see the project as a way to import the 
lifestyle of New Zealand and Australia to Europe. However, the UK reef has not been 
active very long. In May 2011, less than two years after its official opening, the reef had 
to be closed again after it was damaged by a boat propeller (BBC News Dorset 2011; 
Williams 2012).  
After that the project got caught up in other turmoil. Already in 2009, ASR founder 
Kerry Black had sold his shares to a US American investor and retired to Australia. The 
rest of the ASR team left in 2011, and founded a new company with a similar portfolio; 
ASR went into liquidation and did not fulfil its obligations to repair the damaged UK 
reef. In late 2013, Bornemouth City Council was reported to have received insurance 
payments that will allow repair and reopening of the reef (Williams 2013). Whether the 
reef has had a positive economic effect remains a subject of discussion and ongoing ac-
ademic research (Plymouth University News Centre 2012). The Orewa Beach project 
has not been pursued further after the consent application for the project was publicly 
notified in August 2011 (Fairfax NZ News 2011; Thompson 2011).  
Before the company ceased trading, it had been looking into other markets for 
MPRs. In Kovalam, Kerala, a reef project for coastal protection and surfing enhance-
ment has been realized using funds from a Tsunami Rehabilitation Programme (TRP) 
provided by the Indian central government (Radhakrishnan 2010; The Times of India 
2010). The local NGO Kerala Tourism Watch critiqued this as a diversion of Tsunami 
relief funds towards tourism development and campaigned against the project, arguing 
that it should not have been realized, at least not without a prior Environment Impact 
Assessment (EIA), Social Impact Assessment (SIA), or Fisheries Impact Assessment 
(Abraham 2010). The NGO criticizes what they perceive as aggressive marketing, inap-
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propriate mixing of public and private interests and missing independent scientific mon-
itoring: 
At the same time the New Zealand based MNC [multinational company] ASR Ltd. 
and Kerala Tourism department are engaged in aggressive propaganda and lobby-
ing for more reefs, highlighting the Kovalam artificial reef as a replicable model. 
The Kerala Tourism preaches on their website that this technology could be used in 
other locations in India. The ASR Ltd. Company in their blog [is] advertising that 
‘the monitored results of Kovalam Multipurpose Reef, released by Kerala Tourism, 
indicate that it is a success’. This published report in the Kerala Tourism website is 
prepared by ASR Ltd. Company and not a scientific and independent report. The 
Kerala Tourism misused a government website for the promotion and recommen-
dation of a failure model for a private Multinational company. Someone can read 
this in the context of the recent Coastal Protection and Management Project Report 
worth thousands of crore rupees, suggesting reefs as a major portion of the solution 
for coastal protection/restoration and management in coastal areas of the country 
prepared by ASR Ltd. company for Asian Development Bank (ADB). The groups 
in Kerala [are] demanding an enquiry and an appropriate action against the offi-
cials who misused their designation for the promotion of an unproved method for a 
private company. (Abraham 2010) 
 
The protest has also been supported by a UK-based NGO (Abraham 2010). ASR on the 
other hand used images of local fishermen and a working elephant employed for the 
reef construction, joining forces in what they promote as a sustainable development pro-
ject. 
 
 
10.4 The Future: Managed Advance? 
 
Another major market possibility for artificial reef projects might be found in neigh-
bouring Australia. As mentioned before, the limited success of surfing reefs – attributed 
to insufficient size – is also a factor of the scale of the investment. A reef for coastal 
protection alone does not need the same volume – it is not as expensive as a structure 
that is meant to create surfing waves. The New South Wales (NSW) coast is character-
ized by many highly developed urban and suburban beaches with popular residential ar-
eas and tourist destinations. While coastal erosion is a problem at many sites, there has 
also been protest against hard protection measures in the past. In Narrabeen, a coastal 
suburb of Sydney, local residents and members of the Surfrider Foundation successfully 
organized a human “line in the sand” against the planned construction of a seawall in 
2002 (Smith and O’Rourke 2002). At the same time, the State government has officially 
defined “erosion hotspots” (State of New South Wales Office of Environment and Her-
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itage 2011) and some Councils have started to implement Planned Retreat policies (By-
ron Shire Council n.d.).  
While looking for possible alternatives, lobby groups from three of these hotspots 
have contacted ASR to explore the possibilities of constructing artificial reefs for 
coastal protection, and the company director has travelled there to promote the MPR in 
form of “workshops” organized by the local proponents of the reef idea. These are well-
off coastal communities that are able to raise the 35,000-50,000 NZD which ASR 
charges for a preliminary study (the price can rise up to 100,000 NZD in cases where no 
data from previous studies is available). Consequently, ASR has discovered the Austral-
ian coasts as a possible new market. This not only includes NSW, but also other states:  
Western Australia is probably one of the best places in the world for multipurpose 
reefs. There’s more surfers per capita than anywhere else in the world, they have a 
very exposed coast and a very small tidal range; there’s millions of natural cases of 
salients and you don’t need to over-engineer and put rocks all up and down your 
beaches, so yeah we’ll see how we go with Western Australia, […] you know, it’s 
that integrated approach of looking after your beaches. (Interview with Tommy 
Hamilton, ASR) 
 
As in Orewa Beach, the collaboration with local lobby groups allows ASR to indirectly 
promote its services while referring to the projects as community-based initiatives. This 
is another important building block in the company’s self image as a responsible busi-
ness, and underlines the softness of its methods by stressing its social grounding, even 
though the construction process is high-tech and the costs involved difficult to meet for 
most communities. Blackett et al. discuss several New Zealand case studies of local ini-
tiatives for coastal erosion management and show how some community groups are of-
ten essentially lobby groups for minority interests of beachfront property owners 
(Blackett et al. 2010).  
The potential NSW clients are targeted with a new catch phrase for the MPR tech-
nique: “managed advance”. Against the backdrop of emerging policy instruments point-
ing to managed (or planned) retreat from eroding coasts, the ASR company promotes 
artificial reefs as a means to reverse the trend, to widen the beach and not to give in to 
natural processes. This echoes the widespread protest against managed retreat policies – 
as it was encountered, for example, with regards to the Waihi Beach seawall controver-
sy discussed in Part II. Such a line of argument however seems to be a partial departure 
from the “working in concert with nature” theme, and opens up the possibility to close 
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the ranks with concerned property owners – the most promising set of potential custom-
ers in the absence of concerted state action or funding of coastal protection measures.  
ASR is not the only player in the soft protection business who seeks new opportuni-
ties vis-à-vis emerging managed retreat policies. Holmberg Technologies Inc. based in 
Florida, for example, offers a patented technique named Undercurrent Stabilizer™. On 
his website, the company director Dick Holmberg explicitly counters arguments for a 
managed retreat strategy brought forward by marine geologist Orrin Pilkey, Professor 
Emeritus of Earth and Ocean Sciences at Duke University in North Carolina. Pilkey is a 
well-known opponent of hard protection measures and part of the emerging internation-
al community of practice promoting soft protection. He got involved in some controver-
sial cases, most prominently at North Top Sail Beach in North Carolina (Lehmann 
2013), where he argues that managed retreat would be the only viable option.  
Pilkey believes that there has already been some progress made by those promoting 
the idea to retreat, especially towards the position represented by the US Army Corps of 
Engineers. This federal agency is responsible for publicly funded structural coastal pro-
tection projects in the US, and also defines common procedures in its Coastal Engineer-
ing Manual (CEM) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2002), which is referred to by pri-
vate sector engineers world-wide. In a documentary produced by the Santa Aguila 
Foundation and accessible via its website “Coastal Care”, Pilkey argues that the Corps 
had already started to reconsider its position towards managed retreat:  
We’re talking about retreating from the shore, 20 years ago that was unpatriotic, 
unamerican, for God’s sake. And so, and it really was. For the [….] US Army 
Corps of Engineers, which is supposed to make the decisions about what to do 
about our beaches and so forth, for them, retreat – of course, they’re in the army – 
retreat is unthinkable. So […] we have made good progress and the Corps really 
has to really evaluate the retreat alternative, when they look at what do to about a 
beach. (Orrin Pilkey in Santa Aguila Charitable Trust 2010b, 17:15) 
 
Dick Holmberg however promotes his beach stabilization technique as a way out of the 
cul-de-sac of hard protection or managed retreat:  
One area where both Pilkey and the [Army] Corps [of Engineers] agree is that you 
can’t work proactively with natural sedimentological processes. Pilkey claims we 
should retreat from a ‘naturally’ migrating shoreline. The Corps fights what it calls 
‘natural and inevitable erosion’ by armoring the coast (which exacerbates erosion) 
and by throwing more and more dredging at an erosion problem that simply did not 
exist before dredges began altering seabeds. (Holmberg Technologies 2010) 
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ASR employee John Green takes a much more pragmatic stance. He argues that since 
managed retreat is unlikely to be politically viable in many locations, MPRs are at least 
“softer” than hard measures. Instead of arguing for MPRs as a direct alternative to man-
aged retreat, his argument for the ASR technology rests on the grounds that it can pre-
vent the use of hard protection: 
There’s places where they just will not give up their land, they will not allow the 
ocean to advance on their shores any more than it already has, you know. [A] lot of 
people just don’t want to give in, you know, and give up. But you’re drawing a line 
in the sand and telling the ocean it can’t go beyond that line, and that’s a really, re-
ally hard thing to do, so while man still exists and man still loves to be near the 
ocean, there’s still gonna be issues, you know, and they’re still gonna try hard 
structures to protect the coast. Hopefully we’re on the side of the soft, softer op-
tions and we can ride that wave. If there is a wave towards those softer options then 
yeah I think we’re on the right side. (Interview with John Green, ASR) 
 
The now liquidized ASR company did not succeed in building a new market in NSW. 
However, the successor company eCoast may still pick up the thread. It remains to be 
seen how this new company will frame the technology in the future: as surfing en-
hancement, as multifunctional, or primarily as a coastal protection measure. In 2012, 
shortly after the new company was formed, the eCoast website claimed that  
[a]ll of the MPRs built with the primary purpose of coastal protection have proved 
very successful, and have also enhanced the local ecology, beach amenity and so-
cio-economic situation (eCoast 2012). 
 
Multipurpose reefs are described as “a form of coastal protection for exposed coasts that 
incorporate environmentally sensitive function and ecological, amenity and socio-
economic benefits”, but without the mentioning of surfing aspects, although “surf sci-
ence and surf break management” are defined as central areas of expertise on the com-
pany’s home page. The basic principles of the MPR approach are outlined as 
applying modern coastal science and engineering principles which work within the 
existing coastal processes (rather than against them), [and] developing eco-
recreation opportunities which are beneficial to the lifestyle and health of commu-
nities (eCoast 2012). 
 
In 2015, the webpage is still active, but no longer directly accessible. Do multifunction-
al reefs still have economic potential as soft protection? Jim Dahm underlines that 
[t]here are […] significant questions around whether it is really practical to achieve 
cost-effective outcomes in terms of both erosion protection and enhanced surfing 
amenity – that the requirements for these outcomes are too different. At the mo-
ment, the technology is struggling for credibility and they need to make sure the 
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next 2-3 projects are constructed as designed. Another couple of high profile fail-
ures […] will set the idea back a decade or two. (Jim Dahm, pers. comm., 
11.03.2014) 
 
Even though largely carried out by volunteers, dune restoration is also connected to the 
market – serving as an entry point for people looking for paid labour, as a niche market 
for “voluntourism” (Callanan and Thomas 2005), and as a general motor for the promo-
tion of soft protection technologies. The reef technology discussed in this chapter how-
ever plays in a different field in terms of the scale of necessary financial and other re-
sources. High investment costs and the absence of public funding make artificial reefs a 
soft coastal protection technology for the rich – and its novelty and experimental char-
acter leave it vulnerable to setbacks and failures. At the same time, the interest the ap-
proach has attracted from investors might be seen as another indication that soft protec-
tion technologies are gaining momentum, also in business terms.  
The multipurpose reef approach relies on coastal science knowledge as much as surf-
ers’ ethics, which both feed into the goal of working with natural coastal processes. It 
provides another example of how the sociotechnical imaginary to ‘work with nature’ 
emerges through practices of making coastal natures. The practices and discourses of 
soft engineering draw upon the relatively young discipline of coastal science (Schwartz 
2005: 1099) and use computer modelling and 3D animation technologies adopted from 
other fields to understand and mimic natural processes. Through this, nature becomes 
legible in a scientific sense, and open to practical encounters and tinkering. While the 
progress of scientific knowledge alone is – contrary to the hopes of some commentators 
(Pilkey and Hume 2001) – no guarantee that the ‘working with nature’ imaginary will 
take hold and acquire the discursive and practical power to influence the future politics 
of the coast, science is nonetheless one of the most influential modes of making claims 
of how the world, and thereby coastal naturecultures, ought to be ordered. 
Conclusion: 
Working with Nature, Making Coastal Naturecultures 
“[N]atures […] are often unfinished matters.” (Hinchliffe 2008: 95) 
The increasing popularity of soft protection approaches challenges established ways of 
defending the coast. In a world altered by climate change and in search of more sustain-
able avenues into the common anthropocenic future, an emerging sociotechnical imagi-
nary reenvisions coastal protection: ‘to work with nature – and not against it’. Instead of 
eternally fixing the boundaries between land and sea and securing them by all means, 
the practices of soft coastal protection allow for more flexibility and openness to fluctu-
ation and change. These practices are necessarily place-bound and embedded into spe-
cific figurations of different actors, material objects, living matter, legal frameworks, 
scientific discourses, and further important imaginaries addressing questions of nature 
and culture. The empirical work of ethnography can make the issues at stake visible and 
show the investments and work involved in soft protection projects of different scale. It 
can also assist those engaged in such practices to enter a conversation on common goals 
and initiatives by providing context through the ethnographic work of connecting, jux-
taposing, and comparison. Bringing theory to the field can open up new conceptual 
spaces for actors imagining and practicing nature, proffering opportunities to consider 
what nature it is that they want (Hull and Robertson 2009). 
Even where soft protection is not yet realized, the ‘working with nature’ imaginary 
frames how people discuss possibilities for transitioning to a different coastal protection 
regime and the obstacles faced for the time being. In the case of the Waihi Beach pro-
tection scheme analysed in the opening of the book, residents, scientists and consultants 
collaborated to achieve a solution beyond hard protection – but they did not succeed. 
The community of practice involved, made up of locals, practitioners and coastal poli-
cy-makers, felt that “the science has been done”, that neither scientific arguments nor 
the already existing political frameworks were sufficient to support a soft solution. But 
still, the conflict has changed the local environment, with ratepayers questioning the le-
gitimacy of the Council’s rule and local Māori exploring possibilities to better voice 
their opposition to hard structures on the beach assisted by a four-pillar model of sus-
???
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tainability that includes cultural aspects into resource management policies. Further-
more, there is hope that the seawall’s materiality and sheer unsightfulness may become 
enrolled into a different coastal policy in the future. In this way, the case illustrates the 
coproduction of natural and social orders emerging from the practices of coastal protec-
tion as a complex process involving more than just human actors. 
The controversial Waihi Beach coastal protection scheme also included the construc-
tion of an artificial dune very similar to the methods successfully used by dune care ad-
vocates in other locations – but in Waihi Beach, it utterly failed. This failure shows how 
important the role of human labour and acceptance of the project is, but also how the 
material forces of the coastal environment need to be counted in. The Waihi Beach dune 
was a technical failure: it was washed away shortly after it was planted, probably due to 
the insufficient room provided in the neat strip between people’s properties and the tide 
line, because the quantity of sand used was too small and the project did not include the 
necessary maintenance effort of repeated sand application. But it was also a social fail-
ure, because the local Coast Care volunteers strongly refused to donate their labour 
force only to become enrolled into a project they perceived as a co-optation strategy 
eventually aiming to stabilize the seawall scheme. With this perspective, they found 
themselves in rare agreement with their antagonists from the local hard protection lobby 
group who called the dune enhancement “a sob to the greenies”.  
This non-participation needs to be understood in light of New Zealanders’ remarka-
ble willingness to contribute extensive volunteer labour, including the widespread en-
gagement in nature conservation groups like Coast Care. In the second empirical part of 
the book, I looked at exemplary practices of caring for the coast, many of which are be-
ing carried out by volunteers. When it comes to dune restoration, ‘working with nature’ 
approaches in fact involve a massive amount of human work, mostly provided by Coast 
Carers and other volunteers. The economy of volunteer labour enrolled into Coast Care 
projects is crucial for them to be realized and maintained, and makes them economically 
feasible in the first place. This workforce consists not only of a large constituency of 
senior residents that want to take things into their own hands and “do their bit” in the 
quest for sightly and functional dune environments, but also people looking to gain 
qualifications that might help them to enter or re-enter the formal job market – because 
they are unemployed, have difficulties to fund expensive tertiary education programs, or 
in the case of international volunteers, are part of a highly mobile percentile of well-
educated young people who try to distinguish their CVs from competitors by ways of 
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overseas volunteering experience. Large-scale dune restoration projects also rely on la-
bour provided by people in the criminal justice system working on periodic detention 
schemes. Their labour force is used to free large areas of dune land from infesting 
weeds and thus provide emptied, easy-to-plant dunes for unexperienced volunteers, es-
pecially the many school groups enrolled in the Coast Care program.  
Throughout the chapters of part III, I described a diversity of nature-making projects, 
ranging from do-it-yourself coastal protection by coastal property owners to local au-
thorities removing people’s gardens encroaching onto the dunes, and from conservation 
projects enrolling unemployed Māori youth to surfer-scientists and their business of 
selling artificial reefs. While these projects follow different internal logics, they all con-
nect coastal management practices to the sociotechnical imaginary of ‘working with na-
ture’. Here again, coastal protection projects are producing and reproducing social as 
well as natural orders. Where dune restoration projects – in the scope of Coast Care and 
beyond – function as do-it-yourself, cost-effective approaches to erosion control, they 
rely on people accepting erosion as a natural process. ‘Working with nature’ in this re-
gard means to work with an environment in constant flux, with the advantages of using 
dune restoration as a soft protection technique making up for it not settling things once 
and for all. While dune restoration comes with low initial financial costs, especially if 
compared to hard structures, ongoing maintenance is required. Dune scrapings might 
need to be repeated after major storm events, and besides the ongoing maintenance 
work of pest control, coastal vegetation that has been washed away by the sea has to be 
replaced regularly: “sacrificial plants”, as the owner of a native plant nursery calls them. 
But still, people accept this approach and make it work. 
The Papamoa Beach encroachment project shows how dune restoration is used by 
the local Council as a means to reclaim the dunes as a public space for nature. The pro-
ject reinforces property boundaries by removing privatized garden spaces and rein-
stalling a dune ecosystem. At the same time, the public space of the beach is tied to a 
right state of coastal nature that features native sand-binding vegetation and functional 
dunes, and not the pretty garden flowers introduced from elsewhere. The public interest 
of the project is underlined by the enrolment of school children, while ironically, the en-
forcement of boundaries is reflected by the massive use of periodic detention workers 
who are sanctioned for their own overstepping of (other) boundaries.   
While the initial goal of coastal erosion control remains the prime motivation for 
many Coast Carers, especially beachfront house owners subscribing to dune restoration 
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approaches, another interest has emerged in the field, attracting increasing attention. 
Connected to what I have called the imaginary of ‘reconstructing native nature’, the 
primary goal of many dune restoration projects is now the reintroduction of a specific 
Aotearoa New Zealand coastal nature. As such, Coast Care has become part of a larger 
development, with the bicultural nation of Aotearoa New Zealand coming to terms with 
its native nature and culture. A clear departure from earlier attempts to acclimatize (Star 
2009), that is to deliberately introduce species into the (post)colony, the progress of na-
tive plants over the last few decades coincides with the cultural and political renaissance 
of indigeneity in Aotearoa New Zealand. The emerging interest in native nature can be 
understood as a symptom of a changing national identity not only for those who identify 
as Māori. In the process where biculturalism emerges as the distinctive feature of Ao-
tearoa New Zealand, native nature becomes an important signifier of a desirable com-
mon future for the nation.  
The multipurpose reef approach is also visionary in its own sense. While soft ap-
proaches based on dune restoration techniques can be achieved with relatively simple 
technological means and rely mostly on physical labour, soft engineering approaches 
can have very high entry costs: an investment into expensive and often still experi-
mental approaches whose merits are yet to be proved. The artificial reef developed by 
the ASR company relies on recent technoscientific progress: the rise of coastal science, 
the invention of novel geotextile materials, and advances in computer modelling tech-
nologies and 3D graphics. The example shows that the ‘working with nature’ approach 
thwarts across categories like low and high tech. Here, nature is understood through sci-
entific means, with the goal to subtly manipulate, mimick and enhance it, producing 
better surfing conditions, broader beaches, and marine habitat. The way to achieve this 
is found in the understanding of root causes, or underlying mechanisms of sediment dis-
tribution, and dealing with them by harnessing natural processes to the desired end. 
However, nature is not limited to numbers and functions alone here. An environmental 
consciousness built on the shared experience of surfing provides another layer of tacit 
understanding of nature for the proponents of the artificial reef company. The multipur-
pose reef approach still constitutes an open field of experimentation, and it remains un-
settled if it will eventually work in political, technological and economic terms. Howev-
er, the idea is persuasive exactly because of its promise to work “in concert with natural 
processes” (ASR Ltd. n.d.) on a larger economic and technological scale and with refer-
ence to scientific progress.  
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Looking at the scope of examples discussed, the ethnography of soft coastal protec-
tion opens up for analysis the coproduction of coastal nature in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
People’s shared practices are coproductive in the sense that specific naturecultures are 
resulting from the material practices of engaging with, caring for, and making natures at 
the coast – like do-it-yourself coastal protection, the reconstruction of native na-
tureculture, or the development of artificial reef technologies in concert with nature. 
These naturalcultural assemblages are orders of nature and culture, with material and 
symbolic qualities. They are evidence to what people believe is the right way to interact 
with the coastal environment as much as they are outcomes of the endless redistribution 
of material through the coastal system, the growing and dying of plants, and the effects 
of returning storms. The sociotechnical imaginary of ‘working with nature – and not 
against it’, while potentially of global extension, becomes adopted and adapted as a 
framework for thought and action only by means of its entanglement with other im-
portant imaginaries defining the common future of Aotearoa New Zealand. These ad-
dress not only the right state of nature – accessible as the public space of the beach, eq-
uitable in remembrance of the national beach bach myth, native as found by the Europe-
an explorers and colonizers, and unspoiled, providing the scenic views and nature expe-
rience that New Zealanders perceive as their birthright (Kearns and Collins 2012; Phil-
lips 2012). They also legitimize certain forms of human engagement in coastal nature: 
the hands-on, physical volunteer labour needed to maintain the distinctiveness of Aotea-
roa New Zealand as a country, an understanding of local Māori that defines soft as what 
they can achieve without the outside interference of Pākeha engineers, or the connection 
to the coastal environment born out of the daily immersion of surfer-scientists into the 
sea.  
However, in spite of this diversity of practices, and arguably multiple naturecultures 
emerging from them, the immediate appeal of the sociotechnical imaginary of ‘working 
with nature – and not against it’ relies at least partly on the implicit idea of a singular, 
universal nature. What others have called “capital-N Nature” (Hinchliffe 2007; Tsing 
2005; Castree 2005) locates nature firmly outside the social and political sphere. Nature 
can then serve as an expression of how the world should be ordered ideally. Similar to 
what Cooper and McKenna (2008b: 315) observe in relation to the overwhelmingly 
positive connotation of the term “protection”, it is difficult to construct an argument to 
explicitly work against nature. ‘Working with nature’ provides this community of prac-
tice with a vision and a mission, with a motivation that easily translates into practice 
 300
and is a driver for positive change. Seen from the point of view of those who promote 
soft protection, hard structures are not a viable approach to coastal protection because 
they too often entail the loss of sandy beaches. Related to this, hard protection does not 
offer a desirable future. This combination of description and prescription characterizes 
sociotechnical imaginaries as collective imaginations of the common future (Jasanoff 
and Kim 2009; 2013; 2015).  
Anna Tsing has observed how the universal idea of global Nature connects to situat-
ed projects of “making and remaking the variety of small-n nature” (Tsing 2005:112). 
There remains a tension between different effects of generalized Nature, providing in-
spiration and covering up exclusions at the same time: 
“Global Nature both facilitates and obscures worldwide collaborations. […] Global 
Nature can inspire moral views and actions. […F]orms of global Nature are re-
sources for everyone involved in using or advocating for the environment. They 
make it possible to make claims for Nature, and for the globe. The cultural speci-
ficity of their universals does not, in itself, make them wrong. However, claims of 
universality do make it hard for us to see just who can imagine themselves inside, 
and who is out. (Tsing 2005: 111f.) 
 
This is productive, but difficult terrain. Throughout the book, I have argued that coastal 
protection practices form a politics of nature. Taking Steve Hinchliffe’s claim serious 
that nature writ large is losing its persuasiveness as a political shortcut – or, as he puts 
it, “Nature doesn’t seem to be working as a rallying site for everyone and everything 
anymore” (Hinchliffe 2007: 188; see Lorimer 2015), I believe that those working to-
wards a transition in coastal protection regimes can profit from making explicit what na-
ture(s) they are working towards, who is legitimately included into their projects, and 
why. I do not want to delimit the enabling role of the sociotechnical imaginary ‘working 
with nature’ in framing the politics of coastal nature and soft protection, especially since 
it has been shown to be sufficiently open to include more specific claims to natures sit-
uated in the Aotearoa New Zealand context. However, I suggest to think of ‘working 
with nature’ as the expression of a strategic naturalisation. I take this concept from the 
anthropology of reproduction, where Sarah Franklin and others have observed “process-
es of naturalization, de-naturalization, and re-naturalization” (Franklin et al. 2000: 9f.) 
in the context of assisted reproduction. Charis Thompson (Thompson 2001; 2005) refers 
to “strategic naturalizing” in her analysis of a complex “ontological choreography” car-
ried out in order to make the Euro-American principle of biological kinship fit with the 
possibilities of new reproductive technologies. By highlighting some connections, 
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downplaying others, these practices eventually produce parenthood as socially and natu-
rally grounded.  
My own observations on the ‘working with nature’ imaginary in the politics and 
practices of soft coastal protection could be seen as evidence to a strategic naturaliza-
tion of nature happening in the field. Importantly, the interventions I deal with come 
from relatively powerless positions: people that want to transition to a more sustainable 
coastal future in an environment affected by economic interests in coastal space above 
all. However, referring to Nature as a beacon for a more sustainable future, I would ar-
gue, requires some mindful attention to actual practices and the rationales guiding them, 
given Nature’s potential to foreclose political discourse. Towards this end, combining 
the heuristic of sociotechnical imaginaries with a sharpened focus on nature as practice 
allows us to analyse the potential multiplicity of natures resulting from approaches that 
aim to ‘work with nature – and not against it’. My experience with translating theory 
back to the field – briefly discussed in Chapter 2 – showed that people in the field per-
ceived opening up the blackbox of Nature also as enabling, not limiting. To the contra-
ry, theoretical inspiration has been welcomed as a vehicle to think more explicitly about 
how material practices are framed by imaginaries of what one finds are desirable coastal 
natures.  
Cracking open the underlying concepts of nature can then become an analytical tool 
that opens up space for a critical investigation of related practices of naturemaking and 
the politics involved. The ‘working with nature’ imaginary can be used to different ends 
and by different actors, and that includes powerful ones pursuing strategic goals. Look-
ing into possible futures, there are signs that the idea of green infrastructure will get 
more traction and attention in the near future (NYS 2100 Commission 2013; European 
Commission 2011; The Nature Conservancy 2013a/b). A prominent example is the 
NYS 2100 Commission’s suggestion for infrastructure restructuring in New York State 
post hurricane Sandy, which includes soft coastal protection elements. And departing 
from a logic of compensation for the destruction of environmental damage caused by in-
frastructural projects, concepts like the “Working with Nature” position paper of the 
port development lobby (PIANC 2011) or “Building with Nature” by the Dutch 
Ecoshape consortium (Ecoshape 2012; Deltares 2013) argue that nature can be en-
hanced by development and construction projects that have restoration aspects included 
from the start. Infrastructure engineering is said to potentially lead to a net gain in envi-
ronmental value, making for more, or better nature than before – nature enhanced, and 
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not compromised, by human intervention. Such projects are consequently presented as 
“a unique opportunity to induce positive change” (Deltares 2013). Importantly, the ar-
gument relies on a concept of nature that is compatible to understanding natural and so-
cial worlds as coproduced, with the assumption that “man-made projects are an inherent 
part of the environment” (ibid). At the same time however, the agendas quoted above 
once again draw legitimizing power from capital-N Nature for the interventions they 
propose. 
Given that instead of one Nature there are always specific tangible natures in the plu-
ral, a closer empirical look at actual projects can show how ideas are translated into na-
turecultures – sometimes making a difference to established practices, sometimes con-
tinuing the same under a different name. The analysis of practices framed by the ‘work-
ing with nature’ imaginary or other emerging concepts like soft engineering or green in-
frastructure will be useful to figure out what is actually done by whom and how, what 
the outcomes are, who profits and who or what is left out of these projects of nature-
making (Hinchliffe 2007: 186). This way, theory can make a real difference: as a tool 
for people to make sense of the world, and to understand and critically engage with the 
practices and politics of nature emerging from the manifold projects happening on the 
ground.  
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